Kaczmarek v. Village of Independence

18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81
CourtCuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
DecidedJuly 28, 1915
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81 (Kaczmarek v. Village of Independence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaczmarek v. Village of Independence, 18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1915).

Opinion

Foran, J.

This case is before the court upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus. On the 28th day of May, 1915, the petitioner, Mike Kaczmarek, was arrested upon a warrant issued by the mayor of the village of Independence, upon affidavit filed before him charging that the petitioner, without having first obtained a license from the village of Independence, did then and there use and occupy a certain street, to-wit, Breeksville road, within the corporate limits of the village of Independence with a certain automobile for the carriage of persons for hire, and did then and there operate said automobile for the purpose of affording a means of.local street transportation similar to that ordinarily afforded by street railways, contrary to the .provisions of ordi[82]*82nance No. 25 of said village of Independence, Cuyahoga county, Ohio.

It appears that the village of Independence, Cuyahoga county, Ohio, in the month of April, 1915, passed an ordinance regulating vehicles and the use of the streets and requiring every person carrying on the business of transportation of passengers for hire to obtain a license before commencing business. Section 1 of this ordinance requires that a license be obtained by any person desiring to carry on the business of transporting passengers for hire within the corporate limits of the village of Independence. Section 2 provides that the route over which such persons intend to travel or carry passengers, and the schedule they expect to give, shall be designated and a map thereof furnished. Section 3 requires the owner of all vehicles, to be used for such purpose to pay a license fee of twenty-five dollars, which shall be paid to the public service street repair fund. Section 4 provides that a bond in the sum of $10,000 shall be given for the operation of one or more automobiles or vehicles, conditioned to the effect that, in the event of any person or property being injured or damaged by the negligence or carelessness of the driver in the operation of the owner’s automobile, the person so injured, either in person or property, may recover therefor; that is, the bond is given for the benefit of persons who may be injured in person or property by reason of the operation of. such automobile or vehicle. Section 5 provides regulations as to the character and kind of person who shall be employed to drive such automobile, including his age and intelligence. Section 7 provides that the automobile so used shall be kept in a clean and sanitary condition, and contains regulations for traffic and for preventing overcrowding of such vehicles. The other sections relate to matter of administrative detail.

The petitioner claimed that his arrest was-unlawful, for the reason that said ordinance is void and of no effect, in that the council had no authority to require a bond as provided for by Section 4 of said ordinance. It is also claimed that the license fee is unreasonably excessive and that the council had no authority to regulate fares; nor had the council authority to impose, as [83]*83a condition to granting a license, that the operator shall have a sufficient knowledge of the English language to carry on an intelligent conversation, as provided by Section 5 of the ordinance.

It is conceded that the petitioner, Mike Kaczmarek, does not reside in the village of Independence, and that he is not a taxpayer in said village, and that at the time of his arrest he did not operate his automobile exclusively in said village, but carried passengers from Cleveland and other localities to and through Independence, and from said village to Cleveland, and other places along Brecksville road.

The issues involved are, perhaps, new in this locality, but in western cities and in the coast cities the operation of what is known as the “jitney bus” is well known and understood. The use of the automobile as a means and mode for the transportation of passengers in cities and villages is of comparatively recent origin, and arose, as has been said, in the western cities, but has been proceeding with rapid strides all over the country.

The case was ably, skilfully and learnedly presented by counsel, and elaborate briefs, showing great research and discriminating marshaling of authorities, have been filed. To some extent the questions presented in the argument and by these briefs are new and novel, but in the final analysis the application of the old legal principles to new conditions will be found decisive of the questions involved.

The present age is one of change and transformation. The dream of yesterday is the reality of today, and the precursor of greater things for tomorrow. The tallow dip and the electric light furnish no greater contrast than the farmer’s stone boat and the automobile. In every department of industry, in commerce, in travel, transportation, transmission of power, and transmission of news and thought, we see the rapid passing of one mode of doing things to some improved mode of accomplishing the same or a better result with less effort and in less time. That all rights may be preserved and all be protected, the law must meet these changing conditions in production, distribution and transportation. The jitney bus is a part of the general social and industrial evolution everywhere seen and manifested. [84]*84Electricity put the horse car and the cable ear in the discard. While the jitney will have no such effect upon the electric street car, it has and will curb and destroy transportation monopolies in cities and their suburbs. For this reason the jitney should be fostered within all reasonable limitations and its rights preserved. The advent and activities of this vehicle as a mode of passenger travel has been so rapid within the last year or two that state legislatures have not had sufficient time to subject it to intelligent regulation and supervision.

No sane, thinking man will for a moment contend that a wholly irresponsible and reckless person should be permitted to operate and run an automobile as a vehicle for the transportation of passengers through the streets of a municipality or the highways between municipalities. Of necessity, then, there must be regulation and supervision. The public safety and preservation of private as well as public property rights demand that this mode of conveyance be strictly and scrupulously regulated. In the absence of statutory regulation, municipalities in the exercise of their general police power and the authority conferred upon them by statute may, we believe, within the limits of their jurisdiction, regulate the operation of jitney busses. Such regulation, of course, should be reasonable, but.it ought to be sufficiently effective to protect the public and preserve property rights, for the primary object of the police power of the state and of municipalities is not alone the prevention of crime and the pursuit and punishment of offenders, but also the preservation of order, removal of obstructions and nuisance, and the adoption and enforcement of local laws for the safety, convenience and comfort of the community.

The question as to what are the proper limits of the police power of a state or municipality, while a judicial one, is not always easily answered. It may be said, in a general way, that it depends in each case upon the relation of the act in question to the situation demanding the exercise of the power. In a long list of fluctuating authorities, it has been held to include the regulation of streets, highways, bridges, carriers, peddlers, drays and vehicles of all kinds. In these respects the statutes of Ohio confer full and ample power upon municipalities.

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Bluebook (online)
18 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 81, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaczmarek-v-village-of-independence-ohctcomplcuyaho-1915.