Kanematsu USA Inc. v. United States

26 Ct. Int'l Trade 137, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 2002 CIT 9, 26 C.I.T. 137, 24 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1193, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 9
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJanuary 29, 2002
DocketSlip Op. 02-9; Court 95-04-00405
StatusPublished

This text of 26 Ct. Int'l Trade 137 (Kanematsu USA Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kanematsu USA Inc. v. United States, 26 Ct. Int'l Trade 137, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 2002 CIT 9, 26 C.I.T. 137, 24 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1193, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 9 (cit 2002).

Opinion

OPINION

POGUE, Judge.

This case is before the court after trial de novo. Kanematsu USA Inc. (“Plaintiff’) challenges a decision of the United States Customs Service (“Customs”) denying Plaintiffs protests filed in accordance with section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1994). 1 At issue is the proper tariff classification under 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1993), Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), of Plaintiffs importation of electromagnetic Power Take Off (“PTO”) clutch/brakes. 2

Background

Upon importation, Customs classified the subject merchandise under subheading 8505.20.00. This subheading covers “electromagnetic couplings, clutches, and brakes!,]” and resulted in the assessment of a 3.9% ad valorem duty. 3 Customs’ classification was based on its belief that the subject merchandise contained both an electromagnetic clutch and an electromagnetic brake. 4

Plaintiff claims, however, that the subject merchandise is classifiable as “parts of tractors suitable for agricultural use,” under subheading 8708.99.10, where it is eligible for duty-free treatment. 5 Plaintiff *1366 argues that the subject merchandise is a “unique device,” containing two components, an electromagnetic clutch and a mechanical brake. According to Plaintiff, the brake portion of the subject merchandise is specifically excluded from chapter 85 by Explanatory Note 85.05 6 and, following a GRI 1 analysis, the PTO clutch/brake is classifiable in Chapter 87. 7

Uncontested Facts

Both Plaintiff and Customs agree that the merchandise at issue is a good, known as the PTO clutch/brake. See Revised Pretrial Order, Schedule C, Uncontested Facts ¶ 3. The PTO clutch/brake is principally used in lawn and garden tractors. Id. ¶ 7. It is not, however, used in propulsion of the tractor. Id. ¶ 4. Rather, power is transferred through the subject merchandise from the engine to operate various instruments attached to the tractor. 8 See id. ¶ 5. The clutch and brake alternate in performing their functions: when the brake is engaged, the clutch must be disengaged and when the clutch is engaged, the brake must be disengaged. See id. ¶16. 9

The parties also agree as to the general mechanics of the PTO clutch/brake. The brake is engaged as a result of internal spring forces. In the absence of an electrical current, the pre-loaded leaf springs pull the armature away from the rotor and into contact with the brake plate. See id. ¶ 16(C). Once the electrical current flows to the coil, the magnetic field attracts the armature to the rotor. See id. ¶ 16(B). The armature rotates with the rotor and torque is transferred from the armature to the pulley, from the pulley to the belt and ultimately to the implement attached to the tractor. See id.

*1367 The parties disagree, however, on whether the brake is a mechanical brake and whether one of the components of the PTO clutch/brake performs a principal function.

Standard of Review

The court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(1994). “The Court must determine ‘whether the government’s classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with - the importer’s alternative.’ ” H.I.M./Fathom, Inc. v. United States, 21 CIT 776, 778, 981 F.Supp. 610, 613 (1997)(quoting Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984)). Following the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001), the Court does not afford the deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to Customs’ standard classification rulings such as that at issue here.

The analysis of a Custom’s classification involves a two-step process. First, the court must ascertain “the proper meaning of specific terms in the tariff provision.” David W. Shenk & Co. v. United States, 21 CIT 284, 286, 960 F.Supp. 363, 365 (1997). This aspect of Customs’ classification is subject to de novo review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2640 (1994), because it is a question of law. See Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States, 23 CIT -, -, 83 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1357 (1999), aff'd, 242 F.3d 1044 (Fed.Cir.2001). Then the court determines whether the goods come “within the description of such terms as properly construed.” Shenk, 21 CIT at 286, 960 F.Supp. at 365. This is a question of fact.

The trial beings with a presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Salant Corp. v. United States, 24 CIT --, -, 86 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1303 (2000)(quoting Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997)(holding that “although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification decision ... the presumption carries no force as to questions of law”)). To overcome the presumption, the party challenging the classification must produce a preponderance of evidence on the disputed factual question. See Universal Elecs. Inc., 112 F.3d at 492.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The HTSUS consists of (A) the General Notes; (B) the General Rules of Interpretation; (C) the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation; (D) sections I to XXII, inclusive (encompassing chapters 1 to 99, and including all section and chapter notes, article provisions, and tariff and other treatment accorded thereto); and (E) the Chemical Appendix.

The General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”) of the HTSUS govern the proper classification of merchandise. See Orlando Food Corp. v. United States,

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Related

United States v. Mead Corp.
533 U.S. 218 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States
733 F.2d 873 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Lonza, Inc. v. United States
46 F.3d 1098 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Universal Electronics Inc. v. United States
112 F.3d 488 (Federal Circuit, 1997)
Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States
242 F.3d 1044 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Salant Corp. v. United States
86 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Court of International Trade, 2000)
Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States
83 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (Court of International Trade, 1999)
David W. Shenk & Co. v. United States
21 Ct. Int'l Trade 284 (Court of International Trade, 1997)
H.I.M./Fathom, Inc. v. United States
21 Ct. Int'l Trade 776 (Court of International Trade, 1997)
Orlando Food Corp. v. States
140 F.3d 1437 (Federal Circuit, 1998)

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26 Ct. Int'l Trade 137, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 2002 CIT 9, 26 C.I.T. 137, 24 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1193, 2002 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 9, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kanematsu-usa-inc-v-united-states-cit-2002.