NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1299
KAMEEL NASR
vs.
LISI NASR.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The former husband, Kameel Nasr (husband), appeals from a
judgment of divorce nisi entered following a trial in the
Probate and Family Court. The husband argues that the judge
erred in the division of the marital estate by awarding the
marital home to the former wife, Lisi Nasr (wife).1 We affirm.
Background. After approximately eighteen months of
cohabitation, the parties married on January 27, 2019. Both
were in their seventies and had no children from the marriage.
1The husband also asserts error in the judge's award of a vehicle to the wife and order that the husband pay a portion of the wife's legal fees. We decline to address these claims where the husband failed to develop either argument in his appellate brief. See S.S. v. S.S., 104 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 641 (2024). In 2019, they purchased a condominium (condo), which they used
as the marital home.
The wife worked as an anthropologist at Harvard Medical
School when the parties met, but she resigned from her full-time
position after the parties moved in together. She also resigned
from her part-time jobs with the city of Chelsea and Language
Line. The husband was an author of six published books. He
earned additional income from two rental properties. During
their relationship, including prior to their marriage, the
parties renovated and resold houses together. Much of the
profits from these home sales went to the Curiosity Foundation
(foundation), a nonprofit organization run by the husband. The
judge credited the wife's testimony at trial that the foundation
was not a legitimate nonprofit, and that the husband, who was
the only person to transfer money out of the foundation, used it
for his personal expenses.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. When reviewing a
judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34, "[f]irst, we examine
the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors
in § 34 were considered." Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267
(1987). "The second tier of our review requires us to determine
whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are 'apparent in
his findings and rulings.'" Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371
(2011), quoting Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 108 (1986).
2 "The power to make an equitable division of the marital estate
is entrusted to the judge's discretion, and we review the
decision to ensure the judge properly relied on the statutory
factors enumerated in G. L. c. 208, § 34." Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 493 Mass. 599, 613 (2024). "[A]n equitable, rather
than an equal, division of property is the ultimate goal of
G. L. c. 208, § 34." Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626
(2000). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to
property division unless it is plainly wrong and excessive"
(quotation and citation omitted). Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass.
230, 245 (2014).
2. Award of the marital home. The husband contends that
the judge abused his discretion by awarding the marital home to
the wife. He argues that the judge's decision was inequitable,
given the brevity of the marriage, and that the judge erred in
his consideration of four specific issues relating to the
statutory factors: (1) the source of the downpayment for the
condo; (2) the wife's allegations of abuse; (3) the inclusion of
the assets of the Curiosity Foundation in the marital estate;
and (4) the wife's career change. We disagree.
The judge considered the relevant statutory factors, which
include:
"the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
3 employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties, the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and the amount and duration of alimony, if any, awarded . . . . The court may also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit."
G. L. c. 208, § 34. He noted several times in the judgment that
the "very short term" length of the marriage factored into the
resulting equitable division of marital assets. He also found
that the husband was the "primary financial contributor" to the
marriage. Consequently, the judge awarded the husband many of
the assets with which he entered the marriage, including
personal investment accounts and three other properties, but
nevertheless awarded the wife the marital home. We conclude
that this property division was not "plainly wrong or excessive"
(citation omitted). Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 774, 794
(2007). Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in more detail
below, we discern no abuse of discretion in the weighing and
balancing of the factors relating to the four issues that the
husband specifically challenges.
a. Commingled funds. The husband contends that the judge
erred by finding that the down payment on the condo came from
commingled funds. We disagree.
At trial, the wife testified that she helped the husband
with his book sales by editing and marketing the books. She
4 also testified that she helped the husband "flip" six houses
prior to the purchase of the condo by cleaning the properties,
improving their landscaping, and marketing the houses with
videos and photographs. The judge credited the wife’s testimony
that she assisted the husband with "flipping of homes" and
discredited the husband's testimony that the wife "did almost
nothing." Although the record does not reflect clearly where
the husband deposited the profits from each home sale, a
substantial portion appears to have gone into the husband's
personal accounts. The amount of money transferred between the
foundation and the husband's personal accounts around the time
of each house sale supports the judge's conclusion that the
money in the husband's accounts, and later the downpayment,
came from commingled funds. Additionally, the husband testified
that he used his wife's income to qualify for the mortgage. We
thus discern no error in the judge's conclusion that both
parties "contributed to the purchase of the home," even if the
husband was "the primary financial contributor."2
b. The history of abuse. Next, the husband asserts that
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1299
KAMEEL NASR
vs.
LISI NASR.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The former husband, Kameel Nasr (husband), appeals from a
judgment of divorce nisi entered following a trial in the
Probate and Family Court. The husband argues that the judge
erred in the division of the marital estate by awarding the
marital home to the former wife, Lisi Nasr (wife).1 We affirm.
Background. After approximately eighteen months of
cohabitation, the parties married on January 27, 2019. Both
were in their seventies and had no children from the marriage.
1The husband also asserts error in the judge's award of a vehicle to the wife and order that the husband pay a portion of the wife's legal fees. We decline to address these claims where the husband failed to develop either argument in his appellate brief. See S.S. v. S.S., 104 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 641 (2024). In 2019, they purchased a condominium (condo), which they used
as the marital home.
The wife worked as an anthropologist at Harvard Medical
School when the parties met, but she resigned from her full-time
position after the parties moved in together. She also resigned
from her part-time jobs with the city of Chelsea and Language
Line. The husband was an author of six published books. He
earned additional income from two rental properties. During
their relationship, including prior to their marriage, the
parties renovated and resold houses together. Much of the
profits from these home sales went to the Curiosity Foundation
(foundation), a nonprofit organization run by the husband. The
judge credited the wife's testimony at trial that the foundation
was not a legitimate nonprofit, and that the husband, who was
the only person to transfer money out of the foundation, used it
for his personal expenses.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. When reviewing a
judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34, "[f]irst, we examine
the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors
in § 34 were considered." Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267
(1987). "The second tier of our review requires us to determine
whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are 'apparent in
his findings and rulings.'" Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371
(2011), quoting Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 108 (1986).
2 "The power to make an equitable division of the marital estate
is entrusted to the judge's discretion, and we review the
decision to ensure the judge properly relied on the statutory
factors enumerated in G. L. c. 208, § 34." Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 493 Mass. 599, 613 (2024). "[A]n equitable, rather
than an equal, division of property is the ultimate goal of
G. L. c. 208, § 34." Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626
(2000). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to
property division unless it is plainly wrong and excessive"
(quotation and citation omitted). Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass.
230, 245 (2014).
2. Award of the marital home. The husband contends that
the judge abused his discretion by awarding the marital home to
the wife. He argues that the judge's decision was inequitable,
given the brevity of the marriage, and that the judge erred in
his consideration of four specific issues relating to the
statutory factors: (1) the source of the downpayment for the
condo; (2) the wife's allegations of abuse; (3) the inclusion of
the assets of the Curiosity Foundation in the marital estate;
and (4) the wife's career change. We disagree.
The judge considered the relevant statutory factors, which
include:
"the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
3 employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties, the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and the amount and duration of alimony, if any, awarded . . . . The court may also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit."
G. L. c. 208, § 34. He noted several times in the judgment that
the "very short term" length of the marriage factored into the
resulting equitable division of marital assets. He also found
that the husband was the "primary financial contributor" to the
marriage. Consequently, the judge awarded the husband many of
the assets with which he entered the marriage, including
personal investment accounts and three other properties, but
nevertheless awarded the wife the marital home. We conclude
that this property division was not "plainly wrong or excessive"
(citation omitted). Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 774, 794
(2007). Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in more detail
below, we discern no abuse of discretion in the weighing and
balancing of the factors relating to the four issues that the
husband specifically challenges.
a. Commingled funds. The husband contends that the judge
erred by finding that the down payment on the condo came from
commingled funds. We disagree.
At trial, the wife testified that she helped the husband
with his book sales by editing and marketing the books. She
4 also testified that she helped the husband "flip" six houses
prior to the purchase of the condo by cleaning the properties,
improving their landscaping, and marketing the houses with
videos and photographs. The judge credited the wife’s testimony
that she assisted the husband with "flipping of homes" and
discredited the husband's testimony that the wife "did almost
nothing." Although the record does not reflect clearly where
the husband deposited the profits from each home sale, a
substantial portion appears to have gone into the husband's
personal accounts. The amount of money transferred between the
foundation and the husband's personal accounts around the time
of each house sale supports the judge's conclusion that the
money in the husband's accounts, and later the downpayment,
came from commingled funds. Additionally, the husband testified
that he used his wife's income to qualify for the mortgage. We
thus discern no error in the judge's conclusion that both
parties "contributed to the purchase of the home," even if the
husband was "the primary financial contributor."2
b. The history of abuse. Next, the husband asserts that
the judge abused his discretion by giving "too much weight" to
2 Regardless of whether the judge labelled the downpayment funds as "commingled," he had the discretion to divide the condo equitably. See § 34 (permitting division of "all or any part of the estate of the other," however title was acquired); Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 577 (2019).
5 the wife's allegation of abuse in the relationship. The judge
credited the wife's testimony that the husband abused her
emotionally and psychologically during the marriage. See
Cerutti-O'Brien v. Cerutti-O'Brien, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 171
(2010) (judge in divorce proceedings entitled to make witness
credibility determinations). Factoring that abuse into the
decision to award the marital home to the wife was within the
judge's discretion. See Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass. 28,
38 (2004) (in equitable division, it is appropriate for judge to
consider conduct that has harmed marriage or marital estate).
We are not persuaded by the husband's contention that the judge
based the decision to award the marital home to the wife
"primarily" on this conduct, or that he gave it "too much"
weight. While the judgment does not detail the exact weight
given to each factor, abuse is noted in just one of the judge's
twenty-six factual findings. We therefore discern no abuse of
discretion in the judge's consideration of the history of abuse
during the marriage as one of several factors in the division of
marital property.
c. The foundation's assets. The husband argues that the
judge erred by considering the assets in the foundation in the
division of the assets. Massachusetts law construes a party's
estate broadly, to include "all property to which a party holds
title, however acquired." Williams, 431 Mass. at 625. Here,
6 there was evidence at trial that the accounts for the foundation
were in the husband's name. According to the wife, payments
from the foundation went into forty-two different bank accounts
for the husband.3 Her testimony was supported by the husband's
financial statements, which showed that the majority of
withdrawals from the foundation went into his personal accounts.
By contrast, the husband claimed he could not remember "when and
where" he deposited the funds for substantial deposits from real
estate sales. Moreover, the husband obstructed the judge's
efforts to verify his financial information by omitting several
accounts, including those for the foundation, from his initial
trial financial statement. Based on this evidence, the judge
found that the husband regularly used the foundation's funds for
personal expenses and that it was not a legitimate nonprofit
entity. We discern no error in that finding or in the judge's
conclusion that the foundation functioned as an extension of the
husband's personal assets and thus should be included in the
marital estate.4
3 The wife hired a forensic accountant to investigate the foundation, but the accountant did not testify at trial.
4 We note that regardless of the judge's determination about the foundation, he concluded that none of its assets should be distributed to the wife, largely because of the short length of the marriage.
7 d. The wife's voluntary career change. Lastly, the
husband argues that it was error for the judge to consider the
wife's career change in the division of assets. He contends
that the judge made contradictory findings about whether her
decision was voluntary or the result of undue pressure from the
husband. However, we see no inherent contradiction in the
judge's finding that the husband influenced the wife's decision
to change careers and reduce her income, while not crediting the
wife's testimony that she did so entirely under duress from the
husband. Under these circumstances, it was well within the
judge's broad discretion to include the wife's career change in
his consideration of the division of assets.5 See Ross v. Ross,
385 Mass. 30, 37 (1982) (weight accorded to each § 34 factor
within judge's discretion).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Grant, Brennan & Smyth, JJ.6),
Clerk
Entered: December 22, 2025.
5 The wife's request for appellate attorney's fees is denied.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.