Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc.
This text of Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc. (Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RASHID KAMBAROV, No. 25-1390 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01103-YY v. MEMORANDUM* QUALITY COUNTS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP.,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Amy M. Baggio, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 15, 2026** Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Rashid Kambarov appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim against Quality Counts, Inc., for lack of
personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate
and remand.
We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that it lacks personal
jurisdiction. Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2025) (en
banc). “[W]here, as here, the motion [to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction] is
based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only
make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts” to survive the motion to dismiss.
Global Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
must “take as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all
genuine factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, we apply Oregon’s
long-arm statute, which “confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process.”
Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. “Due
process … requires that non-resident defendants have sufficient ‘minimum contacts’
with the forum state such that exercising jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207,
2 25-1390 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We analyze specific personal jurisdiction
under a three-part test:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Briskin, 135 F.4th at 750–51 (citation omitted). To determine whether a defendant
purposefully directed conduct at the forum state, we apply the “effects” test drawn
from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). Under that test, purposeful
direction is satisfied “if a defendant: (1) commits an intentional act, (2) expressly
aimed at the forum state, that (3) causes harm the defendant knew was likely to be
suffered in the forum state.” Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1213.
1. The first element of the Calder effects test is satisfied because Quality
Counts committed an intentional act. An act is “intentional” if the actor has “an
intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to
accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin
Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 806 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the operative complaint alleges
that Quality Counts “completed [an] employment report about [Kambarov],” sold
3 25-1390 the report to Elwood Staffing, and “published inaccurate information about
[Kambarov].” These intentional acts satisfy the first element of the Calder effects
test. See, e.g., id.
2. The second element of the Calder effects test is satisfied because Quality
Counts expressly aimed the dissemination of the allegedly false report at Oregon.
The contents of the report concerned whether an Oregon state court validly convicted
an Oregon resident of a felony. Cf. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (“The allegedly libelous
story concerned the California activities of a California resident.”). The report
undermined Kambarov’s eligibility for employment with an Oregon branch office
of Elwood Staffing in Oregon. Cf. id. (“[The allegedly libelous story] impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in
California.”). The report was drawn from Oregon sources, namely, the records of
the Oregon state courts. Cf. id. (“The article was drawn from California
sources ….”). And the only harm that Kambarov suffered—the termination of his
employment and the related emotional harm—was suffered in Oregon. Cf. id. at 789
(“[T]he brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the
injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.”). “In sum,
[Oregon] is the focal point both of the [report] and of the harm suffered.” Id.; see
also Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1214–15.
4 25-1390 While Elwood Staffing is headquartered in Indiana, an Oregon office of
Elwood Staffing requested the report, and Quality Counts provided that office with
access to the report. That Oregon office “had access directly … to Quality
Counts’[s] portal,” which means that Elwood Staffing employees at the Oregon
office would have “[been] able to sit at their desk and directly log into th[e] portal”
to access the report. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, in no meaningful
sense was the report “directed toward” Indiana. Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1210).
3. The third element of the Calder effects test, which requires that the
defendant “knew or should have known that his actions were likely to cause [the
plaintiff] harm in the forum state,” is likewise satisfied here. Burri Law, 35 F.4th at
1215. The record shows that Quality Counts knew that Kambarov lived in Oregon
and that he had applied for a job with Elwood Staffing in Oregon. And because
Quality Counts effectively published the false report in Oregon, Quality Counts
knew or should have known that the report would cause Kambarov reputational harm
in Oregon. See id.
4. Because the district court did not address the second and third Briskin
factors, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and “remand for the court to complete
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