Justiano v. G4S Secure Solutions, Inc.

291 F.R.D. 80, 2013 WL 690811, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25046
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 22, 2013
DocketCivil No. 12-1050 (JBS/JS)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 291 F.R.D. 80 (Justiano v. G4S Secure Solutions, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Justiano v. G4S Secure Solutions, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 80, 2013 WL 690811, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25046 (D.N.J. 2013).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOEL SCHNEIDER, United States Magistrate Judge.

This Opinion and Order addresses the discovery dispute raised in plaintiffs January 29, 2013 letter and defendant’s February 2, 2013 response [Doe. No. 14]. The dispute generally concerns plaintiffs request for “comparator” information. For the reasons to be discussed plaintiffs application is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Background

By way of brief background plaintiffs complaint alleges defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the New Jersey Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). Plaintiff was employed as a security guard at the Salem/Hope Creek Generating Facility (“Facility”). Plaintiff alleges that starting in or about January 2010 he missed work because of various medical problems. Plaintiff contends he was not provided with required individualized FMLA notice of his right to intermittent leave. He also contends defendant did not designate or treat his intermittent absences as FMLA protected. In addition, plaintiff argues his leave of absence due to the hospitalization of his mother was not counted as an excused leave. Plaintiff was fired on December 14, 2010 for absenteeism. Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that defendant interfered with his rights under the FMLA and NJFLA and retaliated against him for taking what should have been counted as FMLA leave. Defendant argues plaintiff violated its applicable Attendance Policy and plaintiff was fired for cause.

The parties’ discovery dispute concerns plaintiffs request for comparator information. Plaintiff wants “comparator discovery” to show that he was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Plaintiff argues he seeks, “evidence related to the employment consequences imposed upon other similarly situated employees who accrued absences that were either FMLA and/or NJFLA qualifying, as well as the employment consequences imposed upon employees who accrued non-FMLA and/or NJFLA qualifying absences.” January 29, 2013 Letter Brief (“LB”) at 4. Defendant argues plaintiff has not demonstrated a “particularized showing for the information he seeks.” February 5, 2013 Letter Brief (“LB”) at 3. Defendant also argues, “[¡Information pertaining to individuals who held the same job as Plaintiff have nothing to do with Plaintiffs claim.” Id. at 4. Further, defendant argues, “[t]here is no threshold showing that there are any comparable situations or that G4S engaged in some pattern of discrimination [83]*83against security officers at this location.” Id. at 5.

Discussion

As a general matter the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “allow broad and liberal discovery.” Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir.1999). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery is as follows: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense____ For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Courts have interpreted the federal rules to mean that discovery encompasses “any matter that bears on or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.” Kopacz v. Del. River and Bay Autk, 225 F.R.D. 494, 496 (D.N.J.2004).

While the scope of discovery pursuant to Rule 26 is broad, it is not unlimited and may be circumscribed. Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1999); Kopacz v. Delaware River and Bay Authority, 225 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D.N.J.2004). As noted in Claude P. Bamberger Intern., Inc. v. Rohm and Haas Co., C.A. No. 96-1041 (WGB), 1998 WL 684263, at *2 (D.N.J. April 1, 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), “while the standard of relevancy is a liberal one, it is not so liberal as to allow a party to roam in shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not appear germane merely on the theory that it might become so.” Discovery should not serve as a fishing expedition during which a party searches for evidence to support facts not yet pleaded. Smith v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuius, P.C., C.A. No. 07-5139 (JHR), 2008 WL 2885887, at *5 (D.N.J. July 23, 2008).

In the employment discrimination context it can hardly be disputed that discovery directed to similarly situated employees is relevant. Salamone v. Carter’s Retail, Inc., C.A. No. 09-5856 (GEB), 2011 WL 1458063, at *3 (D.N.J. April 14, 2011); see also Davis v. Cleary, C.A. No. 09-0925 (AET), 2011 WL 4435697, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2011). Indeed, discovery in these cases is broad because plaintiffs often rely on indirect or circumstantial proof of discrimination. Salamone, at *3. There is no general rule to determine who is or who is not a similarly situated employee. Instead, “case specific definitions” are used. Id., at *3. The determination of whether employees are similarly situated takes into account factors such as the employees’ job responsibilities, the supervisors and decision-makers, and the nature of the misconduct engaged in. Wilcher v. Postmaster General, 441 Fed.Appx. 879, 882 (3rd Cir.2011).1 The Court therefore disagrees with defendant’s argument that “[¡Information pertaining to individuals who held the same job as Plaintiff have nothing to do with Plaintiffs claim.” LB at 4. As discussed, the reported decisions have developed ease-specific definitions. Further, the Court does not accept defendant’s argument that plaintiff must demonstrate a “particularized showing” for what he seeks. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b), plaintiff is entitled to any nonprivileged matter relevant to his claim. “Courts have construed this rule liberally, creating a broad vista for discovery.” E.E.O.C. v. Princeton Healthcare System, C.A. No. 10-4126 (JAP), 2011 WL 2148660, at *11 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (citation omitted).

The first interrogatory at issue is No. 5 which asks defendant to:

Identify each and [every] security officer employed by Defendant at the Generating Facility, in the three years prior to the date the interrogatories were served, that the Defendant contends violated the same workplace policy(ies), procedures and rules that Defendant contends Plaintiff violated [84]*84during the last six (6) months of Plaintiffs employment (Defendant’s absence and call-off policy).2

Defendant objects to this interrogatory as irrelevant and seeking confidential information. Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.3 Plaintiffs interrogatory is appropriately limited to similarly situated employees.

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Bluebook (online)
291 F.R.D. 80, 2013 WL 690811, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25046, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/justiano-v-g4s-secure-solutions-inc-njd-2013.