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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 JUSTIN BAKER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01785-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 13 v. RECONSIDERATION 14 LIFETIME ADVOCACY PLUS et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Justin Baker’s Motion to Reconsider the 18 Court’s Order (Dkt. No. 41) on Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Attorney Christopher Reed (Dkt. 19 No. 42) and the Court’s Order (Dkt. No. 37) on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of 20 Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 43). Having reviewed the motions and the relevant record, the 21 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions. 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h)(1). Such motions are ordinarily 24 denied absent “a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal 1 authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable 2 diligence.” Id. Absent such a showing, motions for reconsideration should be granted only in 3 “highly unusual circumstances.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 4 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656,
5 665 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Inventist, Inc. v. Ninebot Inc., 664 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1215 (W.D. 6 Wash. 2023) (noting that reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy,” and that the moving 7 party bears a “heavy burden” (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 8 (9th Cir. 2000))). “A motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present 9 evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” 10 Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880 (quoting Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890). “Whether or 11 not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo Nation v. 12 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) 13 (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). 14 II. DISCUSSION
15 A. Reconsideration of Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Opposing Attorney 16 The core of Plaintiff’s arguments in his motion for reconsideration are the same as the 17 arguments brought in his initial motion. First, he argues that Christopher Reed is a party to the 18 lawsuit because he is considered an “agent and representative” of Thrive Communities 19 Management (“Thrive”) and Clarion Partners. Dkt. No. 42 at 1. As the Court stated in its order 20 denying Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Christopher Reed, “While the complaint in the Avenue5 21 Litigation named Mr. Reed as a defendant, the settlement agreement did not.” Dkt. No. 41 at 2; 22 see also Dkt. No. 18-2 (Settlement Agreement). Second, the settlement agreement does not 23 mention Thrive as a party. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 1. Christopher Reed also provided a declaration
24 in support of his response to Plaintiff’s initial motion confirming that neither he, nor his client, 1 Thrive, was party to the settlement or part of settlement discussions. Dkt. No. 24 (Reed Decl.) 2 ¶ 3. Third, while Clarion Partners apparently was a party to the settlement (see Dkt. No. 18-2 at 3 1), no attorney ever made an appearance as a representative for Clarion Partners during the 4 litigation in case number C24-1862, and Plaintiff provides no evidence that Mr. Reed was in any
5 way involved with Clarion Partners. See generally Baker v. Avenue5 Residential et al, No. C24- 6 1862 (W.D. Wash.). Accordingly, the Court stands by its findings in the Order on Plaintiff’s 7 Motion to Disqualify Opposing Attorney. 8 Plaintiff also asserts in the instant motion that Christopher Reed has a conflict of interest, 9 and that Christopher Reed is in violation of the American Bar Association’s Rules of 10 Professional Conduct (See Dkt. No. 42 at 1–2, 4)—arguments which he made in his initial 11 motion (see Dkt. No. 18 at 1–2). Plaintiff does not make a showing of manifest error in the 12 instant motion. Further, he does not provide any legal authority to support his motion to 13 reconsider. Absent from Plaintiff’s instant motion are new facts that could not have been 14 brought, with reasonable diligence, in his initial motion. Further, Plaintiff incorporates additional
15 discussion of the settlement agreement, including screenshots of the agreement pasted within his 16 brief. But Plaintiff already provided the settlement agreement as an attachment to his initial 17 motion. Plaintiff also appears to attempt to re-phrase or expand on previously made arguments. 18 Still, there is no explanation as to why any of the information in the instant motion could not 19 have been provided earlier in the initial motion with reasonable due diligence. Therefore, 20 Plaintiff fails to carry his burden in a motion for reconsideration. See LCR 7(h)(1); Marlyn 21 Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880. 22 B. Reconsideration of Order on Motion to Appoint Counsel 23 Plaintiff asserts several reasons that the Court should reconsider its order denying his
24 request for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff’s arguments include: (1) that he has provided notes 1 from medical doctors in support for his need for counsel, and the Court should give weight to the 2 medical opinions; (2) that although the Court highlighted that Plaintiff had articulated complaints 3 as a reason to deny his request for counsel, the Court ignored past complaints in which judges in 4 this District asserted that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and dismissed the action, or in which
5 judges in this District determined Plaintiff didn’t follow the Local Civil Rules; (3) that “judges at 6 the courthouse repetitively tell me that I’m articulating fine, yet they tell me my motions are 7 denied”; (4) that Plaintiff does not have the ability to maneuver through lawsuits that consists of 8 elements, statutes, and burdens of proof; (5) that individuals accused of crimes have a right to an 9 attorney, but individuals bringing civil suits do not, despite the fact that such court cases are 10 “strikingly similar”; (6) that the Court has funding to appoint an attorney; and (7) that 11 represented Parties have a much higher likelihood of prevailing. Dkt. No. 43 at 1–3. 12 Motions for reconsideration are ordinarily denied absent a showing of manifest error in 13 the prior ruling, or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought 14 to the Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. See LCR 7(h)(1). Here, Plaintiff does
15 not provide any showing that there was manifest error in the prior ruling. Further, Plaintiff does 16 not articulate any arguments that could not have been brought in his initial motion, nor does he 17 give any legal authority in support of the instant motion. All of Plaintiff’s arguments could have 18 been brought in his initial motion, and he presents no new facts to the Court here. For example, 19 Plaintiff’s attached medical note is dated March 18, 2025. Dkt. No. 43 at 6. Plaintiff, however, 20 filed his complaint on September 13, 2025 (Dkt. No. 1-1), his first Motion to Appoint Counsel 21 on September 18, 2025 (Dkt. No. 11), and his second Motion to Appoint Counsel on November 22 16, 2025 (Dkt. No. 20). He makes no assertions that he could not have submitted medical 23 documentation to the Court at any time prior to the motion for reconsideration. See generally
24 Dkt. No. 43.
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 JUSTIN BAKER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01785-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 13 v. RECONSIDERATION 14 LIFETIME ADVOCACY PLUS et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Justin Baker’s Motion to Reconsider the 18 Court’s Order (Dkt. No. 41) on Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Attorney Christopher Reed (Dkt. 19 No. 42) and the Court’s Order (Dkt. No. 37) on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of 20 Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 43). Having reviewed the motions and the relevant record, the 21 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions. 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h)(1). Such motions are ordinarily 24 denied absent “a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal 1 authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable 2 diligence.” Id. Absent such a showing, motions for reconsideration should be granted only in 3 “highly unusual circumstances.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 4 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656,
5 665 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Inventist, Inc. v. Ninebot Inc., 664 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1215 (W.D. 6 Wash. 2023) (noting that reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy,” and that the moving 7 party bears a “heavy burden” (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 8 (9th Cir. 2000))). “A motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present 9 evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” 10 Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880 (quoting Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890). “Whether or 11 not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo Nation v. 12 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) 13 (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). 14 II. DISCUSSION
15 A. Reconsideration of Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Opposing Attorney 16 The core of Plaintiff’s arguments in his motion for reconsideration are the same as the 17 arguments brought in his initial motion. First, he argues that Christopher Reed is a party to the 18 lawsuit because he is considered an “agent and representative” of Thrive Communities 19 Management (“Thrive”) and Clarion Partners. Dkt. No. 42 at 1. As the Court stated in its order 20 denying Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Christopher Reed, “While the complaint in the Avenue5 21 Litigation named Mr. Reed as a defendant, the settlement agreement did not.” Dkt. No. 41 at 2; 22 see also Dkt. No. 18-2 (Settlement Agreement). Second, the settlement agreement does not 23 mention Thrive as a party. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 1. Christopher Reed also provided a declaration
24 in support of his response to Plaintiff’s initial motion confirming that neither he, nor his client, 1 Thrive, was party to the settlement or part of settlement discussions. Dkt. No. 24 (Reed Decl.) 2 ¶ 3. Third, while Clarion Partners apparently was a party to the settlement (see Dkt. No. 18-2 at 3 1), no attorney ever made an appearance as a representative for Clarion Partners during the 4 litigation in case number C24-1862, and Plaintiff provides no evidence that Mr. Reed was in any
5 way involved with Clarion Partners. See generally Baker v. Avenue5 Residential et al, No. C24- 6 1862 (W.D. Wash.). Accordingly, the Court stands by its findings in the Order on Plaintiff’s 7 Motion to Disqualify Opposing Attorney. 8 Plaintiff also asserts in the instant motion that Christopher Reed has a conflict of interest, 9 and that Christopher Reed is in violation of the American Bar Association’s Rules of 10 Professional Conduct (See Dkt. No. 42 at 1–2, 4)—arguments which he made in his initial 11 motion (see Dkt. No. 18 at 1–2). Plaintiff does not make a showing of manifest error in the 12 instant motion. Further, he does not provide any legal authority to support his motion to 13 reconsider. Absent from Plaintiff’s instant motion are new facts that could not have been 14 brought, with reasonable diligence, in his initial motion. Further, Plaintiff incorporates additional
15 discussion of the settlement agreement, including screenshots of the agreement pasted within his 16 brief. But Plaintiff already provided the settlement agreement as an attachment to his initial 17 motion. Plaintiff also appears to attempt to re-phrase or expand on previously made arguments. 18 Still, there is no explanation as to why any of the information in the instant motion could not 19 have been provided earlier in the initial motion with reasonable due diligence. Therefore, 20 Plaintiff fails to carry his burden in a motion for reconsideration. See LCR 7(h)(1); Marlyn 21 Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880. 22 B. Reconsideration of Order on Motion to Appoint Counsel 23 Plaintiff asserts several reasons that the Court should reconsider its order denying his
24 request for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff’s arguments include: (1) that he has provided notes 1 from medical doctors in support for his need for counsel, and the Court should give weight to the 2 medical opinions; (2) that although the Court highlighted that Plaintiff had articulated complaints 3 as a reason to deny his request for counsel, the Court ignored past complaints in which judges in 4 this District asserted that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and dismissed the action, or in which
5 judges in this District determined Plaintiff didn’t follow the Local Civil Rules; (3) that “judges at 6 the courthouse repetitively tell me that I’m articulating fine, yet they tell me my motions are 7 denied”; (4) that Plaintiff does not have the ability to maneuver through lawsuits that consists of 8 elements, statutes, and burdens of proof; (5) that individuals accused of crimes have a right to an 9 attorney, but individuals bringing civil suits do not, despite the fact that such court cases are 10 “strikingly similar”; (6) that the Court has funding to appoint an attorney; and (7) that 11 represented Parties have a much higher likelihood of prevailing. Dkt. No. 43 at 1–3. 12 Motions for reconsideration are ordinarily denied absent a showing of manifest error in 13 the prior ruling, or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought 14 to the Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. See LCR 7(h)(1). Here, Plaintiff does
15 not provide any showing that there was manifest error in the prior ruling. Further, Plaintiff does 16 not articulate any arguments that could not have been brought in his initial motion, nor does he 17 give any legal authority in support of the instant motion. All of Plaintiff’s arguments could have 18 been brought in his initial motion, and he presents no new facts to the Court here. For example, 19 Plaintiff’s attached medical note is dated March 18, 2025. Dkt. No. 43 at 6. Plaintiff, however, 20 filed his complaint on September 13, 2025 (Dkt. No. 1-1), his first Motion to Appoint Counsel 21 on September 18, 2025 (Dkt. No. 11), and his second Motion to Appoint Counsel on November 22 16, 2025 (Dkt. No. 20). He makes no assertions that he could not have submitted medical 23 documentation to the Court at any time prior to the motion for reconsideration. See generally
24 Dkt. No. 43. Additionally, Plaintiff does not assert why he could not have made any of his other 1 arguments prior to his filing the instant motion, and, considering that such arguments stem from 2 his past encounters with judges in this District and from his general beliefs about the right to 3 counsel in civil cases, it appears he could have made such arguments earlier. See id. at 1–3. 4 Even if Plaintiff had made his arguments earlier, they would have failed. As stated in the
5 Court’s initial order denying appointment of counsel, in civil cases, the appointment of counsel 6 to a pro se litigant “is a privilege and not a right.” United States ex. Rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 7 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965) (citation omitted). A court must consider together both “the 8 likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims 9 pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 10 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, “Appointment of counsel should be allowed only in 11 exceptional cases.” United States ex. Rel. Gardner, 352 F.2d at 794. 12 The Court respects and acknowledges Plaintiff’s pleadings that identify he has medical 13 diagnoses, and that those diagnoses are legitimate and likely burdensome in his everyday life. 14 However, Plaintiff’s medical diagnoses do not qualify as “exceptional circumstances” in the
15 context of appointing counsel in a civil case. See Velasquez v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. C08-9, 2008 16 WL 594721, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (finding no exceptional circumstances even though 17 plaintiff requested counsel, in part, due to mental and physical disabilities); Roberts v. 18 Snohomish County, No. C16-1464, 2018 WL 828472, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding 19 no exceptional circumstances where plaintiff requested counsel under Americans with 20 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because the court found no showing that ADA applied, the court had 21 previously denied motion to appoint counsel where plaintiff claimed disability, and the court 22 found plaintiff was not likely to succeed on merits). Additionally, Plaintiff reveals his diagnoses 23 but does not explain how or if they interfered with his ability to successfully litigate his
24 previously completed claim, or with his ability to successfully bring a complaint in the present 1 matter. See Bishop-McKean v. Washington Dep’t of Corr., No. C20-5416, 2021 WL 3015203, at 2 *1–2 (W.D. Wash. June 15, 2021) (finding no exceptional circumstances where plaintiff 3 requested appointment of counsel due to physical disabilities, where plaintiff showed capability 4 to litigate claims).1
5 Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that, despite being told that past briefs were articulated 6 appropriately, some of his motions have still been denied. But whether a motion is denied 7 depends on its merit; a ruling does not necessarily reflect, or depend upon, whether the motion’s 8 author can articulate a point to the court. Motions brought by attorneys from expensive law firms 9 that incorporate both case law and other legal arguments are routinely denied in courts across the 10 country, including this one. As such, although Plaintiff has been told before that he has 11 articulated a motion appropriately, denial very well could have meant that his legal arguments 12 did not have merit, not that he did not clearly articulate his arguments.2 Plaintiff also argues that 13 he should receive an attorney because defendants in criminal cases have a right to counsel. 14 However, there is a stark difference between the two—in a criminal case, the Sixth Amendment
15 requires that a defendant be given counsel because their liberty (freedom from jail or prison) is at 16 stake. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. In a civil case, a Plaintiff does not run the risk of losing their 17 freedom from jail or prison. Finally, despite Plaintiff’s assertions that the Court has funding to 18 give him counsel, the Court has limited access to pro bono counsel and limited resources; 19 therefore, any plaintiff who requests counsel must meet the standard for such appointment. 20 21 22
23 1 Plaintiff successfully filed and brought to conclusion another case in this District without counsel. See Baker v. Avenue5 Residential et al, No. C24-1862. 24 2 The Court provides general guidance on Plaintiff’s example because he has not provided specific examples. 1 C. Potential Legal Assistance for Plaintiff 2 Recognizing that Plaintiff seeks assistance with this matter, the Court informs Plaintiff of 3 potential resource: the Federal Civil Rights Legal Clinic, which offers free, limited-scope 4 || assistance to self-represented litigants in federal civil-rights cases, including, but not limited to, 5 || following court rules and procedures or preparing case documents. Participation is voluntary, and 6 || the Clinic operates independently from the Court. To request an appointment, Plaintiffs in Seattle 7 submit the online form available at www.kcba.org/nlc, or call 206-267-7070 and press “1” 8 leave a message. In Tacoma, Plaintiffs may request an appointment by calling 253-368-6690. 9 TI. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Disqualify Attorney Christopher 11 || Reed (Dkt. No. 42) and Motion for Reconsideration of Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 43) 12 || are DENIED. 13 14 Dated this 18th day of February, 2026. (Nas Ze 16 Tana Lin 7 United States District Judge
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ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION — 7