Justin Jamaul Broadnax v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 13, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-00599-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 13, 2024

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00599-CR

JUSTIN JAMAUL BROADNAX, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-84886-2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Reichek, and Justice Nowell Opinion by Justice Reichek Justin Jamaul Broadnax appeals his conviction for murder. Bringing seven

issues, appellant contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to

conduct a hearing on his motion to quash, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting evidence of extraneous firearms, (3) he was egregiously harmed by

improper comments made by the prosecutor, (4) the jury charge contained an

erroneous instruction, (5) the evidence showed he acted in self-defense, (6) the

evidence showed he acted with sudden passion, and (7) his conviction is unjust.

Finding no merit in appellant’s arguments, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background

In 2019, appellant began dating a woman named Hannah Michelle Bond.

Bond was seventeen years old when the relationship began and appellant was

twenty-five. Hannah testified appellant was jealous and would constantly track her

location on his phone.

On August 21, 2021, Hannah went to visit her friend Corey Mack to purchase

some marijuana. At the time, Corey was staying in an apartment with his friend,

Skylar Thuo. Skylar’s brother, William, and Skylar’s boyfriend, Destino Ponce also

lived in the apartment. All four were present when Hannah arrived. Hannah did not

know anyone in the apartment other than Corey.

After purchasing some marijuana, Hannah went out to the apartment’s back

patio with Corey to smoke. While she was there, a friend of Destino’s named Ethan

arrived to purchase some marijuana. Ethan made the purchase and, when Destino

opened the door for Ethan to leave, they found appellant standing in the doorway.

According to Destino, appellant barged into the apartment and demanded to know

where Hannah was. William, Destino, and Skylar all testified appellant acted very

aggressively and seemed overly confident given that he was outnumbered.

Destino went to the patio and told Hannah that appellant was looking for her.

He then went back into the apartment and repeatedly told appellant to leave.

Appellant refused, saying he was fine where he was. Corey and Hannah came in

–2– from the patio and Hannah got her things. Hannah then walked to the front door and

appellant followed.

Both Destino and Corey were standing by the door when Hannah and

appellant walked by. As appellant walked past Corey, he hit Corey in the head with

his elbow. The blow had sufficient force to push Corey through the louvered slats

of an interior door. Corey and Destino then pushed appellant into the breezeway

outside the apartment. Appellant tripped on his way out and landed face down on

the ground. Corey, Destino, William, and Ethan proceeded to hit and kick appellant

while appellant attempted to fight back from his position on the ground. Hannah

and Skylar stood nearby. After a while, everyone except Corey backed away. Corey

was still on top of appellant when appellant reached up, grabbed him around the

neck, and pulled him closer. Appellant then pulled out a gun hidden underneath his

clothing and fired two shots in rapid succession – one bullet hit the wall of the

building, and the other hit Corey in the chest.

After being shot, Corey stumbled back into the apartment followed by

Destino, William, Ethan, and Skylar. Skylar and William called 911. While waiting

for help to arrive, Skylar and Destino performed chest compressions on Corey.

Police who arrived at the scene continued compressions, but Corey died as a result

of his injuries. A search of the apartment revealed no weapons. The gun used to kill

Corey was never recovered.

–3– Immediately after the shooting, appellant and Hannah fled to appellant’s

mother’s house. Hannah testified appellant knew he had killed Corey, but said he

did not care because Corey “put his hands on him” and “was the person he wanted.”

Appellant told his mother he shot someone who was trying to rob him. On the advice

of his mother, appellant changed the color of his hair and shaved his beard. Friends

then took appellant and Hannah to Hannah’s mother’s house in Houston. Both

appellant and Hannah kept their phones turned off and purchased a “burner” phone

so they could not be traced. They were eventually found and arrested.

At trial, appellant testified in his own defense. He stated he went to the

apartment that day because Hannah invited him there to meet her friend. Appellant

said when he arrived at the door, Ethan waved him in. He acknowledged the men

yelled at him to leave, but said he was confused by their attitude because he thought

he had been invited.

According to appellant, Corey threw the first punch at him as he was walking

by and he was able to duck out of the way. During the fight that followed, appellant

said the men kicked him, punched him, and “stomped on his head.” He testified he

thought they were going to kill him and he pulled out the gun to protect himself. He

characterized his first shot that went into the wall as a warning shot. When Corey

refused to back down, appellant shot him in the chest.

Appellant stated he was unaware Corey had died until the next day when he

saw it on social media. He said he dyed his hair and cut his beard because he was

–4– afraid Corey’s friends would come after him. He denied hiding from the police and

said he did not know they were looking for him until he was arrested. He stated he

planned to go to the police, but they arrested him before he was able to do so.

Analysis

In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to conduct a hearing on his motion to quash the indictment in a separate

case brought against him for possessing a firearm in violation of a protective order.

Appellant argues the protective order was void because it lacked the required

findings on gun violence. Appellant also appears to challenge the constitutionality

of the statute under which he was charged in the protective order case.

As the State correctly notes, this issue is multifarious and appellant’s actual

complaint with respect to the murder case before us is unclear. Even if we wanted

to address appellant’s complaint, the record contains neither the protective order nor

the motion to quash. “The failure to provide a sufficient appellate record precludes

appellate review of a claim.” London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). We overrule appellant’s first issue.

In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting evidence of firearms found in his vehicle and at his mother’s residence

over his relevance objection. Appellant argues that, because none of the firearms

was used in the offense, and the State did not show he owned any of them, the

admission of the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

–5– We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of

evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d

895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A trial judge abuses his discretion if his decision

falls outside the zone of reasnable disagreement. Id. If the ruling is correct under

any theory of law, it will not be disturbed even if the trial court gave a wrong or

insufficient reason for the ruling. Id.

Under Rule 401 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has

a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence

and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. TEX. R. EVID. 401. The

exclusion of relevant evidence is a remedy that should be used sparingly and only if

the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 403. There must be a “clear disparity between the

degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value.” Conner v. State,

67 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

In response to appellant’s relevance objection, the State argued that evidence

the murder weapon was not found among the multiple weapons discovered both in

appellant’s vehicle and the house to which he fled was probative of appellant’s

knowledge of his guilt and rebutted his claim of self-defense. Appellant does not

address the State’s reasoning on appeal, but asserts only that evidence of weapons

other than the murder weapon is “logically irrelevant” and more prejudicial than

probative.

–6– We disagree with appellant that evidence of weapons other than the murder

weapon is “logically irrelevant.” Evidence of firearms found in the truck appellant

drove to the apartment, and the disappearance of the gun used in the offense while

the additional guns were retained, is relevant to show appellant’s state of mind before

and after the shooting. The evidence was not gruesome or inflammatory, and its

introduction did not take up a large portion of the record.1 Even if the trial court

abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, we conclude it did not have the

potential “to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof

specific to the offense charged.” Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)). While

appellant states in a single sentence that he was egregiously harmed by admission of

the firearms evidence, he provides no supporting argument, substantive analysis, or

citation to authorities to show how he was harmed. Accordingly, we conclude this

issue is waived. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

In his third issue, appellant contends that (1) a sidebar comment made by the

prosecutor during trial and (2) a portion of the State’s closing argument addressing

his claim of self-defense caused him egregious harm to the extent he was denied a

fair trial. Appellant concedes he did not object to either statement. He makes no

1 In weighing the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice we examine factors including, but not limited to, (1) how probative the evidence is; (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, but nevertheless indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). –7– argument to show the general rule requiring an objection to preserve a complaint for

appellate review does not apply here. See Herrera v. State, 599 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.) (discussing rules for error preservation).

In addition, after reviewing the record, we conclude appellant was not denied

a fair trial. The sidebar comment about which appellant complains is a statement

made by the prosecutor that defense counsel should “have a drink of water and

simmer down.” The statement was made in response to defense counsel’s repeated

objections that the prosecutor was not remaining at counsel table while questioning

a witness. Immediately after the comment, the trial court sua sponte admonished the

prosecutor to refrain from making sidebar comments. This single, unobjected-to

statement, which was rebuked by the trial court, was not so inflammatory as to rise

to the level of causing an unfair trial. See Jimenez v. State, 240 S.W.3d 384, 406

(Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d).

The portion of the State’s closing argument challenged by appellant involves

statements made by the prosecutor that this was the first case she had seen where the

defendant and his counsel were attempting to blame the victim and his friends for

the victim’s death. Appellant asserts this amounted to an argument that defense

counsel engaged in conduct the prosecutor found personally objectionable. Read in

context of the entire argument, the statement was simply rebuttal to appellant’s claim

that he acted in self-defense. It was not directed at defense counsel, but at his theory

of the case, which is within the scope of proper argument. See Davis v. State, 268

–8– S.W.3d 683, 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d). We resolve appellant’s

third issue against him.

Appellant next asserts he was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s inclusion

of an instruction on provocation in the jury charge. The elements of provocation

are:

(1) the defendant did some act or used some words that provoked the attack on him,

(2) such acts or words were reasonably calculated to provoke the attack, and (3) the act was done or the words were used for the purpose and with the intent that the defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm upon the other.

Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). An instruction on

provocation should only be given when there is evidence from which a rational jury

could find every element of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This

standard does not require the judge to assess the credibility or strength of the

evidence. Id. “It simply requires the judge to decide whether evidence has been

presented that could support a jury’s finding of all three elements of provocation

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. When the instruction is given, we review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Smith v. State, 965

S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

Appellant concedes the testimony that he started the fight by hitting the victim

is sufficient to satisfy the first element of provocation. He contends there is no

–9– evidence, however, that appellant intended to provoke the fight as a pretext for

inflicting harm on Corey. We disagree.

The evidence shows appellant was jealous and that he tracked Hannah to

Corey’s apartment. After entering the apartment with a concealed weapon, appellant

refused to leave despite repeated demands by the other occupants of the apartment

to do so. No one other than appellant was carrying a weapon, and the men were

allowing appellant to leave peacefully when he struck Corey with sufficient force to

push him through a door. While appellant asserts he could not have anticipated that

all of the men in the apartment would participate in the fight, this argument appears

disingenuous given his antagonism toward all the men immediately before striking

their friend in their presence.

During the ensuing fight, appellant was on the ground fending off kicks and

punches. It was not until the fighting subsided that appellant pulled Corey to him,

reached for his gun, and shot Corey in the chest at close range. Appellant later told

Hannah he did not care that Corey had died because he “was the person he wanted.”

Reading this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, we

conclude there was evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that appellant’s actions were reasonably calculated to provoke an attack with

the intent of having a pretext for harming Corey. We resolve appellant’s fourth issue

against him.

–10– In his fifth and sixth issues, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to

support the jury’s negative findings on the issues of self-defense and sudden passion.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011). We do not resolve conflicts of fact, weigh evidence, or evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry

v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead we determine whether

both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all

the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the adjudication.

Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The factfinder is

the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and their testimony’s weight. See

Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The factfinder may

choose to disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We review all of the evidence in the case

regardless of whether it was erroneously admitted. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d

772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “A court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding

against the rare occurrence when the factfinder does not act rationally.” Nisbett v.

State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

–11– A person is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the

degree the person reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to

protect themselves against the other’s use of unlawful deadly force. Braughton v.

State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The use of deadly force is not

justified in response to verbal provocation alone, or if the person provoked the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. Id. The defendant bears the burden

of adducing some evidence that would support a rational finding in his favor on the

defensive issue. Id. at 608. “In resolving the sufficiency of the evidence issue, we

look not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-

defense testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have

found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would

have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could

find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant provoked the attack on him as a pretext

for killing Corey. Where the defendant provokes the attack, he forfeits his right to

claim self-defense. Elizondo, 487 S.W.3d at 196. Accordingly, we conclude there

was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of appellant’s self-defense

claim.

–12– Similarly, the evidence of provocation supports the jury’s rejection of

appellant’s claim of sudden passion. Sudden passion is a mitigating factor that is

relevant to determining appropriate punishment. Beltran v. State, 472 S.W.3d 283,

293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “A defendant may not rely on a cause of his own

making, such as precipitating a confrontation, to support his argument that he acted

out of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138,

149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). The only evidence of sudden

passion was appellant’s testimony, which the jury was free to disbelieve. Trevino v.

State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). We resolve

appellant’s fifth and sixth issues against him.

In his final issue, appellant argues his conviction should be reversed because

“he has a right to live.” Appellant’s argument does not assert a legal challenge to

his conviction and presents nothing for our review.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Amanda L. Reichek// AMANDA L. REICHEK 230599f.u05 JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

–13– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

JUSTIN JAMAUL BROADNAX, On Appeal from the 401st Judicial Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 401-84886- No. 05-23-00599-CR V. 2021. Opinion delivered by Justice THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek. Chief Justice Burns and Justice Nowell participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 13th day of December, 2024.

–14–