Kansas City & Pacific Railroad v. Ryan

52 Kan. 637
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJanuary 15, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 52 Kan. 637 (Kansas City & Pacific Railroad v. Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kansas City & Pacific Railroad v. Ryan, 52 Kan. 637 (kan 1894).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Horton, C. J.:

It is insisted that many of the special findings of the jury are unsupported by any evidence and contrary thereto; also, that the damages allowed at $5,000 are so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice. The jury specially found that.no officer, agent or employé of the railroad company knew of the existence of the defect which caused the jack to break, prior to the time it broke; that there was no evidence to show whether the foot broken from the jack at the time Eyan was injured was the same foot upon the jack when the company purchased it; and that it was customary on railroads generally to leave the inspection of tools used in track work to the section foreman. But they further found that the defect in the jack was visible before it broke, if it had been properly inspected.

care-safe machinery. It has been frequently ruled by this court, in accordance with the authorities generally, that an employé of a railroad company, by virtue of his employment, assumes all the ordinary and usual risks and hazards incident to his employment; that, as between a railroad company and its employés, the railroad company is not an insurer of the perfection of any of its machinery, appliances or instrumentalities for the operation of its railroad; that, as between a railroad company and its employés, the railroad company is required to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence, and only such, m furnishing to its employes reasonably o \ • , * • J safe machinery and instrumentalities for the operation of its railroad; that it will be presumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the railroad company performs its duty in such cases, and the burden of proving otherwise will rest upon the party asserting that the railroad company has not performed its duty; that, where an employé seeks to recover damages for injuries resulting from insuffi[645]*645ciency of any of the machinery or instrumentalities furnished by the railroad company, it will not only devolve upon such employé to prove such insufficiency, but it will also devolve upon him to show either that the railroad company had notice of the defects, imperfections or insufficiencies complained of, or that, by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care and diligence, it might have obtained such notices; that proof of a single defective or imperfect operation of any of such machinery or instrumentalities, resulting in injury, will not of itself be sufficient evidence, nor any evidence, that the company had previous knowledge or notice of any supposed or alleged defect, ¡imperfection or insufficiency in such machinery or instrumentalities. (Kelly v. Bridge Works, 17 Kas. 558; Railroad Co. v. Holt, 29 id. 149; Jackson v. Railroad Co., 31 id. 761; Railroad Co. v. Wagner, 33 id. 660; Railroad Co. v. Ledbetter, 34 id. 334; Railway Co. v. Weaver, 35 id. 434; Railway Co. v. Dwyer, 36 id. 69; Railroad Co. v. McKee, 37 id. 592.)

A critical examination of all of the evidence in the case, including that offered upon the part of Ryan, fails to show that there was any evidence introduced to support the finding that “the defect or flaw in the jack was visible before it broke, if it had been properly inspected.” Involved with this finding are' also the following findings: “ That the railroad company was guilty of negligence in receiving the jack for use on its road, if it was received in the condition it was when it broke,” and “ that a man of ordinary skill and diligence, by the usual and ordinary inspection of the jack before it broke, would have been likely to have discovered the flaw or defect therein.” It would necessarily follow that if the defect in the jack was visible before it broke, and if it existed from the time it was made, or from the time that the foot was attached or welded, that “the railroad company was guilty of negligence in receiving the jack,” and, also, that “a man of ordinary skill and diligence, by the usual and ordinary inspection or examination of the jack before it broke, would have been likely to have discovered the defect.” It [646]*646appears from all of the evidence that the broken foot was iron, and was fastened or welded to the steel bar of the jack by having the steel split and the iron inserted. The evidence was conflicting, whether the footpiece and bar were originally a single piece of steel, or whether a new foot piece had been put on the jack subsequent to its original completion. All of the witnesses, however, testifying upon the trial about this matter, stated that the foot was defectively and insufficiently fastened or welded to the steel bar. The pivotal question in the case, to charge the railroad company with negligence, was whether the company, by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care and diligence, could have discovered the defect in the jack before it broke. The definition of “visible” is “perceptible by the eye; that may be seen; apparent; open; obvious.” Of course, if the defect in the jack was visible before it broke, the railroad company was clearly guilty of negligence in furnishing it to its employés for use. In the absence of evidence to sustain the finding that the defect in the jack was visible, the other findings referred to and connected therewith may also be treated as of doubtful support to the verdict. As to whether such defect was visible before the jack broke, we refer to the following excerpts of the evidence, being all that was offered upon that point:

Ryan, the plaintiff below, testified:

“Q,ues. You had some experience on railroads before you worked on the Kansas City & Pacific? Ans. Yes, sir; I had worked some on the section.

“Q,. And you had worked on the Kansas City & Pacific about three weeks before this happened? A. Somewhere about a month, I guess.

“Q,. You commenced the 1st of April, didn’t you? A. I do n’t know exactly when I did commence.

“ Q,. And this happened on the 22d of April ? A. Yes, sir.

“ Q,. This jack had been in use right along on track work during the time you were working on the railroad ? A. Yes, sir.

“ Q,, Used every day and every hour in the day, almost, in [647]*647raising track? A. Yes, sir; there was a jack there all the time.

“Q,. That was what you were principally engaged in doing — surfacing road, and getting the track up in shape? A. Yes, sir.

“Q,. So that it was necessary to use the jack about all the time? A. Yes, sir; the jack was used all the time.

Q,. This was the only time it ever broke, to your knowledge? A. Yes, sir; I never saw the jack break before.”

John Tomaine, called as a witness by Ryan, testified:

“Q,. How long had Mr. Ratliff had that jack with his gang? A. I think he had had the jack ever since I commenced to work there for him.

“Q,. That was how long before? A. I commenced to work for him probably in February, about the 1st, 1889.

“Q. Then it was February, March, and April up to the time it was broken? A. Yes, sir.

“Q,, You never noticed any signs of any defect about the jack? A. I never paid any attention to it.

“Q,. I say you never noticed any? A. No, sir.

Q. What work were you engaged in most of the time when you were working for them on this section during the month of April? A. We were raising track.

“Q,. And surfacing? A.

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Bluebook (online)
52 Kan. 637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kansas-city-pacific-railroad-v-ryan-kan-1894.