Justus v. Canyon County
Opinions
— On the second Monday in January 1941, defendants, the board of county commisisoners of Canyon County, set up under and in compliance with Chapter 12, Title 30 I. C. A., the budget for the ensuing year, containing among other items, $44,000, the maximum amount which the board estimated could be raised by a levy of 2 mills on the dollar on all taxable property in said county, authorized by Sec. 30-33011. C. A. as amended by 1939 S. L. Ch. 182, page 349. Thereafter 1941 S. L. Ch. 66, page 127, carrying an emergency clause, page 130, became effective the date of the approval, March 3, 1941, authorizing a three mill levy.
Whereupon, June 18, 1941 defendants passed a resolution 1 declaring an emergency in Canyon County as to *32 the relief situation therein, and that the 2 mill levy was insufficient, that they had been notified unless a 3 mill levy was made, cooperation from state funds would be withdrawn, and accordingly increased the relief levy from two to three mills.
Plaintiff, as a taxpayer in Canyon County, in this original proceeding resists such action as violative of the county budget law, supra, in that the budget having been fixed in January, could not thus be later changed.
Defendants urge lack of jurisdiction in this court because the board was exercising discretionary powers. Plaintiff contends the board was exceeding their jurisdiction to act, not that it was abuse of discretion.
Being a question of jurisdiction and a matter of state wide importance which should be promptly decided, the application is not improper. Williams v. Lewis, 6 Ida. 184, 54 P. 619; Baker v. Gooding County, 25 Ida. *33 506, 138 P. 342; State v. Leonardson, 51 Ida. 646, 9 P. (2) 1028; Taylor v. Girard, 54 Ida. 787, 36 P. (2) 773.
Plaintiff’s position as to the bar of the budget law however, is not well taken because that law itself expressly provides for contingencies such as this arising after the initial setting up of the budget:
Section 30-1205 I. C. A.:“.... In the event of any unforseen contingency arising, which could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of making the budget, and which shall require the expenditure of money not provided for in the budget, the board of county commissioners, by unanimous vote thereof, shall have the right to make an appropriation from the ‘general reserve appropriation’ to the office, department, service, agency or institution in which said contingency arises, in such amount as shall be determined by resolution of said board....”
Such provision is clearly applicable herein. Lloyd Corporation v. Bannock County, 53 Ida. 478, 25 P. (2) 217 (original opinion ); State v. Superior Court, (Wash.) 261 P. 90; In re Protest of Cities Service Gas Co., (Okl.) 19 P. (2) 546; Los Angeles County v. Payne, (Cal.) 66 P. (2) 658; State v. District Court, (Mont.) 91 P. (2) 399; McKinney v. Helms, (Ind.) 2 N. E. (2) 800; Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, (Ky.) 78 S. W. (2) 324. See also, Section 30-1208, I. C. A.
The legislature perforce knew the counties had made their budgets prior to the effective date of the three mill levy amendment. The legislature must have intended the amendment to be operative in the current year because of the emergency clause, hence the 1941 amendment clearly extended the powers of the county commissioners under the budget law, if it did not in fact amend such law, thereby empowering them to make the three mill levy for 1941, even though the budget had already been set up on the two mill basis.
Since the levy is not made until September (Sec. 61-801 I. C. A.) there is no occasion to issue warrants and allow them to remain unpaid but the additional levy authorized by the 1941 amendment may be made.
*34 Writ denied.
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115 P.2d 756 (Justus v. Canyon County) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.