Justin Sokol v. Wells Fargo Bank NA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-3141
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 23-3141 ____________

JUSTIN SOKOL, Appellant

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10 ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 3:21-cv-16758) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 12, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 30, 2024)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

A District Court dismissed Justin Sokol’s suit against his former employer for

Sokol’s failure to prosecute or otherwise comply with the Court’s orders. More than ten

months later, Sokol unsuccessfully sought relief from the judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied the Rule 60(b)(1) motion, so we will affirm.

I

After Wells Fargo terminated his employment, Sokol sued the bank in state court.

Wells Fargo removed the case to federal court, and the parties commenced discovery in

December 2021.

Sokol—who was represented by counsel—failed to comply with numerous

obligations in this case. He did not respond to correspondence from Wells Fargo’s

counsel, and he failed to appear at a Court-ordered scheduling conference in November

2021. He missed several discovery deadlines and served no discovery responses until

May 2022, after the Court intervened at Wells Fargo’s request.

When Sokol failed to respond to the Court’s June 2022 directive to cure the

deficiencies in his discovery responses, Wells Fargo again asked the Court to intervene.

The Court scheduled an in-person status conference for July 19, 2022, and Sokol again

failed to appear. The Court then tried to reach Sokol’s counsel at two telephone

numbers—the business number listed on the docket and a cell phone number provided by

counsel’s former law partner. It was unable to reach counsel after multiple attempts.

2 On July 22, 2022, Wells Fargo moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b) to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the Court’s orders. On August

25, 2022, a Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) detailing

Sokol’s dilatory conduct and recommending dismissal.1 As of that date, Sokol’s counsel

had not contacted the Court or Wells Fargo’s counsel since June 2022. In September

2022, the District Court adopted the R&R and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Over ten months later, in July 2023, Sokol sought relief from the dismissal order

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), asserting excusable neglect. He attached a certification from

his counsel, who stated that he left his former law firm on June 1, 2022, and did not

realize the defunct email address from that firm was associated with his ECF account.

Counsel stated that he updated his ECF account with a functional email in July 2023 (i.e.,

more than one year later). Counsel further stated that the last correspondence he received

about Sokol’s case was a May 2022 letter from Wells Fargo. Counsel opted not to “press

any issues” in the ensuing fourteen months because he believed Wells Fargo “was not

interested in accelerating the resolution of the case” and because, “[f]or both [c]ounsel

and the plaintiff, there were reasons that such a delay or pause was not unwelcome.”

Suppl. App. 3. Neither Sokol’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion nor counsel’s certification

mentioned the R&R that the Court ordered to be served on Sokol and his counsel by first

class mail.

1 The Magistrate Judge noted that Sokol’s counsel, not Sokol himself, “appears responsible for the prejudicial and dilatory conduct in this case.” R&R 6, D. Ct. ECF No. 19.

3 The District Court denied the Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and Sokol timely appealed.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review grants or denials of Rule 60(b) relief for abuse of discretion. Sovereign

Bank v. REMI Cap., Inc., 49 F.4th 360, 364 (3d Cir. 2022). Under that standard, we will

affirm unless “the District Court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact,

an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact,” or unless “no

reasonable person would adopt [its] view.” In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d

176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III

The sole basis for Sokol’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion was excusable neglect. To

evaluate excusable neglect, courts assess the totality of the circumstances, Nara v. Frank,

488 F.3d 187, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2007), including: “1) the danger of prejudice to the [non-

moving] party; 2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings;

3) the reason for the delay—and whether it was within the movant’s control; and 4)

whether the movant acted in good faith,” Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty., 946 F.3d

187, 191 (3d Cir. 2019).

The Court addressed each of these factors. First, it recounted that Wells Fargo had

been prejudiced by Sokol’s pre-dismissal failure to comply with discovery obligations. It

noted that if discovery were reopened Wells Fargo could be further prejudiced by loss of

4 evidence, fading memories, and unreachable witnesses. Second, although Sokol filed his

motion within Rule 60(b)(1)’s outer time limit, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c), the Court found

that Sokol offered no reasonable explanation for filing nearly eleven months after the

dismissal order. Third, the Court found that Sokol’s proffered reason for the delay

displayed an inexcusable lack of diligence. Finally, it stated that counsel’s justifications

for his failures strained credulity.

We discern no errors in the Court’s analysis, and its view was reasonable.

Therefore, we will not interfere with the Court’s exercise of discretion.2

* * *

For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying

Sokol’s request for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

2 Sokol did not raise Rule 60(b)(6) before the District Court, so his argument under that rule is forfeited. Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). In any event, Sokol’s appellate brief does not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances or extreme and unexpected hardship that would warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014).