Kamoku v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 12, 2026
• Docket: 24-662
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CORALEE L. KAMOKU, No. 24-662 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:23-cv-00177-DKW-KJM v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 12, 2026**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Coralee L. Kamoku appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of her

complaint challenging the Commissioner of Social Security’s partially favorable

decision granting her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Social Security Act, made following remand. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo the district court’s

dismissal as untimely of a complaint seeking review of a decision of the

Commissioner, Banta v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir.1991), and where the

relevant facts are undisputed, we review de novo a district court’s decision whether

to apply equitable tolling. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We

affirm.

The district court did not err in dismissing Kamoku’s complaint as untimely.

Kamoku filed her complaint more than two years after the sixty-day limitations

period had expired. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final

decision of the Commissioner . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil

action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner . . . may allow.”); see

also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986) (This limitation period

constitutes “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be

strictly construed.”). We need not consider whether the final letter from the

Appeals Council somehow extended the time to appeal. Even if the limitations

period started to run when the Appeals Council sent the letter, Kamoku’s action

would be untimely by months.

2 24-662 The district court also properly concluded that Kamoku was not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The district court reasonably

determined that both the death of Kamoku’s brother in July 2022, and the

subsequent foreclosure action occurred more than a year after the March 1, 2021,

deadline for filing her civil action had expired. Further, the district court

reasonably found that “the purported failures of Kamoku’s attorney” would not

constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (“Attorney miscalculation is

simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling[.]”); see also Irwin v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“[P]rinciples of equitable tolling . . . do not

extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”). Finally,

the district court reasonably concluded that Kamoku failed to establish how the

Covid pandemic specifically prevented her from filing her complaint or written

exceptions in a timely manner. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005) (“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-662