K. C. v. Ahmad Khalifa
This text of K. C. v. Ahmad Khalifa (K. C. v. Ahmad Khalifa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 10 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
K. C., a minor by and through his No. 18-56520 Guardian ad Litem Dana K. Dunmore, D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:18-cv-06619-RGK-AS
v. MEMORANDUM* AHMAD KHALIFA, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Movant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. VELANTA MONIQUE BABBITT, in her No. 18-56576 individual capacity and as parent and guardian of B. D., a minor, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-06528-DMG-FFM Plaintiff-Appellee,
DIGNITY HEALTH, a California corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
SEBHAT AFEWORK, M.D.,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 6, 2020 Pasadena, California
2 Before: KLEINFELD and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,** District Judge.
These two cases, consolidated for purposes of oral argument, were removed
from state court to federal district court, and then ordered remanded. They are
materially similar. Patients sued their physicians, Dr. Khalifa and Dr. Afework, for
medical malpractice. Both physicians were employed by Eisner Pediatric &
Family Medical Center. The Eisner facility and its employees were “deemed” to
be Public Health Service employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(g). Section 233
provides for removal from state court to federal court of cases against deemed
persons, substitution of the United States for those persons deemed to be Public
Health Service employees, and exclusiveness of the remedy against the United
States, much like Westfall Act cases. Both physicians sought to avail themselves
of section 233, but the district court remanded their cases back to state court. They
appeal the remand orders.
Section 233 speaks to removal, but not to appeals from remands. A remand
** The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
3 order is generally not reviewable on appeal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), if the
defect in removal fell within section 1447(c) and the case was not removed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443. Section 1443 speaks to civil rights actions
and has no applicability to the cases before us. Section 1442 provides for removal
of actions against federal officers relating to acts performed under color of their
federal office. Even assuming the physicians here could qualify as federal officers
for purposes of section 1442, both remand orders were proper because the
removals were untimely. Dr. Afework’s notice of removal, filed on July 27, 2018,
was untimely given the proof of service of summons indicating service on March
26, 2018, and Dr. Afework did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
service occurred on a later date that would have rendered removal timely. See
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2014). And it is undisputed
that Dr. Khalifa was served on April 15, 2018, but did not file his notice of
removal until August 1, 2018.
Both cases were also remanded on the ground that the removals were not
authorized under section 233. If the agencies and the district court erred in treating
the physicians as not being deemed to be Public Health Service employees, we
4 would need appellate jurisdiction to correct the error, but we lack it under section
1447(d). The district courts’ determinations that they were not entitled to removal
under section 233 was at least “a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-
matter jurisdiction,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, 551 U.S. 224, 234
(2007), so it falls within section 1447(c). See DeMartini v. DeMartini, 964 F.3d
813, 821 (9th Cir. 2020). Remands of cases removed pursuant to section 233 are
therefore unreviewable under section 1447(d).
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts to the extent they held the section
1442 removals were untimely, and we dismiss the remainder of the appeals for lack
of jurisdiction under section 1447(d). We do not, because we lack jurisdiction,
reach the question whether the district courts were correct to dismiss under section
233. See DeMartini, 964 F.3d at 820; Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 960
F.3d 586, 598 (9th Cir. 2020). As such, we are unable to address appellants’
arguments.
DISMISSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
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