FILED
Sep 11 2026, 9:06 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Kamal Siddique,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Nusrat Siddique,
Appellee-Petitioner
September 11, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-DC-72
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable Jonathan M. Brown, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
29D02-2311-DC-11018
Opinion by Judge Bailey
Judges Brown and Weissmann concur.
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Kamal Siddique (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order dissolving his
marriage to Nusrat Siddique (“Wife”). Husband raises the following five issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it imposed a lien on two of his businesses.
2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it imposed certain sanctions following discovery violations.
3. Whether the court clearly erred when it determined his ownership percentage of one of his businesses.
4. Whether the court abused its discretion when it determined that he had dissipated some of his assets.
5. Whether the court erred when it determined that any future-found marital property would be the sole property of Wife.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [3] At all relevant times, Husband has been a partial owner of two businesses:
Siddique Enterprises LLC and Ayesha Investments. Husband and Wife were married in 2012, and they had two children together. Wife filed a petition to dissolve the marriage on November 21, 2023.
[4] In April 2024, Wife served discovery requests on Husband. On June 14, Wife filed a motion to compel discovery, which motion the trial court granted. On August 6, Wife filed a notice of discovery issues and a request for Trial Rule 37 sanctions in which she outlined the items that were missing from Husband’s discovery responses. Then, on August 7, the court entered a provisional order requiring Husband to pay $536.00 per week in child support, pay a child support arrearage by a specific date, and make a $5,000 predissolution distribution to Wife.
[5] On September 30, Wife filed a notice of Husband’s noncompliance with discovery. On November 8, Wife filed a motion to compel Husband’s participation in a business valuation. In that motion, Wife alleged that she and Husband had twice agreed to use Bret Brewer to conduct the business valuations but that Husband had canceled meetings with Brewer. As a result, Wife asked the trial court to order Husband to pay Brewer’s fees, meet with Brewer within two weeks, and provide any additional documentation to Brewer within three days. The trial court granted Wife’s motion.
[6] On December 3, Wife filed a motion for rule to show cause and alleged that Husband had “fail[ed] to contact, respond, or remit any form of payment to” Brewer. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 95. And Wife argued that Husband’s “continued willful disregard” of the court’s order caused “undue delays in the acquisition of necessary discovery and information necessary to effectuate the litigation of this matter” and had caused her to incur “unnecessary legal fees[.]” Id. The next day, Wife filed a motion to appoint Julie Camden to serve as a financial commissioner “to effectuate the procurement of necessary financial information, statements, and documents requested and necessary.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 8. The court granted that motion on December 10.
[7] The court held a hearing on Wife’s pending motions. Wife appeared, but Husband did not. Following the hearing, the court ordered Husband to serve fourteen days in the county jail but stayed that sentence pending his “strict and timely compliance with” certain conditions, including: contacting Brewer and executing any documents necessary within seven days, paying Wife a predissolution distribution of $45,000 within seven days, paying over $16,000 in Wife’s attorney’s fees, supplementing his deficient discovery responses within seven days, and cooperating with Camden. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 100.
[8] On December 18, Wife filed a motion for execution of jail sentence. Wife contended that Husband had failed to timely pay the predissolution distribution and her attorney’s fees and had failed to supplement his discovery responses. On December 23, the court issued a provisional order in which it set out child custody and support issues and ordered Husband to pay Wife a predissolution distribution payment of $70,000. On December 30, following a hearing, the court ordered Husband to serve his jail sentence due to his noncompliance.
[9] On February 9, 2025, Camden filed an emergency motion for the appointment of a receiver. Camden alleged that she had received Husband’s financial records and that she saw “signs of dissipation.” Id. at 136. In particular, Camden alleged that there were “transfers from [Husband’s] bank account in large amounts, and the receiving bank has no records of those accounts in his name, meaning he’s transferring large sums of money to other people.” Id. She also asserted that Husband had various outstanding debts to attorneys, that Husband claimed to be insolvent, and that “the transfers/dissipations appear to be what is rendering him insolvent.” Id. at 137.
[10] Based on Husband’s past failures to comply with discovery, the court granted the request for a receiver on March 19. In particular, the court concluded that Husband “did not learn from the 14 days he spent in jail” as he “has failed to assist the Commissioner with disclosing his financial records.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 20. In addition, the court found “it difficult to believe [Husband] will disclose his assets without a receiver being appointed and/or additional incarceration” and that Husband’s “noncooperation and inaction is jeopardizing the assets of the marital estate[.]” Id. Accordingly, the court concluded: “In light of [Husband’s] pattern of contemptuous behavior over the past year, even with the appointment of a Commissioner to assist the Court in moving this case forward, and with [Husband] serving an executed sentence,” a receivership “is unfortunately a necessary step-up to ensure prompt compliance with court orders and protect the assets of the marriage[.]” Id. at 22. The court then appointed Camden as receiver over Husband and his assets.
[11] On June 11, Wife filed another motion for rule to show cause and a request for sanctions. Wife alleged that Husband had failed to pay the full amount due to Brewer, had failed to cooperate with Brewer, and had failed to provide answers to questions Brewer had asked of Husband. Wife alleged that, as a result, the business valuations could not be completed. Wife then asked that Husband be “precluded from presenting evidence of his ownership interest” in his companies. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 146.
[12] On June 17, Wife filed a notice alleging that Husband had dissipated assets. Wife alleged that, prior to Camden obtaining the receivership, Husband and/or his agents had relocated funds from his accounts. The same day, Camden filed a motion to find Husband in contempt for failing to pay her fees for several months. Camden further stated that she had traveled to seven banks and learned that Husband had reduced the balance in one account to zero and that other banks had been unable to provide her with funds.
[13] The court held a hearing on, among other things, Wife’s motion for rule to show cause and notice of dissipation. Husband brought a check with him to the hearing to pay Brewer’s outstanding fee. Following that hearing, the court noted that Husband’s “game-playing” had “caused delays in these proceedings” and had “resulted in the waste of judicial resources[.]” Id. at 156. The court also found that the case was rife “with discovery non-compliance and credibility issues associated with” Husband. Id. at 156-57. And the court noted that it had “exercised many of the options it has at its disposal in an effort to encourage/bring [Husband] into compliance.” Id. at 157. Accordingly, the court ordered that Husband “is prohibited from presenting evidence or offering evidence” opposing Wife’s evidence of Husband’s ownership interest in his companies. Id. The court also ordered Husband to serve fourteen days in the county jail as a result of his failure to make child support payments. And the court ordered Husband to serve an additional six weeks in the county jail as a result of his failure to provide proof to the court related to the relocation of his assets. The court then noted that “no other case has had a litigant go to such lengths to not comply with this court’s orders, discovery processes, or has been as disingenuous in his actions” as Husband has in this case. Id. at 160.
[14] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on Wife’s petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage on July 28 through 30. Following the hearing, the court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions thereon addressing various issues, including custody and parenting time, child support and child-related expenses, the marital estate, and Husband’s businesses.
[15] In relevant part, the court found as follows:
139. Commissioner Camden indicated that Husband was largely not cooperative with providing information to her and she discovered accounts that Husband had otherwise failed to disclose through her investigative process;
***
141. When Commissioner Camden was able to deliver her order of appointment to the relevant banks in this matter to receive funds, it was discovered that money that was once in said accounts had either been reduced to zero or had decreased;
142. Specifically, Commissioner Camden discovered that the account at Bank of America . . . , which once held over $200,000.00 (see Exhibit 1G), had since been reduced to $0.00;
143. Other accounts, such as the Forum Bank account and Huntington Bank [account], had decreased in value as well;
144. A cash balance plan, owned by Husband, was discovered the Friday preceding the commencement of the final hearing on this matter. Commissioner Camden confirmed in her testimony that she had not been informed by Husband of Husband’s cash balance plan during her appointment;
***
172. Husband, prior to and throughout these proceedings, had ownership interests in various businesses, including but not limited to: (1) Siddique Enterprises LLC . . . [;]
***
180. Husband had the largest percentage of shares in, and therefore ownership of, Siddique Enterprises LLC, in years 2018, 2019, and 2020, but his ownership interest had notably decreased immediately preceding the commencement of this matter, and during these proceedings, specifically:
a. In tax years 2018, 2019, and 2020, Husband was a 50% shareholder in Siddique Enterprises LLC according to his Schedule K-1s;
b. In tax year 2021, Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC as illustrated within his Schedule K-1 decreased to 42%;
c. Then, in tax year 2022, Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC as illustrated within his
Schedule K-1 drastically decreased to 20% (see Petitioner’s Admitted Exhibit 11);
***
184. Commissioner Camden described that when business owners typically change their shareholder interest as Husband did, there is usually a series of documents issued illustrating what changes were being made as well as detailing consideration received by the shareholder for their shares;
185. Compensation for shares sold would be illustrated within the individual’s tax returns, as income would be reported for the sale, as well as in banking accounts for the receipt of funds;
***
187. Commissioner Camden indicated tax year filings for 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 respectively, reported no income for Husband received from the sale of Husband’s shares in Siddique Enterprises LLC to any other person, which leads the Court to further discount Husband’s testimony;
188. Brewer similarly indicated Husband’s personal tax returns included no information or transactional data relating to Husband having sold his shares in Siddique Enterprises, LLC;
189. Brewer provided that, even if money was not exchanged for the sale of shares, transactional data would still exist to illustrate the exchange of shares, such as a note receivable or on Schedule D of the tax return, but no such information was provided to Brewer, nor was it on Schedule D. This again leads the Court to discount the testimony of Husband;
190. While money is not always exchanged in circumstances where a closely held business is owned/transferred by family members, the alleged transfer of shares by Husband in Siddique Enterprises LLC at issue would have exceeded the exclusion limit for gift tax purposes, requiring a gift tax return be filed by Husband, which was also not produced to Brewer;
191. Brewer explained that while a Schedule K-1 may detail a change in shares for an individual, it does not necessarily mean shares changed hands without further transactional information supporting the transfer;
192. Between tax year 2020 and tax year 2022, Husband had reported his shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC had decreased from fifty percent (50%) to twenty percent (20%) within his Schedule K-1s without disclosing any compensation received in his tax filings, associated loan documentation, or other documentation evidencing a transaction having otherwise occurred;
193. Despite requests having been made by Brewer (such as shown in Petitioner’s admitted Exhibit 28), Brewer ultimately received insufficient information regarding any further transactional data evidencing Husband’s decreased shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC, if said transaction ever occurred at all;
194. Because Brewer had received no transactional data to support the decrease of Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC, Brewer ultimately assessed a fifty percent (50%) shareholder interest to Husband in valuing Siddique Enterprises, LLC;
***
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-72 | September 11, 2026 Page 10 of 26 196. Brewer valued Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC to be worth $6,833,500.00 (see Petitioner’s Admitted Exhibit 1R);
Id. at 59-68.
[16] Based on those findings, the court entered the following conclusions:
230. The Court finds that Husband reduced his shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC in contemplation of, or in relation to, the instant dissolution proceedings to, in effect, reduce the value of [the] parties’ marital estate;
231. The Court finds that Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC is fifty percent (50%), and values Husband’s shareholder interest in Siddique Enterprises LLC at $6,833,500.00;
***
234. Given the disparity of income earning potential between [the] parties as well as the conduct of Husband throughout [these] proceedings in relation to the disposition or dissipation of assets, the Court awards Wife sixty percent (60%) of the marital estate . . . ;
m. The Court awards Wife an equalization payment in the amount of $3,700,534.80 . . . ;
235. Should further assets later be discovered, that were in existence at the time of the parties’ dissolution that were not otherwise disclosed by Husband, Wife shall receive such asset, in full, as her sole and separate property[.]
***
239. Wife shall have a lien upon any real estate owned by [H]usband or 50% of any real estate owned by Siddique Enterprises, LLC, or thirty-three (33%) percent of Ayesha Investments pursuant to Ind. Code [Section] 34-55-9-2 and may file any necessary documentation to effectuate said lien to secure any asset awarded to her, including, the equalization payment of $3,700,534.80;
240. Wife shall . . . in addition have a judgment lien on 50% of any asset owned by Siddique Enterprises, LLC, or thirty-three (33%) percent of Ayesha Investments pursuant to Ind. Code [Section] 31-15-7-8.
Id. at 72-75 (emphases removed). The court then dissolved the parties’ marriage. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision Issue One: Liens
[17] Husband first asserts that the court erred when it granted Wife liens against real property and assets owned by Siddique Enterprises and Ayesha Investments. As our Supreme Court has stated:
When entering a dissolution decree, a trial court “may provide for the security, bond, or other guarantee that is satisfactory to the court to secure the division of property.” I.C. § 31-15-7-8.
This statutory language provides courts with “the broadest possible discretion in requiring security.” Birkhimer v. Birkhimer, 981 N.E.2d 111, 127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting In re
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-72 | September 11, 2026 Page 12 of 26
Marriage of Davis, 182 Ind. App. 342, 395 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (1979)).
Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 565 (Ind. 2024).
[18] Husband specifically contends that the court erred when it imposed the liens because “a court cannot impose a lien against a non-party” and “neither Siddique Enterprises nor Ayesha Investments was a party to the proceedings.” Appellant’s Br. at 40. Husband continues that “Indiana law does not even give [him] an interest in the real estate owned by an LLC just because he is a member[.]” Reply Br. at 5. We must agree.
[19] There is no dispute that “[t]he interest of a member in a limited liability company is personal property.” Ind. Code § 23-18-6-2. Thus, Husband’s interests in Siddique Enterprises and Ayesha Investments were Husband’s personal property subject to distribution as part of the marital estate. But there is nothing about that statute that extends Husband’s fractional ownership to the LLCs’ underlying real estate or personal property. Rather, Husband’s interest in those companies is limited to his “economic rights in the limited liability company, including the member’s share of the profits and losses of the limited liability company and the right to receive distributions from the limited liability company.” I.C. § 23-18-1-10.
[20] Our Court has previously addressed a similar situation. In Connolly v. Connolly, we held that a husband with a one-third ownership in an LLC that owned commercial real estate had no “direct ownership” in the properties because the real estate was “titled in the company, not in its members” and that the husband’s interest in the properties was “derivative of his membership interest in the company.” 952 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Thus, the Court held that husband “does not own a fractional interest in the real estate but owns a personal property interest in the company as a whole.” Id.
[21] Similarly, here, Husband has a fractional interest in two companies. But the companies hold title to the real and personal property. Husband does not have a fractional interest in the real estate or personal property owned by those companies. Because Husband has no direct ownership of the property owned by the companies, there is no interest in the property to which a lien could attach. As such, the trial court erred when it granted a lien to Wife against the real property and assets of Siddique Enterprises and Ayesha Investments. We therefore reverse that portion of the court’s order and remand with instructions for the court to vacate those liens and instead grant Wife a lien on Husband’s ownership interests in the LLCs. See Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that it is “abundantly clear that the trial court was permitted to grant [the wife] a security interest against [the husband’s] CCI stock and his membership interests in the LLCs, and that such liens could be foreclosed to pay the equalization judgment.”), trans. denied.
Issue Two: Discovery Sanctions [22] Husband next contends that the court abused its discretion when it sanctioned him for discovery violations. As our Supreme Court has stated:
We assign the selection of an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation to the trial court’s sound discretion. McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. 1993). Trial judges stand much closer than an appellate court to the currents of litigation pending before them, and they have a correspondingly better sense of which sanctions will adequately protect the litigants in any given case, without going overboard, while still discouraging gamesmanship in future litigation. We therefore review a trial court’s sanction only for an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 180-81.
Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012). Further,
[t]he purpose of the discovery rules is to allow for minimal trial court involvement and to promote liberal discovery. Although concealment and gamesmanship were once accepted as part and parcel of the adversarial process, we have unanimously declared that such tactics no longer have any place in our system of justice. Today, the purpose of pretrial discovery is to make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.
In service of that goal, Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(c) expressly provides that a trial court may impose sanctions, including outright dismissal of the case or default judgment, if a party fails to comply with an order to compel discovery. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the purpose of sanctioning discovery violations is not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
Id. (citation modified).
[23] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded his evidence regarding the percentage of ownership he held in Siddique Enterprises and when it sentenced him to jail time. He also contends that, even if neither sanction alone constituted an abuse of discretion, the cumulative effect was unjust. We address each argument in turn.
Siddique Enterprises [24] On this issue, Husband first argues that the court abused its discretion when it did not allow him to present evidence regarding how much of Siddique Enterprises he owned.1 Husband acknowledges that there were “compliance issues” with the discovery orders. Appellant’s Br. at 42. But he maintains that the “exclusion of any and all evidence that [he] owned less than 50% of Siddique Enterprises was an unjust, unlawful, and grossly disproportionate sanction under the circumstances.” Id. We cannot agree.
[25] The parties agreed to use Brewer to evaluate Husband’s businesses in September 2024. However, Husband failed to meet with Brewer and, on November 8, Wife filed a motion to compel Husband’s compliance. As a result, the court ordered Husband to pay Brewer’s fees, meet with Brewer within two weeks, and provide any necessary documents to Brewer within three days. But Husband failed to pay or meet with Brewer, and Wife filed a motion for rule to show cause. The court sanctioned Husband to fourteen days in jail but
1 Wife maintains that Husband did not properly preserve this issue because he did not make an offer of proof. We do not agree and therefore address Husband’s argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-DC-72 | September 11, 2026 Page 16 of 26 suspended that sentence pending Husband’s compliance with the court’s orders. Husband again failed to comply, and Wife filed a motion to execute jail time, which the court granted. Despite the court’s prior orders and jail time, Husband still failed to comply with Brewer. Husband paid only half of Brewer’s fee, and he failed to cooperate with Brewer by not providing necessary documents and answering questions. Wife then filed another motion for rule to show cause. The court found that Husband’s actions amounted to “game-playing” that had occurred “throughout this case[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 156. As a result, the court prohibited Husband from presenting evidence related to his ownership percentage of Siddique Enterprises.
[26] Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(b) specifically allows a court to prohibit the “disobedient party” from “introducing designated matters in evidence.” Given Husband’s gamesmanship and repeated failures to comply with the business valuation process despite numerous opportunities and prior sanctions, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ultimately sanctioned Husband by prohibiting him from presenting evidence regarding his ownership interest in Siddique Enterprises.
[27] In any event, while the court excluded additional evidence by Husband related to his business ownership, the court still had before it evidence that showed that Husband owned only twenty percent of the company. And, contrary to Husband’s argument that the court “explicitly refused to consider it,” Reply Br. at 8, the trial court’s order makes it clear that it did indeed consider the evidence that showed that Husband owned twenty percent of the company but did not find that evidence to be credible in light of the other evidence.
[28] In particular, the court included in its findings that Husband’s K-1 tax forms showed that his ownership interest decreased from 50% to 42% in 2021 and then again from 42% to 20% in 2022. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 65. And the court found that “Commissioner Camden indicated that from 2020-2021 and then again from 2021-2022, Husband appeared to have transferred his shares in Siddique Enterprises LLC.” Id. at 66. Thus, the court acknowledged that there was evidence that Husband’s “ownership interest had notably decreased immediately preceding the commencement of this matter.” Id. at 65. However, the court found that evidence to not be credible in light of the lack of business documentation outlining the change and the fact that Husband’s individual tax return did not show that he had received money in exchange for the shares he had purportedly sold. As such, Husband has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion when it sanctioned him.
Jail Time [29] Husband next argues that the court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve jail time. Specifically, Husband maintains that the court put Husband in jail because the court “was mad at him” and because the court did not provide Husband with a “meaningful opportunity to purge” his contempt. Appellant’s Br. at 48-49. We again cannot agree.
[30] Wife filed her first notice of discovery issues on August 6, 2024, after Husband failed to provide complete discovery. Following a hearing, the court issued a provisional order and set out certain requirements for Husband. Then, in November, Wife filed a motion to compel compliance after Husband failed to cooperate with Brewer, and the court ordered Husband to pay Brewer, meet with him by a certain date, and provide necessary documents within a specific time frame. After Husband again failed to comply, Wife filed a motion for rule to show cause. After a hearing, the court sentenced Husband to fourteen days in jail, but suspended that sentence on the condition that Husband comply with the court’s orders. Husband again failed to comply, and the court ordered him to execute his sentence.
[31] Then, after Husband failed to comply with certain orders regarding parenting time and communications with Wife, the court again sentenced Husband to fourteen days in jail but again suspended that sentence if Husband were to comply with the court orders. Husband yet again failed to comply, and the court sanctioned him by ordering him to pay part of Wife’s attorney’s fees. Then, in June 2025, the court again found Husband in contempt for failing to cooperate with Brewer and sanctioned Husband by preventing him from presenting certain evidence. In addition, Husband continued to fail to pay child support, and, as discussed further below, he dissipated assets, reducing some accounts and completely emptying others.
[32] In other words, the court gave Husband repeated opportunities to comply with its orders. It sanctioned Husband by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees, by sentencing him to jail but then suspending that sentence on the condition that Husband comply with court orders, by putting Husband in jail when he failed to comply, by prohibiting him from presenting evidence, and by appointing a financial commissioner and then a receiver. Despite those opportunities to correct his behavior, Husband continued to engage in gamesmanship, and he failed to provide documentation related to his relocated assets. As the court found, “no other case has had a litigant go to such lengths to not comply with this court’s orders, discovery processes, or has been as disingenuous in his actions” as Husband has in this case. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 160. Based on Husband’s repeated actions, and taking into consideration the fact that the court gave Husband numerous chances to avoid jail time, the court was well within its discretion to sentence Husband to fifty-six days in the county jail.
Collective Harm [33] Husband also asserts that, even if no individual sanction was inappropriate, “the cumulative weight of the punishments to which [he] was subjected constitutes an abuse of discretion[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 49. He maintains that the “sanctions were grossly disproportionate to any misconduct [he] may have engaged in” and that the sanctions were not tailored “to coerce, or even to punish, [him] for any perceived misconduct.” Id. at 50. But, again, the court imposed various sanctions as a direct result of Husband’s blatant and continued disregard for numerous court orders. As outlined above, the court gave Husband several chances and imposed several different sanctions in order to compel Husband to comply with its orders. But Husband repeatedly failed to comply. It is clear that Husband did not give the court a choice other than to impose the sanctions it did, and the collective sanctions were within the court’s discretion.
Issue Three: Ownership Determination [34] Husband also contends that the court clearly erred when it determined that he owned 50% of Siddique Enterprises. As this Court has stated:
Generally, when, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of review; first we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Davis v. Davis, 889 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment.
Id. Those appealing the trial court’s judgment must establish that the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo. Id.
Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[35] On appeal, Husband contends that the court’s finding that he owned 50% of Siddique Enterprises “was unsupported by sufficient, competent evidence[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 52. But contrary to Husband’s argument, there is evidence that Husband owned 50% of the company at the time of the hearing.
[36] There is no dispute that Husband owned 50% from 2018-2020. And, while his K-1 tax forms showed that his ownership interests dropped in 2021 and again in 2022, Commissioner Camden and Brewer both testified that, when there is a change of ownership, the transfer is usually documented and that the resulting proceeds from the sale would be included in an individual’s tax return. However, Husband did not report any income from the sale of shares on his income taxes, and Husband’s tax returns did not include any transactional data related to the sale of his shares.
[37] Stated differently, while Husband’s testimony and Schedule K-1 tax forms indicated that his interest in Siddique Enterprises had decreased, the court did not find either the testimony or documents to be credible in the absence of any corresponding supporting documentation detailing that a transfer had occurred or that Husband had received any income. We cannot now second-guess the court’s credibility determination. The testimony of Brewer and Camden that there was no indication that Husband’s interest had actually been reduced is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Husband still owned 50% of Siddique Enterprises.
Issue Four: Dissipation [38] Husband next contends that the court clearly erred when it determined that he had dissipated assets. “Our court reviews findings of dissipation in various contexts under an abuse of discretion standard.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, “[w]e will reverse only if the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts.” Id.
[39] “Dissipation generally involves the use or diminution of the marital estate for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and does not include the use of marital property to meet routine financial obligations.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The test for dissipation is whether the assets were actually wasted or misused.” Id. “Dissipation of marital assets includes the frivolous and unjustified spending of marital assets.” Grathwohl v. Garrity, 871 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[40] Husband specifically argues that the court abused its discretion when it found that he had dissipated assets because the money had “disappeared from several accounts before the dissolution petition was filed.” Appellant’s Br. at 54. However, it is well settled that dissolution courts “may consider evidence of either pre- or post-separation dissipation.” Hardebeck v. Hardebeck, 917 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, contrary to Husband’s argument, the mere fact that the accounts decreased in value prior to the separation is not dispositive and does not demonstrate that dissipation did not occur.
[41] Husband also argues that the “mere fact that money disappears from an account does not mean that dissipation has occurred.” Appellant’s Br. at 54. He maintains that there was no evidence of any waste or misuse. And he argues that “there is no evidence that [he] changed his ownership interest two years before the dissolution petition in order to avoid paying [Wife] her share[.]” Id.
[42] However, the evidence supports the court’s determination that Husband dissipated assets. Indeed, Camden testified that an account that had previously held over $200,000 had been reduced to zero. And she testified that the balances in other accounts had been reduced. After the reduction in bank balances was discovered, the court ordered Husband to bring all documentation related to the assets that had been removed from the accounts. However, Husband failed to bring proof of the relocated assets, providing the court with only “minimal bank statements.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 159. And the court specifically found that Husband’s responses to questions regarding his bank accounts were “evasive.” Id.
[43] In sum, the balances for several bank accounts were either reduced or zeroed; Husband failed to comply with discovery orders regarding his accounts and the financial commissioner; and Husband attempted to make it appear as though he had reduced his interest in Siddique Enterprises to twenty percent while not providing any supporting documents. Based on that evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that he had dissipated assets.
Issue Five: Future-Found Marital Property [44] Finally, Husband contends that the court erred when it ordered that any assets that are discovered at a later date, that were in existence at the time of the parties’ dissolution, and that were not disclosed by Husband would automatically be awarded to Wife. When a party challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, he must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[45] Here, Husband has not directed us to any controlling authority to demonstrate that a trial court lacks the authority to award all future-found property to one party if it was in existence at the time of the dissolution but had not been disclosed by the other party. Nor has Husband directed us to any evidence to overcome the strong presumption that the court complied with the applicable statute when it divided the marital property, including future-found property. As such, Husband has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the court erred.
Conclusion [46] The trial court erred when it awarded Wife liens on property owned by
Husband’s businesses because Husband has no direct ownership interest in those properties. But the court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions on Husband, the court’s determination regarding Husband’s ownership interest was not clearly erroneous, the court’s determination that Husband had dissipated assets was not an abuse of discretion, and Husband has not met his burden on appeal to show that the court erred when it awarded future-found marital property to Wife. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
[47] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Daniel J. Canon Saeed & Little, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Nissa M. Ricafort Broyles & Ricafort, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana