Kambiz Zadeh v. Aegis Security Insurance Company

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 22, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-2059 Lower Tribunal No. 20-12085-CA-01 ________________

Kambiz Zadeh, Appellant,

vs.

Aegis Security Insurance Company, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge.

Isaac Law Firm, PLLC, and Jorge E. Isaac, for appellant.

Sprechman & Fisher, P.A., and Stacey S. Fisher, for appellee.

Before MILLER, LOBREE and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Kambiz Zadeh, the defendant below, appeals the denial of his motion

to vacate a default final judgment. The undisputed record reflects that service

was not properly effectuated and that the judgment was void. We therefore

reverse and remand for the judgment to be vacated and service quashed.

BACKGROUND

Aegis Security Insurance Company sued Zadeh and other defendants

to enforce an indemnification agreement relating to a surety bond. After

attempting to serve Zadeh three times at three different addresses, Aegis

moved to perfect service via substituted service by the Florida Secretary of

State per section 48.062, Florida Statutes (2021), claiming that Zadeh was

avoiding service or could not be located. In support, Aegis proffered returns

of non-service for the three attempted addresses, one of which was the

address Zadeh concedes he was living at during that time. The return for that

address reflected that the process server spoke with a housekeeper who

indicated that Zadeh lived there but was away travelling with an unknown

return date. The trial court granted leave for the substituted service, and after

Zadeh failed to answer, ultimately entered a default final judgment.

Zadeh became aware of the judgment several years later and filed an

unsworn, pro se “motion to reverse ruling,” claiming that he was never served

or involved in the underlying transaction and asking the court “what I need to

2 do to void or reverse this judgment.” The trial court considered it as a motion

to quash and denied the motion in an unelaborated order. Zadeh

subsequently retained counsel and filed a motion for rehearing seeking relief

from a void judgment as well as quashing service. In opposition, Aegis

argued both that Zadeh was avoiding service at his known address and that

the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a successive motion for relief from

judgment. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. Zadeh filed a timely

notice of appeal of the original order denying the pro se motion as well as an

amended notice of appeal including the order denying the subsequent

motion.

ANALYSIS

While we generally review a trial court’s ruling on a rule 1.540(b) motion

for abuse of discretion, the underlying determination of “[w]hether a final

judgment is void presents a question of law that an appellate court reviews

de novo.” See Peaceful Paws Mem’l Servs. LLC v. Tarves, 368 So. 3d 503,

506–07 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (quoting Specialty Sols., Inc. v. Baxter Gypsum

& Concrete, LLC, 325 So. 3d 192, 196 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)). Where a

judgment is void, the trial court has no discretion and must vacate that

judgment. Id. at 506.

3 It is well established that “a complaint that was improperly served

renders the default judgment void.” Id. at 507; see also InClaim, LLC v.

Structural Wrap, LLC, 413 So. 3d 251, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (noting that

because substituted service is an exception to the general requirement of

personal service, strict compliance with substituted service statutes is

required to protect due process). Here, the undisputed record reflects that

Aegis did not satisfy the requirements for substituted service under section

48.161(1), Florida Statutes (2021), which requires the plaintiff to file an

affidavit of compliance. Aegis concedes that it did not file an affidavit of

compliance. This means that Zadeh was not properly served, rendering the

resulting default judgment void. See Monaco v. Nealon, 810 So. 2d 1084,

1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“Failure to timely file an affidavit of compliance

alone warrants quashing of the substituted service.”).

We briefly address the alternative argument that Zadeh’s rule

1.540(b)(4) motion was successive to his first pro se motion and that alone

warrants affirmance. “[P]rinciples of res judicata bar successive motions for

relief from judgment [only] where the grounds for relief were repetitive of

those asserted in the first motion, or which with due diligence could have

been asserted in the first motion.” Gen. Comput. Servs., Inc. v. AP SC River

Oaks LLC, 130 So. 3d 722, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quotation omitted).

4 Here, Zadeh’s first motion was unsworn, informal, and not identified as a

motion for relief from judgment under rule 1.540. The trial court also did not

indicate that it considered compliance with the requirements of the substitute

service statute in denying the original motion. Indeed, the first motion

contains no reference to the substitute service statute or rule 1.540 and the

order denying the motion referenced it only as a motion to quash. On the

record before us, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the argument

raised in the second motion. See State Dep’t of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.

2d 1384, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (noting that successive rule 1.540

motions are res judicata only where the “jurisdictional question was actually

litigated and decided” in the prior motion and finding successive motion not

precluded where “the trial court’s order denying the first Rule 1.540 motion

[was] not sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial court ruled on the merits

of the jurisdictional question”).

For the foregoing reasons, we therefore reverse and remand, with

directions to grant the second motion and vacate the final judgment against

Zadeh and quash service of process.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.