Juneiver Gregorio Chacon-Cardenas v. Warden, Baker Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JUNEIVER GREGORIO CHACON-CARDENAS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-1514-WWB-SJH

WARDEN, BAKER DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Respondents. ________________________________

ORDER Petitioner is proceeding on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging, inter alia, that Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) mandatory detention of him without an individualized bond hearing is unlawful. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 3). Federal Respondents concede that based on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision, Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (See Doc. 4 at 1 (citing Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026))). In Hernandez Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he text of [8 U.S.C.] § 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that mandatory detention applies only to . . . arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” 175 F.4th at 1276. Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner falls into the latter category of aliens and is entitled to a bond hearing. (See Doc. 4 at 1–2). As such, considering the opinion in Hernandez Alvarez and Respondents’ concession that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, the Court grants Petitioner’s claim that his mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the INA.1 Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED to the extent that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge in accordance with 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a).2 Within seven days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall either afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release Petitioner,

1 The Court notes it has previously found that aliens, like Petitioner, who have resided in the United States without lawful admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Arellano v. Warden, Baker Corr. Inst., No. 3:25-cv-1333- WWB-PDB, 2026 WL 1090987, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2026) (adopting the plain meaning of the statutes as interpreted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (holding that “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1) and “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) are synonymous; thus an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted” “shall be detained”) and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) (finding “[p]resence without admission deems the petitioners to be applicants for admission” subject to § 1225’s mandatory detention)). While the Court disagrees with the majority’s opinion in Hernandez Alvarez, finding Judge Lagoa’s well-reasoned dissent to be an accurate interpretation of the law, it recognizes the precedential authority of Hernandez Alvarez and acknowledges that it is now the law of this circuit. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does not affect this result.”).

2 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, it need not address Petitioner’s other claims for relief. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be cumulative”); see, e.g., Pena-Gil v. Lyons, No. 25-CV-03268, 2025 WL 3268333, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 24, 2025). they shall provide Petitioner with access to a telephone to arrange transportation from the detention facility. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the Petition, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on July 2, 2026.

WENDY W.B UNITED STAVES T JUDG

Jax-7 Cc: Juneiver Gregorio Chacon-Cardenas, A243109092 Counsel of Record