Jump v. City Ice & Fuel Co.

110 N.E.2d 29, 92 Ohio App. 329, 49 Ohio Op. 381, 1952 Ohio App. LEXIS 717
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 23, 1952
Docket7579
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 110 N.E.2d 29 (Jump v. City Ice & Fuel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jump v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 110 N.E.2d 29, 92 Ohio App. 329, 49 Ohio Op. 381, 1952 Ohio App. LEXIS 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).

Opinion

Hildebrant, P. J.

A jury in the Court of Common Pleas found plaintiff entitled to participate in the workmen’s compensation fund for the death of her husband.

The principal contention on this appeal is failure to prove that the injury resulting in the death occurred *330 in the course of and arose out of the employment. The burden of so proving rests upon the plaintiff.

Stevens v. Industrial Commission, 145 Ohio St., 198, 61 N. E. (2d), 198, pertinent to the requirements of proof in such a case, states in the syllabus:

“1. Where an employee is killed during working hours at a place distant from the locus of his employment or the situs of his duties, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that his death did not occur in the course of and arise out of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

“2. In a proceeding to recover workmen’s compensation, the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that the injury to or death of the employee occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment.

“3. It is the duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.”

Plaintiff’s decedent was employed by the defendant as a night supervisor between the hours of six p. m. and six a. m. His regular employment required him to report for work at the head office and manufacturing plant of the company located on Livingston street, and known as station. No. 8, where he received instructions concerning the night duties either orally from the day superintendent, who was his immediate superior, or in writing, when, as frequently happened, the day man had left before decedent’s arrival at station 8. He supervised the supply and servicing of some seven substations located in the downtown area of the city, including the west end basin area, lying between the *331 Eighth street viaduct to Price Hill and John street on the east, and including substation No. 54, located in the Southern Railroad yards to the west of the Union Terminal, access to which was from Gfest street, causing the station to be referred to colloquially among defendant’s employees as “Gest street.”

In traveling from his house in Price Hill to report for work at station 8J he customarily boarded a streetcar at Eighth and Elberon, which would proceed eastwardly over the Eighth street viaduct, and on Eighth street to its junction with John street, where he would transfer and proceed northwardly on John street, a distance of some 16 blocks to Livingston street, within a half block of station 8 located thereon. About midway between Eighth street and Livingston street, John street crosses Lincoln Park driveway.

It is not disputed that plaintiff’s decedent was fatally injured at approximately 6:20 p. m., on the evening of December 28, 1948, as a pedestrian being run down by a motor vehicle on the westerly crossing of John street across Lincoln Park drive in the northwest quarter of the intersection.

He was last seen alive by his son to whom he called a personal word while running to catch his street ear at about 5:20 p. m., as claimed by plaintiff, or 5:40 p. m., as claimed by defendant; the dispute as to time not appearing vital to the court. Within the hour, he was found fatally injured at the John street, Lincoln Park drive intersection.

If he was killed while on the way to work, the claim is not compensable. If killed after having reported to work, either at station 8 or elsewhere at a substation, the claim is compensable.

While admittedly a variation from regular routine, plaintiff sought to show that decedent, with the employer’s acquiescence and knowledge, at times went *332 first to Gest street to cheek the needs of that station, and plaintiff’s theory is that decedent went first to “Gest street,” also known as station 54, in the Southern Railway yards, and then proceeded via a path through the yards to the Union Terminal, where he boarded a bus from which he alighted at the fatal intersection and thus was en route between the stations after having checked on “Gest street,” and thus was injured while in the course of his employment. Plaintiff contends this is the only theory consistent with decedent’s being at the fatal intersection at all.

To establish the irregular practice of reporting first at Gest street on occasion, one Harris, a discharged former employee under decedent at station 8, testified as follows,:

“Q. And where — what plant did you work at? A. Over on Livingston street.

“Q. And what were your hours? A. Prom three to eleven-thirty.

“Q. At night? A. Yes.

“Q. Were you acquainted with Heber L. Jump? A. Yes, sir. He was a night foreman.

“Q. Was he your immediate superior? A. Yes. He took care of everything while he was around there.

“Q. He was your boss? A. Yes, he was boss there when I was there.

“Q. And what were his duties as far as you could observe? A. Well, he would go out and check different places where they were supposed to take ice to keep them filled and check the railroad yards for cars to be iced and took care of things around like that, see that trucks got out for their routes.

“Q. How many places would he have to check? A. Well, there was station 54 and the passenger station, coach yards, and then he would have to go and check the Gest street cars, and out at Marshall avenue down in the bottoms.

*333 “Q. And how would he get around to those different stations? A. They had a pick-up truck down to the ice plant that he always used.

“Q. Now, did you ever have occasion to answer the phone when he called in from one of those stations? A. That’s right.

“Q. And what station would he have occasion to call in from? A. Well, he has called from station 54 down there.

“Q. Where is station 54? A. It’s at G-est street.

“Q. Behind the terminal? A. Yes. It’s back in there at the back of the terminal.

“Q. And is that the Southern Railroad yards? A. Yes.

“Q. And did you ever answer the telephone when he called in from down there before he came up to Livingston street? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And was there any particular time of night that he would call in from down there or was it early in the evening or during the night or when? A. He had no certain time to call. When he checked these ice stations and they needed ice, why, if he had to go somewhere else to make another check, why, if it was really necessary the ice was took there, why, he called in and left orders for somebody to take a load of ice to that particular place.

“Q. Well, did he call you on the 28th of December, 1948, before he came to work on that night? A. Well, that I don’t know whether he called or not. I wasn’t in the state at that time.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Robinson v. Board of Retirement
294 P.2d 724 (California Court of Appeal, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
110 N.E.2d 29, 92 Ohio App. 329, 49 Ohio Op. 381, 1952 Ohio App. LEXIS 717, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jump-v-city-ice-fuel-co-ohioctapp-1952.