This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0845
Justin Dean Schultz, Respondent,
vs.
Analisa French Perkins, Appellant.
Filed June 17, 2024 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Bratvold, Judge
Winona County District Court File No. 85-FA-19-994
Dominique J. Navarro, Navarro Law Firm, PLLC, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Theresa M. Gerlach, Law Office of Theresa Gerlach, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying mother’s motions to modify
custody, parenting time, and child support, mother argues that the district court erred by
(1) denying her motion to modify custody, (2) denying her alternative request for two
additional weeks of parenting time in the summer, and (3) denying her motion to modify child support. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s
motion to modify custody, we affirm in part. But because the district court implicitly
denied, without findings or discussion, mother’s alternative request for additional summer
parenting time and mother’s motion to modify child support, we reverse in part and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion and as discussed below.
FACTS
Appellant Analisa French Perkins (mother) and respondent Justin Dean Schultz
(father) are the parents of A.J.S. (the child), who was born in April 2011. Mother and father
have never been married. Until 2019, the child lived with mother and the parents
cooperated with parenting time and child support. No court order governed custody or
parenting time.
In 2017, father admitted to mother that he “had been using [methamphetamines] for
years.” Mother’s brief to this court acknowledges that, as of February 2019, father was
“drug-free.”
In May 2019, mother was civilly committed for mental-health reasons. Father
petitioned for custody and a parenting-time schedule. Mother testified at a 2019 hearing
that she “believed that [father] was sober and that” father having custody of the child
“would be the best thing” for the child while mother got treatment for her mental-health
needs. Mother and father agreed to a change in custody, and in December 2019, the district
court issued an order granting father sole legal and sole physical custody of the child,
granting mother supervised parenting time, and reserving child support. At the time of the
2 order, father’s home was in Goodview and mother resided about 50 miles away in
Rochester.
Mother’s civil commitment ended in 2020. In October 2022, mother moved to
(1) modify legal and physical custody so that the child would reside primarily with mother,
(2) modify parenting time to provide that father’s parenting time was supervised and on
alternate weekends, and (3) modify child support based on the changes in parenting time.
Mother also sought attorney fees.
In an affidavit submitted in support of her motion, mother averred that a substantial
change in circumstances had occurred since the 2019 order was issued. Specifically, she
attested that (1) the child was “endangered in [father’s] care” because father “has admitted
to having a drug problem,” father also has “methamphetamines, marijuana, and mushrooms
in his apartment where he lives with [the child] and a loaded handgun in the vehicle he uses
to transport” child, and father has been charged with criminal offenses related to drug and
firearms possession; (2) mother’s “mental health issue that caused the 2019 order has been
resolved,” mother is in therapy, and mother has “stable work and housing”; and (3) the
child had “integrated into [mother’s] home by consent of the parties” because mother has
had unsupervised parenting time every other weekend by consent of the parties.
After a hearing on December 16, 2022, the district court issued an interim order
finding that “the incident mother was primarily concerned about” relating to father’s drug
use and firearm possession “occurred back in April 2022” and that “there is no present
endangerment proven that would justify the urgent modification of the custody
arrangement.” The district court “set the matter on for an evidentiary hearing for [mother]
3 to make her arguments as to why a change in custody is in the child’s best interest based
on her claim that there has been a significant change of circumstances in her life and the
life of the child that warrants a reconsideration of the current custody order.”
At a scheduled evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2023, mother supplemented her
parenting-time request, asking that mother’s “existing every other weekend parenting time
be expanded to include holidays and two nonconsecutive weeks per year in the summers
for vacation time.” Several witnesses testified at the hearing, including mother, father,
mother’s psychologist, mother’s former coworker, mother’s uncle, and mother’s friend.
Father testified, first, about his role as the child’s primary custodian since 2019. He
testified that the child attends middle school in Winona, has friends at school, participates
in band, and plans to begin karate in the summer. Father described the child as “a shy kid”
but said that he can be “outgoing” when “around the people that he’s comfortable with.”
Father also explained that the child has a health condition that requires a pacemaker and
special medical care.
He added that he and mother agreed she should have unsupervised parenting time
with the child every other weekend. Father acknowledged that they were exchanging the
child at a designated exchange center because he and mother had some difficulty recently
and exchanges often led to “arguing, yelling, [and] disagreements.” After one incident in
2022, father asked police to remove mother from his property “because she refused to
leave” when the child was at father’s home. Father petitioned for and received a harassment
restraining order (HRO) against mother. The HRO is not included in the record.
4 Father admitted that he has struggled with drug abuse throughout his life but
testified that he has been sober since April 2022, when he was charged with (1) being a
felon in possession of a firearm, (2) third-degree possession of methamphetamine,
(3) fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine, and (4) being an unlawful
controlled-substance user in possession of a firearm. He testified that child-protective
services did not “get involved” before or after his 2022 criminal charges. He also explained
that, as a result of the criminal proceedings, the district court imposed probation for five
years, ordered that he complete 80 hours of community service, and required a
chemical-dependency evaluation.
Father agreed during cross-examination that, at one point within the past year, he
kept drugs in the apartment where he lived with the child, and he added that the drugs were
“locked in a safe.” He also agreed that he kept a loaded firearm in his vehicle and that it
was the same vehicle he used to transport the child. But father testified that he “never
transported [the child] with a loaded firearm in the vehicle.”
The district court denied mother’s motion to modify custody, ordered that father
have sole legal and sole physical custody of the child, ordered that mother should have
“liberal and meaningful” parenting time every other weekend with exchanges scheduled at
visitation-exchange centers, established a holiday parenting-time schedule, and denied
mother’s request for attorney fees. The order did not address mother’s request for another
two weeks of parenting time in the summer or mother’s motion to modify child support.
The district court found, as it did in the interim order, that no present endangerment
warranted a modification of custody. The district court also pointed out that mother’s
5 affidavit and testimony stated that she learned of father’s April 2022 offense on October 2,
2022. But on cross-examination, mother “admitted she knew of these charges as early as
April 2022.” The district court found that mother was “less than candid” and that the
criminal charges were “old information” that mother “sat on . . . until October 2022.”
The district court also rejected mother’s argument that there had been a substantial
change in circumstances based on father’s drug use. The district court stated that “father
was an addict long before mother agreed to changing custody to father back in 2019.”
Based on its findings that father “has been candid about his historical struggle with
controlled substances,” that father “is an addict who is now in recovery,” as well as that
father is currently sober and successful on probation, the district court found no change in
circumstances related to father’s drug use.
The district court also made findings about mother’s claim that she made “positive
changes” relating to her mental health. The district court found that mother’s treating
counselor stated that “mother is doing well without any current concerns,” that mother is
“training to be an EMT/Paramedic,” and that mother works part-time as a cleaner in an
apartment complex. The district court further found that “mother testified that she is the
parent of two children including a fifteen-year-old son who lives with his father in St.
Cloud.” Mother added that she sees her fifteen-year-old son “one weekend a month and the
father has coordinated her parenting time so that the boys can be together on those
weekends.” But the district court also found that “there is a current [HRO] in place” that is
“due to the actions of the mother against the father and not visa-versa.”
6 The district court rejected mother’s claim that the child had integrated into her
household after determining that “[m]other produced absolutely no evidence of
integration” because “her testimony established that the child enjoys a traditional
every-other weekend visitation schedule and that father has tried to be very flexible to
ensure support for the mother-child relationship.”
Finally, the district court evaluated the best-interests factors “for the purposes of
determining issues of custody and parenting time,” citing Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1
(2022). The district court determined that ten factors favored father and two factors were
neutral; no factors favored mother. The district court concluded that the best-interests
factors weighed in favor of father maintaining sole legal and sole physical custody and
granting parenting time for mother on alternating weekends.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s motion to modify legal and physical custody.
“Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the [district] court
abused its discretion . . . .” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)). “We review the [district court’s] findings [of fact]
for clear error, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
7 credibility and reversing only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings of fact are not set
aside unless clearly erroneous). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly
contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
When applying the clear-error standard of review, this court (1) views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the district court’s findings, (2) does not reweigh the evidence,
(3) does not engage in fact-finding, (4) does not reconcile conflicting evidence, and
(5) “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the
correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Id. at 221-22 (quotation omitted).
A. We need not address whether the district court abused its discretion by determining that mother failed to allege a prima facie case of endangerment.
We review a district court’s determination of whether a party presented a prima
facie case for custody modification for an abuse of discretion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski,
732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007). To determine whether there is a prima facie case
for custody modification, a district court considers whether the movant alleged facts that,
if true, provide sufficient grounds for modification. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 507.
Specifically, to make a prima facie case to modify custody, the movant must allege that
(1) the circumstances of the child or the parties have changed; (2) modification would serve
the child’s best interests, and (3) one of the five specific additional grounds for
modification as set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i)–(v) (2022) exists. Id. One of these five
8 grounds is that “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical or
emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv). But a prima facie case is not made if the allegations are merely conclusory,
“too vague to support a finding of endangerment,” or “devoid of allegations supported by
any specific, credible evidence.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn.
App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2006); see Miller v. Miller,
953 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. 2021) (requiring the district court, when addressing a motion
to intervene, to accept the movant’s allegations unless they are “frivolous on their face”).
If the movant does present a prima facie case, then “the district court must hold an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 508. If the prima facie case
is based on endangerment, the movant “must allege (1) the circumstances of the child[] or
custodian have changed; (2) modification would serve the [child’s] best interests, (3) the
[child’s] present environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or
emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the change outweigh its detriments” for the
child. Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018).
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in its interim ruling that
father’s drug and firearm use and possession did not satisfy the statutory standard for
endangerment. Mother contends that the district court erred by determining that mother
“did not allege a prima facie case of endangerment to modify custody” because, by
scheduling an evidentiary hearing, the district court “implicitly [determined] that [mother]
had alleged and established a sufficient prima facie case for custody modification.”
9 The district court’s interim ruling stated that mother’s petition and other
submissions did not present a prima facie case of endangerment based on father’s recent
criminal charges and drug use. Still, the district court determined that an evidentiary
hearing was appropriate to address two other grounds for custody modification: mother’s
stable mental health and the child’s integration into mother’s household. During the
evidentiary hearing, the district court received evidence on father’s recent criminal charges,
his drug use, and his firearms possession, and the district court’s subsequent order made
relevant factual findings on all three grounds presented by mother.
Because the district court held an evidentiary hearing on all grounds that mother
alleged for custody modification and decided mother’s endangerment allegations on the
merits, we need not consider mother’s argument about whether the district court abused its
discretion in the interim ruling on endangerment.
B. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the child’s present environment does not endanger the child.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that her
motion to modify based on endangerment was “meritless.” Mother contends that the record
shows father has a “long history of methamphetamine use and recent relapse” and that the
district court “minimized these issues and failed to acknowledge the significant negative
effects” on the child. The existence of endangerment is a question of fact that we review
for clear error. See Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn. App. 2000), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
10 We first address the relevant caselaw. Mother also urges that relevant caselaw
suggests that “anticipated adverse effects” may support a finding of endangerment. We
disagree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that endangerment “is concerned
with whether the child’s present environment endangers the child . . . not whether the child
may be endangered by future events.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285
(Minn. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, endangerment requires
evidence of the child’s present environment to warrant a change in custody. See Sharp,
614 N.W.2d at 263-64 (determining that the record supported a finding of endangerment
based on testimony indicating that a parent’s current conduct “will cause emotional
psychological damage to [the] child” (emphasis omitted)).
The record supports the district court’s finding that the child’s present
environment—living with father—does not endanger the child’s physical or emotional
health or development. The district court found that “father made some egregious decisions
when he relapsed,” but he was “caught, charged and immediately took responsibility for
his mistakes.” Father has “been candid about his historical struggle with controlled
substances” and “is now in recovery.” The district court also found that father’s “entire
criminal case was very nearly resolved by the time mother brought her motion before the
court.” The district court also noted that father’s addiction was not a change in
circumstances because father “was an addict long before mother agreed to changing
custody” in 2019. The district court found that father’s addiction “is a continuation of life
as the child has come to know it for the majority of his life.” Accordingly, given that
father’s criminal case was resolved before the evidentiary hearing and that father was sober
11 and in recovery, the district court determined that there was no present endangerment to
the child.
Because the record fully supports the district court’s findings, we conclude that the
district court did not clearly err by finding that mother did not prove endangerment and
thus did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s motion to modify custody on this
ground.
Mother also argues that the district court erred by finding “that mother exposed the
child to men who took drugs.” “[T]o further discredit mother’s claims” that father’s drug
use endangers the child, the district court found that, while in mother’s care, the child “has
been exposed to other men who were important in mother’s life who struggled with
chemical use.” The district court found that, in 2019, mother’s significant other “overdosed
and died, sending her into a state of depression that warranted her civil commitment.”
Mother’s brief to this court acknowledges that, in 2019, her “then boyfriend”
overdosed and died and “her mental health plummeted,” leading her to enter a
mental-health facility and, ultimately, to her civil commitment. While mother is correct
that the record does not support the district court’s finding that the child was exposed to
drug use related to these sad events, that cannot alone support mother’s request for reversal.
Existence of error alone is not enough to warrant relief; an appellant must also show that
the error caused prejudice. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that harmless error be
ignored); Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285 (citing this aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61). This
finding is part of the district court’s discussion of father’s history of addiction and its
determination that the child was not endangered in father’s care. We note that this
12 erroneous finding is not mentioned in the district court’s best-interests analysis. And the
district court’s decision does not appear to have relied in any other respect on the erroneous
finding that mother exposed the child to “other men . . . who struggled with chemical use.”
Thus, we conclude that the error was harmless.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that no modification was warranted based on changes in mother’s mental health.
Mother’s modification motion was based, in part, on her allegations of substantial
changes in circumstances relating to her own mental health. Mother also argued in her
modification motion that the child had “integrated into [mother’s] home by consent of the
parties.” The district court expressly rejected the integration argument, finding that “mother
produced absolutely no evidence of integration.” Mother does not raise integration in her
brief to this court. As a result, we do not consider it.
As for mother’s mental health, the district court found that mother’s “mental health
crisis” had been resolved, her treating counselor testified that she was “doing well without
any current concerns,” mother continues in treatment, she “has undertaken the education
and training to be an EMT/Paramedic,” and she is employed cleaning apartments. These
findings indicate that the district court found significant changes in mother’s circumstances
since the 2019 custody order, although the district court does not expressly say that those
changes were “substantial.”
The district court then evaluated whether a modification of custody was warranted
by discussing each of the 12 best-interests factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subd. 1
(2022). Ten factors favored father, two factors were neutral, and no factors favored mother.
13 Mother argues that the record does not support some findings of fact in the district court’s
analysis of the best-interests factors. “[W]e review the [district court’s] findings [of fact]
for clear error, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility and reversing only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 790 (quotation omitted). We address
each of mother’s challenged findings in turn.
First, mother argues that the district court erred by finding that “mother did not
provide sufficient evidence as to the stability of her housing.” Mother argues that “the
record is clear that at the time of trial mother had lived in her home for over four years.”
While mother is correct that she testified that she had resided in the same home for four
years, she takes the district court’s finding out of context. The district court was addressing
the willingness and ability of each parent to provide ongoing care for the child and meet
the child’s needs. When the district court discussed mother’s ability to do so, the district
court noted that mother did not provide evidence about any school arrangements for the
child if he were to live with her. In contrast, the district court found that father had shown
he is able to meet the child’s housing and schooling needs, among other needs, over the
four years he had sole physical and sole legal custody. Accordingly, even if we assume that
the district court erred in finding that mother lacked stable housing, we would, nonetheless,
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that this factor
favors father as the child’s custodian.
Second, mother argues that the district court clearly erred by “finding that the child
was doing well in school when there was no evidence regarding the child’s school
14 performance.” During the evidentiary hearing, the district court sustained mother’s
objection and excluded father’s testimony that the child was “doing well” in school. But in
other testimony, father stated that the child has friends at school, participates in band, and
will be starting karate in the summer. And in discussing the related best-interests factor of
the child’s emotional needs, the district court found that, since 2019, the child “has
established ties with friends, a support network and is thriving at school.” Although the
record did not specifically include evidence that the child is “doing well” or “thriving” in
school, this is a reasonable inference based on father’s testimony.
More importantly, mother takes this finding out of context. The district court
discussed the best interests of the child given the “effect on the child’s well-being and
development of changes to home, school, and community.” The district court concluded
that “[a]ny significant changes, including a change of custody to mother and the child’s
subsequent schooling and social life will undeniably disrupt the child’s life and his
well-being.” Thus, the district court’s finding that this factor favors father maintaining
custody is supported by the record.
Third, mother argues that the record does not support the district court’s findings
that mother (1) filed an ex parte motion, (2) “had caused delays in the case,” (3) “‘sat on’
the information about . . . father’s drug charges for months before she filed her motion,”
(4) had several attorneys who withdrew, prolonging litigation, and (5) delayed the hearing
by seeking continuances. Even if we conclude that each of these challenged findings is
clearly erroneous, the existence of error is not enough to warrant relief on appeal. Mother
must also show that the error caused prejudice. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that
15 harmless error be ignored); see Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285. None of these findings
affected the district court’s analysis of endangerment, mother’s change in circumstances,
or the district court’s assessment of the best-interests factors. 1 Accordingly, any error was
harmless. 2
Thus, having concluded, first, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting endangerment as grounds for custody modification and, second, that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis of the best-interests factors, we finally
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s
custody-modification motion. 3
1 While the findings that mother “sat on” the information about father’s drug charges and made an ex parte motion were mentioned in the district court’s endangerment analysis, they were not necessary to the conclusion that there was no endangerment. 2 The district court determined that mother should not be awarded attorney fees because (1) her motion was meritless, (2) mother needlessly lengthened the proceedings because “[s]he has been through a number of attorneys,” and (3) “[f]ather cannot pay her fees and pay for his own attorney as well.” The record shows that mother has had the same attorney from the time she filed the motion to modify until the evidentiary hearing. Even though the record does not support the district court’s finding that mother had “a number of attorneys,” we conclude that this error is harmless. Mother’s motion for attorney fees was denied, in part, based on father’s inability to pay, which is sufficient to support the district court’s decision to deny attorney fees. Mother’s brief to this court did not raise the district court’s denial of her motion for attorney fees, so we need not consider it further. 3 Mother’s brief to this court also argues that the district court erred by failing to honor the parties’ agreement that they would share joint legal custody. Father argues that they had no agreement. We can find no basis in the record supporting mother’s claim of an agreement on custody. During the evidentiary hearing, father agreed on cross-examination that he and mother “should have equal say in” major decisions for the child. But father did not testify that he agreed to share joint legal custody. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the parties had no agreement on legal custody.
16 II. The district court abused its discretion by implicitly denying mother’s alternative request for summer parenting time without any discussion or related findings.
In her motion, mother requested that the child live with her and that father have
supervised parenting time every other weekend. At the hearing, mother also requested, in
the alternative, that mother’s “existing every-other-weekend parenting time be expanded
to include holidays and two nonconsecutive weeks per year in the summers for vacation
time.” The district court ordered that mother have parenting time on alternate weekends
and established a holiday parenting-time schedule. The district court did not address
mother’s request for two nonconsecutive weeks of parenting time during the summer. The
district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting-time questions and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App.
2017).
Mother challenges the district court’s parenting-time order in three respects, which
we discuss in turn. First, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion and
criticizes the district court’s holiday parenting-time schedule. We reject mother’s
holiday-schedule argument as unsupported by the record. 4
4 Mother argues that the “district court abused its discretion by failing to include the parties’ stipulation[]” for the holiday parenting time. Father argues that mother’s “counsel declared during her opening statement that the parties [had] an agreement regarding a holiday schedule, but it was never confirmed by [father] on the record or otherwise.” Indeed, mother’s opening statement included the comment that father agreed to a holiday schedule. Father is correct, however, that nothing in the record shows the parties submitted an agreed-upon holiday schedule. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse it discretion by ordering a holiday schedule that differed from mother’s proposed schedule.
17 Second, we address mother’s request for two nonconsecutive weeks of parenting
time during the summer. Mother argues in her brief to this court that the “district court
erred by failing to address mother’s alternative parenting time schedule modification
requests.” We agree that the district court failed to address mother’s alternative request for
more parenting time in the summer because the district court’s order does not discuss the
issue, nor does the order include any relevant factual findings. “Appellate courts cannot
assume a district court erred by failing to address a motion, and silence on a motion is
therefore treated as an implicit denial of the motion.” Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni
Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 27, 2010). Thus, the district court implicitly denied mother’s request for
summer parenting time.
In part, mother contends that the district court did not apply best-interests factors.
We therefore consider the district court’s best-interests analysis as it is most closely related
to parenting time. The district court observed that the parents’ homes are not near each
other and that the best-interests factor of “maximizing parenting time with both parents”
favors “maintaining the status quo and the consistency of the current parenting
arrangement.” The district court determined that it was in the child’s best interests to
continue living with father rather than to uproot the child “from his life to move to
Rochester” with mother.
But the district court’s concern about uprooting the child given the distance between
the parents’ homes does not apply to two weeks of parenting time during the summer. We
cannot further review the district court’s implicit denial of mother’s request for summer
18 parenting time, however, because we cannot discern the district court’s reasoning.
“Effective appellate review of the exercise of [the district court’s discretion] is possible
only when the [district] court has issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate
its consideration of all [relevant] factors . . . .” Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn.
1989) (reversing the district court’s spousal-maintenance decision based on insufficient
findings and remanding the matter to the district court “for additional findings”).
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s implicit denial of mother’s request for summer
parenting time and remand the issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Third, mother argues that the district court erred “by failing to award [mother] the
statutory minimum parenting time of 25% or 91 overnights.” Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 1(g) (2022), “there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is entitled to receive a
minimum of 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.” We have applied this statute
to modification motions. See Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Minn. App. 2009).
But mother raises this parenting-time issue for the first time on appeal. We rarely
consider issues not argued to or considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Accordingly, we decline to address this issue on
appeal, but mother may raise the issue on remand to the district court.
III. The district court abused its discretion by implicitly denying mother’s child-support-modification motion without any discussion or related findings.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by “refus[ing] to address
[her] child support modification motion.” Appellate courts generally review orders
modifying child support “for abuse of discretion.” Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703,
19 708 (Minn. 2013). A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on a
misapplication of the law, is contrary to the facts, or is contrary to logic. Shearer,
891 N.W.2d at 77.
The terms of a child-support order may be modified if there is a showing of a certain
change of circumstances that “makes the terms unreasonable and unfair.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2022). There is a presumption under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(b)(1) (Supp. 2023), that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and
the current order is unreasonable and unfair if a child-support-guidelines calculation based
on the parties’ current incomes “is at least 20 percent and at least $75 per month higher or
lower than the current support order.”
The district court’s order does not discuss mother’s child-support-modification
request. At the evidentiary hearing, the district court pointed out that the parties have an
open IV-D child-support case and could seek modification in an expedited process before
a child-support magistrate. 5 The district court stated that it is “more straightforward for the
magistrate to churn through it [in the expedited process] because they’re really good at it.”
The district court acknowledged that it “could” address the child-support-modification
motion, but it is “just not as good at it as [the magistrates] are. They’re a lot smarter.” The
district court did not make any findings about the parties’ incomes or discuss child support
5 A IV-D case is “a case where a party has assigned to the state rights to child support because of the receipt of public assistance . . . or has applied for child support services under title IV-D of the Social Security Act., United States Code, title 42, section 654(4).” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 10 (2022).
20 in its order. We accordingly treat the district court’s silence on child-support modification
as an implicit denial. See Palladium Holdings, 775 N.W.2d at 177-78.
Father argues that, under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 353.01, subd. 1, child-support
modification proceedings “shall be conducted in the expedited process if the case is a IV-D
case,” and therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to address the child-support
motion because the expedited process is mandatory.
We disagree. Rule 353.01, subdivision 1, states that there are exceptions to the
expedited-process requirement “as provided in subdivision 2 and Rule 353.02.” Minnesota
General Rule of Practice 353.02, subdivision 1, states that “[t]hese rules do not prevent a
party . . . from commencing a proceeding or bringing a motion in district court if the
proceedings or motion involves one or more issues identified in Rule 353.01, subd. 1, and
one or more issues identified in Rule 353.01, subd. 3,” such as modification of custody or
parenting time. Additionally, rule 353.02, subdivision two, provides that “the district court
judge shall decide all issues before the court” and allows a district court to refer support
issues to an expedited-process court “[i]f the district court judge cannot decide the support
issues without an additional hearing.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 353.02, subd. 2. In short, even
though child support may be determined in an expedited process before a magistrate, that
did not preclude mother from seeking relief in district court in connection with her motion
for modification of custody or parenting time. Also, while the district court may refer
child-support issues to the expedited process, the district court did not make a referral here.
No legal analysis or findings of fact support the district court’s implicit denial of
mother’s motion to modify child support. We therefore cannot further review the district
21 court’s denial of mother’s motion to modify child support. See Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53.
Thus, we reverse the district court’s implicit denial of mother’s motion to modify child
support and remand for the district court to either decide the issue or refer it to an expedited
process.
IV. We decline to consider mother’s proposed “new rule of law.”
Mother’s brief to this court argues that we should “create a new rule of law” about
child-custody rights based on stipulation. Mother argues that when she stipulated to
granting father sole legal and physical custody in 2019, she was not provided with the
notices required by Minn. Stat. §§ 518.17 and 518.68 (2022). She urges this court to adopt
a new rule of law about the standard for modification of child-custody orders and to
determine that
[w]here an initial custody order fails to provide notice according to section 518.17, subd. 3a, [and the custody order] was entered based upon the stipulation of parties, and: (1) one party was unrepresented and did not waive the right to an attorney, and (2) that party was subject to a civil commitment or (3) that party was on medication that affected her ability to understand the proceedings; a subsequent custody modification motion should be made based on 518.17’s best interests of the child standard.
Father argues that (1) the court of appeals “should not entertain” this issue because it was
not presented to the district court; (2) the issue relates to mother’s testimony at the
December 2019 hearing, and mother has not provided this court with a transcript of that
hearing; and (3) mother “is, effectively, asking that this court rewrite [Minn. Stat.
§ ] 518.17, which is for the legislature, not this court.”
22 Mother did not raise this issue during district court proceedings. Under Thiele, this
court generally declines to hear matters raised for the first time on appeal. 425 N.W.2d at
582. We therefore do not address this issue. We note, however, that the district court
applied the best-interests factors from Minn. Stat. § 518.17 in deciding mother’s motion to
modify custody. While this may not address mother’s concerns in their entirety, she must
first raise the issue in district court before seeking relief on appeal in this court.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.