Kamrath v. Addictions Recovery Center, Inc.

District Court, D. Oregon·Decided May 30, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-01516·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

TORSTEN KAMRATH, an Individual,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:23-cv-01516-MC

v. OPINION & ORDER

ADDICTIONS RECOVERY CENTER, INC., a corporation,

Defendant. _____________________________

MCSHANE, District Judge: Plaintiff Torsten Kamrath brings religious discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Oregon law against his former employer, Defendant Addictions Recovery Center, Inc. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 11. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully terminated his employment when he declined, based on a sincerely held religious belief, to take the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant again moves to dismiss.1 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 2. Because Plaintiff again fails to sufficiently allege a conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the COVID-19 vaccine, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.12) is GRANTED.

1 As discussed below, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint. Op. & Order, ECF No. 10.

1 – OPINION & ORDER I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Torsten Kamrath was employed by Addictions Recovery Center for approximately six years as a Certified Recovery Mentor and Peer Support Specialist. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff is a “devoutly religious individual who adheres to principles of a Christian faith and is dedicated to following the tenets of his faith to the best of his ability.” Id. ¶ 6. In the

summer of 2021, Defendant announced that they would be implementing and enforcing a COVID-19 vaccine mandate in the workplace, except for employees with approved religious exemption requests. Id. ¶ 11. In September 2021, Plaintiff formally sought a religious exemption to the mandate. Id. Defendant denied the exemption and, on October 15, 2021, terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Id. Plaintiff then filed this action and Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the original Complaint, the Court noted: In the present case, although Plaintiff identifies as “devoutly religious,” he fails to explain how practicing his Christian beliefs actually conflicted with the employment requirement to take the COVID-19 vaccine. See Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11. Indeed, the sum total of Plaintiff’s allegations supporting his sincerely held religious belief consists of: “Plaintiff is also a devoutly religious individual who adheres to principles of a Christian faith and is dedicated to following the tenets of his faith to the best of his ability” and “Plaintiff had serious objections to taking the vaccine because of his deeply held religious beliefs.” Id. Such “[g]eneral references to Christianity do not meet even a ‘fairly minimal’ burden at the pleading stage, as such allegations are conclusory and fail plausibly to suggest that a plaintiff’s anti-vaccination beliefs are in fact religious.” Stephens v. Legacy- GoHealth Urgent Care, No. 3:23-cv-206, 2023 WL 7612395, at *[6] (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023), findings and recommendations adopted as clarified by, 2023 WL 7623865 (Nov. 14, 2023); Trinh v. Shriners Hosps. for Child., No. 3:22-cv-01999, 2023 WL 7525228, at *I10–11 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023), (granting motion to dismiss in Title VII claim where plaintiff was “devoutly” religious and objected to taking the COVID-19 vaccine because it would “constitute violating her bodily integrity and tainting the purity of her body”) (emphasis in original), findings and recommendations adopted, 2023 WL 7521441 (Nov. 13, 2023).

2 – OPINION & ORDER ECF No. 10, 5. Plaintiff’s FAC adds an allegation containing his statement to Defendant explaining why he required a religious exception. FAC ¶ 11. Once again, Defendant moves to dismiss. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). But the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). III. DISCUSSION To assert a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim under Title VII, Plaintiffs must allege that (1) she “had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) [she] informed [her] employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected [her] to an adverse employment action

3 – OPINION & ORDER because of [her] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). “According to the EEOC, ‘a bona fide religious belief is one that is sincerely held.’” Stephens, 2023 WL 7612395, at * 3 (quoting U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-CVG-2023-3, Section 12: Religious Discrimination, § 12-1(A)(2) (Jan. 15, 2021) (cleaned up)).

The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have each cautioned against second-guessing the reasonableness of an individual’s asserted religious beliefs. See e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725 (2014) (noting the Court’s “narrow function in this context is to determine whether the line drawn reflects an honest conviction[.]”) (cleaned up); Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023) (“we do not interrogate the reasonableness of [Plaintiff’s] beliefs and instead focus our inquiry on whether she has alleged an actual conflict.”). However, a court need not take “plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1223. Similarly, a “threadbare reference” to a plaintiff’s religious beliefs is insufficient to satisfy the first element

of a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination. Gage v. Mayo Clinic, No. CV-22-02091-PHX- SMM, 2023 WL 3230986, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2023) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Title VII does not protect medical, economic, political, or social preferences. See Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Detwiler, 2022 WL 19977290, at *4 (finding plaintiff's objection to regular COVID-19 antigen testing to be secular—as opposed to a “sincere religious opposition”— because they believed the tests were carcinogenic and would cause more harm than good) report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3687406 (D. Or. May 26, 2023); Ruscitti v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-cv-00787-JR, 2023

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust
200 F.3d 661 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)