Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 17, 2026
Docket25-1390
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc. (Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kambarov v. Quality Counts, Inc., (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RASHID KAMBAROV, No. 25-1390 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01103-YY v. MEMORANDUM* QUALITY COUNTS, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP.,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Amy M. Baggio, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 15, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Rashid Kambarov appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim against Quality Counts, Inc., for lack of

personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate

and remand.

We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that it lacks personal

jurisdiction. Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2025) (en

banc). “[W]here, as here, the motion [to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction] is

based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only

make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts” to survive the motion to dismiss.

Global Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972

F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We

must “take as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all

genuine factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.

To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, we apply Oregon’s

long-arm statute, which “confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process.”

Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990)

(per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. “Due

process … requires that non-resident defendants have sufficient ‘minimum contacts’

with the forum state such that exercising jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207,

2 25-1390 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We analyze specific personal jurisdiction

under a three-part test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Briskin, 135 F.4th at 750–51 (citation omitted). To determine whether a defendant

purposefully directed conduct at the forum state, we apply the “effects” test drawn

from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). Under that test, purposeful

direction is satisfied “if a defendant: (1) commits an intentional act, (2) expressly

aimed at the forum state, that (3) causes harm the defendant knew was likely to be

suffered in the forum state.” Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1213.

1. The first element of the Calder effects test is satisfied because Quality

Counts committed an intentional act. An act is “intentional” if the actor has “an

intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to

accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 806 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the operative complaint alleges

that Quality Counts “completed [an] employment report about [Kambarov],” sold

3 25-1390 the report to Elwood Staffing, and “published inaccurate information about

[Kambarov].” These intentional acts satisfy the first element of the Calder effects

test. See, e.g., id.

2. The second element of the Calder effects test is satisfied because Quality

Counts expressly aimed the dissemination of the allegedly false report at Oregon.

The contents of the report concerned whether an Oregon state court validly convicted

an Oregon resident of a felony. Cf. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (“The allegedly libelous

story concerned the California activities of a California resident.”). The report

undermined Kambarov’s eligibility for employment with an Oregon branch office

of Elwood Staffing in Oregon. Cf. id. (“[The allegedly libelous story] impugned the

professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in

California.”). The report was drawn from Oregon sources, namely, the records of

the Oregon state courts. Cf. id. (“The article was drawn from California

sources ….”). And the only harm that Kambarov suffered—the termination of his

employment and the related emotional harm—was suffered in Oregon. Cf. id. at 789

(“[T]he brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the

injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.”). “In sum,

[Oregon] is the focal point both of the [report] and of the harm suffered.” Id.; see

also Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1214–15.

4 25-1390 While Elwood Staffing is headquartered in Indiana, an Oregon office of

Elwood Staffing requested the report, and Quality Counts provided that office with

access to the report. That Oregon office “had access directly … to Quality

Counts’[s] portal,” which means that Elwood Staffing employees at the Oregon

office would have “[been] able to sit at their desk and directly log into th[e] portal”

to access the report. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, in no meaningful

sense was the report “directed toward” Indiana. Burri Law, 35 F.4th at 1210).

3. The third element of the Calder effects test, which requires that the

defendant “knew or should have known that his actions were likely to cause [the

plaintiff] harm in the forum state,” is likewise satisfied here. Burri Law, 35 F.4th at

1215. The record shows that Quality Counts knew that Kambarov lived in Oregon

and that he had applied for a job with Elwood Staffing in Oregon. And because

Quality Counts effectively published the false report in Oregon, Quality Counts

knew or should have known that the report would cause Kambarov reputational harm

in Oregon. See id.

4. Because the district court did not address the second and third Briskin

factors, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and “remand for the court to complete

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Related

Calder v. Jones
465 U.S. 783 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Burri Law Pa v. William Skurla
35 F.4th 1207 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.
374 F.3d 797 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Brandon Briskin v. Shopify, Inc.
135 F.4th 739 (Ninth Circuit, 2025)

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