Kamasinski v. NH Supreme

Opinion

Kamasinski v . NH Supreme CV-95-10-M 02/27/95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Theodore K a m a s i n s k i , On B e h a l f o f H i m s e l f and A l l O t h e r s S i m i l a r l y S i t u a t e d , Plaintiff, v. C i v i l N o . 95-10-M

New Hampshire Supreme C o u r t Committee on J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t ; Hon. David A . B r o c k , Chief J u s t i c e o f t h e New Hampshire Supreme C o u r t ; F r e d e r i c k K . U p t o n , Chairman o f t h e Committee on J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t ; W i l l i a m R. J o h n s o n , Vice-Chairman o f t h e Committee on J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t ; David S . Peck, Executive Secretary o f t h e Committee on J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t ; and R o b e r t L . C h i e s a , Raymond A . C l o u t i e r , Douglas S . H a t f i e l d , J r . , D a v i d A . Hodges, S r . , W a l t e r L . Murphy, Donna P . S y t e k , John R. Newson, Members o f t h e Committee on J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t , Defendants.

O R D E R

Before t h e c o u r t i s pro se p l a i n t i f f Theodore Kamasinski's

c o m p l a i n t , by which he seeks a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n r u l e s o f

t h e New Hampshire Supreme Court r e q u i r i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of

proceedings before t h e Committee on J u d i c i a l Conduct ( t h e "CJC")

v i o l a t e h i s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t t o f r e e speech. The Magistrate

Judge issued a Report and Recommendation t h a t plaintiff's

complaint be dismissed f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t matter j u r i s d i c t i o n . Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 2 ( h ) ( 3 ) . P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a timely objection t o the M a g i s t r a t e ' s Report and Recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 7 2 .

I. Discussion. A f t e r reviewing p l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t , t h e Magistrate Judge found t h a t i t f a i l s t o present a case o r controversy under A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e United States C o n s t i t u t i o n because i t does not describe a controversy r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . The Declaratory Judgment A c t , 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, authorizes f e d e r a l c o u r t s t o grant d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f when presented w i t h an a c t u a l case o r controversy. The Act i t s e l f , however, does not confer s u b j e c t matter j u r i s d i c t i o n . Rather, i t "makes a v a i l a b l e an added anodyne f o r disputes t h a t come w i t h i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ' j u r i s d i c t i o n on some other b a s i s . " Ernst & Young v . Depositors Economic P r o t e c t i o n C o r p . , No. 94-1749, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1387 a t *12 ( 1 s t C i r . January 2 5 , 1 9 9 5 ) . And, as t h i s c o u r t has previously noted:

A d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n i s appropriate t o resolve a " ` d e f i n i t e and c o n c r e t e ' dispute between adverse p a r t i e s , appropriate t o immediate and d e f i n i t i v e determination o f t h e i r l e g a l r i g h t s . " This standard i m p l i c a t e s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f ripeness and precludes A r t i c l e I I I c o u r t s from i s s u i n g advisory o p i n i o n s . I n determining whether a pending a c t i o n i s r i p e f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n , c o u r t s must c o n s i d e r : ( 1 ) t h e f i t n e s s o f t h e issues f o r j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , and ( 2 ) t h e hardship t o t h e

2 p a r t i e s o f w i t h h o l d i n g c o u r t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The f i t n e s s i n q u i r y assesses whether t h e r e i s a present case o r controversy between t h e p a r t i e s . The hardship i n q u i r y " t u r n s on whether t h e challenged a c t i o n creates a ` d i r e c t and immediate' dilemma f o r the p a r t i e s . "

VDI v . P r i c e , No. 90-341-M, 1994 U.S. D i s t . LEXIS 12913 ( D . N . H . 1994) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; see a l s o Abbott L a b . v . Gardner, 387 U.S. 1 3 6 , 149 (1967) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e " f i t n e s s " and " h a r d s h i p " aspects o f t h e ripeness i n q u i r y ) .

With regard t o t h e " f i t n e s s " prong o f t h i s i n q u i r y , " t h e c r i t i c a l question . . . i s whether t h e claim i n v o l v e s u n c e r t a i n and contingent events t h a t may not occur as a n t i c i p a t e d o r may not occur a t a l l . " Ernst & Young, s u p r a , a t * 1 8 . This i n q u i r y " r e f l e c t s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l awareness t h a t t h e f i t n e s s requirement has a pragmatic a s p e c t : i s s u i n g opinions based on s p e c u l a t i v e f a c t s o r a h y p o t h e t i c a l record i s an a l e a t o r y business, a t best d i f f i c u l t and o f t e n i m p o s s i b l e . " I d . at *18.

I t i s axiomatic t h a t a f e d e r a l c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n can be invoked only when t h e p l a i n t i f f has s u f f e r e d some a c t u a l o r threatened i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from a l l e g e d l y i l l e g a l o r u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conduct. Warth v . S e l d i n , 422 U.S. 4 9 0 , 499 (1975). And, as t h e c o u r t o f appeals f o r t h i s c i r c u i t has

3 c a u t i o n e d , " t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o grant d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f i s t o be exercised w i t h great circumspection when matters o f p u b l i c moment are i n v o l v e d o r when a request f o r r e l i e f threatens t o drag a f e d e r a l c o u r t prematurely i n t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues t h a t are freighted with uncertainty." Ernst & Young, s u p r a , a t * 1 4 . Courts have a l s o recognized, however, t h a t :

When t h e p l a i n t i f f has a l l e g e d an i n t e n t i o n t o engage i n a course o f conduct arguably a f f e c t e d w i t h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , but proscribed by a s t a t u t e , and t h e r e e x i s t s a c r e d i b l e t h r e a t o f prosecution thereunder, "he should not be r e q u i r e d t o await and undergo a c r i m i n a l prosecution as t h e s o l e means o f seeking r e l i e f . "

B a b b i t t v . United Farm Workers N a t ' l U n i o n , 442 U.S. 2 8 9 , 298 (1979) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; see a l s o Rhode I s l a n d v . Narragansett I n d i a n T r i b e , 19 F.3d 6 8 5 , 693 ( 1 s t C i r . 1994) ( " a l i t i g a n t `does not have t o await t h e consummation o f threatened i n j u r y t o o b t a i n preventive r e l i e f . I f t h e i n j u r y i s c e r t a i n l y impending t h a t i s e n o u g h . ' " ) c e r t . d e n i e d , ___ U.S. ___, 130 L . E d . 2d 2 1 1 , 115 S . C t . 298 (1994) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .

Here, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t he " n o t i f i e d t h e [CJC] t h a t he wished t o p e t i t i o n t h e [CJC] t o i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g a t i o n s o f misconduct against a New Hampshire judge but t h a t he was

4 concerned by t h e f r e e speech r e s t r a i n t s imposed on complainants by t h e r e l e v a n t . . . c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s . " Complaint, p a r a . 12. By l e t t e r dated May 2 4 , 1993, p l a i n t i f f requested t h a t t h e CJC waive enforcement o f i t s c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s i n h i s c a s e . The CJC responded on August 2 7 , 1993, s t a t i n g t h a t i t had voted t o " d e f e r t a k i n g any a c t i o n on [ p l a i n t i f f ' s ] l e t t e r o f May 2 4 , 1993, pending t h e outcome o f an a n t i c i p a t e d review o f t h e Committee's c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s by t h e Supreme Court Advisory Committee on R u l e s . " Uncertain as t o whether t h e CJC would apply t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s against him i f he should f i l e h i s p e t i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f i n i t i a t e d t h i s proceeding.

At t h e core o f p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint i s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i f he f i l e s t h e intended p e t i t i o n against an unnamed New Hampshire Judge, t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s , i f a p p l i e d t o h i m , would p r o h i b i t him from p u b l i c l y d i s c l o s i n g t h e substance o f h i s complaint o r any f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o i t , thereby d e p r i v i n g him o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected r i g h t t o freedom o f speech. He claims t h a t , " [ b ] y r e f u s i n g t o waive t h e f r e e speech r e s t r a i n t s , imposed as a c o n d i t i o n t o e f f e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s g r i e v a n c e , t h e [CJC] v i o l a t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t o f p e t i t i o n o r r i g h t o f access." Plaintiff's

5 Objection t o Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation a t 5 . A c c o r d i n g l y , p l a i n t i f f asserts t h a t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment p e t i t i o n i s r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , and a c t u a l f i l i n g o f t h e intended p e t i t i o n should not be deemed a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e c o u r t ' s exercise o f j u r i s d i c t i o n t o determine t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e CJC's c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s .

P l a i n t i f f f u r t h e r asserts t h a t i f t h e c o u r t were t o defer r u l i n g upon h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenges t o t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s u n t i l a f t e r he f i l e s h i s intended p e t i t i o n , he would be f o r c e d t o e l e c t e i t h e r : ( i ) t o exercise h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o f r e e speech i n f a c i a l v i o l a t i o n o f t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s , thereby p l a c i n g himself i n jeopardy o f serious s a n c t i o n s ; o r ( i i ) t o honor t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s a t t h e expense o f h i s constitutional r i g h t s . He argues t h a t a f t e r r e c e i v i n g t h e l e t t e r from t h e CJC d e f e r r i n g any r u l i n g on h i s request f o r a w a i v e r ,

P l a i n t i f f was again f o r c e d t o choose between e x e r c i s i n g h i s f i r s t amendment guaranteed r i g h t o f p e t i t i o n o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s f i r s t amendment r i g h t o f f r e e speech. The P l a i n t i f f could have exercised h i s r i g h t o f f r e e speech concerning t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f j u d i c i a l misconduct against a s t a t e judge w h i l e a b s t a i n i n g from t h e a c t o f p e t i t i o n i n g t h e Defendants f o r redress o f h i s grievances against t h e same State Judge, o r v i c e versa.

6 P l a i n t i f f ' s Objection a t 7 . Asserting t h a t t h e mere existence o f t h e CJC c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s operate t o c h i l l h i s exercise o f h i s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s , p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n i s unquestionably r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l review and presents an a c t u a l case o r c o n t r o v e r s y . The c o u r t d i s a g r e e s .

P l a i n t i f f ' s complaint presents p r e c i s e l y t h e type o f " s p e c u l a t i v e s i t u a t i o n " referenced by t h e Court o f Appeals f o r t h e F i r s t C i r c u i t i n Narragansett I n d i a n T r i b e , 19 F.3d a t 6 9 3 . While " [ i ] t i s w e l l established t h a t a case i s r i p e because o f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l hardship t o denying preenforcement review when a person i s f o r c e d t o choose between f o r g o i n g p o s s i b l y l a w f u l a c t i v i t y and r i s k i n g s u b s t a n t i a l s a n c t i o n s , " Presbytery o f t h e Orthodox Presbyterian Church v . F l o r i o , 40 F.3d 1454, 1468 ( 3 r d C i r . 1994) ( q u o t i n g Edwin Chemerinsky, Federal J u r i s d i c t i o n 103 (1989)) (emphasis added), here p l a i n t i f f does not p r e s e n t l y face a choice between abandoning h i s r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n t h e CJC on t h e one hand, o r r i s k i n g possible sanctions under t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s , on t h e o t h e r . Merely f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e CJC w i l l not expose p l a i n t i f f t o any form o f penalty o r s a n c t i o n . And, unless and u n t i l he f i l e s a p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e CJC, p l a i n t i f f is e n t i r e l y f r e e t o exercise h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o f r e e

7 speech. He may f r e e l y discuss h i s a l l e g e d grievances whenever and w i t h whomever he chooses, w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g any law o r regulation. The CJC c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s simply do not apply t o him nor w i l l they ever apply t o h i m , unless he should a c t u a l l y f i l e a complaint against a New Hampshire judge w i t h t h e CJC, thereby i n v o k i n g i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n (and r u l e s ) .

C u r r e n t l y , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge i s p u r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e and h y p o t h e t i c a l ; i t does not a r i s e from an a c t u a l o r even an i n e v i t a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y . See North Carolina v . R i c e , 404 U.S. 2 4 4 , 246 (1971) ( a case must i n v o l v e " a r e a l and s u b s t a n t i a l controversy a d m i t t i n g o f s p e c i f i c r e l i e f through a decree o f a conclusive c h a r a c t e r , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an o p i n i o n a d v i s i n g what t h e law would be upon a h y p o t h e t i c a l s t a t e o f f a c t s . " ) . The p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t h i s case are many, i . e . p l a i n t i f f might decide not t o f i l e a p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e CJC a f t e r a l l ; o r , i f plaintiff a c t u a l l y f i l e s a p e t i t i o n , t h e CJC might waive a p p l i c a t i o n o f i t s c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y modify those r u l e s as a p p l i e d t o him i n t h i s c a s e ; o r , t h e CJC might amend i t s r u l e s before any p e t i t i o n i s f i l e d ; o r , other circumstances might a r i s e t o moot any c o n t r o v e r s y .

8 I f and when p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d a c t u a l l y f i l e a p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e CJC, and i f t h e r u l e s as t h e y now e x i s t were i n v o k e d a g a i n s t ( o r were n o t waived f o r ) p l a i n t i f f , t h e n a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n would l i k e l y be r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . B u t t h e n , and o n l y t h e n , would p l a i n t i f f be i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f h a v i n g t o e l e c t between h o n o r i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s he b e l i e v e s t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a t t h e expense o f h i s c l a i m e d r i g h t t o f r e e s p e e c h , o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s r i g h t o f f r e e speech a t t h e r i s k of sanctions f o r v i o l a t i n g those c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s . At t h a t p o i n t , t h e p r e c e d e n t s c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f would appear t o s u p p o r t his assertion of ripeness. See S t e f f e l v . Thompson, 415 U . S . 4 5 2 , 459 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ( " I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t i s n o t necessary t h a t p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t expose h i m s e l f t o a c t u a l a r r e s t o r p r o s e c u t i o n t o be e n t i t l e d t o c h a l l e n g e a s t a t u t e t h a t he c l a i m s deters the exercise of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights.").1

II. Conclusion.

Succinctly s t a t e d , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s are not

b e i n g , and c a n n o t be i m p i n g e d upon i n any way by t h e CJC

1 P l a i n t i f f ' s complaint i s not f a c i a l l y devoid o f m e r i t , s e e , e . g . , Doe v . F l o r i d a J u d i c i a l Q u a l i f i c a t i o n C o m ' n . , 748 F . S u p p . 1520 ( S . D . F l a . 1 9 9 0 ) , r a t h e r i t seeks t o i n v o k e t h i s c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n p r e m a t u r e l y , i n t h e absence o f an a c t u a l case o r c o n t r o v e r s y .

9 c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r u l e s u n l e s s and u n t i l he f i l e s a c o m p l a i n t ,

t h e r e b y i n v o k i n g t h e c o m m i t t e e ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n and c o n c o m i t a n t

application of i t s rules to him. U n t i l p l a i n t i f f f i l e s such a

p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e CJC, n o t h i n g he m i g h t do o r say c o u l d p o s s i b l y

expose him t o any s a n c t i o n s under t h e r u l e s he seeks t o

c h a l l e n g e , because t h e y do n o t p u r p o r t t o l i m i t t h e speech o f

anyone e x c e p t t h o s e who f i l e c o m p l a i n t p e t i t i o n s w i t h t h e CJC.

P l a i n t i f f ' s c h a l l e n g e i s n o t r i p e f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w because it

p r e s e n t s no a c t u a l case o r c o n t r o v e r s y .

For t h e s e reasons and f o r t h e reasons s e t f o r t h i n t h e

M a g i s t r a t e J u d g e ' s R e p o r t and Recommendation, p l a i n t i f f ' s

complaint i s dismissed f o r l a c k o f subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n .

SO ORDERED.

Steven J . M c A u l i f f e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Judge

February 2 7 , 1995

cc: Theodore Kamasinski A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , S t a t e o f New Hampshire