Jung v. Board of Trustees of New York City Fire Department

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Jung v. Board of Trustees of New York City Fire Department

228 A.D.2d 681, 645 N.Y.2d 823, 645 N.Y.S.2d 823, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7416

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided June 24, 1996·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

It is well settled that when the Board of Trustees of the New York City Fire Department, Article 1-B Pension Fund (hereinafter the Board), denies an application for accidental disability benefits in consequence of a tie vote, the Board’s determination can be set aside on judicial review only if it can be concluded as a matter of law that the petitioner’s disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident (see, Matter of Canfora v Board of Trustees, 60 NY2d 347; Matter of Coleman v Board of Trustees, 224 AD2d 522; Matter of Massari v Board of Trustees, 213 AD2d 648, 649; Matter of Causarano v Board of Trustees, 178 AD2d 474). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that, as a matter of law, a causal relationship exists between the service-related accident and the claimed disability (see, Matter of Nicolosi v Board of Trustees, 198 AD2d 282). It is only when the circumstances admit but one inference that the court may decide as a matter of law that that inference should be drawn (see, Matter of Radigan v O’Connell, 304 NY 396, 397; Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, 201 AD2d 730).

Applying these stringent principles to the facts of the case at bar (see, Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, supra), the petitioner has not established, as a matter of law, a causal connection between his line-of-duty accidents and his disability. In light of the conflicting medical evidence in the record, the cir[682] cumstances admit more than one inference as to the cause of the petitioner’s disabling condition, and thus the Supreme Court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, which inference should be drawn (see, Matter of Callahan v Board of Trustees, 226 AD2d 628; Matter of Regan v Board of Trustees, 226 AD2d 731; Matter of Romanelli v Board of Trustees, 210 AD2d 232, 233; Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, supra; Matter of Scotto v Board of Trustees, 76 AD2d 774, 776, affd 54 NY2d 918). Further, we are not persuaded that the determination under review was arbitrary or capricious (see, Matter of Petchonka v Board of Trustees, 204 AD2d 646, 647). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

It is well settled that when the Board of Trustees of the New York City Fire Department, Article 1-B Pension Fund (hereinafter the Board), denies an application for accidental disability benefits in consequence of a tie vote, the Board’s determination can be set aside on judicial review only if it can be concluded as a matter of law that the petitioner’s disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident (see, Matter of Canfora v Board of Trustees, 60 NY2d 347; Matter of Coleman v Board of Trustees, 224 AD2d 522; Matter of Massari v Board of Trustees, 213 AD2d 648, 649; Matter of Causarano v Board of Trustees, 178 AD2d 474). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that, as a matter of law, a causal relationship exists between the service-related accident and the claimed disability (see, Matter of Nicolosi v Board of Trustees, 198 AD2d 282). It is only when the circumstances admit but one inference that the court may decide as a matter of law that that inference should be drawn (see, Matter of Radigan v O’Connell, 304 NY 396, 397; Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, 201 AD2d 730).

Applying these stringent principles to the facts of the case at bar (see, Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, supra), the petitioner has not established, as a matter of law, a causal connection between his line-of-duty accidents and his disability. In light of the conflicting medical evidence in the record, the cir[682] cumstances admit more than one inference as to the cause of the petitioner’s disabling condition, and thus the Supreme Court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, which inference should be drawn (see, Matter of Callahan v Board of Trustees, 226 AD2d 628; Matter of Regan v Board of Trustees, 226 AD2d 731; Matter of Romanelli v Board of Trustees, 210 AD2d 232, 233; Matter of Flynn v Board of Trustees, supra; Matter of Scotto v Board of Trustees, 76 AD2d 774, 776, affd 54 NY2d 918). Further, we are not persuaded that the determination under review was arbitrary or capricious (see, Matter of Petchonka v Board of Trustees, 204 AD2d 646, 647). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

Jung v. Board of Trustees of New York City Fire Department, 228 A.D.2d 681, 645 N.Y.2d 823, 645 N.Y.S.2d 823, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7416 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

228 A.D.2d 681 (Jung v. Board of Trustees of New York City Fire Department) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related