COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0183-25-2
JUSTIN RAY DUTCHER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and Athey Opinion Issued April 28, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS Steven B. Novey, Judge
(Sante J. Piracci, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Anna M. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM
Justin Ray Dutcher appeals his conviction for possession of Schedule I or II controlled
substance in violation of Code § 18.2-250. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to strike a juror for cause. We hold the trial court did not err and affirm the conviction.2
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. 2 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(c); Rule 5A:27(c). Counsel for the appellant waived oral argument. BACKGROUND3
In December 2023, Colonial Heights Police Officer Tristan Bennett encountered Justin Ray
Dutcher during a traffic stop. Dutcher, the driver of the stopped car, appeared “very anxious.”
Officer Bennett saw a passenger in the front seat and a white substance within a glass smoking
device “by the shift column.” Dutcher admitted that the smoking device was his. Officers arrested
him for possession of Schedule I or II controlled drugs. The police searched the car and found over
sixty grams of methamphetamine, packaging materials, and more than $600 in cash.
Dutcher was indicted for possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. He
elected to be tried by a jury. During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if they
were “aware of any bias or prejudice” they might have for either party or if they knew of any reason
that they could not be impartial. Venireman J.B., the subject of the issue on appeal, did not raise his
hand or indicate he could not judge the case on the evidence presented at trial.4 All the potential
jurors agreed that they could enforce the law even if they disagreed with it. When the
Commonwealth asked the prospective jurors if they or anyone in their families had been prosecuted
in the City of Colonial Heights, J.B. responded affirmatively but confirmed that he could remain
impartial. In response to a defense question, J.B. explained that, about forty years ago, his younger
brother “had a drug issue.” But J.B. stated that he could “put all that aside.”
After voir dire, the Commonwealth’s attorney made a motion to strike J.B. for cause
because he was the prosecutor in a prior case involving J.B. himself. In response, defense counsel
asked for an opportunity to rehabilitate J.B. The trial court found that J.B. did not need any
rehabilitation because he affirmed that he could be fair. Nonetheless, the court allowed the parties
3 On appeal of the process of jury selection, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below. See Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 25 (2020). 4 We refer to the venireman by his initials to protect his privacy. -2- to bring J.B. back for additional questioning. The Commonwealth’s attorney then withdrew his
motion to strike J.B. for cause. But at that point Dutcher asked to strike J.B. for cause “based on the
same thing.”
J.B. returned to the courtroom yet again for further questioning. He confirmed that he could
decide the case based only on the evidence presented and could give both parties a fair trial. In
response to questioning, J.B. said that at one point he had “an issue with drugs” but had “never
[been] caught for using” them. He conceded that he had been charged with assault and battery in
2004 but said he did not know who prosecuted him and did not remember if he was convicted. He
opined that he was not treated unfairly and emphasized that nothing from his experience would
affect his ability to be fair in this case.
Dutcher again made a motion to strike J.B. for cause “based on his answers.” The
Commonwealth objected and emphasized that the 2004 case against J.B. had been nolle prossed,
likely explaining why J.B. did not recall the outcome of the matter. The trial court denied the
motion. The Commonwealth used a peremptory strike to excuse J.B. from the venire.
The jury found Dutcher guilty of the lesser offense of possession of a Schedule I or II
controlled substance. He was sentenced to ten years of incarceration with seven years and six
months suspended.
ANALYSIS
Dutcher contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike J.B. for cause.
We disagree for the reasons that follow.
“[J]uror impartiality is [a question] of fact,” and a trial court’s decision to seat a juror “is
‘entitled to great deference on appeal’ unless ‘plainly wrong or unsupported by the record.’”
Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436, 454 (2023) (quoting Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63
Va. App. 92, 121, 127 (2014)); see Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 (2005).
-3- Accordingly, “the trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause will
. . . not [be] disturbed on appeal[] unless manifest error appears in the record.” Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448, 455 (2017) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178,
191 (2004)); see Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 256 (2010). “A manifest error occurs
when the record shows that a prospective juror cannot or will not lay aside his or her preconceived
opinion.” Taylor, 67 Va. App. at 456. “In conducting our review, we consider the juror’s entire
voir dire, not merely isolated statements.” Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 150, 157 (2019)
(quoting DeLeon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 409, 413 (2002)); accord Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 164 (2010).
Both the United States and Virginia Constitutions guarantee the “right to be tried by an
impartial jury.” Northcraft v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 587 (2023); see Code § 8.01-358
(outlining the process for safeguarding this right). “For that guarantee to be effective, persons
accused of violating criminal laws must be provided with ‘an impartial jury drawn from a panel . . .
free from exceptions.’”5 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 22 (2012) (quoting Breeden v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300 (1976)). “Every prospective juror must stand indifferent to the
cause . . . .” Id. at 23. And the guarantee requires that “any reasonable doubt as to a juror’s
qualifications must be resolved in favor of the accused.” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 587 (quoting
Breeden, 217 Va. at 298). “If . . . a reasonable doubt [exists about] whether the juror possesses
these qualifications, that doubt is sufficient to [e]nsure his exclusion.” Taylor, 61 Va. App. at 23
(quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 298); see Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 118 (2001). “These
principles must be strictly applied, and when a prospective juror equivocates about whether he or
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0183-25-2
JUSTIN RAY DUTCHER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and Athey Opinion Issued April 28, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS Steven B. Novey, Judge
(Sante J. Piracci, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Anna M. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM
Justin Ray Dutcher appeals his conviction for possession of Schedule I or II controlled
substance in violation of Code § 18.2-250. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to strike a juror for cause. We hold the trial court did not err and affirm the conviction.2
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. 2 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(c); Rule 5A:27(c). Counsel for the appellant waived oral argument. BACKGROUND3
In December 2023, Colonial Heights Police Officer Tristan Bennett encountered Justin Ray
Dutcher during a traffic stop. Dutcher, the driver of the stopped car, appeared “very anxious.”
Officer Bennett saw a passenger in the front seat and a white substance within a glass smoking
device “by the shift column.” Dutcher admitted that the smoking device was his. Officers arrested
him for possession of Schedule I or II controlled drugs. The police searched the car and found over
sixty grams of methamphetamine, packaging materials, and more than $600 in cash.
Dutcher was indicted for possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. He
elected to be tried by a jury. During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if they
were “aware of any bias or prejudice” they might have for either party or if they knew of any reason
that they could not be impartial. Venireman J.B., the subject of the issue on appeal, did not raise his
hand or indicate he could not judge the case on the evidence presented at trial.4 All the potential
jurors agreed that they could enforce the law even if they disagreed with it. When the
Commonwealth asked the prospective jurors if they or anyone in their families had been prosecuted
in the City of Colonial Heights, J.B. responded affirmatively but confirmed that he could remain
impartial. In response to a defense question, J.B. explained that, about forty years ago, his younger
brother “had a drug issue.” But J.B. stated that he could “put all that aside.”
After voir dire, the Commonwealth’s attorney made a motion to strike J.B. for cause
because he was the prosecutor in a prior case involving J.B. himself. In response, defense counsel
asked for an opportunity to rehabilitate J.B. The trial court found that J.B. did not need any
rehabilitation because he affirmed that he could be fair. Nonetheless, the court allowed the parties
3 On appeal of the process of jury selection, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below. See Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 25 (2020). 4 We refer to the venireman by his initials to protect his privacy. -2- to bring J.B. back for additional questioning. The Commonwealth’s attorney then withdrew his
motion to strike J.B. for cause. But at that point Dutcher asked to strike J.B. for cause “based on the
same thing.”
J.B. returned to the courtroom yet again for further questioning. He confirmed that he could
decide the case based only on the evidence presented and could give both parties a fair trial. In
response to questioning, J.B. said that at one point he had “an issue with drugs” but had “never
[been] caught for using” them. He conceded that he had been charged with assault and battery in
2004 but said he did not know who prosecuted him and did not remember if he was convicted. He
opined that he was not treated unfairly and emphasized that nothing from his experience would
affect his ability to be fair in this case.
Dutcher again made a motion to strike J.B. for cause “based on his answers.” The
Commonwealth objected and emphasized that the 2004 case against J.B. had been nolle prossed,
likely explaining why J.B. did not recall the outcome of the matter. The trial court denied the
motion. The Commonwealth used a peremptory strike to excuse J.B. from the venire.
The jury found Dutcher guilty of the lesser offense of possession of a Schedule I or II
controlled substance. He was sentenced to ten years of incarceration with seven years and six
months suspended.
ANALYSIS
Dutcher contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike J.B. for cause.
We disagree for the reasons that follow.
“[J]uror impartiality is [a question] of fact,” and a trial court’s decision to seat a juror “is
‘entitled to great deference on appeal’ unless ‘plainly wrong or unsupported by the record.’”
Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436, 454 (2023) (quoting Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63
Va. App. 92, 121, 127 (2014)); see Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 (2005).
-3- Accordingly, “the trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause will
. . . not [be] disturbed on appeal[] unless manifest error appears in the record.” Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448, 455 (2017) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178,
191 (2004)); see Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 256 (2010). “A manifest error occurs
when the record shows that a prospective juror cannot or will not lay aside his or her preconceived
opinion.” Taylor, 67 Va. App. at 456. “In conducting our review, we consider the juror’s entire
voir dire, not merely isolated statements.” Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 150, 157 (2019)
(quoting DeLeon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 409, 413 (2002)); accord Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 164 (2010).
Both the United States and Virginia Constitutions guarantee the “right to be tried by an
impartial jury.” Northcraft v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 587 (2023); see Code § 8.01-358
(outlining the process for safeguarding this right). “For that guarantee to be effective, persons
accused of violating criminal laws must be provided with ‘an impartial jury drawn from a panel . . .
free from exceptions.’”5 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 22 (2012) (quoting Breeden v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300 (1976)). “Every prospective juror must stand indifferent to the
cause . . . .” Id. at 23. And the guarantee requires that “any reasonable doubt as to a juror’s
qualifications must be resolved in favor of the accused.” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 587 (quoting
Breeden, 217 Va. at 298). “If . . . a reasonable doubt [exists about] whether the juror possesses
these qualifications, that doubt is sufficient to [e]nsure his exclusion.” Taylor, 61 Va. App. at 23
(quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 298); see Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 118 (2001). “These
principles must be strictly applied, and when a prospective juror equivocates about whether he or
5 The error of failing to strike a juror for cause is not harmless even if the Commonwealth ultimately uses a peremptory strike to remove that person from the jury. See Dehart v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 213, 216 (1995). -4- she has formed a fixed opinion, the prospective juror should be stricken by the trial court.” Taylor,
61 Va. App. at 23.
Simply put, a potential juror may serve on the jury only if he “stands indifferent in the
cause.” Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 42 (2020) (quoting Townsend, 270 Va. at
330). For a juror’s opinion to disqualify him, it must be one of such a “fixed character [that it]
repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case” and causes the juror to believe that “the
accused stands condemned already.” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 589 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 61 (2011)); see Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
971, 976 (1980) (quoting Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106 (1931)). Ultimately, if a
venireperson is discovered to have preconceived views, “the test of impartiality is whether [he] can
lay [them] aside . . . and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial.”
Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761 (2000) (quoting Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19
Va. App. 619, 621 (1995)).
The trial court—not the appellate court—has the opportunity to see and hear each
prospective juror respond to questions posed during the entire voir dire. See Andrews, 280 Va. at
256 (“[I]t is the trial judge who sees and hears the prospective juror and, thus, is in the best position
to weigh h[is] ‘inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue, and [his] general demeanor.’” (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 (1978))). As a result of this perspective, that court
“is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror’s responses during voir dire
indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in performing the duties of a juror as
required by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.” Keepers, 72 Va. App. at 42-43 (quoting
Green, 262 Va. at 115).
Granting deference to the trial court, which was able to see and hear the prospective jurors,
and considering the voir dire as a whole, we conclude that the court’s finding that J.B. was impartial
-5- was not “plainly wrong” and did not constitute manifest error. See Harvey, 76 Va. App. at 454
(quoting Huguely, 63 Va. App. at 127). J.B. stated unequivocally that he could be impartial and
repeatedly said that he could be fair. He was questioned—twice—and thoroughly vetted by the
trial court. In fact, at no point was J.B. equivocal or tentative with his responses that he could be
impartial and fair. This record simply does not establish or even suggest that J.B. held a
preconceived opinion of such “fixed character [that it] repel[led] the presumption of innocence” or
that he was not otherwise indifferent to the case. See Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 589 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Lovos-Rivas, 58 Va. App. at 61).
For these reasons, Dutcher has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to strike potential juror J.B. for cause.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by refusing to strike J.B. for cause. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
-6-