In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00192-CR ___________________________
JUSTIN MORGAN GREENE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 235th District Court Cooke County, Texas Trial Court No. CR22-00359
Before Birdwell, Womack, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Justin Morgan Greene pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2). He pleaded true to the State’s
enhancement paragraph related to a prior felony conviction for family-violence assault
and elected to have a jury assess his punishment. The jury assessed his punishment at
fifty-five years’ confinement.
In a sole point of error, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel failed to present certain mitigating evidence related
to his mental health history. Because we conclude that counsel’s performance was not
deficient and that Greene was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency, we affirm.
I. Background
After stealing a vehicle, Greene walked into a convenience store and muttered
something to the store clerk. The clerk did not hear him, so she leaned forward and
said, “[E]xcuse me?” Greene told her, “I want to see your F-ing blood,” and he
stabbed her in her neck with a knife. He then ran away.
At Greene’s punishment trial, the jury heard testimony from one of the police
officers who responded to Greene’s location after he fled from the convenience store,
the paramedic who treated the store clerk, the store clerk, and her husband. The State
offered and the trial court admitted various exhibits, including videos from the
officer’s body camera and from surveillance cameras both inside and outside the
2 convenience store. The defense then called three witnesses: Greene, his mother, and
his sister. The defense did not offer any defense exhibits into evidence.
A. The State’s Case
Officer Lauren Trevino testified that when Greene was initially apprehended by
responding officers, he spoke with them and did not fight. That did not last; while
Officer Trevino transported Greene in her patrol vehicle, he managed to get out of
his seatbelt and move his handcuffs to the front of his body. After Officer Trevino
had parked and gotten out of her vehicle, she noticed that it was shaking and that
Greene was trying to break a window. She and the other officers removed him from
the vehicle to secure his handcuffs, and he became violent.
Officer Trevino testified that it had taken five police officers—four of whom
were male—to restrain Greene. He exhibited excessive strength and violence, and
despite the cold, wet weather at the time, his skin was hot to the touch. In one of
multiple physical altercations with Greene, Officer Trevino was injured when he bit
her and pulled her thumb out of its socket. She testified that in her opinion and based
on her law-enforcement experience, Greene’s behavior had been the result of illegal
drug use.
The paramedic who treated the store clerk testified that when he arrived at the
convenience store, she was bleeding from the wound in her neck. He did what he
could to stop the bleeding and transported her to the hospital. He testified that neck
wounds are considered “critical” injuries due to all the veins and arteries and the
3 airway in that area. He then described the severity of the store clerk’s injuries and
explained that if she had been stabbed just one inch to the left or right of her stab
wound, it could have been fatal.
The store clerk testified about the attack and her injuries. She told the jury what
Greene had said to her and described where and how he had stabbed her. After he
stabbed her, she felt a burning sensation and grabbed her neck, which had started
bleeding “a lot.” She was scared but managed to stay calm. Her husband, who had
been at the convenience store to help her close at the end of her shift, called 911 and
followed Greene out of the store. Greene was gone by the time the paramedics
arrived.
The store clerk had to have surgery to repair her salivary gland, her thyroid
gland, and the artery that ran between them; they had been sliced by the knife. She
testified that she was very lucky because the knife could have killed her. At the time of
trial, she continued to deal with scar tissue and numbness in her lips and chin. She
told the jury that she thought about the attack every day and that she still had
nightmares.
The store clerk’s husband testified that he had not seen Greene stab his wife
and that he had not realized anything was wrong until he saw her reach for her gun
that she carried. At that point, he stood up. Greene made eye contact with him before
running out the door. The husband chased Greene out of the store and drew his own
gun, yelling for Greene to stop. He shot at the tires of Greene’s vehicle, and Greene
4 fled on foot. The husband then returned to the store to help his wife, who was
holding napkins to her neck. He testified that he had been scared for her.
During the husband’s testimony, the jury viewed the surveillance footage from
the store that day. He testified that watching the footage made him want to hurt
Greene. He told the jury that his wife was lucky to be alive. Since the attack, he had
started going to work with her every day. He did not sleep much anymore because he
would keep an eye on her at night and wake her up when she started screaming in her
sleep.
Before the State rested, it offered Greene’s certified priors for the enhancement
paragraph. In September 2017, Greene was convicted of continuous family-violence
assault causing bodily injury, see id. § 25.11, and sentenced to ten years’ confinement,
probated for five years. Approximately eighteen months later, Greene’s community
supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to four years’ confinement. The trial
court admitted the judgments into evidence.
B. The Defense’s Case
Greene testified that when he went into the convenience store, he believed that
he was being followed by “cyborgs.” He thought the store clerk was a cyborg and
wanted to “make sure” she was human by seeing her blood. He claimed that he had
“freaked out” when he saw her gun.
Greene testified that he had been hallucinating and that he was “outside of [his]
mind” when he stabbed the store clerk and when he later became violent with the
5 police officers. He explained that he had smoked methamphetamine that morning and
that he had been smoking it for two straight weeks. Greene admitted that he had been
using methamphetamine “off and on” for eighteen years—beginning when he was
fifteen years old.
Greene also testified that he had a history of mental illnesses. When he was
thirteen years old, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and manic depression. By
the time of trial, he had also been diagnosed as schizophrenic. Approximately six
weeks before he attacked the store clerk, Greene was released from commitment at a
state hospital. He went to MHMR and received medication for his diagnoses. When
he ran out of his medication, he began self-medicating with methamphetamine. He
started hallucinating and then became paranoid, which ultimately led to the attack.
Greene told the jury that he took “full responsibility” for the attack, and he
apologized for what he had done to the store clerk and to her family in the process.
He testified that in the future, he would check himself into the state hospital when he
ran out of his medication and that he would “probably not use illicit drugs anymore.”
Greene explained that he deeply regretted his actions and asked the jury to show him
mercy.
On cross-examination, the State asked Greene about his criminal history. He
testified that he was arrested for assault in 2011 and 2013. Regarding his September
2017 conviction for continuous family-violence assault, he explained that he had
grabbed the mother of his children and had “shook her up.” He had also been
6 arrested for disorderly conduct—once when the police were looking for drugs in his
hotel room and once when he displayed a firearm—and for unlawful possession of
body armor by a felon, and he had pled guilty to resisting arrest. Greene recalled the
facts of these incidents and testified to specific details, remembering some of them
“quite well.” For the family-violence incident, Greene explained that he had been
drinking. For the body-armor incident, he explained that he had been “off [his]
medication” but that he “might have been” smoking methamphetamine. Regarding
the other incidents, Greene provided no excuses for his actions.
Greene’s mother testified about Greene’s mental illnesses and explained that he
had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, manic depression, and schizophrenic
affective disorder. She confirmed that Greene had been released from a state hospital
six weeks before he attacked the store clerk and explained that he had also been
hospitalized once before that. For both hospitalizations, she had sought an emergency
mental health warrant on his behalf. According to Mother, Greene had stopped taking
his medication because he “felt like he didn’t need it or it wasn’t helping.” She told the
jury that Greene was not a violent person when properly medicated.
Mother also testified that mental illness “runs in the family.” Greene’s father
and brother had been diagnosed as bipolar, manic, and schizophrenic, and both had
been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease, which she described as a terminal illness
that “kills . . . brain cells.” Mother asserted that Huntington’s disease was a hereditary
7 condition, but when counsel asked her whether Greene himself had ever been
formally diagnosed with the disease, she said no.
Mother then testified generally about Greene’s family and his life prior to the
attack, stating that he had been doing well. She told the jury that she did not want to
see her son go to jail for the better part of his life, that he needed medical and mental
help, and that she would continue to try to help him manage his mental health
treatment.
Greene’s sister described him as a “great dad” and a “great brother” who
“love[d] to spend time with his family.” She testified that he had “always” had mental
health issues and that he had suicidal ideations. When asked about Greene’s
commitment to the state hospital, Sister became emotional and explained that he had
stopped taking his medication. She told the jury that Greene was not inherently
violent and that if he were released, she would “continue to help ensure” that he took
his medication. Sister asked the jury to have mercy on her brother.
During his closing argument, Greene’s trial counsel told the jury that Greene
would have to live with what he had done to the store clerk for the rest of his life. He
argued that Greene had been hallucinating and that someone who had been
“voluntarily using methamphetamines up for a long time” did not know what he was
doing. Counsel mentioned Greene’s history of mental illnesses and asserted that he
would not go unmedicated again, but he also stated that Greene’s “mental defects”
were not an excuse. He urged the jury, “Don’t throw away [Greene’s] life. Don’t
8 throw away his ability to be a part of a family . . . .” Counsel finished his argument by
asking the jury to give Greene a chance.
C. The Verdict
The jury assessed Greene’s punishment at fifty-five years’ confinement, and the
trial court entered its judgment on the verdict. Greene timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance
of counsel. Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see U.S. Const.
amend. VI. To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation was deficient and that
the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The record must
affirmatively demonstrate that the claim has merit. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
When an appellant’s ineffective-assistance claim challenges his trial counsel’s
failure to call witnesses, the appellant “must show that [such witnesses] had been
available to testify and that [the] testimony would have been of some benefit to the
defense.” Ex parte Ramirez, 280 S.W.3d 848, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal
quotation omitted).
9 In evaluating counsel’s effectiveness under the deficient-performance prong,
we review the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of the
case to determine whether counsel provided reasonable assistance under all the
circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307; Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 813–14. Our review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and we
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was not deficient. Nava, 415
S.W.3d at 307–08.
An appellate court may not infer ineffective assistance simply from an unclear
record or a record that does not show why counsel failed to do something. Menefield v.
State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Trial counsel “should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity
to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.” Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at
593. If trial counsel did not have that opportunity, we should not conclude that
counsel performed deficiently unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that
no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308. Direct
appeal is usually inadequate for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
because the record generally does not show counsel’s reasons for any alleged deficient
performance. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592–93; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.
Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial—that is, a trial with a reliable
10 result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In other words, an appellant must
show a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have turned out differently
without the deficient performance. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at
308. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308.
We must ultimately focus on examining the fundamental fairness of the proceeding in
which the result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have
been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at
2069.
III. Analysis
In his sole point of error, Greene argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to “investigate [Greene’s] mental health history, request a mental
health examination, obtain and/or admit court records regarding civil commitments,
obtain and/or admit mental health records, contact [Greene’s] treatment providers, or
call a mental health expert to testify.” Greene also argues that counsel should have
“[i]nvestigate[d] Huntington’s [d]isease” and called an expert witness to testify about
the disease. He contends that the “supporting documentation and[] expert testimony
would have mitigated the effect of [his] behavior” when he attacked the store clerk
and his criminal history.
11 Greene did not file a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, and his trial counsel unexpectedly died forty days after the date that his
judgment of conviction was entered. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4 (requiring motion for
new trial be filed within thirty days after date judgment signed). Thus, there was no
hearing at which counsel testified regarding trial strategy. See Ex parte Covarrubias, 665
S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“We should be circumspect in our analysis
of ineffective assistance claims in light of trial counsel’s inability to respond . . . .”);
Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“If counsel’s reasons for
his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the
conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel’s decisions
and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.”). Based on the
limited record before us, we cannot conclude that counsel’s conduct was “so
outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Nava, 415 S.W.3d
at 308.
A. No Deficient Performance
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary . . . .” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. This duty requires counsel to “investigate the facts
of the case and determine if an expert is necessary to present the defendant’s case to
the jury and, if so, to obtain competent expert assistance.” Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d
626, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). But “Strickland does not require counsel to
12 investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the
effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
533, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2003). Nor does it require counsel “to present mitigating
evidence at sentencing in every case.” Id., 123 S. Ct. at 2541. When counsel ultimately
decides not to investigate or present certain mitigating evidence, Strickland requires
that counsel “put forth enough investigative efforts to base [his] decision . . . on a
thorough understanding of the available evidence.” Ex parte Woods, 176 S.W.3d 224,
226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The decision “must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S. Ct. at 2541
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).
Here, the record does not demonstrate that counsel put forth an insufficient
investigative effort or that he lacked a thorough understanding of the available
evidence. Rather, it shows that he did investigate the facts of this case and recognized
the evidence both for and against his client in developing a defensive strategy.
For example, Greene’s argument that counsel should have “[i]nvestigate[d]
Huntington’s [d]isease” and presented expert testimony of the same occupies several
pages of his appellate brief. The record reflects, however, that while Greene’s father
and brother had been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease, Greene himself had not.
Counsel was clearly aware of this fact in deciding not to present expert testimony on a
disease that Greene did not have. During Mother’s testimony, counsel confirmed that
Greene had never been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease after she testified that it
13 was a hereditary condition. Counsel did not inquire further or ask any other defense
witnesses about the disease, nor did he mention it during closing argument. We
cannot say that counsel’s strategy in handling the evidence of Huntington’s disease—
or lack thereof—was unreasonable.
Nor can we say that counsel’s strategy in handling the evidence actually related
to Greene’s mental health history was unreasonable. While there was evidence that
Greene had a history of mental illnesses, there was also evidence that he had an
eighteen-year history with methamphetamine and that he had been self-medicating
with it in the weeks before the attack. Indeed, he may have been hallucinating when
he attacked the store clerk, but the evidence revealed that his hallucinations were not
the product of any mental illness but were the direct result of his voluntary
intoxication via methamphetamine.
Greene’s trial counsel, having apparently grasped this evidence, asked the jury
for “mercy.” In his opening statement, counsel told the jury that the evidence would
speak for itself and that Greene, when he attacked the store clerk, “was not capable of
understanding what he was doing, by his own fault.” [Emphasis added.] Counsel asked
the jury, “How long [of a punishment] is enough to teach him, you are not allowed to
self-medicate, Mr. Greene.” Then during the defense’s case, Greene, his mother, and
his sister also asked the jury to show mercy in assessing his sentence.
Furthering that strategy, counsel’s closing argument focused on “fairness.” He
pointed out that Greene had taken responsibility for his actions and that he had not
14 tried to plead an insanity defense, specifically acknowledging that Greene’s “mental
defects” were not an excuse. Counsel then asserted that Greene was “appalled at
himself” and urged the jury to assess punishment at ten to twenty years’ confinement.
Contrary to Greene’s assertion that his mental health “was the basis for [his]
defense,” it is just as likely—if not more likely—that counsel’s defensive strategy was
to present Greene to the jury as a defendant who deserved its mercy because, among
other reasons,1 he had a history of mental illnesses. Notably, the State even
recognized this defensive strategy and rebutted it, arguing to the jury, “Please show
[Greene] the mercy that he showed [the store clerk] on [the day he attacked her], and
that’s absolutely nothing.” Based on the record before us, we must defer to counsel’s
strategic decisions. See Ortiz, 93 S.W.3d at 88–89.
Further, Greene’s ineffective-assistance argument is flawed because it makes
two inferential leaps: (1) because counsel did not call a mental health expert to testify,
he failed to seek the assistance of a mental health expert and (2) because counsel did
not offer documentary evidence of Greene’s mental health history, he failed to
1 In addition to presenting evidence of Greene’s mental health history, counsel made sure that the jury knew about the family that Greene would leave behind while he served his sentence—through the testimony of defense witnesses and when counsel addressed the jury himself:
We’re going to ask you to have mercy on him. Sentence him to a reasonable sentence, but let him go back to his family and go forward without sin. . . . Does he deserve to be punished? Absolutely.
The question is for how long. How long do we take this young man away from his family, his children.
15 request or obtain such documentary evidence. Cf. Riggins v. State, No. 01-08-00693-CR,
2010 WL 2991222, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting similar argument). Greene has
not shown that counsel failed to consult with a mental health expert or to request or
obtain documentary evidence of Greene’s mental health history—by contacting
Greene’s treatment providers, requesting a mental health examination, or otherwise.
Nor has Greene shown that a mental health expert was available to testify or that a
mental health expert’s testimony would have been beneficial to his defense. See
Ramirez, 280 S.W.3d at 853; Starr v. State, No. 01-18-00947-CR, 2020 WL 4006447, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (quoting Ramirez).
With the record silent as to why counsel did not present the testimony of a
mental health expert or offer documentary evidence of Greene’s mental health
history, we cannot infer that counsel was ineffective. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593;
Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 432. On this record, it is just as likely that no favorable evidence
or testimony was available. See Riggins, 2010 WL 2991222, at *5.
B. No Prejudice
Even if we could somehow conclude that counsel’s failure to present the
testimony of a mental health expert or documentary evidence of Greene’s mental
health history constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Greene has failed to show
a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have turned out differently if
16 counsel had done so. The jury heard a great deal of testimony about Greene’s mental
health history from Greene, his mother, and his sister. While favorable expert
testimony and supporting documentary evidence—assuming there had been any—
would have bolstered the lay witness testimony,2 it likely would not have influenced
Greene’s punishment.
First, it is unclear from the record whether the new alleged mitigating evidence
would have substantially differed from the evidence actually presented at sentencing.
See Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that even
if sentencing evidence had “merely scratched the surface,” new mitigating evidence
that did not differ in a substantial way would have had no effect on the outcome
(citing Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2005))); Parker v. State, 462 S.W.3d
559, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Martinez).
Second, the new alleged mitigating evidence would not have rebutted the
evidence that he attacked the store clerk because he was on methamphetamine. See
Martinez, 195 S.W.3d at 731 (concluding that even though omitted mitigating evidence
was “strong,” there was still no reasonable probability that it would have “tipped the
2 See Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (defining “bolstering” as “any evidence the sole purpose of which is to convince the factfinder that a particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of credit, without substantively contributing ‘to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence’”). Indeed, Greene argues that expert testimony and documentary evidence would have “corroborated the defense testimony and increased the credibility of [Greene] and his witnesses.”
17 scale in [defendant’s] favor”); Parker, 462 S.W.3d at 565 (similar); see also Ex parte West,
No. WR-78,439-02, 2016 WL 9000801, at *14 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8, 2016) (not
designated for publication) (holding that defendant had not shown prejudice for
failure to call witnesses to provide mitigation testimony because cross-examination
could have revealed harmful information).
Third, the aggravating evidence against Greene was particularly compelling. In
addition to the evidence of Greene’s voluntary intoxication, the jury heard the horrific
details of the attack, the store clerk’s injuries, and her firsthand account of being
stabbed in the neck with a knife. It viewed a video of the violent attack itself, with
sound, and saw Greene’s actions before and after he stabbed the store clerk. The jury
heard testimony from multiple witnesses describing the physical, medical, and
emotional trauma that the store clerk had endured and continued to endure because
of Greene’s actions, as well as her husband’s trauma. The jury also received evidence
of Greene’s criminal history and heard his attempts to rationalize those incidents. And
the jury heard testimony that Greene had failed to properly manage his mental
illnesses in the past.
Even if the testimony of a mental health expert or documentary evidence of
Greene’s mental health history could have added more to the mitigation picture than
counsel had already presented, we cannot conclude that it likely would have been
compelling enough to change Greene’s sentence. See West, 2016 WL 9000801, at *14
(reaching similar conclusion). The fact that expert testimony or documentary
18 evidence—again, assuming there had been any—might have bolstered the lay witness
testimony is not significant enough to tip the scales in Greene’s favor when weighed
against all the evidence against him that supported a longer sentence. See id.; cf. Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 534–35, 537, 123 S. Ct. at 2542, 2543–44 (finding prejudice where
mitigating evidence was “powerful” and relevant to assessing moral culpability and
where defendant did not have a history of violent conduct that could have been used
to offset powerful mitigating evidence).
Contrary to Greene’s contention that the expert testimony and documentary
evidence would have “allowed an informed jury to consider punishment in light of
[his] history of mental illness,” the record reflects that the jury did just that. It had
been informed of Greene’s mental health history through three different lay witnesses’
testimonies. With that information—as well as the evidence that Greene had an
eighteen-year-long methamphetamine habit and had been voluntarily intoxicated
when he attacked the store clerk, that he had a criminal history consisting of both
violent and non-violent offenses, and that he had never been diagnosed with
Huntington’s disease despite its being mentioned during defense testimony to
somehow excuse his behavior—and having heard counsel’s and Greene’s family’s
pleas for mercy, the jury considered a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or
life in prison. Within that punishment range, the jury assessed Greene’s punishment at
fifty-five years.
19 We also reject Greene’s notation that the State “pointed out the lack of
corroborating evidence regarding [his] mental health.” On cross-examination, the
State asked Greene whether he had “br[ought] any documentation” for his
commitment to the state hospital or for his diagnoses—two questions out of
approximately fifty-five pages of defense testimony in the record. In its rebuttal
argument, the State asserted that Greene had not “br[ought] any evidence of” his
mental illness—one sentence out of approximately nine pages of closing argument in
the record. We cannot say whether this effectively swayed the jury, particularly when
the rest of the State’s argument emphasized Greene’s voluntary intoxication, arguing,
“[W]e are not here because [Greene] was off of his medication. . . . [W]e are
here . . . because [he] decided not to take his medication or get more medication[] but
instead[] decided to smoke meth for two weeks straight.” The State also appeared to
concede that Greene had a mental illness, arguing that having a mental illness does
not excuse his stabbing someone in the neck. The State urged the jury to think about
the store clerk and to hold Greene accountable for his voluntary actions. The jury
clearly did so.
On this record, we cannot say that the jury would have assessed a different
punishment if it had heard the testimony of a mental health expert or had received
documentary evidence of Greene’s mental health history, and Greene has not shown
otherwise.
We overrule Greene’s sole point of error.
20 IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Greene’s sole point of error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: March 13, 2025