Kaira Construction, Inc. v. North Providence Zbr, 01-3817 (2002)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedOctober 17, 2002
DocketC.A. NO. PC01-3817
StatusPublished

This text of Kaira Construction, Inc. v. North Providence Zbr, 01-3817 (2002) (Kaira Construction, Inc. v. North Providence Zbr, 01-3817 (2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaira Construction, Inc. v. North Providence Zbr, 01-3817 (2002), (R.I. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal from a decision of the North Providence Zoning Board of Review (Board). Kaira Construction and Richard Almonte1 (Appellants) seek reversal of the Board's decision of March 15, 2001, denying Appellants' application for a dimensional variance. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69.

FACTS AND TRAVEL
Appellants own Lot 435, comprising approximately 4,500 square feet and located in a Residential General Zone (R8 Zone) on the North Providence Tax Assessor's Plat 5. Mr. Almonte purchased the property in question in 1992 from Roger and Francoise Cousineau. Appellants applied to the Board for relief from Article IV Section 413 of the North Providence Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance), which governs prerecorded substandard lots of record. Appellants sought to build a single family residence on the vacant lot.

Appellants requested relief in the form of a dimensional variance because the disputed property is an undersized lot in that 8,000 square feet are required to build in an R8 zone according to the current Ordinance. The Board held public meetings on February 15, 2001 and March 15, 2001. The Board heard testimony from Appellants' attorney, as well as various objectors.

The parties who testified in opposition to the requested relief included Jeffrey DiDomenico, Kelli DiDomenico and Kevin DiDomenico. Essentially, these neighbor objectors argued that the Board should not grant the Appellants' application since Mr. Almonte, a commercial builder, was aware when he bought the lot in question that it was undersized and therefore outside the minimum requirements as set forth in the Ordinance. The Board also heard from Mr. Almonte, who argued that the lot fits into the category of a prerecorded substandard lot of record, thereby permitting the Board to grant relief. The Board took a roll call vote with three members voting to grant Appellants' application and two members voting to deny the requested relief. This voting alignment resulted in Appellants' application being denied since at least four votes are required to grant an application before a Zoning Board pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-57 (2)(iii). The Board issued a written opinion on June 28, 2001.

A timely appeal was filed by Appellants on July 20, 2001. On appeal, Appellants argue that the Board's decision was clearly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious in that a majority of the Board voted to grant the application. Further, Appellants argue that the Board, on multiple prior occasions, granted dimensional variance relief to numerous lot owners in the surrounding area.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
General Laws § 45-24-69(D), which directs this Court in its review of a decision of the Zoning Board of Review on appeal, provides:

"(D) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions which are:

(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory or ordinance provisions;

(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

This Court, while reviewing an appeal from a decision of the Zoning Board of Review, "must examine the entire record to determine whether `substantial' evidence exists to support the board's findings." Restivov. Lynch, 707 A.2d 663, 665-6 (R.I. 1998) (citing Salve Regina Collegev. Zoning Board of Review of Newport, 594 A.2d 878, 880 (R.I. 1991)). "Substantial evidence as used in this context means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means an amount more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand and Gravel Co., Inc.,424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) (citing Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 507, 388 A.2d 821, 824-5 (R.I. 1978)). "To that end a reviewing court should exercise restraint in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the zoning board which is based on the evidence before it." Hein v.Town of Foster Zoning Board of Review, 632 A.2d 643, 646 (R.I. 1993) (citing Mendosa v. Corey, 495 A.2d 257 (R.I. 1985)).

ADEQUACY OF WRITTEN DECISION
Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-61, the Board is required to include in its decision all findings of fact and conditions. Our Supreme Court has long noted that zoning boards must "make express findings of fact and should pinpoint the specific evidence upon which they base such findings." Hopf v. Board of Review of City of Newport, 102 R.I. 275, 289, 230 A.2d 420, 428 (R.I. 1967). It is a prerequisite that the zoning board make factual determinations as opposed to mere conclusional statements so that a reviewing court may resolve evidentiary conflicts.See Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of New Shoreham,770 A.2d 396 (R.I. 2001). "When the board fails to state findings of fact, the court will not search the record for supporting evidence or decide for itself what is proper in the circumstances." Id. at 401. "[D]ecisions [should]. . . address the evidence in the record before the board that either meets or fails to satisfy each of the legal preconditions for granting [variance] relief, as set forth in § 45-24-41 (c) and (d)." Id. (citing Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578 (R.I. 2001)).

Here, the Board simply recited boilerplate language in its written decision. The only findings of fact pertain to the statutory requirements for a dimensional variance.

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Related

Hopf v. Board of Review of City of Newport
230 A.2d 420 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1967)
Schofield v. ZONING BD. OF CRANSTON
206 A.2d 524 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1965)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Apostolou v. Genovesi
388 A.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1978)
Restivo v. Lynch
707 A.2d 663 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1998)
Sciacca v. Caruso
769 A.2d 578 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2001)
Salve Regina College v. Zoning Board of Review
594 A.2d 878 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1991)
Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review
770 A.2d 396 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2001)
Toohey v. Kilday
415 A.2d 732 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Hein v. Town of Foster Zoning Board of Review
632 A.2d 643 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1993)
Mendonsa v. Corey
495 A.2d 257 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1985)
Kelly v. Zoning Board of Review
180 A.2d 319 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
Kaira Construction, Inc. v. North Providence Zbr, 01-3817 (2002), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaira-construction-inc-v-north-providence-zbr-01-3817-2002-risuperct-2002.