Kansas City Mortgage Co. v. Burgess

306 So. 2d 161, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14703
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 17, 1975
DocketNo. 74-337
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 306 So. 2d 161 (Kansas City Mortgage Co. v. Burgess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kansas City Mortgage Co. v. Burgess, 306 So. 2d 161, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14703 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

OWEN, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, in an action for deceit, appeals an order dismissing with prejudice its amended complaint, the order reciting that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and the Statute-of Frauds.

This suit was filed in May, 1973. The amended complaint alleges, in essence, that in August, 1965, the defendant willfully misrepresented to plaintiff certain facts, intending the plaintiff to rely thereon, and that plaintiff did rely on said misrepresentations to its detriment etc. The amended complaint also alleges that “ . . . the defendant left the State of Florida shortly after this transaction and kept his whereabouts unknown to the plaintiff [and] that the defendant returned to the State of Florida in May, 1973”.

The complaint does not seek to hold defendant-appellee liable on the debt of another. It sounds solely in deceit. Consequently, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the case.

The three year Statute of Limitations for an action for fraud (Section 95.11(5) (d), F.S.) applies, and, ultimately, may be established as a bar to the action. It is, however, an affirmative defense and can be asserted by a motion to dismiss only it it appears on the face of a prior pleading. Rule 1.110(d), R.C.P. On the face of the complaint it appeared that the cause of action did accrue more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. However, the amended complaint alleged matters which, if true, would toll the running [163]*163of the statute under Section 95.07, F.S.1 The motion to dismiss was essentially a “speaking motion”, seeking to show facts to prove that the defendant was not out of the State of Florida so as to toll the Statute of Limitations. This is not the proper function of a motion. Such allegations properly are contained in the answer, setting forth the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations and denying those allegations by which .the plaintiff attempts to show that the statute has been tolled by virtue of defendant’s absence from the state.

The order dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
306 So. 2d 161, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14703, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kansas-city-mortgage-co-v-burgess-fladistctapp-1975.