Kamari Lowery v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 3D2023-1957
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 25, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1957 Lower Tribunal No. F19-6088C ________________

Kamari Lowery, Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard Hersch, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Appellant Kamari Lowery appeals his conviction of manslaughter,

robbery with a weapon, and armed burglary with assault, and his resulting

sentence. On appeal, he asserts the “trial court erred by instating, over

objection, a randomized method of jury selection that deprived counsel of

making informed, meaningful, and strategic decisions about which jurors to

peremptorily strike.”

But Lowery did not properly preserve his challenge for appeal. As our

Court recently stated in Sikes,

To preserve for appellate review a challenge to the trial court’s jury selection method as it pertains to the use of peremptory challenges, a party must do more than, as Sikes did here, simply object to the procedure that was used to select the jury. The party must (i) exhaust his or her peremptory challenges, (ii) identify an objectional juror that is still on the jury panel, (iii) request and be denied an additional peremptory challenge as to the objectionable juror, and (iv) prior to the jury panel being sworn, object to the composition of the jury.

Sikes v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 415 So. 3d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA

2025). See also Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 486 So. 2d 547, 548–50

(Fla. 1986) (“The Ter Keursts’ counsel objected to the system directed by the

judge and urged that he should not have to exercise his challenges in this

manner . . . . He did not, however, object to the jury ultimately sworn or

indicate any desire to challenge any of those persons remaining. Moreover,

he neither urged nor suggested that different people would have been

2 peremptorily challenged if a different system had been utilized. . . . The Ter

Keursts’ counsel did not object to the jury as finally composed; he evidenced

no dissatisfaction with the jurors who sat, even though obviously dissatisfied

with the method of selection. We do not find this case to present

fundamental error and, therefore, hold that the contemporaneous objection

rule applies. The Ter Keursts would have had to object to the jury as finally

composed to prevail on appeal.”); Aquila v. Brisk Transp., L.P., 170 So. 3d

924, 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Santa Fe Dev. Corp. v. Randolph, 506 So. 2d

18, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Harris v. State, 349 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla. 2d DCA

1977). While he objected to the method of jury selection, he did not take

additional steps. 1 And so, we are constrained to affirm.

Affirmed.

LINDSEY and GOODEN, JJ., concur.

1 Sikes and Lowery took the same approach—initially objecting to the method and then renewing their objection to that method at the conclusion of jury selection. Sikes, 415 So. 3d at 237. Cf. Paul v. State, 407 So. 3d 468, 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), review granted, No. SC2025-0478, 2025 WL 1672365 (Fla. June 13, 2025) (outlining how Paul performed additional steps to preserve the challenge to the random-box method of jury selection).

3 Kamari Lowery v. State of Florida 3D23-1957

GORDO, J., concurring in result.

While I agree with the majority that this case should be affirmed in all

respects, I write separately to address the issues raised by the appellant.

I.

Kamari Lowery was indicted for first-degree murder, armed robbery

and armed burglary of an occupied conveyance with assault or battery. He

drove with his brother, Kenyota Lowery, and his brother’s girlfriend, Aldana

Mesias, to purchase marijuana from two individuals, Jonathan Escobar and

Mariano Marin. After Escobar and Marin arrived at the scene, the brothers

approached their vehicle on foot and, at gunpoint, demanded “anything”

inside. Mesias remained in the car and witnessed the incident.

After handing over the marijuana, Escobar attempted to leave, but

before he could do so, Kenyota—still pointing the firearm—demanded that

Escobar surrender his chain. Escobar refused and told him, “Shoot me.” As

Escobar again attempted to leave, the brothers fired four to six shots in his

direction, striking him in the head, right eye, and left thigh. Escobar died at

the scene, while Marin was unharmed. The brothers fled to their car and

Mesias drove them away. All three were arrested shortly thereafter.

4 The case proceeded to a joint trial.1 During jury selection, the parties

were given time to fully question the entire venire. They resolved all for-

cause challenges by agreement, leaving fifty-one prospective jurors. Before

peremptory challenges began, the court announced it would use a “Google

random number generator” to call the remaining jurors in random order rather

than sequentially. The court explained the parties would not know which

juror numbers would be called until announced. No juror numbers were

changed and both sides knew which jurors were still available for challenge.

Defense counsel objected to the court’s procedure, arguing he “would

like to see what jurors are still available.” The trial court overruled the

objection, noting the parties had seating charts and therefore knew which

jurors remained available. Counsel responded he saw no reason why the

parties should be blind to the order of the remaining jurors. The court noted

the objection and proceeded with the jury selection, allotting each side with

ten peremptory challenges.2

1 The State charged Kenyota with the same charges as Kamari. Mesias was indicted as an accessory after the fact and subsequently entered into a plea agreement in exchange for her testimony against the brothers. 2 Under section 913.08(1)(a), Florida Statutes, both the state and the defendant are entitled to ten peremptory challenges when the charged offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment. See § 913.08(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

5 After considering thirty-six jurors, the parties selected a twelve-

member panel. 3 Once Kamari’s counsel exhausted his peremptory

challenges, the trial court asked if he wished to raise any for-cause

challenges. Counsel did not raise any for-cause challenges, made no

request for additional peremptories, identified no objectionable juror and

accepted the panel.

The court then proceeded to select two alternates, allowing each side

two additional strikes. The parties considered five prospective jurors,

selected two alternates and accepted both without objection. 4 Before the

panel was sworn, Kamari’s counsel informed the trial court that he was

renewing “all previous motions and objections” and accepted “the panel only

subject to all previous renewals.” Counsel did not express any

dissatisfaction with the jury panel or request additional peremptory

challenges. Upon the conclusion of jury selection, the trial court asked both

defendants whether they were satisfied with their lawyers’ services up to that

point and both responded, “Yes, sir.”

3 The court discussed the prospective jurors with the parties in the following randomized order: 34, 50, 46, 53, 79, 16, 62, 44, 72, 33, 12, 22, 47, 24, 59, 55, 42, 17, 29, 77, 43, 36, 13, 41, 69, 8, 39, 9, 2, 25, 48, 15, 27, 32, 6 and 64. 4 In total, the parties considered forty-one jurors to select a twelve-member panel and two alternates.

6 Following a four-day trial, the jury found Kamari guilty of

manslaughter—a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder—armed

robbery and armed burglary of an occupied conveyance with assault or

battery. 5 Kamari subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing he was

“prejudiced in not being able to make strikes with full knowledge of order of

the remaining prospective members of the jury panel.” The trial court denied

the motion. Kamari was sentenced to 20 years for manslaughter and 30

years for robbery and burglary, followed by 20 years of probation, with a 10-

year mandatory minimum. This appeal followed.

II.

A trial court’s “jury selection procedure” is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Rock v. State, 638 So. 2d 933, 934 (Fla. 1994). “[W]hether an

issue is properly preserved for appellate review is a question of law that this

Court reviews de novo.” Wong v. State, 212 So. 3d 351, 355–56 (Fla. 2017).

III.

This case involves two distinct objections to the trial court’s method of

jury selection, both of which are intertwined and addressed in the arguments

before us. Kamari argues, during the jury selection, he first lodged a

5 Kenyota was convicted on all indicted charges and has appealed both his conviction and sentence in a related proceeding. See Kenyota Lowery v. State of Florida, No. 3D23-2017.

7 challenge to the trial court’s use of a random jury-box method6 and later

complained about the exercise of peremptory strikes. In my view, the

objection to the jury selection method is properly preserved for appellate

review, whereas the claim regarding the exercise of peremptory strikes is

not. 7

IV.

At the outset, the manner in which peremptory challenges are

exercised during jury selection lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court. See Rock, 638 So. 2d at 934. While I agree with the majority’s

6 The “random jury-box method” is a system of jury selection in which prospective jurors are selected by lot from the venire and placed into the jury- box, typically twelve at a time in a criminal case. Counsel for both sides then alternately exercise challenges for cause and peremptory challenges against those seated, with new jurors randomly drawn to replace any who are removed. This process continues in structured rounds until each side has either used or waived its allotted challenges, at which point the twelve individuals remaining in the box become the petit jury. This system focuses on evaluating jurors individually as they are seated and does not permit full advance knowledge of replacement jurors. See United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1981). 7 This case presents two fundamentally different issues. The first is an objection to the method of jury selection itself, independent of any effect on peremptory strikes, which requires determining whether the court abused its discretion in employing that method. See Rock, 638 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1994). The second is whether the jury selection method interfered with the exercise of peremptory strikes, which requires examining whether counsel was able to exercise those strikes in an informed, effective and strategically sound manner. See Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 486 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1986); Sikes v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 415 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).

8 ultimate conclusion, I would frame the initial inquiry by examining whether

the trial court in this case abused its discretion by employing the random jury-

box method that did not allow the parties to know in which order the

remaining jurors would be subject to peremptory challenge.8 In doing so, I

would begin by considering whether any constitutional provision, statute,

rule, binding case law, or historical tradition prohibits Florida courts from

employing the random jury-box method used in this case. 9

8 Kamari initially objected to the lack of knowledge regarding the order in which jurors remained available for challenge and renewed all prior objections before the jury was sworn. This issue is analogous to the preservation posture recognized in longstanding Florida Supreme Court precedent. See Rock, 638 So. 2d at 934–35 (Fla. 1994) (finding that a contemporaneous objection to the trial court’s method of jury selection was sufficient to preserve the issue for consideration on the merits). Notably, this issue is materially different from the one we addressed in Sikes, 415 So. 3d 235. There, we considered whether the jury-selection procedure impaired counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory strikes. Sikes did not involve a challenge directed solely to the method of jury selection itself, as addressed in Rock. Here, Kamari presented a separate challenge to the trial court’s use of the random jury-box procedure, independent of its effect on peremptory challenges. That argument concerns whether the procedure— by not allowing the parties to know the order in which the remaining jurors would be seated—constitutes an abuse of discretion. Sikes did not address that question. Rather, our review there was limited to whether the procedure interfered with counsel’s effective use of peremptory strikes. 9 Kamari asserts he would have preferred the “struck jury” system, an alternative method of jury selection in which an initial panel is drawn by lot from the pool of qualified venire members. The size of this panel equals the number of jurors needed to decide the case—typically twelve in a criminal trial—plus the total number of peremptory challenges allotted to both sides. Counsel then alternately exercise their peremptory challenges against this larger panel until each side has exhausted its allotted strikes, leaving the

9 A.

Under the Florida Constitution, peremptory strikes are not recognized

as a freestanding constitutional right. Article I, section 16(a) of the Florida

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy and public

trial by an “impartial jury.” Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const. The constitutional

command is impartiality; it does not prescribe the mechanics of jury

selection. The impartial-jury guarantee under the Florida Constitution does

not grant a defendant a right to a particular type of selection or preferred jury

composition; it guarantees fairness, not customization. See West v. State,

584 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“[A defendant’s right to an

impartial jury] does not entitle that defendant to be tried by any particular

jurors or by a jury of a particular composition.”).

Consistent with that principle, Florida law has long recognized that

peremptory challenges are very important tools in the process of seating an

impartial jury. They themselves, however, are not the constitutional

guarantee. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, while cause

challenges and peremptory strikes are the primary mechanisms by which an

impartial jury is selected, peremptories occupy a fundamentally different

remaining twelve individuals to serve as the petit jury. Unlike the random jury-box system, the struck jury system usually permits full advance knowledge of replacement jurors in sequence. See Blouin, 666 F.2d 796.

10 status: they are not constitutional entitlements but procedural tools designed

to facilitate the selection of a fair and impartial jury. See State v. Neil, 457

So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), receded from on other grounds by State v.

Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993) (“The primary purpose of

peremptory challenges is to aid and assist in the selection of an impartial

jury.”); State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1993) (“[T]he peremptory

challenge contributes significantly to the selection of a fair jury[.]”); Busby v.

State, 894 So. 2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]he ability to exercise peremptory

challenges as provided under Florida law is an essential component to

achieving Florida’s constitutional guaranty of trial by an impartial jury.”);

Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452, 459 (Fla. 2012) (“While there is no

freestanding constitutional right to exercise peremptory challenges . . . this

Court has long recognized that ‘such challenges are “nonetheless one of the

most important of the rights secured to the accused.”” (quoting Smith v.

State, 59 So. 3d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2011))).

Our federal Constitution also guarantees a criminal defendant the right

to a speedy and public trial by an “impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 10

That guarantee applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth

10 The Florida Constitution contains language similar to that of the Federal Constitution. See Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.

11 Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which commands that no State shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Importantly, “the United States Constitution

generally sets the ‘floor’—not the ‘ceiling’—of personal rights and freedoms

that must be afforded to a defendant by Florida law.” State v. Horwitz, 191

So. 3d 429, 438 (Fla. 2016). Like Florida, the text of the federal Constitution

confers no freestanding constitutional right to peremptory challenges. The

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to an impartial jury that

is ultimately seated—not the procedures or methods by which jurors are

selected.

The United States Supreme Court has also consistently recognized

that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed but instead

are a tool to help secure an impartial jury. And—so long as the jury ultimately

seated is impartial—the proper regulation of use of a peremptory challenge

does not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation. See Ross v. Oklahoma,

487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (“We have long recognized that peremptory

challenges are not of constitutional dimension. They are a means to achieve

the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact

that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result

does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.”); United States v.

12 Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307 (2000) (“[Peremptories] are one means

to achieve the constitutionally required end of an impartial jury.”).

In sum, the Florida and U.S. Constitutions both safeguard the right to

an impartial jury but neither create a freestanding right to a specific

jury-selection method. See Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 648 (Fla. 1922) (“The

intent of a constitution is shown by the words that are used therein. The

courts have no power to add provisions to the Constitution.”).

B.

Similarly, current Florida statutes and procedural rules confer no right

to know, before exercising a peremptory challenge, which juror will replace

a stricken panelist. Florida’s modern jury-selection statutes and rules govern

eligibility, venire creation and the number of peremptories but do not dictate

the order by which replacement jurors must be called after a peremptory

strike. See § 913.08, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.350. Section 913.08,

Florida Statutes, establishes how many peremptory challenges each side

receives. Rule 3.350, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise governs

the number and allocation of peremptories, including alternates and

discretionary additional strikes. No statute or procedural rule dictates

replacement order or requires advanced knowledge of who comes next. See

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.350.

13 The federal scheme is governed by the federal jury-selection statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1866, which provides “the jury commission or the clerk shall

draw at random from the qualified jury wheel such numbers of names of

persons as may be required for assignment to grand and petit jury panels.”

28 U.S.C. § 1866(a). That directive operates within the broader framework

of 28 U.S.C. § 1863, which requires each district court to implement “a written

plan for the random selection of grand and petit jurors” and to prescribe

detailed procedures designed to ensure the random selection of a fair cross

section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a), (b)(3). These statutes

regulate the mechanics of selecting a jury and do not mandate any fixed

sequence for replacement jurors or require disclosure of who will be called

next. Instead, they require that jurors be selected at random. The exercise

of peremptory challenges, in turn, is governed by Rule 24, Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24. Rule 24 establishes the

number of peremptory challenges and addresses their allocation but it sets

forth no specific method for their exercise and does not mandate any

particular order in which replacement jurors must be called. Section 1866

and Rule 24 embody a jury-selection framework intended to safeguard

randomness and administrative discretion. No federal statute confers upon

litigants a right to advance notice of who comes next.

14 The applicable Florida and federal statutes and rules governing jury

selection regulate only the basic mechanics of the process and number of

peremptory challenges. Neither explicitly recognizes a right to know the

order in which the remaining jurors are subject to peremptory challenges.

C.

Our Florida Supreme Court’s approved jury practices—dating back

more than a century—likewise do not recognize a right to know who comes

next. See Green v. State, 17 Fla. 669, 680–81 (1880). In Green, the Florida

Supreme Court addressed and rejected the precise type of objection

advanced here. There, the defendant argued it was error for the sheriff—

after the regular panel was exhausted—to summon bystanders “one at a

time” and without furnishing a full list in advance. Id. at 680. Relying on the

applicable statute, Chapter 1628, Laws of 1868, section 21, the Court

explained that when “by reason of challenge or otherwise” the panel is

depleted, “the court shall cause jurors to be summoned from the by-standers”

to complete the jury, and that the statute “does not contemplate the issuing

of a special venire” or any formal return of names. Id. at 680-81. The entire

proceeding, the Court emphasized, occurs in “open court” and is reflected in

the “minutes.” Id. at 681. The Court did not require advance disclosure of a

defined replacement sequence. Id. This framework reflects judicial flexibility

15 and a randomized process for selecting replacement jurors—not a

predetermined, preannounced sequence.

Green is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of any right to

know “who comes next.” If Florida law had ever recognized an entitlement

to the order of replacement jurors, Green could not have approved a system

in which bystanders were summoned individually, on demand, without a

preannounced list. See Green, 17 Fla. at 680–81. This historical precedent

belies the claim that replacement in jury selection may only properly occur

through a fixed, party-known order disclosed before a peremptory strike.

Other Florida precedent from the turn of the twentieth century also

confirms that random jury-box method is an appropriate method so long as

a party suffers no prejudice in its application. See Colson v. State, 40 So.

183 (Fla. 1906). In Colson, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s

authority, once the available venire proved insufficient “by reason of

challenges or otherwise,” to draw additional names from the jury-box or direct

the sheriff to summon qualified jurors from the body of the county to complete

the panel. Id. at 187. The governing statute, section 1158 of the Revised

Statutes of 1892, expressly authorized the court, in its discretion, to “draw,

or cause to be drawn from the box, to be summoned, or [] direct the sheriff

16 to summon from by-standers,” a sufficient number of jurors to complete the

jury. Id.

In particular, jurors were randomly selected or called one by one from

the box. Equally significant, the Court rejected challenges premised on

alleged irregularities in the drawing process absent a showing of prejudice,

explaining that even where there has been a “substantial departure” from

prescribed procedures, the objection “should not avail” if “no possible injury

could accrue to the defendant.” Id.

In Ammos v. State, the Florida Supreme Court again affirmed the

longstanding presumption that jurors seated in the box are “fit and qualified

generally for jury service,” underscoring that peremptory challenges operate

as a supplemental safeguard in securing an impartial jury. Ammons v. State,

61 So. 496, 497 (Fla. 1913). Taken together Ammons, Colson and Green

substantiate that Florida’s early jury selection practice did not contemplate—

much less require—advance disclosure of a predetermined replacement

juror. When the available panel proved insufficient, additional jurors were

drawn or summoned as needed—subject to challenge—and absent

prejudice, no irregularity warranted reversal.

Recently, our sister district court upheld the very jury-selection

procedure challenged here. See Paul v. State, 407 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA

17 2025). In Paul, the Fourth District reaffirmed that Florida law secures a

defendant’s right to an impartial jury and the ability to exercise peremptory

challenges but does not guarantee knowledge of which juror will replace a

stricken juror. Id. at 476. The Court held that the random “jury box” method

is a traditional, constitutionally permissible means of conducting jury

selection. Id. at 479. 11

Federal case law has also overwhelmingly approved random jury-box

method and rejected any purported right to know who comes next. See

United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.

Delgado, 350 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, No.

21-10079, 2022 WL 402927, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2022).

In Blouin, the Second Circuit upheld a trial court’s use of the “jury box”

method, which required the defendant to exercise his final peremptory

challenges without knowing which jurors would be called to replace those

struck. Blouin, 666 F.2d at 796. Although the defendant argued such

11 Paul is currently pending review before the Florida Supreme Court. The record in Paul is materially different than the one before us. Paul also addressed whether the randomized procedure prevented defense counsel from making informed, effective and strategically sound decisions when exercising peremptory challenges. That aspect of Paul is not evaluated here, as Kamari failed to preserve such an argument in this case. This discussion is confined to the narrow question of whether the jury selection method itself is permissible.

18 procedure limited his ability to make effective use of his peremptories, the

court flatly disagreed, holding the jury-selection process “did not deny Blouin

any protected right[.]” Id. The court explained this limitation is an inherent

feature of the jury-box system, which—unlike the struck-jury method—does

not permit “full comparative choice” because the parties do not know in

advance who will replace a challenged juror. Id. at 798. The court rejected

the premise that error can be shown merely by demonstrating that a different

procedure would have allowed more “effective” use of peremptories, warning

that if such a rule governed, the struck-jury system would be constitutionally

required in every case. Id. at 798–99.

Comparably, in Delgado, the Sixth Circuit rejected a defendant’s claim

that the trial court’s use of a struck-jury system as a jury-selection method

impaired counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory challenges. Delgado, 350

F.3d at 524. The court held the defendant’s claim of inability to make

effective use of his peremptories did “not invalidate” the trial court’s chosen

procedure “in which jurors were not seated in a sequence.” Id. The court

concluded that federal law does not mandate a preferred “method by which

such challenges are to be exercised.” Id. It specifically found the trial court’s

procedure was consistent with “the true nature of the peremptory challenge

right which is to allow the rejection and not the selection of perspective

19 jurors.” Id. at 525 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (cleaned

up).

More recently, in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a trial court’s

jury selection method which required “the parties to exercise peremptory

challenges without first having the opportunity to examine all prospective

jurors.” Williams, 2022 WL 402927, at *2. The court rejected the defendant’s

claim that the method employed by the trial court “impaired [counsel’s] ability

to exercise intelligently his peremptory challenges.” Id. Williams, Delgado

and Blouin confirm that peremptory challenges are intended to help secure

an impartial jury, not to allow parties to shape the jury selection according to

their preferred strategy.

D.

It is also worth considering whether the history and tradition of common

law discussions or statutory schemes in our early Republic have ever

recognized a mandatory right to know in advance which qualified juror will

be called to be considered to serve next.

Florida’s early statutory practice employed random selection as the

foundational mechanism for constituting juries—a method that necessarily

carried forward into the replacement process once challenges were

20 exercised. See Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Fla., ch. 86,

§§ 4, 7, at 134 (1832).

The Territorial Legislature required that the names of qualified jurors

be written on slips of paper and placed in a box, from which the required

number would be drawn in the presence of the marshal or sheriff. See Acts

of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Fla., ch. 86, § 4, at 134 (1832)

(“Be it further enacted, That the clerks of the superior courts in the several

counties in this Territory shall write the names of the persons returned to

them as qualified to serve as jurors, which shall be written on slips of paper

and placed in one box, from which, in the presence of the marshal or sheriff,

shall be drawn forty-seven names; and the persons so drawn shall be

summoned by the proper officer according to law.”).

Those drawn were then summoned for service, and, upon assembly,

their names were again placed into a box and drawn to compose the grand

and petit juries. See Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Fla.,

ch. 86, § 7, at 134 (1832) (“Be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of

the marshal, as soon as the court is open, to call aloud at the door of the

court house the whole of the jurors summoned to attend; and the names of

all that are present shall be taken down by the clerk of the court, on slips of

paper of equal size, and put into a hat or box, and the twenty three first drawn

21 shall compose the grand jury, and the balance remaining undrawn shall be

the petit jury.”).

Even where additional jurors were required, the statute directed that a

venire facias issue and that the replacement jurors be “chosen as

aforesaid”—that is, by the same randomized drawing process. See Acts of

the Legislative Council of the Territory of Fla., ch. 86, § 7, at 134 (1832)

(“That if there should be a failure to summon jurors, the court may direct a

venire facias12 to issue returnable immediately, and shall direct the

summoning of forty-seven jurors, who shall be chosen as aforesaid, the first

twenty-three selected to act as grand jurors, and the remainder as petit

jurors.”) (footnote added).

This statutory scheme leaves no room for a claimed entitlement to a

fixed or party-known sequence of replacements. From initial qualification

through final composition, jury formation depended upon chance selection

administered by court officers—not upon a predetermined lineup disclosed

to litigants in advance. At no point could the parties know, much less control,

who ultimately would comprise the petit jury. Its membership emerged only

12 Venire facias is “a judicial writ directing the sheriff to summon a specified number of qualified persons to serve as jurors.” Meriam-Webster Online Dictionary (1828), https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/venire%20facias (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

22 through successive randomized draws. In that historical framework,

peremptory challenges operated against jurors as they were drawn and

presented, not against an anticipated and ordered succession of future

replacements.

Florida’s early jury selection practice notably included the use of

“talesmen,” or “bystanders,” to complete a jury when necessary—a

procedure that by its very nature forecloses any claimed entitlement to a

fixed or knowable sequence of replacements. Green, 17 Fla. at 680; John

Proffatt, A Treatise on Trial by Jury, Including Questions of Law and Fact

191 (1877). As stated above, Green holds that when the original jurors were

exhausted due to challenges or other reasons, the court could promptly

summon additional jurors from the bystanders or the county at large to

complete the panel, without needing to issue “a special venire.” Green, 17

Fla. at 680.

Proffatt observes that when summoned jurors failed to appear, or the

panel was reduced by exemptions or challenges, the deficiency was “made

up by summoning so many of the bystanders as will be necessary to

complete the panel.” Proffatt, supra at 191. This approach limited any

party’s ability to anticipate which jurors would serve next and reinforced the

notion that early Florida practice valued completing the jury efficiently over

23 adhering to preferred procedural formalities. Thus, history and tradition

confirm that random selection from the jury-box has been the governing

norm—throughout Florida—since at least 1832.

From at least the seventeenth century forward, the dominant

common-law model for ordinary juries was a “jury-box” style procedure in

which names were drawn by lot, challenges were exercised against jurors

under consideration and vacancies were filled by additional “random” draws

from the remaining pool. See Giles Duncombe, Trials per Pais: Or, the Law

of England Concerning Juries by Nisi Prius, & C. 157–58 (1665); Seymour

D. Thompson & Edwin G. Merriam, A Treatise on the Organization, Custody

and Conduct of Juries, Including Grand Juries 287 (1882). Under that model,

a litigant could not claim any entitlement to know in advance which particular

venire member would replace a juror removed by challenge because the

replacement was selected “indifferently” (i.e., by lot) from the remaining

panel. Duncombe, supra at 157–58; Thompson & Merriam, supra at 287.

Any historical sources that do address replacement order treat randomness

as a feature intended to prevent parties from manipulating the composition

of the petit jury by anticipating substitutions. See Thompson & Merriam,

supra at 287–88.

24 One of the earliest treatise descriptions of jury selection explains that

prospective jurors’ names were placed into a “box or glass” and drawn until

the requisite number was obtained, with additional names drawn as needed

when jurors were challenged or failed to appear. Duncombe, supra at

157-58. That description reflects a process where the identity of any

replacement juror necessarily remained unknown to the litigants at the time

they decided whether to challenge a juror then under consideration.

Nineteenth-century American sources describe the same basic

approach as the typical method in many jurisdictions: names written on slips,

placed in a box, twelve drawn to form the presumptive jury and additional

names drawn to complete the panel as jurors were challenged or excused.

See Thompson & Merriam, supra at 287. That “box” method, as described,

is structurally incompatible with any right to know in advance who will replace

a struck juror because the replacement is not selected until after the strike is

made and is selected by lot. Id. Another treatise explains that when a juror

was excused, the court could “fill the vacancy” by directing the clerk to draw

another name from the box, again reflecting replacement by random

selection rather than by a litigant-known sequence. W.W. Thornton, The

Law Appertaining to Juries and Instructions Thereto: Applicable to Those

States Having Codes Similar to the Indiana Code, the Instructions Being

25 Applicable to Any State, Having All Been Approved by the Supreme Court of

Indiana 105 (1888).

South Carolina’s early practice, as reflected in its courts, provides a

clear illustration of historical jury formation and replacement. See State v.

Sims, 18 S.C.L. 29, 32 (S.C. App. L. & Eq. 1830). In Sims, twelve names

were drawn from a “box or glass” to form the jury and if a juror was

challenged, “other persons” were drawn “out of the said box or glass to fill up

and complete the said jury.” Id. at 32. The court endorsed this method of

summoning replacement jurors as necessary, noting that, taken together, the

system was “better calculated to further the ends of justice, and to secure

the trial by jury from fraud and corruption.” Id. at 33. This principle mirrors

the 1731 South Carolina Act, which directed that petit jurors be drawn from

a separate box or glass and that replacements be drawn as necessary to

complete the panel, rather than from any litigant-controlled or litigant-known

order.

The historic case most directly on point, City Council of Charleston v.

Kleinback, 29 S.C.L. 418, 423 (S.C. App. L. 1844), rejected the very idea

Kamari advances here—challenging with an eye toward a particular

substitute—holding the parties “should not be permitted to make their

challenges with any view of looking to any particular juror in the

26 supernumerary list as a substitute.” Kleinback further illustrated the rule by

explaining that, even if names were initially in a known order, they must be

“put in the hat and drawn over again,” requiring the parties to “take them as

they are thus drawn,” which defeats any asserted entitlement to advance

knowledge of the substitute. Id. The point of such randomization was not

merely administrative convenience but also preventing “undue advantage”

and avoiding temptations for “criminal understanding” by making it

impossible to target a particular juror as the predictable replacement. Id.

Modern commentary likewise describes random replacement as the

“usual system” in a jury-box approach, where a challenged juror is replaced

by someone “selected randomly” from the remaining prospective jurors. Jon

M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to

Representative Panels 146 (1977). Van Dyke explains that under this

system, a litigant may perceive the replacement as less favorable than the

juror just struck. See Id. (“Attorneys usually must exercise some restraint in

exercising peremptory challenges and will only eliminate those persons who

appear ‘worse’ than average. Under the usual system, a juror challenged

peremptorily is replaced in the jury-box by someone selected randomly from

among the remaining prospective jurors, and the new juror may be someone

worse (from the perspective of the litigant exercising peremptory challenge)

27 than the person just challenged. The new juror may also be challenged, if

any challenges are left.”). This randomized approach is considered effective

in creating a balance in jury selection, ensuring that peremptory challenges

function as a safeguard against obviously unsuitable jurors while preventing

strategic manipulation of the panel.

Historical authorities make it clear that where statutes are silent about

the mode of impaneling, all subsequent proceedings in relation to the

formation of a jury are left to the discretion of the court, which includes the

order in which jurors are called and replaced. See Thompson & Merriam,

supra at 288 (“Where the statutes are silent as to the mode of impaneling

the jury, after the jurors are returned into court, all subsequent proceedings

in relation to the formation of a jury are left to the discretion of the court.”);

1 Seymour D. Thompson, A Treatise on the Law of Trials in Actions Civil and

Criminal 84 (1889) (“Within the scope of this discretion are such questions

as the order in which the name of the jurors shall be called.”).

The absence of any textual command in the common law or statutory

scheme mandating a replacement order is faithful to history and tradition

since the founding of our Republic. The key takeaway is that trial judges

maintain substantial latitude to select procedures tailored to local conditions

and efficient jury management absent prejudicial error.

28 E.

Equally important is whether peremptory challenges themselves

guarantee the right to select preferred jurors and whether a right requires

advance knowledge of replacements.

Across the nineteenth century, leading commentators consistently

described the peremptory strike as a mechanism for excluding objectionable

jurors, not for choosing preferred ones. Seymour D. Thompson explained

the “right of peremptory challenge is a right to reject and not a right to select.”

1 Thompson, supra at 37. Hugo Hirsch echoed the same understanding in

his treatise, stating the right to exercise a peremptory strike is “not to select,

but to reject.” Hugo Hirsch, A Practical Treatise on Juries, Their Powers,

Duties, and Uses, in All Actions and Proceedings, Both Civil and Criminal,

Under the Common Law, and Under the Statutes of the United States and

the State of New York 141 (1879). In their treatise on the organization and

conduct of juries, Seymour D. Thompson and Edwin G. Merriam emphasized

the peremptory challenge “is a right only to reject, and can never be so

exercised as to confer a right to select.” Thompson & Merriam, supra at 286.

Centuries-old precedent from both Florida courts and the United States

Supreme Court reinforces that same principle. In Colson, the Florida

29 Supreme Court characterized it as a “fundamental principle” that a

“peremptory challenge is a right to reject, and not a right to select.” Colson,

40 So. at 187. The Court reiterated that understanding in Melbourne v. State,

explaining that a criminal defendant “has no right to any particular juror” and

that the right of “challenge confers the right to reject, not to select, jurors.”

Melbourne v. State, 40 So. 189, 190 (Fla. 1906). More recently, in Hayes,

the Court described the “central function of peremptory challenges is to

enable each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial

toward the other side.” Hayes, 94 So. 3d at 459 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has articulated the same rule for

nearly two centuries. In United States v. Marchant, the Court made clear the

“peremptory challenge is not of itself a right to select, but a right to reject

jurors.” United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. 480, 482 (1827). That

formulation was reaffirmed in Hayes v. Missouri and again in Brown v. New

Jersey. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) (“The right to

challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a juror.”); Brown v. New Jersey,

175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899) (“The right to challenge is the right to reject, not to

select, a juror.”) (citation omitted).

30 This understanding necessarily clarifies the role of peremptory

challenges, whose central function under Florida law is not to permit jury

construction but to allow each side to exclude jurors it believes may be

partial, operating as a safeguard to achieve impartiality rather than as a

substantive right to an engineered jury. See Hayes, 94 So. 3d at 460

(“Indeed, peremptory challenges, as well as challenges for cause, are the

primary tools by which parties remove unfavorable jurors from the jury

panel.”); 33 Fla. Jur. 2d Juries § 78 (“No one is entitled to a particular juror

or a jury of any particular composition. The right is not one of selection; it is

to reject jurors who are biased, prejudiced, or otherwise incompetent.”).

Taken together, this uninterrupted line of commentary and precedent

refutes any claim that peremptories historically implied a right to advanced

knowledge of replacement jurors.

V.

Because no constitutional provision, statute, rule, binding precedent or

historical tradition prevents Florida courts from using the random jury-box

method, the issue ultimately turns on whether the manner in which it was

applied resulted in any prejudice to Kamari.

The Florida Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has made clear that trial

courts retain broad discretion over jury selection procedures, including the

31 manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised. See Walsingham v.

State, 56 So. 195, 198 (Fla. 1911) (“[A] trial court, in impaneling a jury to

serve in a particular case, should have, and has, a very extensive and almost

unlimited discretion . . . .” (quoting State v. Miller, 29 Kan. 43, 46 (1882)));

Ter Keurst, 486 So. 2d at 549 (“[T]he procedure for jury selection has

traditionally been a discretionary function of the trial judge.”); Rock, 638

So. 2d at 934 (“The [] jury selection procedure used in Rock’s case was a

valid exercise of the trial court’s discretion in promoting jury management

and efficiency.”).

Federal case law likewise holds that jury-selection procedures,

including the manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised, are

traditionally committed to the discretion of the trial courts. See Blouin, 666

F.2d at 797 (“[T]rial courts retain a broad discretion to determine the way

peremptory challenges will be exercised.”); Delgado, 350 F.3d at 524 (“Jury

selection procedures, including the manner in which peremptory challenges

are exercised, are traditionally left to the discretion of the [trial] courts.”);

Williams, 2022 WL 402927, at *2 (“We review for abuse of discretion ‘the

procedure adopted by the trial court to regulate the parties’ exercise of

peremptory challenges.’ We have recognized that the ‘trial court has wide

discretion in supervising the selection of jurors and regulating the exercise

32 of peremptory challenges.’” (quoting United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945,

958 (11th Cir. 2020))).

“While the time and manner of challenging and swearing jurors have

traditionally rested within the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial court

does not have the discretion to infringe upon a party’s right to challenge any

juror, either peremptorily or for cause, prior to the time the jury is sworn.”

Lottimer v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So. 2d 165, 166–67 (Fla. 4th DCA

2004) (cleaned up). “The burden of showing that the trial judge abused his

discretion lies with the defendant.” Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944, 949

(Fla. 1979). “A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an

express finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court.” Cargle v.

State, 770 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2000) (quoting § 924.051(7), Fla. Stat.).

“In a direct appeal . . . the party challenging the judgment or order of the trial

court has the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in the

trial court.” Id.

Our appellate review under an abuse of discretion standard requires

more than disagreement with a trial court’s chosen method; it requires a

showing that the procedure meaningfully impaired the exercise of a

protected right. See Lottimer, 889 So. 2d at 166–67. The critical inquiry

therefore is not whether a different jury-selection process could have been

33 used but whether the process used here prejudiced Kamari in exercising his

peremptory challenges in a manner guaranteed by Florida law. It did NOT.

The record shows that Kamari’s counsel was actively, thoroughly and

deliberately engaged throughout an extensive jury selection process.

Counsel exercised all ten peremptory challenges in a measured and careful

manner, including repeatedly reviewing a completed but untendered panel

and employing additional strikes to refine its composition until he was fully

satisfied. Counsel closely scrutinized the State’s use of peremptory

challenges, demanding race-neutral explanations on multiple occasions and

successfully defeating at least one attempted strike, further reflecting vigilant

advocacy. After Kamari’s peremptory challenges were exhausted and the

panel finalized, the trial court offered additional for-cause challenges, which

counsel declined and counsel neither sought additional peremptory strikes

nor suggested that his ability to exercise them had been restricted in any

way. Counsel identified no objectionable juror who ultimately served on the

panel.

The trial court did not prematurely swear the jury or limit the use of

back strikes and all parties remained aware of the remaining juror pool as

counsel repeatedly reviewed both the jury and alternates before accepting

them. At no time did Kamari’s counsel assert the court’s random jury-box

34 method was prejudicial. Kamari raises no challenge to any juror who

ultimately served on the panel and asserts no claim of juror partiality.

Counsel was afforded—and fully exercised—a meaningful opportunity to use

his peremptory challenges. Accordingly, on this record, Kamari has not

carried his burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s choice of using the

random jury-box method was an abuse of discretion or that it resulted in

prejudicial error.

VI.

Kamari asserts his second issue—that the random jury-box method

impaired counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory challenges in an informed,

effective and strategic manner—was properly preserved for appellate

review. 13

A.

Our review of a pure question of law—such as whether an issue has

been properly preserved—is de novo and we are not constrained by the

parties’ characterizations. 14 See Black v. Cohen, 246 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla.

13 This Court previously addressed this issue in Sikes, considering whether the random jury-box method impaired counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory challenges. 415 So. 3d at 237. Because the issue was unpreserved, we did not reach the merits. Id. 14 While the State conceded in its initial brief that this issue was properly preserved, it argued for the first time at oral argument that it was not. Parties are generally bound by the positions they take in their briefs. The

35 4th DCA 2018) (“The preservation of an objection is strictly a question of law

and thus reviewable by the appellate court de novo.”); Alvarez v. Smith, 714

So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (“The determination of legal questions

is for the court rather than the parties.”); Hous. Opportunities Project v. SPV

Realty, LC, 212 So. 3d 419, 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“Our task is to decide

the legal issue before us.”); Citizens of State through Fla. Off. of Pub. Couns.

v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 294 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“[I]t is

our responsibility to say what the applicable law is.”).

Our decades-long Florida Supreme Court precedent holds that a

challenge to the exercise of “peremptories cannot be examined until the

issue is properly presented to the trial court[.]” Neil, 457 So. 2d at 488 (Fla.

1984). “In order to preserve a challenge to a peremptory strike for appellate

determination of legal questions, however—including preservation—rests with us. The parties cannot by stipulation or concession control our resolution of such issues. See Clark v. Munroe, 407 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“The parties cannot by stipulation control questions of law.”); Sigismondi v. State, 380 So. 3d 1208, 1218 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (“[E]ven where ‘the State has not argued the lack of preservation in an appeal[,] this court has an independent obligation to ensure that an alleged prejudicial error was properly preserved for appellate review.’ Consequently, ‘while this independent obligation does not excuse parties from raising on appeal the issue of whether an alleged error is properly preserved, we will not base a reversal on an unpreserved error simply because the opposing party failed to bring the lack of preservation to our attention.’” (quoting Conner v. State, 987 So. 2d 130, 132 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008))).

36 review, the objecting party must notice the trial court of the basis for the

objection.” John v. State, 741 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing

Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996)). A party’s challenge to

the exercise of “peremptories must be raised prior to the jury being sworn.”

State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565, 565 (Fla. 1986).

Florida law is well-settled “that proper preservation entails three

components.” Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160, 1191 (Fla. 2017) (quoting

Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005)). “First, a litigant must make

a timely, contemporaneous objection.” Id. “Second, the party must state a

legal ground for that objection.” Id. “Third, in order for an argument to be

cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal

ground for the objection below.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

We have repeatedly held that to satisfy this third requirement “‘a

defendant must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the

grounds of his objection’ to preserve his objection for appellate review.”

Connolly v. State, 172 So. 3d 893, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (quoting Courson

v. State, 414 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)). This premise is critical

because the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that general objections

are insufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review with respect to

peremptory strikes. See State v. Pacchiana, 289 So. 3d 857, 862 (Fla.

37 2020). Instead, a litigant must assert a “clear and specific [] objection” as

required by law. Id. “The purpose for the rule is to ‘place the trial judge on

notice that error may have been committed, and provide him an opportunity

to correct it at an early stage of the proceedings.’” L.B. v. State, 10 So. 3d

1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting Harrell, 894 So. 2d at 940).

Here, Kamari did not make the argument in the trial court that he now

advances on appeal. While Kamari objected to the jury-selection process

itself—stating he wished to see the order in which jurors remained available

for challenge—he never asserted the process impeded his ability to exercise

peremptory challenges in an informed, effective, or strategic manner at any

point before the jury was sworn. He never put the trial court on notice of this

argument and accepted the twelve-member panel and two alternates without

raising those objections or requesting additional challenges.

Then, after the panel was selected—but before the jury was sworn—

he simply stated he was renewing all prior motions and objections. Those

objections, however, did not include any assertion that not knowing who

comes next somehow impaired his effective exercise of peremptory

challenges. Absent such objections, the trial court was entitled to presume

that no prejudice occurred and that counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory

strikes was not impaired. Because Kamari did not precisely assert that the

38 court’s jury selection method impeded his ability to exercise peremptory

challenges in an informed, effective, or strategic manner before the jury was

sworn, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. 15 See Tillman v.

State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for further

review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower

court . . . .”); State v. Ivey, 285 So. 3d 281, 286–88 (Fla. 2019) (“It is a basic

principle of our law that an objection must be specific to be preserved for

review. Though no magic words are required, the objection must have been

sufficiently precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and

the grounds therefor. . . . The purpose of this rule . . . is to place the trial judge

on notice that error may have been committed, and provide him an

opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the proceedings. A review of the

record establishes that the objection here was not properly [] preserved. . . .

We hold that what counsel said in that discussion did not do the trick: his

statement to the trial judge lacked the requisite specificity. If counsel wished

to [pursue] an objection . . . [he] needed to make that fact clear. . . . Counsel’s

15 Kamari concedes he does not argue fundamental error on appeal. See Mansueto v. State, 148 So. 3d 813, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“Issues not properly raised in the lower tribunal are typically waived on appeal save for unpreserved issues that constitute fundamental error.”); Collins v. State, 211 So. 3d 214, 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that a “fundamental error” claim is waived by failing to make that argument on appeal).

39 statement gives not the slightest hint that he had the objection to the

peremptory strike in view. In the absence of any specific indication that

counsel was referring to the objection to the peremptory challenge, the trial

court could have had no idea that counsel sought to [pursue an objection as

to the peremptory strike.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

State v. Johnson, 295 So. 3d 710, 714-16 (Fla. 2020) (“It is the objecting

party’s obligation to place the trial court on notice of the basis for the

challenge and create a record supporting that objection. . . . In this case,

Johnson did not make a specific objection . . . . Accordingly, Johnson failed

to preserve his challenge to the trial court’s [ruling on the peremptory

strikes.]”) (internal citations omitted); Richemond v. State, 126 So. 3d 281,

284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Under the contemporaneous objection rule, an

issue is properly preserved if the trial court knows that an objection was

made, clearly understands the nature of the objection, and denies that

request. Additionally, courts have avoided the necessity of magic words

when stating an objection as long as counsel articulates the objection with

sufficient specificity as to inform the trial judge of the alleged error. We do

not believe the[] objections [at issue] apprised the trial court that Richemond

was complaining [about the argument he now advances on appeal.] We

40 therefore conclude that he failed to preserve the issue argued on appeal.”) 16

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

VII.

While Kamari argues the struck jury method is preferrable, it simply

does not mean it is exclusively required by law. Where no constitutional

provision, statute, rule, binding precedent or historical tradition prevents

Florida courts from using the random jury-box method, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in applying it where Kamari cannot point to any harmful

prejudice. Paramount to the analysis is the notion that any jury selection

method—even previously approved types—may run afoul of constitutional or

other concerns if proper objections are made and harmful prejudice has

resulted to a party. Here, there is none.

Although concerns may exist that the use of a random jury-box method

for jury selection may call into question a defendant’s “ability to ‘use his

peremptory challenges intelligently and effectively,’” that is outside the scope

16 Although Kamari first claimed prejudice in his motion for new trial, an objection to the exercise of peremptory strikes must be raised before the jury is sworn; an issue first presented in a post-trial motion after the jury is sworn is untimely. See Castillo, 486 So. 2d at 565 (“A second issue is whether the objection to the improper use of peremptories must be raised prior to the jury being sworn. The answer is in the affirmative. . . . Clearly, an objection must be raised prior to the swearing of the jury, and the issue being presented for the first time on a [post-trial motion], after the jury is sworn, is not timely.”).

41 of our plenary review. Sikes, 415 So. 3d at 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (Gooden,

J., specially concurring) (quoting Tedder v. Video Elecs., Inc., 491 So. 2d

533, 535 (Fla. 1986)). Such questions properly fall within the Florida

Supreme Court’s rule-making authority. See Off. of Pub. Def. v. State, 714

So. 2d 1083, 1085–86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (SORONDO, J., specially

concurring) (“The Florida Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate rules

of procedure. . . . Procedural rules concerning the judicial branch are the

responsibility of this Court, subject to repeal by the legislature in accordance

with our constitutional provisions.” (internal citations omitted)).

If the Court deems it appropriate, the adoption of a uniform rule or

procedural amendment governing the use of random jury-box method might

promote statewide consistency, safeguard the informed and meaningful

exercise of peremptory challenges and define the limits of trial court

discretion in employing such a method. Such guidance would establish

when these procedures are permissible, clarify counsel’s ability to make

strategic peremptory decisions and provide an orderly mechanism for

preserving and reviewing related objections. See TRG Desert Inn Venture,

Ltd. v. Berezovsky, 194 So. 3d 516, 520 n.5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016); E.R. Truck

& Equip. Corp. v. Gomont, 300 So. 3d 1230, 1231–32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

42 On this record, I would affirm the first issue because there is no abuse

of discretion in the trial court’s application of the random jury box method and

I would affirm the second issue for failure to preserve it for appellate review.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur in result.