5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 EUN JUNG, et al., Case No. C22-5127RSL 9
10 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 11 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 12 LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE, ATTORNEY’S FEES
13 Defendant. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s “Motion for Sanctions re: Plaintiff’s 16 Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Discovery” (Dkt. # 18). The Court, having reviewed 17 the submissions of the parties and the remainder of the record, grants defendant’s motion for the 18 reasons stated herein. 19 I. Background 20 This case involves an insured, plaintiff Eun Jung, bringing claims against her auto 21 insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual, alleging violations of the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct 22 Act and breach of contract – specifically, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dkt. 23 # 1. On February 27, 2023, this Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 24 dismissed plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. # 32. The Court now turns to defendant’s requests for 25 attorney’s fees related to its motion to compel (Dkt. # 11) and motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 18). 26 A. Motion to Compel 27 28 1 On August 11, 2022, defendant filed a motion to “Compel Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures 2 and Responses to Defendant’s First Interrogatories and Requests for Production.” Dkt. # 11. 3 Plaintiff did not respond to the motion to compel and the Court granted the motion on October 4 31, 2022. Dkt. # 17. Defendant also requested an award of its reasonable attorney’s fees and 5 costs “in the sum of $6,694.00.” Dkt. # 11-1; see also Dkt. # 12 at 3-4 (explaining calculation of 6 fees). The Court denied defendant’s request on the basis that Rule 37 states when a motion to 7 compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or 8 deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or 9 both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 10 attorney’s fees.” Dkt. # 17 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)). Accordingly, the Court 11 concluded that before an award could be granted, the Court must provide plaintiff an 12 “opportunity to be heard.” Id. The Court gave plaintiff a deadline of November 16, 2022 to 13 respond to defendant’s request for attorney’s fees. Id. Plaintiff filed no response. 14 B. Motion for Sanctions 15 In its October 31, 2022 Order granting defendant’s motion to compel, the Court ordered 16 plaintiff to provide defendant with her initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 26(a) and respond to defendant’s First Interrogatories and Requests for Production 18 within fourteen (14) days of its Order. Dkt. # 17. Plaintiff failed to do so, and defendant moved 19 for discovery sanctions, requesting that the Court award defendant attorney’s fees connected 20 with both the motion to compel and the motion for sanctions. Dkt. # 18. 21 On December 16, 2022, plaintiff filed a response to the motion for sanctions, citing 22 plaintiff’s serious health problems and plaintiff’s attorney’s severe personal challenges requiring 23 medical intervention as the reasons for plaintiff “falling out of compliance with [her] discovery 24 obligations.” Dkt. # 20. Plaintiff requested additional time to comply with discovery obligations 25 and provide briefing in response to the motion for sanctions. Id. On February 2, 2023, the Court 26 granted plaintiff an additional fourteen (14) days to respond to both the motion to compel and 27 the motion for sanctions. Dkt. # 30. Plaintiff failed to file additional briefing in response to 28 either motion. It appears that plaintiff continues to be out of compliance with her discovery 1 obligations. See, e.g., Dkt. # 23 (declaration of defendant’s counsel, stating that they have yet to 2 receive plaintiff’s initial disclosures or discovery responses). 3 II. Discussion 4 A. Attorney’s Fees for Motion to Compel 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 states that if a motion to compel is granted, “the court 6 must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct 7 necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's 8 reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 37(a)(5)(A). Here, the Court has granted defendant’s motion to compel and provided plaintiff 10 with an opportunity to be heard. See Dkt. # 17; Dkt. # 30. Accordingly, the Court “must” require 11 plaintiff to pay defendant’s “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 12 attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). 13 Defendant requests a total award of $6,694.00 in attorney’s fees in connection with its 14 motion to compel. Dkt. # 12 at 3. The total fee includes: (a) six (6) hours (billed at a rate of $220 15 per hour) for lead attorney John M. Silk equaling $1,320; (b) 19.7 hours for attorney Brian J. 16 Hansford (billed at $220 per hour) equaling $4,334; and (c) 10.4 paralegal hours (billed at a rate 17 of $100 per hour) equaling $1,040. Id. at 3-4. 18 B. Attorney’s Fees for Motion for Sanctions 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 also states that if a party fails to obey an order, 20 including an order granting a motion to compel, the court “may issue further just orders.” Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Rule further states that “[i]nstead of or in addition to the orders 22 [listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)], the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising 23 that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the 24 failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of 25 expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. 26 Demassa, No. C18-43MMC-TSH, 2019 WL 5395038, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (noting 27 that “while most [discovery sanctions] are discretionary . . . [o]]ne remedy [the award of fees 28 under 37(b)(2)(C)] is not”). Here, plaintiff has failed to obey the Court’s order compelling her to 1 provide defendant with her initial disclosures and respond to defendant’s discovery requests. 2 She has also failed to show that this failure was “substantially justified,” despite being given 3 several opportunities to do so. Accordingly, the Court “must order the disobedient party . . . to 4 pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 37(b)(2)(C). 6 With regard to the motion to compel, defendant requests an award of $1,155. Dkt. # 19 at 7 2. This fee request encompasses a total of four (4) attorney hours billed at a rate of $220 per 8 hour for the time attorney Brian J. Hansford, equaling $880, and 2.5 paralegal hours billed at 9 $110 an hour, equaling $275. Id. 10 C. Reasonableness of Fee Requests 11 The lodestar method is “the default principle for fee calculation in Washington.” Brand v. 12 Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wn. 2d 659, 676 (1999) (Talmadge, J. concurring). Under the 13 lodestar method, there are two primary steps to calculating a fee award. Bowers v. Transamerica 14 Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 EUN JUNG, et al., Case No. C22-5127RSL 9
10 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 11 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 12 LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE, ATTORNEY’S FEES
13 Defendant. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s “Motion for Sanctions re: Plaintiff’s 16 Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Discovery” (Dkt. # 18). The Court, having reviewed 17 the submissions of the parties and the remainder of the record, grants defendant’s motion for the 18 reasons stated herein. 19 I. Background 20 This case involves an insured, plaintiff Eun Jung, bringing claims against her auto 21 insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual, alleging violations of the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct 22 Act and breach of contract – specifically, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dkt. 23 # 1. On February 27, 2023, this Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 24 dismissed plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. # 32. The Court now turns to defendant’s requests for 25 attorney’s fees related to its motion to compel (Dkt. # 11) and motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 18). 26 A. Motion to Compel 27 28 1 On August 11, 2022, defendant filed a motion to “Compel Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures 2 and Responses to Defendant’s First Interrogatories and Requests for Production.” Dkt. # 11. 3 Plaintiff did not respond to the motion to compel and the Court granted the motion on October 4 31, 2022. Dkt. # 17. Defendant also requested an award of its reasonable attorney’s fees and 5 costs “in the sum of $6,694.00.” Dkt. # 11-1; see also Dkt. # 12 at 3-4 (explaining calculation of 6 fees). The Court denied defendant’s request on the basis that Rule 37 states when a motion to 7 compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or 8 deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or 9 both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 10 attorney’s fees.” Dkt. # 17 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)). Accordingly, the Court 11 concluded that before an award could be granted, the Court must provide plaintiff an 12 “opportunity to be heard.” Id. The Court gave plaintiff a deadline of November 16, 2022 to 13 respond to defendant’s request for attorney’s fees. Id. Plaintiff filed no response. 14 B. Motion for Sanctions 15 In its October 31, 2022 Order granting defendant’s motion to compel, the Court ordered 16 plaintiff to provide defendant with her initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 26(a) and respond to defendant’s First Interrogatories and Requests for Production 18 within fourteen (14) days of its Order. Dkt. # 17. Plaintiff failed to do so, and defendant moved 19 for discovery sanctions, requesting that the Court award defendant attorney’s fees connected 20 with both the motion to compel and the motion for sanctions. Dkt. # 18. 21 On December 16, 2022, plaintiff filed a response to the motion for sanctions, citing 22 plaintiff’s serious health problems and plaintiff’s attorney’s severe personal challenges requiring 23 medical intervention as the reasons for plaintiff “falling out of compliance with [her] discovery 24 obligations.” Dkt. # 20. Plaintiff requested additional time to comply with discovery obligations 25 and provide briefing in response to the motion for sanctions. Id. On February 2, 2023, the Court 26 granted plaintiff an additional fourteen (14) days to respond to both the motion to compel and 27 the motion for sanctions. Dkt. # 30. Plaintiff failed to file additional briefing in response to 28 either motion. It appears that plaintiff continues to be out of compliance with her discovery 1 obligations. See, e.g., Dkt. # 23 (declaration of defendant’s counsel, stating that they have yet to 2 receive plaintiff’s initial disclosures or discovery responses). 3 II. Discussion 4 A. Attorney’s Fees for Motion to Compel 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 states that if a motion to compel is granted, “the court 6 must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct 7 necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's 8 reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 37(a)(5)(A). Here, the Court has granted defendant’s motion to compel and provided plaintiff 10 with an opportunity to be heard. See Dkt. # 17; Dkt. # 30. Accordingly, the Court “must” require 11 plaintiff to pay defendant’s “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 12 attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). 13 Defendant requests a total award of $6,694.00 in attorney’s fees in connection with its 14 motion to compel. Dkt. # 12 at 3. The total fee includes: (a) six (6) hours (billed at a rate of $220 15 per hour) for lead attorney John M. Silk equaling $1,320; (b) 19.7 hours for attorney Brian J. 16 Hansford (billed at $220 per hour) equaling $4,334; and (c) 10.4 paralegal hours (billed at a rate 17 of $100 per hour) equaling $1,040. Id. at 3-4. 18 B. Attorney’s Fees for Motion for Sanctions 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 also states that if a party fails to obey an order, 20 including an order granting a motion to compel, the court “may issue further just orders.” Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Rule further states that “[i]nstead of or in addition to the orders 22 [listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)], the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising 23 that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the 24 failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of 25 expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. 26 Demassa, No. C18-43MMC-TSH, 2019 WL 5395038, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (noting 27 that “while most [discovery sanctions] are discretionary . . . [o]]ne remedy [the award of fees 28 under 37(b)(2)(C)] is not”). Here, plaintiff has failed to obey the Court’s order compelling her to 1 provide defendant with her initial disclosures and respond to defendant’s discovery requests. 2 She has also failed to show that this failure was “substantially justified,” despite being given 3 several opportunities to do so. Accordingly, the Court “must order the disobedient party . . . to 4 pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 37(b)(2)(C). 6 With regard to the motion to compel, defendant requests an award of $1,155. Dkt. # 19 at 7 2. This fee request encompasses a total of four (4) attorney hours billed at a rate of $220 per 8 hour for the time attorney Brian J. Hansford, equaling $880, and 2.5 paralegal hours billed at 9 $110 an hour, equaling $275. Id. 10 C. Reasonableness of Fee Requests 11 The lodestar method is “the default principle for fee calculation in Washington.” Brand v. 12 Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wn. 2d 659, 676 (1999) (Talmadge, J. concurring). Under the 13 lodestar method, there are two primary steps to calculating a fee award. Bowers v. Transamerica 14 Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 597-600 (1983). First, a lodestar fee is determined by 15 multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. Id. at 597-98. 16 After the lodestar has been calculated, the court may consider the necessity of adjusting it to 17 reflect factors not considered up to this point, such as the contingent nature of success in the 18 lawsuit or the quality of legal representation. Id. at 598-99. The party requesting fees bears the 19 burden of documenting the hours expended and providing evidence in support of those hours 20 worked. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 21 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). Finally, “the complaining party . . . may recover ‘only the portion of 22 his fees that he would not have paid but for’ the misconduct.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 23 Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 109 (2017) (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836 (2011)); see also 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (limiting payment to “the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in 25 making the motion”). 26 Additionally, the Washington Court of Appeals has outlined six factors for determining 27 whether nonlawyer fees are compensable: 28 1 (1) the services performed by the non-lawyer personnel must be legal in nature; (2) the performance of these services must be supervised by an 2 attorney; (3) the qualifications of the person performing the services must 3 be specified in the request for fees in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the person is qualified by virtue of education, training, or work experience 4 to perform substantive legal work; (4) the nature of the services performed 5 must be specified in the request for fees in order to allow the reviewing court to determine that the services performed were legal rather than 6 clerical; (5) as with attorney time, the amount of time expended must be set 7 forth and must be reasonable; and (6) the amount charged must reflect reasonable community standards for charges by that category of personnel. 8
9 Absher Const. Co. v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn. App. 841, 845 (1995) (internal citations 10 omitted). 11 Here, the fees sought by defendant relate directly to the time spent preparing the motion 12 to compel and motion for sanctions, thus they meet the Goodyear standard in that but for 13 plaintiff’s noncompliance with her discovery obligations, defendant would not have incurred 14 these fees. Additionally, the Court finds that counsel’s rates and hours are reasonable under the 15 lodestar analysis. Thus, the Court GRANTS defendant’s attorney’s fees of $880.00 in relation to 16 the motion for sanctions and $5,654.00 in relation to the motion to compel, for a total award of 17 $6,534.00. 18 However, defendant has not put forth sufficient information to permit the Court to 19 analyze its request for paralegal fees under the Absher factors. Accordingly, defendant’s request 20 for $1,040.00 in paralegal fees relating to the motion to compel and $275.00 in paralegal fees 21 relating to the motion for sanctions is denied. 22 III. Conclusion 23 For all the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 18) is GRANTED. 24 The Court GRANTS defendant’s request for attorney’s fees of $880.00 in relation to the motion 25 for sanctions and $5,654.00 in relation to the motion to compel, for a total award of $6,534.00. 26 Plaintiff is directed to pay a total of $6,534.00 to defense counsel no later than fourteen (14) 27 days from the date of this Order. 28 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2
3 DATED this 28th day of February, 2023. 4
5 A 6
7 Robert S. Lasnik United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28