Justin Ray Miller v. Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedFebruary 12, 2026
Docket3:25-cv-00321
StatusUnknown

This text of Justin Ray Miller v. Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff (Justin Ray Miller v. Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Justin Ray Miller v. Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff, (M.D. Tenn. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION JUSTIN RAY MILLER, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) No. 3:25-cv-00321 v. ) ) MIKE FITZHUGH, Sheriff, ) ) Respondent. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Justin Ray Miller, former pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and current inmate of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis Petition for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in March 2025. (Doc. No. 1). As a preliminary matter, because Petitioner’s site of detention has changed, the proper respondent to the petition is the Sheriff of Davidson County, Daron Hall.1 See Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (“The proper respondent is the custodian who has the power to produce the petitioner before the habeas court.”). Respondent Daron Hall has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition (Doc. No. 15), to which Petitioner has responded in opposition (Doc. Nos. 17, 23, 24). Petitioner has filed a Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 18), a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19), a Motion for Records 1 Counsel for Mr. Hall refers to him as “Darren Hall” but the Court takes judicial notice of the proper spelling of Sheriff Daron Hall’s name and uses it herein. See https://sheriff.nashville.gov/meet-sheriff-hall/ (last visited February 2, 2026). (Doc. No. 25), a “Motion of Consideration” (Doc. No. 27), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 28). I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 6, 2023, a Rutherford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Petitioner

in Case Number 89771 on one count of attempted theft in the amount of $10,000 to $60,000 and one count of criminal simulation of the same amount. (Doc. No. 13-1 at 37). On April 8, 2025, Petitioner accepted a settlement agreement and entered a plea of guilty as to the charge of attempted theft in the amount of $10,000 to $60,000. (Id. at 63). In accepting this agreement, Petitioner accepted the agreed-upon sentence of eight years to serve at forty-five percent as a Range II offender. (Id. at 69, 73). Petitioner’s eight-year sentence was suspended to supervised probation. (Id. at 73). As part of the settlement agreement, Petitioner’s indicted charge of criminal simulation was dismissed. (Id. at 77). Public case information confirms that Petitioner has not sought post-conviction relief. See Rutherford County Online Court Records System (https://rutherford.tncrtinfo.com/crCaseForm.aspx?id=2A9336A8-E5C4-4778-9A87-

E4D5961DC4DF&dsid=23e44664) (last accessed February 3, 2026). On March 16, 2025,2 Petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241. (Doc. No. 1). On April 1, 2025, Petitioner filed a Supplement to his

2 Under the “prison mailbox rule” of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), and the Sixth Circuit’s subsequent extension of that rule in Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 2002) and Scott v. Evans, 116 F. App’x 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2004), a prisoner’s legal mail is considered “filed” when he deposits his mail in the prison mail system to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court. Thus, the Court considers the date of filing as March 16, 2025, the date that Petitioner deposited his petition into the prison mail system (see Doc. No. 1 at 9) instead of March 20, 2025, the date the petition was received by the Clerk’s Office. In the Memorandum filed in support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, counsel for Respondent asserts that Petitioner was not incarcerated at the time he filed the instant petition. (See Doc. No. 16 at 2 n.3) (asserting that the prison mailbox rule did not apply to Petitioner because he was not petition. (Doc. No. 6). By Order entered on May 6, 2025, this Court directed Respondent to file a response to the petition. (Doc. No. 8). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to dismiss the petition without prejudice because Petitioner has not fully exhausted his available state- court remedies. (Doc. No. 14).

II.ANALYSIS OF PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the Unites States[.]” The Rules Governing 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”) apply to habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Williams v. Holloway, No. 2:14-cv-02652-STA-tmp, 2016 WL 1058017, at *4 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14. 2016). A petition for a writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 generally arises from “a challenge to the manner in which a sentence is executed, rather than the validity of the sentence itself.” Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991)). Here, at the time he filed his Section 2241 petition (on March 16, 2025), Petitioner was a pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center awaiting the disposition of his criminal charges in Case # 89771. Among other allegations, Petitioner alleges

that he was deprived of the ability to represent himself in his criminal case because the state-court judge appointed a public defender to Petitioner. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3, 6). At that time, filing a

incarcerated at the time he filed his petition). However, Petitioner provided the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center as his mailing address in his petition (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 10) and submitted a certified inmate trust account statement signed by the custodian of his account at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center. (Doc. No. 2 at 3). The Court therefore finds that Petitioner was incarcerated at the time he filed his petition on March 16, 2025, and eligible for the application of the prison mailbox rule. petition under Section 2241 was appropriate because Petitioner was a state pre-trial detainee who alleged he was being held in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. However, on April 8, 2025, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to his charges while his Section 2241 petition was pending. Once that happened, Petitioner’s custody was based on a

judgment of conviction, making his Section 2241 petition moot unless it challenged the execution of his sentence (as opposed to the validity of the conviction itself). None of the claims raised in the petition challenged the execution of his sentence. In Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Respondent notes that “Petitioner’s habeas petition is to be reviewed through the lens of § 2254 because Petitioner is in custody on a final state court judgment.” (Doc. No. 15 at 1 n.2). Respondent then goes on in his Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss to analyze Petitioner’s claims under those brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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Related

Houston v. Lack
487 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla
542 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 2004)
United States v. Firooz Jalili
925 F.2d 889 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Leonard Louis Capaldi v. Stephen Pontesso, Warden
135 F.3d 1122 (Sixth Circuit, 1998)
Eric Martin v. William Overton
391 F.3d 710 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Scott v. Evans
116 F. App'x 699 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)

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Justin Ray Miller v. Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/justin-ray-miller-v-mike-fitzhugh-sheriff-tnmd-2026.