Kaleb Alaniz v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00201-CR

KALEB ALANIZ, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2024-CR-0931, Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding

June 2, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Kaleb Alaniz, was convicted by a jury of the offense of indecency with

a child by sexual contact.1 Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ incarceration in

accordance with the jury’s verdict. By one issue, Appellant contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in failing to grant his challenge for cause to a member of the venire.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1). BACKGROUND

Because Appellant’s sole issue challenges the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s

challenge for cause to one venire member, we will address only those facts relevant to

the issue before us.

During voir dire, the trial court overruled Appellant on two major objections: his

objection to the entire jury panel and challenge for cause to panel member #27, Mr.

Wilson.2 Wilson is an investigator with the Texas Department of Public Safety. During

Appellant’s voir dire, Wilson responded affirmatively to a question asking whether he

would “almost always” believe a member of law enforcement. Wilson was subsequently

called to the bench for individual questioning. During this questioning, Wilson was asked

if he can “start law enforcement off at the same level as every other witness,” to which he

responded, “yes.” He was also asked, “when a police officer . . . walk[s] into this

courtroom before they take the stand are you starting them off at any different level than

any other witness?” To this question, Wilson responded, “No.” Following this exchange,

the trial court said, “I’m going to deny [Appellant’s challenge for cause of Wilson] based

on his full answer. I mean, he testified he typically outside believes officers, but he can

follow the instruction here and treat them just like any other witness.” The trial court

overruled Appellant’s challenge for cause, which Appellant contends was an abuse of

discretion.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

“To preserve error on denied challenges for cause, an appellant must demonstrate

on the record that: 1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause; 2) he used a

2 The record does not reflect the challenged venire member’s first name.

2 peremptory challenge on the complained-of venireperson; 3) all his peremptory

challenges were exhausted; 4) his request for additional strikes was denied; and 5) an

objectionable juror sat on the jury.” Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 758 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003). In the present case, the record reflects that Appellant asserted a clear and specific

challenge for cause on Wilson, used a peremptory challenge on Wilson, exhausted all his

peremptory challenges, requested an additional strike, and identified an objectionable

juror who sat on the jury. Thus, we conclude that Appellant preserved his claim of error

relating to the trial court’s denial of his challenge of Wilson for cause.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A prospective juror may be challenged for cause if he or she has a bias or prejudice

against the defendant or law upon which either the state or defense is entitled to rely.

Muhammad v. State, No. AP-77,021, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 849, at *17–

18 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2015) (not designated for publication) (citing TEX. CRIM. PROC.

CODE ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9), (c)(2)). The test is whether the prospective juror’s bias or

prejudice would substantially impair his ability to carry out his duties in accordance with

his instructions and oath. Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

The bias or prejudice need not be established with “unmistakable clarity.” Muhammad,

2015 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 849, at *18. However, before a prospective juror

may be excused for cause due to bias or prejudice, the law must be explained to him and

he must be asked whether he can follow the law regardless of his personal views. Tracy,

597 S.W.3d at 512. The proponent of the challenge for cause bears the burden of

establishing that the venire member understood the requirements of the law but could not

overcome his prejudice enough to follow the law. Id.

3 We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause under a clear abuse of

discretion standard. Hudson v. State, 620 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We

review the ruling with considerable deference because the trial court is in the best position

to evaluate a potential juror’s demeanor and responses. Id. Particular deference should

be accorded when a prospective juror’s answers concerning his ability to follow the law

are vacillating, equivocating, ambiguous, unclear, or contradictory. Id.

By his sole issue, Appellant complains of the trial court’s failure to grant his

challenge for cause to venire member Wilson. Wilson is a law enforcement officer and

indicated, in response to a direct question, that he would “almost always” believe a

member of law enforcement. However, when Wilson was asked whether he “can follow

that law and start law enforcement off at the same level as every other witness,” he

responded that he could. This statement affirmatively establishes that Wilson understood

the requirements of the law and could overcome his prejudice enough to follow it. See

Tracy, 597 S.W.3d at 512 (proponent of challenge must establish that venire member

could not overcome prejudice enough to follow law). Further, in overruling the challenge

for cause, the trial court stated, “I’m going to deny it based on his full answer. I mean, he

testified he typically outside believes officers, but he can follow the instruction here and

treat them just like any other witness.” We are mindful of the considerable deference we

are to give the trial court as it is in the best position to evaluate a potential juror’s

demeanor and responses. Hudson, 620 S.W.3d at 731. We conclude that the trial court

did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s challenge of Wilson for cause

and, therefore, overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

4 CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.