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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 KRISTIN JEAN KANO-MANNAZ, 8 Plaintiff, Case No. C24-6055-SKV 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits 14 (DIB). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record (AR), and all 15 memoranda of record, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES 16 the case with prejudice. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff was born in 1976, has one year of college education and job training in animal 19 research, and worked most recently as a logistics supervisor and program coordinator. AR 175- 20 76, 1564. She was last employed in 2018. AR 176, 1296. 21 Plaintiff applied for DIB in July 2018, alleging disability as of January 5, 2018. AR 156- 22 57. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration and, following an October 2020 23 hearing, AR 30-65, an ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled in a decision dated October 30, 2020, 1 AR 15-25. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, AR 1-5, and this Court, 2 by Order dated November 16, 2021, reversed and remanded for further administrative 3 proceedings, AR 1146-55. 4 An ALJ held a second hearing in January 2023, AR 1116-41, and, on February 22, 2023,
5 issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled, AR 1095-1110. Plaintiff sought direct review in 6 this Court and the Court, by Order dated September 27, 2023, again reversed and remanded for 7 further administrative proceedings, AR 1611-18. An ALJ held a third hearing in August 2024, 8 AR 1560-85, and, on October 22, 2024, issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled, AR 9 1535-52. 10 THE ALJ’S DECISION 11 Utilizing the five-step disability evaluation process,1 the ALJ found:
12 Step one: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and through her date insured of December 31, 2022. 13 Step two: Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: right shoulder arthritis, 14 impingement syndrome; lumbar degenerative disc disease; cervical degenerative disc disease; seronegative rheumatoid arthritis; fibromyalgia; post-traumatic stress disorder; 15 depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.
16 Step three: These impairments do not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment.2 17 Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): Plaintiff can perform light work, except that she 18 can sit for six hours and stand and/or walk combined for six hours; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently climb 19 ramps and stairs; bilateral fine fingering and gross handling is frequent; right upper extremity overhead reaching is occasional; must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards; 20 is capable of simple tasks; and can interact occasionally with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. 21 Step four: Plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work. 22 23 1 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 2 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P., App. 1. 1 Step five: As there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, Plaintiff is not disabled. 2
3 AR 1535-52. 4 Plaintiff appealed this final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. Dkt. 1. The 5 parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 4. 6 LEGAL STANDARDS 7 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 8 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on harmful legal error or not supported by 9 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 10 2005). As a general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is 11 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 12 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to 13 determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 14 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means - and means only - such 15 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 16 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (cleaned up); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 17 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for evaluating symptom testimony, resolving 18 conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. 19 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record 20 as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the 21 Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is 22 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that 23 must be upheld. Id. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion of State agency 3 psychological consultant Bruce Eather, Ph.D. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision is 4 free of harmful legal error, supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed.
5 A. Standard for Assessing Medical Opinions 6 Under regulations applicable to this case, the ALJ is required to articulate the 7 persuasiveness of each medical opinion, specifically with respect to whether the opinions are 8 supported and consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). The 9 “supportability” factor addresses the relevance of the objective evidence presented in support of 10 an opinion, as well as the “supporting explanations” provided by the medical source. 20 C.F.R. 11 §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The “consistency” factor examines the consistency of the 12 opinion with evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 13 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). The more consistent an opinion is with that other evidence, the 14 more persuasive it will be. Id. An ALJ’s consistency and supportability findings must be
15 supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 16 B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Dr. Eather’s Opinion 17 Dr. Eather offered an opinion at the reconsideration level. See AR 87-88, 92-94. He 18 opined Plaintiff was capable of performing a regular forty-hour work week with occasional 19 concentration, persistence, or pace interruptions due to psychological symptoms, with occasional 20 superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, and in adapting to minor 21 changes. AR 92-94.
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 KRISTIN JEAN KANO-MANNAZ, 8 Plaintiff, Case No. C24-6055-SKV 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits 14 (DIB). Having considered the ALJ’s decision, the administrative record (AR), and all 15 memoranda of record, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES 16 the case with prejudice. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff was born in 1976, has one year of college education and job training in animal 19 research, and worked most recently as a logistics supervisor and program coordinator. AR 175- 20 76, 1564. She was last employed in 2018. AR 176, 1296. 21 Plaintiff applied for DIB in July 2018, alleging disability as of January 5, 2018. AR 156- 22 57. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration and, following an October 2020 23 hearing, AR 30-65, an ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled in a decision dated October 30, 2020, 1 AR 15-25. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, AR 1-5, and this Court, 2 by Order dated November 16, 2021, reversed and remanded for further administrative 3 proceedings, AR 1146-55. 4 An ALJ held a second hearing in January 2023, AR 1116-41, and, on February 22, 2023,
5 issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled, AR 1095-1110. Plaintiff sought direct review in 6 this Court and the Court, by Order dated September 27, 2023, again reversed and remanded for 7 further administrative proceedings, AR 1611-18. An ALJ held a third hearing in August 2024, 8 AR 1560-85, and, on October 22, 2024, issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled, AR 9 1535-52. 10 THE ALJ’S DECISION 11 Utilizing the five-step disability evaluation process,1 the ALJ found:
12 Step one: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and through her date insured of December 31, 2022. 13 Step two: Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: right shoulder arthritis, 14 impingement syndrome; lumbar degenerative disc disease; cervical degenerative disc disease; seronegative rheumatoid arthritis; fibromyalgia; post-traumatic stress disorder; 15 depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.
16 Step three: These impairments do not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment.2 17 Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): Plaintiff can perform light work, except that she 18 can sit for six hours and stand and/or walk combined for six hours; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently climb 19 ramps and stairs; bilateral fine fingering and gross handling is frequent; right upper extremity overhead reaching is occasional; must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards; 20 is capable of simple tasks; and can interact occasionally with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. 21 Step four: Plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work. 22 23 1 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 2 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P., App. 1. 1 Step five: As there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, Plaintiff is not disabled. 2
3 AR 1535-52. 4 Plaintiff appealed this final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. Dkt. 1. The 5 parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 4. 6 LEGAL STANDARDS 7 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 8 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on harmful legal error or not supported by 9 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 10 2005). As a general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is 11 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 12 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to 13 determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 14 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means - and means only - such 15 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 16 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (cleaned up); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 17 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for evaluating symptom testimony, resolving 18 conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. 19 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record 20 as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the 21 Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is 22 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that 23 must be upheld. Id. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion of State agency 3 psychological consultant Bruce Eather, Ph.D. The Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision is 4 free of harmful legal error, supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed.
5 A. Standard for Assessing Medical Opinions 6 Under regulations applicable to this case, the ALJ is required to articulate the 7 persuasiveness of each medical opinion, specifically with respect to whether the opinions are 8 supported and consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). The 9 “supportability” factor addresses the relevance of the objective evidence presented in support of 10 an opinion, as well as the “supporting explanations” provided by the medical source. 20 C.F.R. 11 §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The “consistency” factor examines the consistency of the 12 opinion with evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 13 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). The more consistent an opinion is with that other evidence, the 14 more persuasive it will be. Id. An ALJ’s consistency and supportability findings must be
15 supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 16 B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Dr. Eather’s Opinion 17 Dr. Eather offered an opinion at the reconsideration level. See AR 87-88, 92-94. He 18 opined Plaintiff was capable of performing a regular forty-hour work week with occasional 19 concentration, persistence, or pace interruptions due to psychological symptoms, with occasional 20 superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, and in adapting to minor 21 changes. AR 92-94. 22 The ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive because it was not supported by reference to 23 objective medical evidence or an explanation for why the evidence suggested significant 1 limitation in adaptation, concentration, persistence, or pace, or “the need for a limitation to 2 ‘superficial’ contact in the setting of occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, or the 3 public.” AR 1548 (citing AR 83-96). The ALJ also found the opinion inconsistent with the 4 “current and complete medical record as a whole, which likewise does not suggest the need for
5 these additional limitations.” Id. In support, the ALJ pointed to the record as including mental 6 status exam (MSE) findings at the psychological consultative examination showing normal dress 7 and hygiene, open and cooperative attitude, no abnormal thought process, normal stream of 8 thought, intact fund of knowledge and abstract thinking, and reasonably good insight, judgment, 9 and impulse control, as well as MSEs in the treatment record showing friendly and cooperative 10 demeanor, good eye contact, normal speech and language, no abnormal thought content, and 11 easy engagement with conversation. Id. (citing AR 274, 303, 313, 332, 339, 527-30, 553, 559- 12 60, 577, 596, 774, 1026, 1029, 1035, 1057, 1078, 1356). 13 Plaintiff asserts error in the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Eather’s opinion that Plaintiff 14 was moderately impaired in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to
15 criticism from supervisors in the workplace. See AR 93. She asserts that the Court expressly 16 instructed the Commissioner to address this specific limitation, and that the Court found that 17 limitation and the limitation to occasional superficial contact with supervisors “separate and 18 distinct” opinions for which the ALJ was required to provide separate supportability and 19 consistency findings. Dkt. 9 at 3 (citing AR 1611-18). 20 The Court, as an initial matter, finds clarification of Dr. Eather’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s 21 social interaction limitations necessary. As the Commissioner observes, the indication that 22 Plaintiff was moderately limited in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to 23 criticism from supervisors was not offered by Dr. Eather as a functional capacity finding. As 1 explained in the form Dr. Eather completed, while the questions eliciting that response and 2 others “help determine the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities[,]” the 3 “actual” mental RFC assessment is recorded in the narrative discussion describing how the 4 evidence supports the physician’s conclusion as to “each category of limitation (i.e.,
5 understanding and memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction and 6 adaptation).” AR 92. In this case, after answering a series of questions about Plaintiff’s social 7 interaction abilities, including but not limited to her ability to accept instructions and respond 8 appropriately to criticism from supervisors, Dr. Eather explained the actual assessed social 9 interaction limitation in narrative form as follows: “[Claimant] capable of occasional superficial 10 contact [with] coworkers, supervisors, and the public.” AR 93. 11 The Court further finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Eather’s opinion of 12 Plaintiff’s social interaction limitations. As reflected above, the ALJ included in the RFC an 13 ability to occasionally interact with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors, AR 1541, but 14 declined to adopt Dr. Eather’s opinion of a limitation to “superficial” contact in that setting, AR
15 1548. In rejecting that limitation, the ALJ properly addressed both supportability and 16 consistency, finding the limitation to superficial contact not supported by reference to objective 17 medical evidence or an explanation and inconsistent with the record as a whole, including MSE 18 findings at a consultative examination and other MSEs in the treatment record. Id. Plaintiff does 19 not identify, see Dkts. 9 & 13, and the Court does not find any error with respect to these 20 supportability and consistency findings. 21 Plaintiff’s assignment of error instead focuses on language in this Court’s September 22 2023 Order. However, in so doing, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge critical differences between 23 the ALJ decision addressed in that Order and the ALJ decision currently before the Court. 1 First, the 2023 ALJ decision, like the 2020 ALJ decision, did not contain any RFC 2 limitation related to supervisors. See AR 19, 1101. Both decisions contained social interaction 3 limitations related only to coworkers and the public. Id. The Court, as such, found error in the 4 ALJ’s failure to sufficiently account for Dr. Eather’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s supervisory-related
5 interactions and pointed to case law recognizing that limitations in relation to coworkers and the 6 public “‘do not address the separate dynamic created by the supervisory relationship.’” AR 7 1615, 1618 (quoting Dennis v. Colvin, No. C14-0822, 2015 WL 3867506, at *8 (D. Or. Jun. 20, 8 2015)); accord AR 1150 (2021 Court Order finding same). In contrast, the ALJ decision now 9 before the Court contains a limitation to occasional interaction with supervisors. 10 Second, in the 2023 Order, the Court addressed the ALJ’s supportability finding of an 11 “internal conflict” between Dr. Eather’s answer to the question regarding supervisory 12 instructions and criticism and his narrative conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of handling 13 occasional superficial contact with supervisors. See AR 1106-07, 1614-16. The ALJ decision 14 now before the Court contains no such finding. See AR 1548. As noted above, the ALJ found
15 the limitation to superficial contact not supported by reference to objective medical evidence or 16 an explanation. Id. The ALJ also, and unlike the ALJ decision addressed in the 2023 Court 17 Order, explains and provides citations to the record in support of the finding of inconsistency. 18 See id.; AR 1616-17. 19 The Court, in sum, finds no basis for Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in failing to 20 assess Dr. Eather’s answer to the question regarding accepting instructions and handling 21 criticism as a separate and distinct opinion. Because the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons 22 for rejecting Dr. Eather’s opinion that Plaintiff was limited to superficial contact with coworkers, 23 supervisors, and the public, the Court finds no error. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and 3 this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. 4 Dated this 25th day of September, 2025.
5 6 A 7 S. KATE VAUGHAN United States Magistrate Judge 8
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