J.W. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 12, 2019
• Docket: 19A-JS-468
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 12 2019, 9:04 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jeremy P. Gooch Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Chief Public Defender, Attorney General of Indiana Hendricks County Lauren A. Jacobsen Danville, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J.W., September 12, 2019 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-JS-468 v. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Karen M. Love, Appellee-Petitioner. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D03-1810-JS-205

Mathias, Judge.

[1] J.W. appeals the Hendricks Superior Court’s dispositional order following his

admission to the delinquent act of truancy. He presents one issue for our

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 1 of 8 review: whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering J.W. placed

in the custody of White’s Residential Treatment Facility (“White’s”). We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] J.W. is a sixteen-year-old boy in the care of his father. He was enrolled in tenth

grade at Plainfield High School (“PHS”) during the 2018–2019 academic

school year, when the events giving rise to the instant case occurred.

[3] Previously, J.W.’s history with the juvenile justice system was limited to one

delinquency action for truancy.1 That action was based on J.W.’s twenty-two

unexcused absences during the 2017–2018 school year. Appellant’s App. p. 21.

J.W. admitted to the offense in April 2018 and was placed on four months of

probation. Id. He was discharged from probation on August 13, 2018. Id.

[4] Shortly after, on August 29, PHS administrators, Hendricks County prosecutor,

and J.W.’s father met to discuss the matter of J.W.’s school attendance in the

new school year. J.W. did not attend this meeting. Then on September 13,

J.W.’s father and the prosecutor met again, this time with J.W. present. After

the second meeting, J.W. accumulated two more unexcused absences. As of

September 28, J.W. had eighteen unexcused absences from PHS. Appellant’s

App. p. 20.

1 This initial delinquency action for truancy was filed under cause number 32D03-1702-JD-48.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 2 of 8 [5] On October 19, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging delinquency against

J.W. based on the status offense of truancy. The petition alleged that J.W.

failed and refused to attend school and needed “care, treatment or rehabilitation

that he would not receive without the coercive intervention of the court.”

Appellant’s App. pp. 14–15. J.W. was then expelled from PHS for the

remainder of the semester due to his failure to attend. Tr. pp. 17, 30.

[6] A preliminary inquiry report prepared by probation officer Rebecca Schrock

(“Schrock”) was also filed on October 19. Appellant’s App. pp. 20–25. The

report revealed that J.W.’s father had no criminal history. Id. at 22. J.W.’s two

older brothers had previously been placed on probation for truancy. Id. at 22–

23. The probation department recommended that J.W. be placed on probation

for one year subject to conditions including compliance with Cross Systems of

Care Coordination (“CSCC”). Id. at 24–25. Possible CSCC services identified

in the report included home and family therapy, tutoring, and social

mentorship. Id.

[7] A pre-trial conference before the juvenile court was held on December 10.

J.W.’s father appeared, but J.W. did not. Tr. p. 20. At that time, probation

officer Schrock amended her recommendation and stated that J.W. should be

placed in a residential setting as soon as possible. Tr. p. 21. The juvenile court

continued the conference to that afternoon to allow J.W. to appear, which he

did. Id. at 25. The juvenile court informed J.W. that it was considering placing

him in a residential facility based on Schrock’s recommendation and on J.W.’s

failure to appear that morning. Id. at 26.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 3 of 8 [8] J.W. returned to PHS the next semester on January 7, 2019. Only four weeks

passed before he again appeared before the juvenile court on February 4.

During that time, J.W. was absent from school on two more occasions. Tr. p.

42. The juvenile court accepted J.W.’s admission of truancy and found him to

be a delinquent child. Id. at 54. J.W. was placed on probation for eight months

and ordered to complete residential programming at White’s in Wabash

County. Id. J.W. filed his notice of appeal on February 28.

Discussion and Decision [9] J.W. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him into

White’s residential treatment program. Appellant’s Br. at 7. We reverse a

dispositional order only for abuse of discretion, because the placement of a

juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter within the sound discretion

of the juvenile court. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006). An abuse of

discretion occurs when the juvenile court’s action is clearly erroneous and

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[10] J.W. contends that, by placing him at White’s, the juvenile court failed to

consider the statutory directive to select the least restrictive placement.

Appellant’s Br. at 10. Specifically, J.W. argues that the juvenile court’s

disposition interfered with family autonomy, disrupted family life, imposed

restraint on his freedom, and neglected to provide a reasonable opportunity for

participation by his father. Id. Though we acknowledge the disruptive effect of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 4 of 8 the juvenile court’s order, J.W. has not demonstrated that the court’s order is

inconsistent with J.W.’s best interest.

[11] Indiana Code section 20-33-2-4 makes compulsory school attendance for

children under age eighteen. Failure or refusal to comply with this section

constitutes the delinquent act of truancy under Indiana Code section 31-37-2-3.

A juvenile court may intervene to coerce a truant child to attend school

regularly, provided that the court’s intervention is consistent with the safety of

the community and the best interest of the child. To wit:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 5 of 8 (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.

I.C. § 31-37-18-6. In other words, when it intervenes, a juvenile court need not

order the least restrictive disposition if a more restrictive–or even more

disruptive–solution better addresses the safety of a child’s community and the

child’s best interest.

[12] J.W. argues that because his attendance record improved in January 2019, the

juvenile court erred when it disregarded less restrictive dispositions in favor of

placement at White’s. Appellant’s Br. at 10. Juvenile courts have a range of

dispositional options for children in the juvenile justice system, including

supervision by a probation department and outpatient treatment under Indiana

Code section 31-37-19-5, or residential treatment and removal from the child’s

home under Indiana Code section 31-37-19-6. As a result of his twenty-two

unexcused absences during the previous school year, J.W. had already once

been adjudicated a delinquent child and completed four months of probation.

Appellant’s Br. at 5. By February 4, 2019, J.W. had twenty unexcused

absences. Tr. p. 42; Appellant’s App. p. 17. These absences represented

continued delinquent behavior in the new school year at approximately the

same level as in the prior school year. In this context, the juvenile court

reasonably concluded that a disposition harsher than probation was appropriate

for J.W.’s treatment. It was therefore not clearly erroneous for the juvenile

court to require J.W. to be schooled at White’s for the remainder of the 2018–

2019 school year.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 6 of 8 [13] J.W. further argues that the juvenile court’s order inappropriately interfered

with his family’s autonomy because White’s is located several hours from his

home in Hendricks County. Appellant’s Br. at 11. We have previously

addressed this issue in the case of a juvenile court that placed a child at an

Arizona residential facility instead of a similar, local facility. E.M.W. v. State,

762 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Due to the distance of E.M.W.’s

placement, reasonable opportunity for parental participation as recognized by

Indiana Code section 31-37-17-4 was diminished. Id. at 1285. We found that

this opportunity “need only be provided if consistent with the safety and best

interest of the child and community.” Id. at 1286. Because the juvenile court’s

decision was based on the out-of-state facility’s higher rate of success providing

the type of treatment and rehabilitation services E.M.W. needed, and thus was

in E.M.W.’s best interest, the placement was within the juvenile court’s

discretion despite its distance and the disruption it may have caused E.M.W.’s

family. Id.

[14] We take seriously J.W.’s contention that his placement at White’s puts a strain

on J.W.’s father, who is a single parent. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Our legislature

recognizes the importance of family and children in society, and accordingly we

caution the State against justifying the need for restrictive placement of

juveniles on the work schedules of their parents, as it did with J.W., his siblings,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 7 of 8 and their father.2 Nevertheless, in its placement order, the juvenile court

appropriately considered White’s success in providing the services J.W. needed,

including support and counseling available after J.W. completes the residential

program. Tr. p. 48. As for the opportunity for J.W.’s father to participate,

White’s was willing to allow J.W.’s father to participate in services by

telephone if the distance prohibited him from traveling. Tr. pp. 55, 57.

[15] The juvenile court treated J.W. as a person “in need of care, protection,

treatment, and rehabilitation.” I.C. § 31-10-2-1. Accordingly, its dispositional

order is consistent with J.W.’s best interest and does not constitute an abuse of

discretion. Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

2 “J.W. needs a solid foundation that is unavailable to him at home due to his father’s work hours. If J.W. does not manage to find a way to gain that foundation, J.W. will continue down his current path and the path of his brothers…” Appellee’s Br. at 10.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JS-468 | September 12, 2019 Page 8 of 8