5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7
8 Justin Clayburn, No. CV 25-0967-PHX-MTL (MTM) 9 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 10 v. 11 Jason Gunther, 12 Respondent. 13
14 15 TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 16 JUDGE: 17 Petitioner filed n Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 18 (Doc. 1.) Judge Liburdi denied Ground One in an Order dated August 18, 2025. Doc. 6. 19 I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 20 In Ground Two Petitioner asserts that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has 21 violated federal law by failing to grant him earned time credits from the date his sentence 22 was imposed. 23 This Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed without prejudice, as 24 Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies within the BOP. If the District 25 Court considers the merits, this Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed as 26 lacking in merit. 27 II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 28 Petitioner filed his Petition (Doc. 1) on March 24, 2025. On September 15, 2025 1 Respondent filed an Answer, challenging this Court’s jurisdiction and asserting that 2 Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 14 at 4-7. 3 III. GROUND TWO 4 A. FSA 5 Under the First Step Act (“FSA”) federal inmates who participate in programming 6 earn time credits towards an earlier release date. An eligible inmate “who successfully 7 completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, 8 shall earn time credits,” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), that are applied “toward time in 9 prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C). 10 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11 Federal courts have an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction. 12 See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). In Reeb v. Thomas, 636 13 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) the Ninth Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 specifies 14 that judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act is not applicable to any 15 determination, decision, or order “made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624.” 18 U.S.C. 16 § 3624(g) “details the criteria for when a prisoner becomes eligible, considering earned 17 time credit, for transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release.” Bottinelli v. Salazar, 18 929 F.3d 1196, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2019). 19 “A habeas claim cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported 20 violation of its own program statement because noncompliance with a BOP program 21 statement is not a violation of federal law.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227. Accordingly, a district 22 court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a petition alleging only “that the BOP 23 erred in his particular case.” Id. at 1228. In contrast, judicial review is available where a 24 habeas petition alleges “that BOP action is contrary to established federal law, violates the 25 United States Constitution, or exceeds its statutory authority.” Id. 26 In Ground Two Petitioner alleges that in failing to grant earned time credits from 27 the date Petitioner was sentenced, BOP ignores the statutory definition of when a “sentence 28 and eligibility for ETCs commence.” Doc. 1 at 8-9. Under Reeb, this claim alleges a 1 violation of federal law in a manner sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. 2 Petitioner is serving a 60-month term of imprisonment for felon in possession of a 3 firearm and making a false statement to acquire a firearm. Doc. 14-1 at 6, 12. Sentence was 4 imposed on November 29, 2023. Doc. 14-1 at 12. 5 C. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 6 The Reeb Court noted that inmates may challenge the BOP’s discretionary 7 determinations through the BOP’s administrative remedy program. 636 F.3d at 1227. 8 Ordinarily, absent exhaustion, a court should dismiss a petition without prejudice or stay 9 the proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Leonardo v. 10 Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 14-1 at 5, ¶ 12 12 (declaration of BOP employee Ruelas). Petitioner requests that this failure be excused, 13 because “engaging in that process with the BOP would be futile.” Doc. 1 at 3-5. 14 Petitioner’s futility argument is unpersuasive. As a matter of efficiency and judicial 15 economy, Petitioner should have allowed the BOP the opportunity to correct any errors 16 through its well-established administrative remedy process, see doc. 14-1 at 3-5, rather than 17 bypass that process. 18 Under the facts of Petitioner’s case, this Court will not excuse Petitioner’s failure to 19 exhaust his administrative remedies, as his failure to do so has impeded preparation of a 20 useful record and frustrated judicial economy. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). 21 This Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to 22 exhaust administrative remedies. 23 D. Merits 24 While this Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed without prejudice, the 25 Court will address the merits in the event the District Court elects to do so. 26 Petitioner alleges that in failing to grant earned time credits from the date he was 27 sentenced, BOP ignores the statutory definition of when a “sentence and eligibility for 28 ETCs commence.” Doc. 1 at 8-9. This argument is in conflict with the plain language of 1 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). By that statute the triggering event for an award of ETCs is not 2 sentencing and federal custody, it is successful participation in “evidence-based recidivism 3 reduction programming or productive activities.” Id.; see also Stevens v Jacquez, CV-23- 4 01482-AA, 2024 WL 3200546, at *4. (D. Or. June 25, 2024). Petitioner makes no showing 5 that he participated in any such programs or activities from his sentencing date until he 6 arrived at his designated federal facility. See doc. 1 at 8-13 (Petitioner’s argument on 7 Ground Two) and doc. 14-1 at 7, ¶ 25, 15 (BOP employee Ruelas declaration that Petitioner 8 did not have a credit earnings start date until his arrival at his first BOP institution on 9 January 26, 2024, when he completed the risk/needs assessment required by the FSA). On 10 this record, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A) and in the absence of a showing that 11 Petitioner participated in approved programming before January 26, 2024, this Court 12 recommends that Ground Two be denied on the merits. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 15 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED 16 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 17 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 18 Circuit Court of Appeals.
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5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7
8 Justin Clayburn, No. CV 25-0967-PHX-MTL (MTM) 9 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 10 v. 11 Jason Gunther, 12 Respondent. 13
14 15 TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 16 JUDGE: 17 Petitioner filed n Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 18 (Doc. 1.) Judge Liburdi denied Ground One in an Order dated August 18, 2025. Doc. 6. 19 I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 20 In Ground Two Petitioner asserts that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has 21 violated federal law by failing to grant him earned time credits from the date his sentence 22 was imposed. 23 This Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed without prejudice, as 24 Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies within the BOP. If the District 25 Court considers the merits, this Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed as 26 lacking in merit. 27 II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 28 Petitioner filed his Petition (Doc. 1) on March 24, 2025. On September 15, 2025 1 Respondent filed an Answer, challenging this Court’s jurisdiction and asserting that 2 Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 14 at 4-7. 3 III. GROUND TWO 4 A. FSA 5 Under the First Step Act (“FSA”) federal inmates who participate in programming 6 earn time credits towards an earlier release date. An eligible inmate “who successfully 7 completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, 8 shall earn time credits,” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), that are applied “toward time in 9 prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C). 10 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11 Federal courts have an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction. 12 See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). In Reeb v. Thomas, 636 13 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) the Ninth Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 specifies 14 that judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act is not applicable to any 15 determination, decision, or order “made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624.” 18 U.S.C. 16 § 3624(g) “details the criteria for when a prisoner becomes eligible, considering earned 17 time credit, for transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release.” Bottinelli v. Salazar, 18 929 F.3d 1196, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2019). 19 “A habeas claim cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported 20 violation of its own program statement because noncompliance with a BOP program 21 statement is not a violation of federal law.” Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227. Accordingly, a district 22 court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a petition alleging only “that the BOP 23 erred in his particular case.” Id. at 1228. In contrast, judicial review is available where a 24 habeas petition alleges “that BOP action is contrary to established federal law, violates the 25 United States Constitution, or exceeds its statutory authority.” Id. 26 In Ground Two Petitioner alleges that in failing to grant earned time credits from 27 the date Petitioner was sentenced, BOP ignores the statutory definition of when a “sentence 28 and eligibility for ETCs commence.” Doc. 1 at 8-9. Under Reeb, this claim alleges a 1 violation of federal law in a manner sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. 2 Petitioner is serving a 60-month term of imprisonment for felon in possession of a 3 firearm and making a false statement to acquire a firearm. Doc. 14-1 at 6, 12. Sentence was 4 imposed on November 29, 2023. Doc. 14-1 at 12. 5 C. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 6 The Reeb Court noted that inmates may challenge the BOP’s discretionary 7 determinations through the BOP’s administrative remedy program. 636 F.3d at 1227. 8 Ordinarily, absent exhaustion, a court should dismiss a petition without prejudice or stay 9 the proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Leonardo v. 10 Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 14-1 at 5, ¶ 12 12 (declaration of BOP employee Ruelas). Petitioner requests that this failure be excused, 13 because “engaging in that process with the BOP would be futile.” Doc. 1 at 3-5. 14 Petitioner’s futility argument is unpersuasive. As a matter of efficiency and judicial 15 economy, Petitioner should have allowed the BOP the opportunity to correct any errors 16 through its well-established administrative remedy process, see doc. 14-1 at 3-5, rather than 17 bypass that process. 18 Under the facts of Petitioner’s case, this Court will not excuse Petitioner’s failure to 19 exhaust his administrative remedies, as his failure to do so has impeded preparation of a 20 useful record and frustrated judicial economy. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). 21 This Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to 22 exhaust administrative remedies. 23 D. Merits 24 While this Court recommends that Ground Two be dismissed without prejudice, the 25 Court will address the merits in the event the District Court elects to do so. 26 Petitioner alleges that in failing to grant earned time credits from the date he was 27 sentenced, BOP ignores the statutory definition of when a “sentence and eligibility for 28 ETCs commence.” Doc. 1 at 8-9. This argument is in conflict with the plain language of 1 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). By that statute the triggering event for an award of ETCs is not 2 sentencing and federal custody, it is successful participation in “evidence-based recidivism 3 reduction programming or productive activities.” Id.; see also Stevens v Jacquez, CV-23- 4 01482-AA, 2024 WL 3200546, at *4. (D. Or. June 25, 2024). Petitioner makes no showing 5 that he participated in any such programs or activities from his sentencing date until he 6 arrived at his designated federal facility. See doc. 1 at 8-13 (Petitioner’s argument on 7 Ground Two) and doc. 14-1 at 7, ¶ 25, 15 (BOP employee Ruelas declaration that Petitioner 8 did not have a credit earnings start date until his arrival at his first BOP institution on 9 January 26, 2024, when he completed the risk/needs assessment required by the FSA). On 10 this record, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A) and in the absence of a showing that 11 Petitioner participated in approved programming before January 26, 2024, this Court 12 recommends that Ground Two be denied on the merits. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 15 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED 16 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 17 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 18 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 19 Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 20 parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 21 Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 22 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 23 within which to file a response to the objections. 24 \\\ 25 \\\ 26 \\\ 27 \\\ 28 \\\ l Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and || Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 3 || district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 4}| 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 5|| Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the || findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 7 || and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 8 Dated this 24th day of March, 2026. 9 10 War Areak V- Prorcis □□ il United States Masistrate □□□□□□ 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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