Kaden Covington v. Kenneth L.P. Haynes, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Delaware
• Decided: November 10, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00399
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE KADEN COVINGTON, ) Plaintiff, V. Civ. No. 25-399-CFC KENNETH L.P. HAYNES, ef ai., Defendants. MEMORANDUM ORDER AT WILMINGTON, this 10 day of November 2025, having reviewed and considered Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and insufficiency of service of process (D.I. 8) and pro se Plaintiff's motion for damages (D.I. 20), WHEREAS Defendants asserts that all claims should be dismissed because of Delaware’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (see D.I. 8 at 5-6), but sovereign immunity does not bar a civil rights suit that seeks prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities, see Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 771-73 (3d Cir. 2023), or claims for damages against state officials in their individual capacities, Melov. Hafer, 912F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 502 U.S. 21 (1991),

WHEREAS Defendants also assert that all claims should be dismissed

because the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process clauses does

not apply to excessive use of force claims against state officials (see D.I. 8 at 8-9), but a complaint need not contain a perfect “statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted,” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014), pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and pro se Plaintiff’s complaint (D.I. 1) contains sufficient facts to a state a Fourth Amendment excessive use of force claim for this stage of the case, see generally, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), WHEREAS Defendants also assert that claims asserted against Defendants Charles Fidler and Mark S. Justice should be dismissed because the complaint does not allege their personal involvement in any violation of Plaintiff's civil rights (see D.I. 8 at 7), review of the complaint confirms this assessment (see D.I. 1), and a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable,” see Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003), and WHEREAS Defendants finally assert that Plaintiff has not effected service as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Delaware Code

(see DI. 8 at 9), Plaintiff does not contest this assertion (see D.I. 19), and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires this Court to dismiss a civil action without prejudice, or order that service be made within a specified time, when service is not timely effected, It is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (D.I. 8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; 2 Defendants Charles Fidler and Mark S. Justice, and all claims asserted against them, are DISMISSED from this case based on a lack of alleged personal involvement; 3. As to Defendants Kenneth L.P. Haynes, Brooke N. Watkinson, and Thomas M. Vincent, all Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to Fourth Amendment and related state claims; 4. All claims for money damages asserted against Defendants Kenneth L.P. Haynes, Brooke N. Watkinson, and Thomas M. Vincent in their official capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice to claims for prospective injunctive relief and any individual capacity claims; 5 Pro se Plaintiff Kaden Covington is GRANTED leave to effect service of process of the complaint (D.I. 1) on Defendants Kenneth L.P. Haynes, Brooke N.

Watkinson, and Thomas M. Vincent, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Delaware Code, on or before December 11, 2025; and 6. Pro se Plaintiff Kaden Covington’s motion for damages (D.I. 20) is

DENIED as premature.

Oh, F Lamth 2 Chief Judge