Kamco Supply Corp. of Boston v. Jenkins, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 4, 2012
DocketCUMcv-09-637
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kamco Supply Corp. of Boston v. Jenkins, Inc. (Kamco Supply Corp. of Boston v. Jenkins, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kamco Supply Corp. of Boston v. Jenkins, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION D_ OCKET NO: CV -09f631 / J 1\ vV - C_A.J..M- iR / Lt / Y=Ot z_ I

KAMCO SUPPLY CORP. OF BOSTON

Plaintiff

v.

l (_' JENKINS, INC. D/B/A JENKINS DRYWALL, CATHY JENKINS, and ·-·--., ·--'' i

FLOYD JENKINS \\·~•.,,~s

Defendants

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the court is the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on

Count V of the Amended Complaint. This motion was granted against

defendants Jenkins, Inc. and Cathy Jenkins on March 29, 2011. An entry of

default and default judgment, entered against defendant Floyd Jenkins on May

10, 2011, were set aside by this court, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), on January

25, 2012. Per that Order, this court granted Floyd Jenkins 45 days to respond to

the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Jenkins did so respond and

the plaintiff has filed a reply memorandum. For the reasons that follow, the

court denies the motion.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a credit agreement between Kamco Supply Corp. of

Boston ("Kamco"), a supplier of commercial building products and Jenkins, Inc.

d/b/a Jenkins Drywall ("Jenkins") to supply commercial building products and

related services to Jenkins on credit. Cathy Jenkins ("Cathy"), a principal of

Jenkins personally guaranteed Jenkins' credit. Kamco alleges that Jenkins failed 1 to act in accordance with the terms of the credit agreement and, consequently,

has sought payment from Jenkins for products and services rendered, plus

interest. Kamco also has sought payment from Cathy, as guarantor of the debt.

Kamco brought suit against Jenkins and Cathy in Androscoggin County

Superior Court in 2007 (CV-07-157) on these claims. Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 16B

the parties engaged in mediation on June 4, 2008 and entered into a Settlement

Agreement disposing of those claims brought. Floyd Jenkins ("Floyd"), also a

principal of Jenkins, was a signatory to this Settlement Agreement. A failure to

comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement led to parties to attend

another mediation session in July 2009. With the claims still unresolved, Kamco

now brings this case on several counts, including breach of the Settlement

Agreement, Count V, which is the subject of this Motion for Summary Judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

M.R. Civ. P. 56( c); see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, Cfi 4, 770 A.2d

653. An issue of "fact exists when there is sufficient evidence to require a fact-

finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Inkell v.

Livingston, 2005 ME 42, Cfi 4, 869 A.2d 745 (quoting Lever v. Acadia Hasp. Corp., 2004

ME 35, Cfi 2, 845 A.2d 1178). "Even when one party's version of the facts appears

more credible and persuasive to the court," summary judgment is inappropriate

because the court may not weigh the evidence presented. Arrow Fastener Co., Inc.

v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, Cfi 17, 917 A.2d 123. In considering a motion for

summary judgment, the court should view the facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, and the court is required to consider only the portions of

2 the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h)

statements. E.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, 9I 8, 800 A.2d 702.

The Plaintiff is seeking a judgment against Floyd in the amount of

$93,632.76 plus pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent

and attorney's fees and costs. Count V of the Amended Complaint also seeks a

first mortgage on certain property located on Route 105 in Andover, Maine, a

second mortgage on certain residential property at 111 East A venue in Lewiston,

Maine (per paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement), and transfer of title by

warranty deed of the Andover property (per paragraph 5 of the Settlement

Agreement). In the intervening time, the Defendants have transferred title to

three properties in Augusta and Andover (De£. Add'l. SMF 9I9I 21-25) and the

Plaintiff apparently no longer requests mortgages on or title to any of the

defendants' properties.

Defendant Floyd asserts that the transfer of these three properties was in

full satisfaction of the Settlement Agreement, per the agreement reached between

the parties in the July 2009 mediation ("2009 Agreement"). (De£. Add'l. SMF 9I9I

20, 26.) Kamco does not dispute that the parties went to mediation in July 2009

in an attempt to come to agreement regarding compliance with the Settlement

Agreement but does dispute that any further agreement was reached. (Pl. Reply

SMF 9I 20.)

To prove the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, Floyd must

prove that it was the intent of both parties that the amount tendered and

received was in full satisfaction of the amount owed. Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012

ME 15, 9I 18, 36 A.3d 903. The evidence put forth by Floyd is sufficient evidence

to. support the fact that the 2009 Agreement to convey the three parcels of land

3 was in full satisfaction of the debt owed and, because both parties made that

agreement, that it was the intent of Kamco as well as the defendants. (De£.

Add'l. SMF 9I9I 20, 26.) Although Floyd's Affidavit in support of his statements

of material facts only states that he believed that the tender of those deeds should

satisfy the debt (Floyd Aff. 9I9I 10, 13), Cathy's Affidavit also is offered in support

of these statements of fact and her affidavit unequivocally states that the 2009

mediation resulted in an agreement, superseding the 2008 Settlement Agreement,

that was intended to fully satisfy the debt owed (Cathy Aff. 9I 6). There is other

evidence that tends to contradict this statement (Pl. Reply SMF 9I 20; Cathy Aff.

Ex. 2&3; Floyd Aff. Ex. 2&3), however, a genuine issue of material fact has been

generated, precluding summary judgment.

The entry is:

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V of the Amended

Complaint is DENIED.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

DATE: June 4, 2012 ~A. Wheeler Justice, Superior Court

4

MICHAEL DUBOIS ESQ 588 MAIN ST LEWISTON ME 04240

KOFCOURTS berland County y Street, Ground Floor and, ME 04101

SUSAN SZWED ESQ PMB 815 PO BOX 9715 PORTLAND ME 04104-5015

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Related

Johnson v. McNeil
2002 ME 99 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2002)
Lever v. Acadia Hospital Corp.
2004 ME 35 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2004)
Inkel v. Livingston
2005 ME 42 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2005)
Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp.
2001 ME 77 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc.
2007 ME 34 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)
Pelletier v. Pelletier
2012 ME 15 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2012)

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