Justin Daniel Berg v. David K. Byers, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-01453
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Justin Daniel Berg, No. CV-26-01453-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 David K. Byers, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Justin Daniel Berg’s In Forma Pauperis Request 16 Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (“IFP Application”) (Doc. 2) 17 and TRO-Temporary Restraining Order In Forma Pauperis Complaint for Violation of 18 Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (“TRO Application”) (Doc. 3). Having determined that 19 Plaintiff is unable to pay the Court’s fees, the Court grants the IFP Application. However, 20 upon screening Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1, Compl.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 21 the Court dismisses the Complaint and denies the TRO Application as moot. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 “[I]n his capacity as a Private Attorney General,” Plaintiff sues multiple state 24 employees across various state governmental entities. (Compl. at 1.) He seeks to “restore 25 [his] parental rights” after “being medically emancipated from this fog” brought on by a 26 “Cognitive Cage.” (Id. at 2.) According to Plaintiff, on September 5, 2014, a state court 27 entered a child support order that was unsigned by the judicial officer (“2014 Order”). (Id. 28 at 6–7.) Since that time, Plaintiff has incurred $96,264 in child support arrears. (Id. at 7.) 1 Plaintiff alleges that the 2014 Order and child support arrears stem from a faulty 2 electronic court record system maintained by the state court and other state entities. (Id. at 3 6.) This system is allegedly a “Bifurcated Record Architecture” designed to create a 4 “Shadow Track” system of orders that are unsigned by judicial officers. (Id.) By way of 5 example, Plaintiff attaches a February 9, 2026 order issued by Judge Rhonda Fisk of the 6 Superior Court of Maricopa County (“2026 Order”). (Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.) According to him, 7 the 2026 Order is unsigned and exemplifies the use of the “Shadow Track.” (Compl. at 9.) 8 The 2026 Order also “ratifies” a judicial policy of risk to his child’s physical safety after 9 his child self-harmed. (Id. at 7.) 10 Plaintiff conducted a “Forensic Audit” of his state court documents using his 11 “cognitive prosthetic,” an artificial intelligence platform called Google Gemini. (See id. at 12 7; Doc. 1-1 at 14–15.) This audit revealed that 45.9% of substantive orders lacked a judicial 13 signature, which he refers to as the “Signature Gap.” (Compl. at 6.) With the use of his 14 cognitive prosthetic, Plaintiff proposes a “Child-Centered Court Integrity Initiative” to 15 repair what he views as a broken system in a self-titled “Manifesto of Restorative Justice” 16 attached as an exhibit to the Complaint. (Doc. 1-1 at 21–56.) 17 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him the use of his cognitive 18 prosthetic as accommodation for his traumatic brain injury. (Compl. at 7.) The denial of 19 his accommodation created a “Cognitive Cage” that disabled him from reporting the 20 Shadow Track system to federal authorities. (Id.) 21 Plaintiff brings six claims. All the claims except Count Five assert a violation of 22 Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. Count Five 23 asserts a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability in violation of Title II of the 24 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. He seeks the restitution of the child 25 support arrears he incurred, damages for his 251-day imprisonment that occurred at some 26 unknown time, and punitive damages in the amount of $10 million to be placed in trust for 27 the implementation of his Manifesto. (Id. at 11.) He also seeks declaratory judgment that 28 the 2014 Order is void, the “Signature Gap” constitutes a Monell custom that violates the 1 Fourteenth Amendment, and the refusal of Plaintiff’s cognitive prosthetic constitutes an 2 ADA violation. (Id. at 11–12.) Finally, he demands that a “Special Master” be appointed 3 to audit the state electronic court record system to identify the “Signature Gap.” (Id. at 12.) 4 II. IFP APPLICATION 5 The Court may authorize a party to commence a civil action without prepaying court 6 fees—to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—if the person submits an affidavit attesting to 7 their poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Although a plaintiff seeking IFP status need not be 8 “absolutely destitute,” he or she “must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 9 and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation 10 modified). “[T]here is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine 11 when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Id. at 1235. The determination is within 12 the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 13 1991), rev’d on other grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). Here, Plaintiff submits an IFP 14 Application that reports no income at all and ongoing monthly expenses of $1,900 and 15 minimal property. (Doc. 2 at 3–4.). Plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay filing fees, so 16 the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP Application. 17 III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 18 For cases like this one in which a party is permitted to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915(e)(2) provides that a district court must screen that party’s complaint for, inter alia, 20 whether it states a claim for which relief may be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 21 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and contain “sufficient 23 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” 24 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 25 544, 570 (2007)). The Court is to construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “liberally” and afford 26 the plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 27 2012) (citation omitted). In addition to screening IFP complaints under § 1915, “[f]ederal 28 courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 1 jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the 2 parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 3 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 4 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears 5 the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over his claims. 6 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 7 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that a federal district court lacks subject- 8 matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the final judgment of a state court. Noel v. 9 Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2003). A disappointed party may not seek reversal 10 of a state court judgment by appealing to a federal district court. Id. at 1155. Known as de 11 facto appeals, suits in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the 12 state ruling” are barred under this doctrine. Bianchi v. Rylaardsam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th 13 Cir. 2003). Thus, Rooker–Feldman “looks to federal law to determine whether the injury 14 alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct 15 from that judgment.” Id. at 901 (citation modified). And when refusing to consider a 16 forbidden de facto appeal, a federal district court must also decline “to decide any issue in 17 the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its 18 judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1159 (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 19 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). “If a federal plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal from a state 20 court decision—alleging legal error by the state court and seeking relief from the state 21 court’s judgment—he or she is barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 22 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004). 23 Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Plaintiff’s claims turn on what he alleges is his harm 24 and from where that harm arose. At the heart of Plaintiff’s allegations underlying Counts 25 One, Three and Six is the unsigned 2014 Order. For example, Plaintiff’s first claim asserts 26 that the unsigned nature of the 2014 Order deprived him of “Liberty, Parental Rights, and 27 Property ($96,264).” (Compl. at 8.) Relatedly, Plaintiff’s third and sixth claims assert that 28 Defendants conspired to interfere with his parental rights by entering and enforcing the 1 “Ghost Order” (id. at 9), which resulted in an “extraction of $96,264 in human capital,” 2 “child endangerment,” and “Conceal[ed] Jurisdictional Nullities” (id. at 10). Plaintiff 3 essentially seeks the Court’s review of the 2014 Order and to rule it void for lack of 4 signature. But this would impermissibly “undercut the state ruling” and is precisely the 5 kind of appellate review that Rooker-Feldman prohibits. 6 B. Failure to State a Claim 7 1. Monell Claims 8 In order to establish a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 9 U.S. 658 (1978), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional 10 right of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 11 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the 12 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 13 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). 14 In his second and fourth claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ use of the Shadow 15 Track system blocks his right to petition the courts for redress, which violates his First and 16 Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 (Id. at 8) According to Plaintiff, this custom was ratified 17 by Judge Fisk in the unsigned 2026 Order and amounts to an unconstitutional practice 18 under Monell. (Id. at 9.) 19 Even taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to 20 establish a civil rights violation claim under Monell. Plaintiff’s primary grievance is that 21 the unsigned state court orders “block his right” to access the courts. But whether a state 22 court order is signed does not, on its own, imply that Plaintiff was denied access to a court 23 system. In fact, his own allegations and attached exhibit demonstrate that he has accessed 24 the courts. In or around February 2026, Plaintiff was actively litigating his family law 25 matter in state court and requested a change of judge, which was ultimately denied by Judge 26 Fisk.2 (Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.) Plaintiff still had his day in court notwithstanding the fact that the

27 1 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have a practice of “Deep-Freezing evidence within the CJC/AG administrative purgatory” (Compl. at 8), but there is no explanation of what 28 “evidence” he refers to, what “deep-freezing” means, or what the “purgatory” is. 2 To the extent Plaintiff challenges the denial of his request, that claim would be barred 1 2026 Order was unsigned, and he fails to allege sufficient facts to support an inference 2 otherwise. 3 Plaintiff also alleges that there is an unconstitutional “No Obligation” policy that 4 supersedes mandated reporter obligations and child safety. (Compl. at 9.) According to 5 Plaintiff, Judge Fisk ratified this policy in the 2026 Order. (Id. at 7, 9.) But the Court cannot 6 infer from this singular, conclusory allegation that the 2026 Order3 ratified such a policy 7 or that policy even exists among state actors. 8 2. ADA Claims 9 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 10 reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the 11 services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 12 such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title 13 II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; 14 (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public 15 entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from 16 participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, 17 or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial 18 of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Thompson v. 19 Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003) (citation 20 modified). 21 Plaintiff’s fifth claim asserts a violation of Title II of the ADA when Defendants 22 denied him use of his cognitive prosthetic for “effective communication” that prevented 23 him “from reporting the $96,264 extraction and the [] Signature Gap.” (Compl. at 9.) 24 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Byers, as the director of the Administrative Office of the 25 Courts, is the “Architect of the ECR Code” that uses “Ghost Orders” that make up the 26 under Rooker-Feldman because the Court would have to hold that the state court was 27 wrong to deny him a change of judge, which is an impermissible appeal. Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 28 3 The 2026 Order, which Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint, does not mention any mandatory reporting obligations or child safety. (See Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.) 1 “Signature Gap” (id. at 3), Defendant Alvardo-Thorson, as the Director of the Arizona 2 Department of Administration, delegated “the authority to deny mandatory cognitive 3 prosthetics” (id. at 4), and persons named Elliot and Quiroz “explicitly refus[ed] ADA- 4 mandated cognitive prosthetics despite actual knowledge of the Plaintiff’s TBI-related 5 barriers” (id. at 7). 6 Even assuming the truth of this allegation, Plaintiff fails to allege the elements of an 7 ADA claim. First, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the “Signature Gap” have to do with 8 unsigned state court orders and have no logical bearing upon whether Plaintiff was denied 9 an accommodation for his disability. Second, Plaintiff fails to assert facts detailing what 10 benefit Plaintiff was excluded from or how Alvarado-Thorson’s delegation of authority 11 excluded him from the benefit. Third, neither Elliot nor Quiroz are named as defendants, 12 and their role and the specific actions they took are unknown. Without more context, it is 13 impossible to discern how Plaintiff was discriminated against in the purported denial of a 14 public entity’s services, programs, or activities. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 While the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must 17 dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims 18 upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the TRO Application will be denied as 19 moot. 20 Ordinarily, a plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint upon dismissal if the 21 defective complaint can be cured. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. But no amount of pleading 22 can save Counts One, Three or Six of the defects under Rooker-Feldman because the root 23 injury of those claims arises from the state court judgment itself. Those claims are 24 dismissed with prejudice. It is possible, however, that Plaintiff can plead additional facts 25 that state a claim under Counts Two, Four, and Five. If he so chooses, Plaintiff may file an 26 amended complaint no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order amending only 27 Counts Two, Four, and Five to cure them of the defects identified herein. Otherwise, the 28 Clerk of Court shall dismiss this matter without further notice. 1 IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff's In Forma Pauperis Request Complaint for 2|| Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 2). 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 1). 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's TRO-Temporary Restraining 6 || Order In Forma Pauperis Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 7\| (Doc. 3) as moot. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint amending only Counts Two, Four, and || Five to cure the pleading defects identified herein. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Clerk of 11 |} Court shall dismiss this matter without further notice. 12 Dated this 6th day of March, 2026. CN 13 “wok: 14 wife hlee— Unifga StatesDistrict Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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