Justin Robbins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 29, 2024
• Docket: 24-3201
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0433n.06

No. 24-3201

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED ) Oct 29, 2024 JUSTIN T. ROBBINS, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Justin Robbins applied for supplemental security income from

the Social Security Administration on the ground that his autism prohibited him from working.

An administrative law judge denied relief to Robbins, and the district court upheld the denial.

Because substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision, we affirm.

I

Robbins was born in 2000 and lives with his mother in northeast Ohio. He has suffered

from autism since childhood. Doctors diagnosed him with this condition after his elementary-

school teachers expressed concern with some of his behaviors—such as his robotic and repetitive

speech and struggles to accept changes to his routine. But this medical condition did not stop

Robbins from doing “decently well” in school. Admin. R. (“A.R.”) 35. Testing showed that he

had a high IQ. And he graduated from high school without the need for special education. No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Robbins was 20 years old at the time of his administrative hearing. He had adjusted to

adulthood in some respects. He was in his third year of community college seeking a music degree.

He had his driver’s license and was “pretty good” at getting to classes. A.R. 46, 435. He worked

“decently well” with classmates. A.R. 37. And apart from school, Robbins did not receive

counseling or medication for any problems with his mood, anxiety, or concentration. He also had

a good relationship with his young nieces and nephews and sometimes watched them for his sister.

Yet Robbins struggled in other ways. He had never held a job. Even as an adult, he relied

on his mother for his daily living. He did not handle his own finances. Further, unless his mother

reminded him, he often overlooked his personal hygiene (for example, by failing to shower or

shave). Robbins could microwave frozen foods, but mostly relied on his mother to cook for him.

His mother also needed to give him “step-by-step” instructions on basic chores and to repeatedly

remind him to do the chores. A.R. 50. And she asked him about his homework every day.

In January 2020, Robbins sought supplemental security income from the Social Security

Administration. Agency officials first rejected Robbins’s claim. He thus requested a hearing

before an administrative law judge.

The administrative law judge found that Robbins did not qualify as “disabled” under the

Social Security Act and so denied him benefits. To reach this result, the judge followed a five-

step approach for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Hamilton v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 98 F.4th 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). At the first two steps, the judge

recognized that Robbins had not worked and that his autism was a “severe” impairment. A.R. 16.

At step three, the judge held that Robbins did not qualify for an automatic disability finding

because his autism did not meet the criteria for such a finding in agency regulations. A.R. 17–19.

At step four, the judge determined Robbins’s “residual functional capacity.” A.R. 19–22. The

2 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

judge decided that Robbins could perform “simple (routine) tasks” in a low-stress environment

and could “respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations[.]” A.R.

19. At step five, the judge relied on a vocational expert to conclude that Robbins could perform

“work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” A.R. 22–23. This expert opined

that someone with Robbins’s capacity could hold various jobs, including “Order Picker,” “Hand

Packager,” and “Collator Operator.” A.R. 55. The Appeals Council denied review, so the judge’s

denial of benefits became the final agency decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

Robbins sued in federal court over this denial of benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A

magistrate judge recommended that the district court reject Robbins’s arguments and uphold the

administrative law judge’s decision. See Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 8769603, at

*8–15 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2023). The district court agreed. See Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

2024 WL 78276, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2024). Robbins appealed. We review the district

court’s decision de novo. See Hamilton, 98 F.4th at 803.

II

The Social Security Act provides benefits to applicants who suffer from a “disability.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Act defines “disability” to mean the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity” because of a physical or mental impairment that will likely last for at

least 12 months. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether an impairment meets this definition,

the Social Security Administration has adopted a “sequential evaluation process[.]” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4). This process considers five issues. First, applicants can qualify as disabled only

if they are not engaged in “substantial gainful activity[.]” Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, they can

qualify as disabled only if they have “severe” and lasting impairments. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If

applicants pass these first two steps, the process turns to the third issue: Do their impairments

3 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

“meet[] or equal[] one of [the Administration’s] listings in” its regulations? Id.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, they automatically qualify as disabled. Id. If not, the process turns to

issue four: Can applicants perform their “past relevant work” given their “residual functional

capacity”? Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(1). If they still can perform their past work, they

are not disabled. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If they cannot, the process ends with issue five: Can they

switch “to other work”? Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If not, they are disabled. Id.

Robbins raises a narrow dispute under this five-step process. He challenges only the

administrative law judge’s discussion of steps three and four. And he does not claim that the judge

legally erred at these steps—a claim that we would review de novo. See Hamilton, 98 F.4th at

803. Rather, he says that the judge lacked enough evidence to support his factual findings.

So Robbins’s arguments trigger a deferential standard of review. We must treat the

administrative law judge’s factual “findings” as “conclusive” if they are “supported by substantial

evidence[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A finding of fact survives this substantial-evidence test as long

as a “reasonable mind” could conclude that the evidence adequately supports the finding. Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citation omitted); see Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Under this forgiving standard, a court

frequently must uphold an administrative law judge’s finding even if the court believes the

evidence would better support the contrary view. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388,

389–90 (6th Cir. 1999). In other words, administrative law judges often have “a zone of choice”

to decide between the parties’ competing factual narratives “without interference by the courts”

for either alternative. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (citation

omitted). Robbins’s claims at steps three and four cannot overcome this deferential test.

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1. Step Three. Applicants can prove their disability at the third step by establishing that

they “have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of [the Administration’s] listings in appendix

1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chapter[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). These so-called

“listings” identify many impairments of the “major body systems” that are “severe enough” to bar

work. Id. § 416.925(a). That is, an applicant with an impairment that falls within a listing qualifies

as disabled based on that impairment alone without further inquiry into how the impairment affects

the applicant’s ability to work. See Sheeks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F. App’x 639, 641

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987)). To qualify for this regulatory

shortcut, though, applicants must prove that they “meet all of the specified medical criteria” in a

listing. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).

This case involves the listing for “[a]utism spectrum disorder”: Listing 12.10. See 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, § 12.10. Applicants must satisfy both of this listing’s two

paragraphs: Paragraphs A and B. See id. § 12.00(A)(2). Paragraph A lists the “medical criteria”

for autism. Id. § 12.00(A)(2)(a). It requires applicants to show both “[q]ualitative deficits in verbal

communication, nonverbal communication, and social interaction” and “[s]ignificantly restricted,

repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities.” Id. § 12.10(A)(1)–(2).

Paragraph B next lists four “functional criteria” used “in a work setting”: (1) “[u]nderstand,

remember, or apply information”; (2) “interact with others”; (3) “concentrate, persist, or maintain

pace”; and (4) “adapt or manage oneself.” Id. § 12.00(A)(2)(b). To decide how an applicant’s

impairment affects each of these four factors, the Administration uses a “five-point scale: None,

mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4). The autism listing (Listing

12.10) requires applicants to show an “[e]xtreme limitation of one” of these four factors or a

“marked limitation of two” of them. Id. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, § 12.10(B). An applicant has

5 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

an extreme limitation if the applicant cannot “function” in the area “independently, appropriately,

effectively, and on a sustained basis.” Id. § 12.00(F)(2)(e). An applicant has a marked limitation

if such “functioning” “is seriously limited.” Id. § 12.00(F)(2)(d). And the applicant has only a

moderate limitation if such “functioning” is “fair.” Id. § 12.00(F)(2)(c).

Applying this framework to Robbins, the administrative law judge jumped immediately to

the “criteria” in Paragraph B. A.R. 17. He found that Robbins had only a moderate limitation in

three factors and a mild one in the fourth. A.R. 17–19. Robbins now criticizes the judge for not

considering Paragraph A. But Robbins must “satisfy the requirements of both paragraphs A and

B.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2) (emphasis added); see Sullivan, 493 U.S.

at 530–31. We thus may uphold the judge’s decision if substantial evidence supported his

Paragraph B analysis without considering Robbins’s Paragraph A arguments. Turning to

Paragraph B, Robbins criticizes the judge’s finding that he had only moderate limitations (as

compared to marked ones) for two of the four factors: “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace” and

“adapt or manage oneself.” We will take those two factors in turn.

Concentrate, Persist, or Maintain Pace. The Administration considers how well

applicants can “[c]oncentrate, persist, or maintain pace” to measure their ability to “focus attention

on work activities” for a sustained period. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E)(3). The

agency lists several examples of what this factor analyzes: Can applicants work at a “consistent

pace”? Id. Can they timely complete tasks? Id. Can they change tasks without disrupting others?

Id. Can they work with others “without interrupting or distracting them”? Id. Can they follow a

routine? Id. And can they work a full day without the need for special breaks? Id.

The evidence would allow a “reasonable mind” to adopt the administrative law judge’s

conclusion that Robbins had only a “moderate limitation” for this factor. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103

6 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

(citation omitted); A.R. 18. To begin with, Robbins graduated from high school and completed

three years of college. These achievements suggest that he can focus on work-like matters for a

sustained period. A.R. 18. Next, the Administration asked Robbins to have a mental-status

assessment with Dr. Christopher Ward. A.R. 18, 435–40. Dr. Ward conducted this interview

remotely because of COVID-19. A.R. 435. Robbins performed reasonably well. Among other

tasks, “he completed ten iterations” of counting “backward from 100 by 7” in thirty seconds. A.R.

438. Robbins also showed a “level of energy, persistence and pace” that was “adequate” for all

the tasks that Dr. Ward assigned to him. A.R. 439. One could reasonably rely on this evidence to

conclude that Robbins had a “fair” ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace. 20 C.F.R. pt.

404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, 12.00(F)(2)(c).

Robbins counters that the administrative law judge placed too much “weight on the wrong

evidence[.]” Appellant’s Br. 31. He points to a medical report from Dr. Kendall Brown, another

psychologist. A.R. 501–08. Dr. Brown opined that Robbins found “consistent concentration”

difficult, especially when he had “to persist with tasks through increasing difficulty.” A.R. 501.

Brown added that these “difficulties” would limit Robbins’s “ongoing employability.” Id.

Robbins asks us to credit Brown’s opinion over Ward’s because Brown met with Robbins “eight

times” in person, but Ward saw him only once using a “telehealth platform.” A.R. 435, 501. Yet

these differences in the number and method of visits represent just two datapoints that go to the

weight of these dueling opinions. And the administrative law judge—not this court—bore the

burden to consider the competing credibility of the two doctors. See Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d

642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990). In that respect, the judge gave other reasons why he did not find Brown’s

opinion persuasive. Brown’s findings, for example, conflicted with objective evidence, including

Robbins’s completion of college coursework and his scores on intelligence tests. A.R. 18–19, 21.

7 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Brown’s opinion also rested heavily on Robbins’s subjective “self-reporting” of his abilities. A.R.

21. The judge thus reasonably weighed this competing evidence. See Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103.

Adapt or Manage Oneself. The Administration considers how well applicants can “[a]dapt

or manage” themselves to measure their “abilities to regulate emotions, control behavior, and

maintain well-being in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E)(4). The

agency again offers examples of what this factor evaluates: Can applicants respond “to [the]

demands” of the job? Id. Can they distinguish between “acceptable and unacceptable work

performance”? Can they set “realistic goals” and make “plans” for themselves “independently of

others”? Can they keep “their personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting”? And

can they see “normal hazards” and take precautions to avoid them? Id.

Here too, the evidence would allow a “reasonable mind” to adopt the administrative law

judge’s conclusion that Robbins had only a “moderate limitation” for this factor. Biestek, 587 U.S.

at 103 (citation omitted); A.R. 18. As an initial matter, Robbins could get to classes

“independently” because he had a driver’s license. A.R. 18. Next, Robbins had the intelligence

to care for his personal hygiene, and he dressed properly when he had the “motivation” to do so.

Id. He also “did not describe difficulty attending to grooming and hygiene” in his interview with

Dr. Ward. A.R. 437. And even when he confronted new “environments” (such as the interview

with Ward), he did not encounter “acute distress[.]” A.R. 18. The administrative law judge also

limited Robbins’s residual functional capacity to “low stress” jobs. A.R. 19.

Robbins responds that the administrative law judge overlooked his mother’s testimony.

She explained that she must repeatedly remind Robbins to take care of his hygiene. Yet the judge

discussed this testimony. Ultimately, however, he found that Robbins’s intelligence and his ability

to attend to his hygiene for various functions (including his classes and medical appointments)

8 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

suggested that he could do so for a job. At day’s end, his mother’s testimony may well have

allowed the judge to find that he had a marked (not just a moderate) limitation. But her testimony

merely created a “zone of choice” between these two potential findings. Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545

(citation omitted). That choice belonged to the administrative law judge—not this court. See id.

2. Step Four. At step four, the administrative law judge must identify the “residual

functional capacity” of applicants and consider how this capacity affects their ability to work at

prior employment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). This “capacity is the most [that applicants] can

still do despite [their] limitations.” Id. § 416.945(a)(1). The Administration recognizes that an

applicant’s mental limitations in “remembering” or “carrying out instructions” or in “responding

appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures . . . may reduce” the applicant’s

ability to work. Id. § 416.945(c). And it has told administrative law judges to identify an

applicant’s residual functional capacity based on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence”

in the case. Id. § 416.945(a)(3). Here, the judge identified Robbins’s residual functional capacity

by listing his abilities and limitations. A.R. 19. The judge found that Robbins could not do

“complex tasks” but that he could perform “simple (routine) tasks” “for at least two hours at a

time” and “carry out” and “remember simple instructions.” Id. The judge added that Robbins

could handle limited interactions with supervisors and coworkers and “deal with changes in routine

work settings.” Id. But Robbins could perform only “low stress” jobs. Id.

Robbins nitpicks this residual functional capacity in various ways. In response, the Social

Security Commissioner suggests that Robbins forfeited any challenge to the judge’s description of

his capacity by raising only conclusory claims in the district court. Yet we need not resolve this

forfeiture issue because substantial evidence supported the judge’s conclusion. For example,

Robbins’s ability to complete three years of college suggests that he can understand instructions

9 No. 24-3201, Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

and perform simple tasks. A.R. 20. And his ability to follow Dr. Ward’s instructions during the

interview also suggests that he could respond appropriately to supervisors. Id.

In response, Robbins does not attempt to overcome the demanding substantial-evidence

test. Instead, he merely cites competing evidence. For example, he again relies on Dr. Brown’s

report to suggest that he cannot carry out simple instructions. Yet Dr. Ward explained that

Robbins’s ability to complete various tasks showed that he had no difficulties in understanding,

remembering, and carrying out instructions. A.R. 439. As another example, Robbins challenges

the administrative law judge’s finding that he can properly interact with supervisors and

coworkers. Yet he ignores that he himself testified that he worked “decently well” with his

classmates on projects. A.R. 37. All told, Robbins’s counsel has litigated this appeal as if we were

the factfinder. But that is not our role. See Crum, 921 F.2d at 644. Because substantial evidence

supported the administrative law judge’s findings, we must uphold them. See id.

We affirm.