Kamala v. Target

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedSeptember 18, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-01156
StatusUnknown

This text of Kamala v. Target (Kamala v. Target) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kamala v. Target, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JULIA KAMALA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-CV-1156-JPS-JPS v.

TARGET, ORDER

Defendant.

1. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Julia Kamala (“Plaintiff”) sues Defendant Target (“Defendant”), seeking from the Court “assist[ance] with [b]irth certificate documentation.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. This order screens Plaintiff’s pro se complaint. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and so cannot proceed. The Court will defer resolving Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 2. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS A party proceeding pro se may submit a request to proceed without prepaying the filing fees, otherwise known as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. “The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,1 is

1Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) specifically references “prisoner” litigants, it has been interpreted as providing authority for such requests by both prisoner and non-prisoner pro se litigants alike. Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (superseded by rule on other, inapplicable grounds); see also Mitchell designed to ensure [that] indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts while at the same time prevent indigent litigants from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Rodriguez v. Crim. Just. Facility Safety Bldg., No. 23-CV-394, 2023 WL 3467565, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2023) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rodriguez v. Crim. Just. Facility, No. 23-CV- 394-PP, 2023 WL 3467507 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2023). To determine whether it may authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court engages in a two-part inquiry. It must examine whether the litigant is able to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court must also examine whether the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”; if any of these criteria applies, the Court “shall dismiss the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). Likewise, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court engages in this part of the inquiry infra Section 3. It follows that a litigant whose complaint does not clear the § 1915(e)(2) threshold or does not plead claims within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and whose case cannot proceed as a result, necessarily cannot reap the benefits of proceeding in forma pauperis. In other words, although in forma pauperis status ought to be granted to those

v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1491 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1915(e) applies to all [in forma pauperis] litigants—prisoners who pay fees on an installment basis, prisoners who pay nothing, and nonprisoners in both categories.”) (Lay, J., concurring). impoverished litigants “who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them,” Brewster v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972), a pro se litigant’s financial status is only part of the picture in determining whether the litigant’s case may proceed without payment of the filing fee. The Court declines to analyze at this juncture whether Plaintiff is indigent because, as it discusses infra Section 3, there are barriers to Plaintiff proceeding with this lawsuit that must first be addressed. The Court will accordingly defer ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 3. SCREENING 3.1 Standards Notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee, the Court may screen a complaint and dismiss it or any portion thereof if it raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense. This is so even when the plaintiff has paid all fees for filing and service . . . .”); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[D]istrict courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants . . . regardless of fee status.”). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). To state a claim, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This rule “requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” United States, ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed- Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). “What is a short and plain statement depends, of course, on the circumstances of the case.” Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Lab’ys, 630 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.13, 8–124, 125 (2d ed. 1979) and citing Atwood v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 243 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1957)). And “undue length alone” may not necessarily warrant dismissal of an otherwise valid complaint. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Edwin K. Atwood v. Humble Oil & Refining Company
243 F.2d 885 (Fifth Circuit, 1957)
Robert L. Brewster v. North American Van Lines, Inc.
461 F.2d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 1972)
Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories
630 F.2d 1383 (Tenth Circuit, 1980)
Stanard v. Nygren
658 F.3d 792 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
James Hoskins v. John Poelstra
320 F.3d 761 (Seventh Circuit, 2003)
Jurijus Kadamovas v. Michael Stevens
706 F.3d 843 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich
526 F.3d 1074 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Brooks v. Ross
578 F.3d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Laura Kubiak v. City of Chicago
810 F.3d 476 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink
126 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)

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Kamala v. Target, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kamala-v-target-wied-2024.