Jurado v. Burt

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2003
• Docket: 02-1133
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Jurado v. Burt No. 02-1133 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0243P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0243p.06 ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ OPINION _________________ JOSE JURADO, JR., X JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Jose Jurado, a Petitioner-Appellant, - Michigan prisoner, appeals from the order of the district court - dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time- - No. 02-1133 barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations set v. - > forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of , 1996 (AEDPA). Jurado concedes that his petition was SHERRY BURT , - untimely under AEDPA. He argues, however, that equitable Respondent-Appellee. - tolling should apply to the nineteen months during which he N was investigating and preparing an application for state post- Appeal from the United States District Court conviction relief, the filing of which would have tolled for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor AEDPA’s limitations period. For the following reasons, we No. 01-60045—Marianne O. Battani, District Judge. reject this argument and affirm the district court’s decision.

Submitted: June 11, 2003 I.

Decided and Filed: July 24, 2003 On October 15, 1992, a jury convicted Jurado of criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to do great bodily harm Before: MOORE and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; less than murder. Jurado then pled guilty to being a second SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge.* felony offender. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fifty to one hundred years for the criminal sexual conduct _________________ conviction and ten to fifteen years for the assault conviction. Jurado exhausted his direct appeals in Michigan’s appellate COUNSEL courts as of December 27, 1995. For AEDPA purposes, Jurado’s conviction became final on March 27, 1996, after the ON BRIEF: Sarah E. Hunter, Birmingham, Michigan, for ninety-day period during which Jurado could have filed a Appellant. Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States seeking direct review of his conviction. See, e.g., Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations period * The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District for § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

1 No. 02-1133 Jurado v. Burt 3 4 Jurado v. Burt No. 02-1133

period begins to run from the latest of four circumstances, one habeas relief because he was investigating and researching of which is “the date on which the judgment became final by claims for his request for state post-conviction relief during the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time the approximately nineteen months that elapsed between for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA April 24, 1996 (the start of the one-year grace period) and became effective on April 24, 1996. Because Jurado’s November 12, 1997 (the date he filed an application for state conviction became final before AEDPA was enacted, he had post-conviction relief). Alternatively, he argued that his a one-year grace period, lasting until April 24, 1997, in which request for state post-conviction relief was “pending” during to file his habeas petition. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 519 that time under the meaning of the statute, such that the (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 699 (2002). statute tolled the period for filing for habeas relief. The one-year period of limitations is tolled by the amount The district court disagreed. It dismissed Jurado’s habeas of time that “a properly filed application for State petition with prejudice, holding that equitable tolling did not post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the apply and that the petition was untimely under the statute. pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in state court. See 28 The district court held that an application for state post- U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226- conviction relief must be filed in order to be “pending” for the 27 (10th Cir. 1998) (“the one year grace period would be purposes of tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Further, it tolled by any time spent pursuing properly filed noted that a motion for state post-conviction review that is post-conviction proceedings”). Jurado did not, however, file filed following the limitations period for seeking federal an application for state post-conviction review within the one- habeas relief cannot toll that period because there is no period year period. remaining to be tolled. See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court declined to toll the Rather, he filed an application for state post-conviction statute during the period in which Jurado’s counsel was review in November 1997, approximately one year and seven investigating potential claims, attempting to discover facts to months after the one-year grace period began. Jurado retained support his claims, and reviewing materials, because no his current counsel in the spring of 1996 to assist him in application for state post-conviction relief had been filed seeking state post-conviction relief under M.C.R. § 6.500 et during those time periods. The district court also noted that seq. Through counsel, he filed a motion for relief from Jurado had failed to allege specific facts as to how he had judgment on November 12, 1997. The trial court denied the “pursued” his state post-conviction relief claims during the motion on the merits and then denied Jurado’s motion for nineteen-month period. reconsideration. Jurado’s subsequent appeals to the state courts were denied, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Jurado then filed a motion for reconsideration and attached his delayed application for leave to appeal on February 29, an affidavit from his counsel, Sarah E. Hunter. Hunter 2000. described her work on Jurado’s case. She asserted that she obtained Jurado’s file from trial counsel on April 22, 1996, Almost one year later, on February 28, 2001, Jurado filed and “analyzed his case by looking at every issue my client a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. identified.” She “did legal research as to the viability of each § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern issue, and spoke with witnesses and/or experts as needed.” District of Michigan. In his habeas petition, Jurado argued She made the following statements about her understanding that equitable tolling should apply to save his petition for of AEDPA’s statute of limitations: No. 02-1133 Jurado v. Burt 5 6 Jurado v. Burt No. 02-1133

In preparing Mr. Jurado’s case . . . I understood that November 1997. She stated that it was her strategy to Michigan did not have a statute of limitations as to when “investigate each and every claim or fact that the client a petition for post judgment relief under MCR 6.500 et indicates was not attended to at trial or on direct appeal,” and seq[.] must be filed. However, Michigan did have a rule that she and her client “honed the issues steadily . . . between indicating that only one such motion could be filed. April of 1997 and November of 1997.” As noted, the one- Accordingly, when issues came up that my client and I year grace period expired on April 24, 1997. believed we should look into, we did so. I chose not to rush and file “anything” to stop the clock under AEDPA, The district court denied Jurado’s motion for as many of my colleagues did, because I was concerned reconsideration, stating that “[t]he Court considered in its that Mr. Jurado might fail to exhaust his constitutional original opinion the discovery and research accomplished by claims and fail to try to develop the factual predicates for counsel. The details of counsel’s work does not modify the those claims in state court. At that time, I was not aware issues.” It granted a certificate of appealability with respect of the case law that would evolve as to the tolling of the to the issue of equitable tolling, and Jurado timely appealed. statute of limitations under AEDPA. II. At the time, I believed the AEDPA statue of limitations was ambiguous as to whether the state court petition was Jurado concedes that his habeas petition was untimely. He “properly filed” or “pending”. I do know that I was also now concedes that his motion for state post-conviction confused as to whether I would be required to file the review was not “properly filed” and “pending” within the motion in April, and that I determined that I would not meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) during AEDPA’s one-year risk filing prematurely in state court just to stop the clock grace period, such that it did not toll the grace period under and risk defaulting federal issues that we had not yet the statute. Thus, his only claim on appeal is that the doctrine analyzed as to their viability. However, I anticipated that of equitable tolling should apply to his case. We review this so long as we were steadily preparing Mr. Jurado’s bid claim de novo. Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 for post conviction relief by investigating potential (6th Cir. 2001) (where the facts of the case are undisputed and claims, we should not file prematurely in state court just the district court rules as a matter of law that equitable tolling to stop the federal clock, as this would not be in the best is unavailable, this court reviews de novo). interests of my client and would not serve finality in state court. Jurado bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Hunter’s affidavit chronicled her activities related to Jurado’s Cir. 2002). The doctrine is used sparingly by federal courts. case during the nineteen-month period. She asserted that she Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., located and arranged meetings with various expert witnesses 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). (including a toxicologist, a neurologist, and a psychologist); “Typically, equitable tolling applies only when a litigant’s sought an advisory opinion on an undisclosed ethical failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose question; and attempted to obtain additional evidence, such as from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.” Id. at the nurses’ notes from the victim’s hospital stay. She 560-61. The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]e have indicated that she drafted and revised the motion for state allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has post-conviction relief over a five-month period, from July to actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective No. 02-1133 Jurado v. Burt 7 8 Jurado v. Burt No. 02-1133

pleading during the statutory period, or where the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. Rather, they made a complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s tactical decision to continue investigating claims for his state misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin post-conviction relief application although they were aware v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). that his time in which to file for habeas relief would expire. However, “[w]e have generally been much less forgiving . . . where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in Where the litigant does not claim lack of knowledge or preserving his legal rights.” Id.; cf. Baldwin County Welcome notice of the filing requirement, this court’s inquiry is focused Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (“One who fails to on examining his diligence in pursuing his rights and the act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse reasonableness of his ignorance of the effect of his delay. See that lack of diligence.”). “Absent compelling equitable Andrews, 851 F.2d at 151. Jurado contends that he was considerations, a court should not extend limitations by even diligent in pursuing his rights. In support, he offers Hunter’s a single day.” Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561. affidavit, which details her work on his case. She states that she received his file on April 22, 1996, and met with Jurado This court determines whether to equitably toll AEDPA’s and his family several times thereafter. She sought an statute of limitations using the five-factor test set forth in opinion from the state bar regarding an undisclosed ethics Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1988). Dunlap, question and received the opinion on June 20, 1996. She 250 F.3d at 1010. The court considers: (1) the petitioner’s contacted an undisclosed expert in June 1996, met with him lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s in October 1996, and determined in December 1996 that he lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; would not benefit Jurado’s case. In January 1997, Hunter (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice spoke to a toxicologist about the effects of the drugs that the to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner’s reasonableness in victim received in the emergency room where the victim gave remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his statements about the crime. She also spoke to a psychologist claim. Id. at 1008. This list of factors is not necessarily about the effect of drugs, alcohol, and pain medication on a comprehensive, and not all factors are relevant in all cases. person’s ability to remember or contrive. She reviewed the Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2002). DNA evidence in Jurado’s case but determined that there was no meritorious issue to raise with regard to it. In April 1997, In this case, the first two factors – petitioner’s lack of notice she sent a subpoena to the hospital where the victim was and lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement treated, in order to obtain nurses’ notes.1 In April 1997, – weigh against equitable tolling of the limitations period. AEDPA’s one-year grace period expired. Though aware of Jurado stated in his brief that he “had to choose between the language of the statute’s tolling provision, Hunter “chose prematurely filing a petition for post-conviction relief in state not to rush” to file the request for state post-conviction relief. court that was not adequately supported by facts, or waiting Hunter’s affidavit accounts for the additional seven months to file until all facts had been reasonably investigated and evaluated, even if the grace period under AEDPA expired.” At the time, his counsel “believed it was more important to 1 develop Petitioner’s case in accord with standards of The hospital declined to honor the subpoena beca use there was no professional conduct” than it was to comply with AEDPA’s pending case. As the district court pointed out, Hunter could have filed statute of limitations, according to his brief. Thus, Jurado the motion for relief from judgm ent at that time with an affidavit attesting to her unsuccessful attempts to obtain the medical records. The hospital does not contend that he or his counsel was unaware of then would have likely provided the records in light of the pending case. No. 02-1133 Jurado v. Burt 9 10 Jurado v. Burt No. 02-1133

as well. In May 1997, she considered and abandoned an issue tolling is identified. Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 152; related to Jurado’s habitual offender charge. In June, she Andrews, 851 F.2d at 151. gave a draft of the motion for post-conviction relief to Jurado and his family. In July, Hunter revised the draft’s sufficiency The final factor is petitioner’s reasonableness in remaining of the evidence argument. Also, she obtained and reviewed ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. Jurado’s medical records from Mexico. She attempted to Jurado’s counsel was aware of the section of AEDPA that contact several neurologists and spoke to two, Drs. Sid provides for tolling, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which states that, Broder and John Blase. In August 1997, Hunter met with “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State Jurado and they finally determined which issues to raise in the post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall motion for state post-conviction relief. On November 12, not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 1997, she filed the motion. subsection.” She states that she believed this section was ambiguous as to whether an application that had not been Although Jurado’s counsel certainly undertook filed with any court was “properly filed” and “pending.” She investigatory and preparatory actions in Jurado’s case during “was not aware of the case law that would evolve as to the the nineteen-month period, these actions did not constitute tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA.” Thus, she due diligence in pursuit of his rights. Jurado’s trial lasted “was confused as to whether [she] would be required to file three days and involved three trial transcripts, plus a fourth the motion in April.” Id. transcript where Jurado then pled guilty to being a habitual offender. The district court found that the case was not Generally, “a lawyer’s mistake is not a valid basis for complex and that the factual bases for the three claims raised equitable tolling.” Whalen v. Randle, 37 Fed. Appx. 113, 120 in the habeas petition (sufficiency of evidence, confrontation (6th Cir. 2002); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. clause, and ineffective assistance of counsel) “could all have 2001) (“attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, been readily apparent after reading the transcripts.” A or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the reasonably diligent attorney could have pursued these claims ‘extraordinary’ circumstances required for equitable tolling”); within one year’s time. Arguably, counsel’s activities amount Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2000) to due (and perhaps excessive) diligence in pursuing every (attorney’s misreading of AEDPA did not require equitable possible theory, no matter how feeble. They do not, however, tolling). “[T]he remedy for negligence by a party’s lawyer is amount to diligence in pursuing his rights, where counsel was generally a legal malpractice suit or an ineffective assistance on notice of AEDPA’s one-year grace period and failed to act of counsel claim, not forcing the opposing party to defend within the period. As the district court stated, AEDPA does against a stale claim.” Whalen, 37 Fed. Appx. at 120 (citing not convey a right to an extended delay while a habeas Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999)). petitioner gathers every possible scrap of evidence that might Jurado’s brief cites no authority showing that it was support his claim. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, reasonable to believe that a motion that was merely being 199 (5th Cir. 1998). Neither does the doctrine of equitable investigated and drafted was “properly filed.” In view of the tolling grant such a right. plain language of the statute, this belief was not reasonable.

The fourth factor, whether respondent was prejudiced by Accordingly, application of the five-factor test indicates the delay in filing, is irrelevant here. Absence of prejudice is that equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case. We a factor to be considered only after a factor that might justify therefore affirm the district court’s decision.