Kane v. Healthfirst, Inc.

120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 2015 WL 4619686
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 3, 2015
DocketNo. 11 Civ. 2325(ER)
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 120 F. Supp. 3d 370 (Kane v. Healthfirst, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kane v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 2015 WL 4619686 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

Opinion

[375]*375 OPINION AND ORDER

RAMOS, District Judge:

Relator Robert P. Kane (“Kane” or the “Relator”) filed this case in 2011- as a qui tarn action under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., and related state laws.1 In 2014, after investigating Kane’s allegations, the United States Government (the “United States” or “Government”) and the State of New York (“New York”) elected to intervene as plaintiffs against three of the defendants named in Kane’s Complaint. Presently before the Court are those defendants’ motions to dismiss the United States’ and New York’s Complaints-in-Intervention,. Docs. 20, 21, pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. .Docs. 54, 52. For the following reasons, both motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

This áction stems' from a software glitch on the part of Healthfirst, Inc. (“Health-first”), a private, non-profit insurance program, which caused three New York City hospitals to submit improper claims seeking reimbursement from Medicaid3 for services rendered to beneficiaries of a managed care program .administered by Healthfirst. Gov’t Compl. (Doc. 20) ¶¶ 3-4, 20, 31-32. The hospitals — Beth Israel Medical Center d/b/a Mount Sinai Beth Israel (“Beth Israel”), St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center d/b/a Mount Sinai St. Luke’s and Mount Sinai Roosevelt (“SLR”), and Long Island College Hospital (“LICH” and, .collectively, the “Hospitals”) 4 — all belonged to a network of nonprofit hospitals operated and coordinated by Continuum Health Partners, Inc. [376]*376(“Continuum”). Id. ¶ 3.5 All three Hospitals were also members of the Healthfirst hospital network and provided care to numerous , patients enrolled in Healthfirst’s Medicaid managed-care plan. Id. ¶ 5,

Pursuant to a contract entered into by Healthfirst and the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”) on October 1, 2005, Healthfirst provides certain “Covered Services,” including hospital and physician services, to its Medicaid-eligible en-rollees in exchange for a monthly payment from DOH. Id. ¶21.6 Healthfirst’s reimbursement for the Covered Services is limited to that monthly fee; it may not otherwise bill DOH on a “fee-for service” or other basis. Id. All doctors, hospitals, and providers that participate in the Health-first network must agree that the payment they receive from Healthfirst for Covered Services rendered to Healthfirst’s Medicaid enrollees will constitute payment in full for those services, except for co-payments that may be collected from enrollees where applicable. Id. Healthfirst contracts with such providers (“Participating Providers”) and pays them for the Covered Services they render to Healthfirst’s Medicaid-eligible enrollees; in turn, Healthfirst is compensated. through- DOH’s. monthly payments. Id.

The error giving rise to the instant controversy relates to electronic remittances, issued by Healthfirst to its Participating Providers, which indicated the amount of any payment due for services rendered by the provider. Id. ¶ 30. These remittance statements also contained “codes” that signaled whether a provider could seek additional payment from secondary payors in addition to Healthfirst, such as Medicaid, other insurance "carriers, or patients themselves. Id. The remittances submitted by Healthfirst for Covered Services rendered to its" Medicaid-eligible enrollees should have contained codes informing providers that they could' not seek secondary payment for such services, with the limited exception of co-payments from-certain patients. Id.

Beginning in 2009, however, due to a software glitch, Healthfirst’s remittances to Participating Providers erroneously indicated that they could seek additional payment for Covered Services from secondary payors. Id. ¶ 31. ' Consequently, electronic billing programs used by numerous Participating Providers automatically [377]*377generated and submitted bills to secondary payors, including Medicaid. Id. Starting in or around January . 2009, . Continuum submitted claims to DOH on behalf of the Hospitals seeking additional payment for Covered Services rendered to Healthfirst enrollees, and DOH mistakenly paid the Hospitals for many of those improper claims. Id. ¶ 32.

In September 2010, auditors from the New York State Comptroller’s office, (the “Comptroller”) approached Continuum with questions regarding the incorrect billing. Id. ¶ 33. Eventually, discussions among the Comptroller, Continuum, and the software vendor revealed that the problem occurred when the codes used in Healthfirst’s billing software were “translated” to codes used in Continuum’s billing software. Id. On December 13, 2010, approximately two years after the problem first arose, the vendor provided a corrective software patch designed to prevent Continuum and other providers from improperly billing secondary payors like Medicaid for services provided to Health-first enrollees, along with an explanatory memorandum. Id. After the problem was discovered, Continuum tasked its employee, Relator Kane, with ascertaining which claims had been improperly billed to Méd-icaid. Id. ¶ 34. In late 2010 and early 2011, Kane and other Continuum employees reviewed Continuum’s billing data in an effort to comprehensively “identify” all claims potentially affected by the software glitch. Id. In January 2011, the Comptroller alerted Continuum to several additional claims for which Continuum had billed Medicaid as a secondary payor. Id.

On February 4, 2011, approximately five months, after the Comptroller first informed Continuum, about the glitch, Kane sent an email to several members of Continuum’s management, attaching a spreadsheet that contained more than 900 Beth Israel, SLR, and LICH claims — totaling over $1 million — that Kane had identified as containing the erroneous billing code. Id. ¶ 35. His email indicated that further analysis would-be needed to confirm his findings and stated -that-the spreadsheet gave “some insight to the magnitude of the issue.” Id., Ex. B. There is no dispute that Kane’s spreadsheet was overly inclusive, in that approximately half. of the claims listed therein were never actually overpaid; nor is there any dispute that the spreadsheet correctly included “the vast majority of the claims that had been erroneously billed.” Id. ¶ 35.7 On February 8, 2011, four days after sending his email and spreadsheet, Kane was terminated. Id. ¶36.8

According to the United States and New York, Continuum “did nothing further” with Kane’s analysis or the universe of claims he' identified. Id. In February 2011, Continuum reimbursed DOH for only five improperly submitted claims. Id.' Meanwhile, the Comptroller conducted further analysis and identified several additional tranches of wrongful claims, which it brought to Continuum’s attention starting in March 2011 and continuing through February 2012. " Id. ¶ 37.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 2015 WL 4619686, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kane-v-healthfirst-inc-nysd-2015.