Kane v. League of Oregon Cities
This text of 676 P.2d 901 (Kane v. League of Oregon Cities) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of defendants on a breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendants, an unincorporated association of Oregon cities and its executive director, offered an award of $1,000 to the best qualified applicant to write and deliver a publication concerning recent developments in antitrust law, that plaintiff complied with all terms and conditions of defendants’ offer, but that defendants nevertheless gave the award to a less qualified applicant than plaintiff. We affirm.
We review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 288 Or 659, 665, 607 P2d 177 (1980); Seeborg v. General Motors Corp., 284 Or 695, 699, 588 P2d 1100 (1978). Our task is to determine if there is a geniune issue of material fact which precludes entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants. Forest Grove Brick v. Strickland, 277 Or 81, 87-88, 559 P2d 502 (1977).
The facts are drawn from plaintiffs complaint and affidavit in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants announced a Convention Fellows Program (Program) in its June, 1982, monthly newsletter. The announcement of the Program, set forth in more detail in the margin, 1 states that $1,000 would be awarded to each of three *839 fellows at the League’s annual convention. City officials were invited to apply for the fellowships, which were to be awarded by a selection committee. Each fellow was to prepare a publication and conduct a convention session on one of the three topics described in the announcement. The publication and convention session plan was to be approved by an advisory committee before a fellow would receive the $1,000 *840 award. The announcement also listed application requirements and deadlines.
One of the three topics was an antitrust publication. The announcement listed three areas the publication should address and stated that “preference will be given to applicants with a background in law * * Plaintiff, an attorney with experience in antitrust litigation, was one of only two applicants for the antitrust fellowship. Both were attorneys. The other applicant was awarded the fellowship by the selection committee; this lawsuit followed.
The contract alleged by plaintiff, if it exists at all, must be found in defendants’ announcement of the program and plaintiff’s application. Plaintiff contends that the announcement was an offer which he accepted by being the best qualified candidate to apply for the award. He urges us to view the program as a competition or contest for which he should have been judged the winner entitled to recover the prize. He also argues that he was not selected as a fellow because the selection committee applied criteria to his application other than those stated in the announcement.
When, as here, “the evidence of the alleged contract is all contained in letters or other writings, it is the province of the court to construe them and see if they constitute a contract.” Higgins v. Bonnett, 282 Or 725, 728, 580 P2d 180 (1978); Wagner v. Rainier Manufacturing Co., 230 Or 531, 537, 371 P2d 74 (1962). We do not believe that defendants’ announcement was an offer because we do not believe that a reasonable person in the position of plaintiff would have been led to believe that defendants’ announcement was an offer acceptable merely by application. See Southworth v. Oliver, 284 Or 361, 587 P2d 994 (1978); see also Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 26 (1981).
Nothing in defendants’ announcement would lead a reasonable person in plaintiffs position to conclude that defendants intended the announcement as an offer. To the contrary, the announcement called for the submission of applications. Part of the application was to be a “rough outline of the [antitrust] publication,” within the general areas specified by the announcement. A reasonable person reading defendants’ announcement could only conclude that the *841 applicant was to submit a proposed publication which defendants could either accept or reject. Defendants’ announcement did not contain a definite proposal that plaintiff could accept without further communications. See Southworth v. Oliver, supra, 284 Or at 370-75.
Plaintiff did, however, make an offer to defendants. The question then becomes: Were defendants required to accept it? In Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill 2d 320, 371 NE2d 634 (1977), the Illinois Supreme Court faced a similar problem. There the plaintiff was an unsuccessful applicant to the defendant medical school. He brought suit against the school for breach of contract, alleging that he had received a brochure from the school describing the academic criteria it would apply in assessing his application but that, instead of using the published criteria in assessing his application, the school made its decision based on the ability of the plaintiff to pledge or make payments of large sums of money to the school. In finding a contract between the parties, the court said:
“Here the description in the brochure containing the terms under which an application will be appraised constituted an invitation for an offer. The tender of the application, as well as the payment of the fee pursuant to the terms of the brochure, was an offer to apply. Acceptance of the application and fee constituted acceptance of an offer to apply under the criteria defendant had established.” 69 Ill 2d at 330.
We believe a similar analysis should apply here, and we hold that defendants’ announcement was an invitation for offers to apply for the fellowships. Once the defendants accepted plaintiffs offer to apply, it was bound to judge his application only on the basis of criteria stated in the announcement.
Only one express criterion is contained in the announcement. “Preference will be given to applicants with a background in law * * *.” Both applicants for the antitrust award were attorneys; this criterion had no further relevance. The only other express provision regarding selection was that the fellowship “will be awarded by a selection committee.” Inasmuch as the fellowship was awarded by a selection committee, plaintiffs application was treated consistently with the express terms of defendants’ announcement.
*842 The announcement is completely silent regarding any other criteria the selection committee would or could use in awarding the fellowships. In this respect, it differs from a contest which spells out criteria to be applied in choosing a winner. Plaintiff asks us to find an implied covenant — he admits there is no express one — to select only the best qualified applicant. We decline to do so. The announcement does not contain any criteria which could be applied by a finder of fact to determine the best qualified candidate, and we are convinced that, under the terms of the announcement, the selection committee was free to exercise discretion in choosing the program fellows.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
676 P.2d 901, 66 Or. App. 836, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kane-v-league-of-oregon-cities-orctapp-1984.