Jutte v. The George Shiras

61 F. 300, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 2185
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·Decided May 4, 1894·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

GREEN, District Judge.

The libel in this case was filed to recover the value of two coal boats and their cargoes, which became a total loss, on their voyage from Pittsburgh, Pa., to Louisville, Ky., at a point on the Ohio river known as “Deadman’s Island.” The boats and cargoes were the property of the libelants and appellants. As owners, they had made a contract with the owner of the steamer George Shiras for the towage of these boats, and at the time of the loss the Shiras was engaged in performing such contract. The allegation of the libelants is that while “on this voyage down the Ohio river from the port of Pittsburgh to the port of Louisville, under said contract of towage, and at Deadman’s island, the said steamboat [the Shiras], through the negligence of its master, pilot, engineer, and crew, or some thereof, ran the said two boats upon the. shore bar, and the said two boats and their contents became and were a total loss.” It appears from the testimony that the Shiras, having in tow five coal boats and a barge, left Pittsburgh between 9 and 10 o’clock of the morning of February 7, 1890. The tow itself seems to have been properly made up, and the Shiras was in the position usual and customary for towboats on this river, with all of the boats making up the tow in front of her. At the time when the Shiras left Pittsburgh the wind was light, and there was some snow falling. She arrived between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon at Deadman’s island. The wind had increased in velocity, and the snow continued falling, but it nowhere appears that the range of vision was seriously affected or diminished [301] thereby. Deadman’s island is about 14 miles below Pittsburgh. It lies at a bend or curve in the river, narrowing the channel in width to about 100 yards, forcing it over toward tbe northerly side, and causing the current to set over, with some velocity, upon the main shore. It appears that, while this is not especially a dangerous part of the river to navigate, it is not an easy place to run, and it always has (o be “run very carefully” by the tows going down. It is considered the better way, for safety, while passing, to “Hank,” as it is termed. “Flanking” is simply permitting the tow to float down stream with the current along the channel, without any assistance from the towboat, which, in fact, instead of propelling the tow, at this point controls its movement by reversing its engines, and backing with such speed as will give to it the control of the tow, without overcoming entirely the force of the current. At this place on the river, unfortunately, this tow ran upon, or was cast upon, the shore, and the consequent injury and loss to the boats resulted. The libelants allege1 that the Hidras failed to flank the tow, as she should have done, and that at, or just immediately before, the time the wreck occurred, she was actually and positively propelling the tow ahead, causing the wreck; and this mismanagement is the negligence charged against her. Upon the other hand, the respondent insists that no negligence should or can he alleged truly against the Shiras; that the' true explanation of the accident is to be found in the fact tha t the wind grew stronger as the day advanced; that, when the Hidras arrived at Deadman’s island, it was blowing in sucb gusts, and with such force and velocity, that although she tried to flank, and did put herself and her tow in proper position to do so safely and successfully, yet she was caught by the gale, and blown completely around, so that her stern was down stream, and so great was the power of the wind that she could not overcome its effect, striving as strongly as she could, and so the tow drilled upon the north shore. In other words, she interposes the defense of a vis major, which, she asserts, was the natural and proximate cause of the injury. A loss is said to be caused by vis major when it results immediately from a natural cause, without the intervention of man, and could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence, and care, and the use of those appliances which the situation of the party renders it reasonable that he should employ. Story defines “vis major” to he any irresistible, natural cause, which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence; and this definition is approved by Chief Justice Cockburn in Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. Div. 437. Thus, a storm of unusual and extraordinary violence, a sudden gust of wind, and a tempest, have been held to be examples of vis major. And under such circumstances, if an injury occurs, he who is in the charge of the thing injured is within the rale which gives immunity from the effects of such an “act of God,” if he can satisfactorily show that he used all known means to guard against the accident to which prudent and experienced men usually, in like circumstances, have recourse. If, then, it be proved, in this case, that this accident which caused [302] the loss of the coal boats and cargo was the immediate result of an, unusual, extraordinary, and violent gale, amounting in fact to a quasi tempest, and if it be true that experience and prudence could ■ not have guarded against the disastrous consequences, the plea of the respondent must prevail, and. the Shiras go free. What, then, was the character of the storm of wind and snow on the day of the accident, at the place in question, and what were the efforts of the master and crew of the Shiras to guard the tow from impending disaster?

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Jutte v. The George Shiras, 61 F. 300, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 2185 (3d Cir. 1894).

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