Kaitlyn Marie Hawthorne v. River County and Biotense D.T.F.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Kentucky
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-00096
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION

KAITLYN MARIE HAWTHORNE PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-P96-JHM RIVER COUNTY AND BIOTENSE D.T.F. DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action. I. Plaintiff, an inmate at the Ballard County Detention Center, sues the River County Drug Task Force.1 The complaint refers to a search occurring on April 25, 2025, stating, in toto: They came in with live rounds, real guns, demanding we listen like we are animals. Everyone around me began shaking and crying from post-trauma; it was heartbreaking to see these women going through this. They showed no compassion. When one inmate asked to use the restroom, they told her no. They impeded church service and demanded the church ladies leave. Inmates were rushed out of their rooms being treated unfairly. Everything appeared very unprofessional.

DN 1, p. 4 (cleaned up). Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages. The Court construes the complaint as asserting an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against the River County Drug Task Force.

1 Fifteen separate actions have been filed in this Court regarding this incident. Those suits name the River City Drug and Violence Task Force as Defendant. The Court considers that “Biotense” in the caption of this case to be a misspelling of “Violence.” Regardless, Plaintiff identifies the Defendant in the body of her complaint as the River County Drug Task Force, and the Court will refer to Defendant as such. II. When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M &

G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). This Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And a court is not required to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require a court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would

also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. Standing is a “jurisdictional” matter, and a lack of standing deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Ward v. Alt. Health Delivery Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001). Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to hearing “actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Article III mandates that parties have standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In order to satisfy the requirements of Article

III standing, a Plaintiff must have suffered (1) an injury-in-fact. Id. The injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Id. There must also be (2) a “casual connection” (causation) between the injury and the conduct giving rise to the claim. Id. Finally, the Court must be able to provide (3) redress for the injury (redressability). Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any injury to her, personally. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations pertain to other inmates. Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Furthermore, while 28 U.S.C. § 1654 “permits individual parties to ‘plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,’ [it] does not authorize a non-attorney to bring suit on behalf of a third person.” Cole v. Robertson Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:18-cv-0497, 2018 WL 3328075, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 6, 2018) (citing omitted); see also Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that § 1654 does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se where

interests other than their own are at stake). Thus, pro se Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, may not bring claims in this Court on behalf of others. Nor is there a reason to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint to bring any claim of her own against Defendant. “Although a district court may allow a plaintiff to amend [her] complaint before entering a sua sponte dismissal, it is not required to do so, LaFountain [v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013], and leave to amend should be denied if the amendment would be futile.” Bishawi v. Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr., 628 F. App’x 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2014)). Here, amendment would be futile. The Sixth Circuit has held that a multi-county task force is not an entity subject to suit.

Mayers v. Williams, No. 16-5409, 2017 WL 4857567, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2017). Rather, “the proper defendants are . . . the jurisdictions that have joined together to form the [task force].” Id.; see also Lopez v. Foerster, No. 20-2258, 2022 WL 910575, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 2022). This means that, here, the respective counties that have joined together to form the River County Drug Task Force, and not the Task Force itself, are the proper defendants. However, even if Plaintiff had sued the respective counties that make up the River County Drug Task Force, the complaint would still fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This is because neither a municipality nor a county can be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal or county policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). Here,

Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that any constitutional injury occurred due to a policy or custom of one of the counties which is part of the River County Drug Task Force. Finally, the Court observes that even if it allowed Plaintiff to amend the complaint to bring an excessive-force claim against any of the individual law enforcement officers of the Task Force who participated in the search of the Ballard County Detention Center on the day in question, the Court would dismiss that claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” on prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). The Sixth Circuit recently analyzed the Eighth Amendment excessive-force standard as follows: What qualifies as the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”? This requirement has objective and subjective components, both of which follow from the Eighth Amendment’s text. See Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). Objectively, harm to a prisoner must rise to a sufficiently serious level because the Eighth Amendment prohibits only “cruel and unusual” deprivations, not just uncomfortable or even harsh” ones. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534. Subjectively, harm to a prisoner must result from a prison official’s sufficiently volitional actions because the Eighth Amendment bars only willful conduct that “inflict[s]” “punishment,” not accidental conduct that causes injury. See Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).

. . . . As a subjective matter, the Court has held that prisoners who challenge [an] officer’s use of force must prove more than that the officer acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to whether the force was necessary (the type of intent that prisoners must prove to challenge their conditions of confinement or medical care). See [Hudson] at 5-6; cf. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. The Court has instead described the “core judicial inquiry” in the use-of-force context as distinguishing between force used in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” and force used “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Only the latter kind of force— force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain—violates the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-7. So even if an officer uses force because of an “unreasonable” belief that it is necessary to restrain a prisoner, the officer does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324.

Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2023). The Sootsman court further explained: To decide whether a jury could find that an officer acted with this malicious intent, the Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider: What was the extent of the prisoner’s injury? What was the nature of the threat that justified the use of force? Was the amount of force proportional to the threat? And did the officer take any actions designed to reduce the required amount of force? Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. More generally, we have added that, while judges may review an encounter by slowing down, pausing, and replaying a video, officers have no such luxury. They must make quick decisions in the heat of the moment. So we defer to their decisions and avoid “unreasonable post hoc judicial second- guessing” of their conduct. Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Griffin [v. Hardrick], 604 F.3d [949], 954 [6th Cir. 2010].

Id. at 618. Here, the Task Force was executing a search warrant2 at the jail where Plaintiff was incarcerated. Even if Plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the objective component set forth above, the Court finds that they do not satisfy the second. Plaintiff was not physically injured, and her allegations do not show that the amount of force used was not necessary to secure the jail to safely execute a search warrant there.

2 Although Plaintiff does not mention a search warrant in her complaint, the Court takes judicial notice that in some of the other actions, the complaints reflect that this incident happened while the River County Drug Task Force was executing a search warrant at the Ballard County Detention Center. See, e.g., Irvan v. River County Drug and Violent Task Force, No. 5:25-cv-98-JHM (DN 1); Roman v. River County Drug and Violence Task Force, No. 5:25-cv-132- JHM (DN 1). IV. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action. Date: November 20, 2025

Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge ce: Plaintiff. pro se United States District Court 4414.009