Kagan v. Ginsberg

622 A.2d 1030, 30 Conn. App. 794, 1993 Conn. App. LEXIS 167
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
DecidedApril 6, 1993
Docket11278
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 622 A.2d 1030 (Kagan v. Ginsberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kagan v. Ginsberg, 622 A.2d 1030, 30 Conn. App. 794, 1993 Conn. App. LEXIS 167 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

Freedman, J.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her action brought against the defendant, Elliot Ginsberg,1 pursuant to the Personal Data Act, General Statutes § 4-190 et seq. In that action, the plaintiff sought the disclosure of certain portions of the file that the defendant maintained on the plaintiff, a family home day-care provider. The portion of the file that the plaintiff sought to obtain related to allegations of child abuse. The defendants refused to disclose this information, claiming that General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 17-38a (9)2 prohibited such disclosure.

[796]*796Both the plaintiff and the defendant filed motions for summary judgment. After hearing both motions for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the action sua sponte and entered judgment for the defendant. This appeal followed.

The trial court based its dismissal of the action on its conclusion that the plaintiff had no standing to bring the action because the plaintiff had “failed to allege in her pleadings that a medical doctor has reviewed her file and recommended its disclosure by the Commissioner to the plaintiff,” a procedure that the trial court found to be “a prerequisite” to obtaining relief under General Statutes § 4-195.3

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on the provisions of General Statutes § 4-194 (b).4 The provisions for a review by a qualified medical doctor contained in § 4-194 (b), however, do not apply when the agency refuses to disclose personal data because it is of the opinion that such nondisclosure is mandated by law.

[797]*797“When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we assume that the words themselves express the legislature’s intent and there is no need to look further for interpretive guidance.” Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 310, 592 A.2d 953 (1991); Suprenant v. New Britain, 28 Conn. App. 754, 758, 611 A.2d 941 (1992). The language of § 4-194 (b) is clear and unambiguous. The provisions relating to medical review only apply when the refusal to disclose personal data is “not mandated by law.” Here, the defendant refused to disclose the information because he believed that nondisclosure was mandated by law. The trial court, therefore, improperly applied § 4-194 (b) to the circumstances of this case.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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Related

State v. Lee
734 A.2d 136 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
Kagan v. Ginsberg, No. Cv 89-0369781 (May 12, 1997)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 5395 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
622 A.2d 1030, 30 Conn. App. 794, 1993 Conn. App. LEXIS 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kagan-v-ginsberg-connappct-1993.