1 2[,U F’ :
3 / IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4
5 DOMESTIC CASE NO.: DM0269-lO DAISY MARIE B. JUMAN Jka DAISY MARIE BENAVENTE 6 SALAS,
7 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt $ .
9 VINCENT J. QUIDACHAY SALAS,
10 Defendant.
12 INTRODUCTION
13 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on May 19, 2022, for a
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt. Present at the hearing 14 were: Plaintiff Daisy Juman (“Plaintiff’) with Counsel Catherine Camacho, and Defendant 15 Vincent Salas (“Defendant”) with Counsel Nicole Cruz. Having considered the arguments, 16 briefs, and the applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show
17 Cause Re: Contempt.
Page 1 of 9 1 BACKGROUND
The instant case arises from a Complaint for Divorce filed on April 22, 2010. The 2 parties entered into a Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce on September 29, 2011, 3 and the same was filed on October 25, 201 1, with a final Decree of Divorce that incorporated
the provisions of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgernent.
5 On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt
6 wherein she argued that: (I) Defendant failed to remit monthly payments to the Personal
Finance Center for the 200$ Dodge Nitro; (2) Defendant failed to make monthly payments on
the Small Business Administration Loan (“SBA Loan”), which encumbered the Agat Property; 8 and (3) Defendant failed to refinance the SBA Loan within five years of the final Decree. See 9 Pl.’s Mot. OSC (March 16, 2022). Defendant filed his Opposition on April 1$, 2022, wherein 10 he argues that the Chamorro Land Trust Lease is not assignable and is not transferable, and the
11 contemplated “transfer” of the Lease under the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment is void. See
12 Defs Opp’n (April 18, 2022). Then on May 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Reply.
A hearing on the instant motion was held on May 19, 2022. At the hearing, the parties 13 established that the payment of the 2008 Dodge Nitro was no longer at issue. See Mm. Entry 14 10:54:50AM (May 19, 2022). As such, the parties focused their arguments on the Agat 15 Property, and the Court took the matter under advisement. Having established that the 2008
16 Dodge Nitro is a non-issue, the Court’s Decision and Order only addresses (1) the SBA Loan
17 on the Agat Property; (2) refinancing the SBA Loan within five years of the final Decree; and
(3) the transfer of the Chamorro Land Trust Lease. 18
Page 2 of 9 1 DISCUSSION
I. CONTEMPT 2
Trial courts may use its contempt powers under title 7 GCA section 34101 to hold a
party in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s orders. See Patti’s Guam Inc. v.
Superior Court of Guam, 2020 Guam 30 ¶ 1$; see 7 GCA § 34101. Title 7 GCA section
5 34101(b) establishes the penalty that may be imposed on a person found guilty of indirect
6 contempt of court, and it states in relevant part:
Any person found guilty of contempt of court pursuant to § 34102(b) [regarding indirect contempt of court] is subject to the same penalties as a person found guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 2 7 GCA § 34101(b). The elements of contempt are generally: “(1) a valid order, (2) knowledge 9 of the order, (3) ability to comply with the order, and (4) willful failure to comply with the 10 order.” Lamb v. Hoffman, 200$ Guam 2 ¶ 44; quoting Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 2003 Guam $ ¶
11 15.
12 a. Valid Order and Knowledge of the Order
The first issue is whether there is a valid order, and whether the parties had knowledge 13 of that order. “A divorce decree incorporating a settlement agreement is simply a consent 14 decree.” Bias v. Crtcz, 2009 Guam 12 ¶ 1$; citing Leon Guterrero v. Movian, 2000 Guam 2$ ¶ 15 8. “A consent decree is a font of a contract.” Leon Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8. “It is
16 approved on its face by a court presumably not privy to the details of the negotiation, or the
17 parties’ subjective intentions; it is then incorporated in a judicial order; and it is ultimately
backed up by the court’s power of contempt.” Id. 1$ Here, the Court approved the final Decree of Divorce, which incorporated the 19 provisions of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce, on its face and without being 20 privy to the details of negotiations or the subjective intentions of the parties. See Leon
Page 3 of9 Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8. As such, the valid ordei here is the Final Decree of Divorce, and
the parties’ knowledge of the same is not disputed. Therefore, a finding of contempt turns on 2 the third and fourth elements. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 3 b. Ability to Comply with the Order 4 1. SBA Loan
5 The first issue is whether Defendant had the ability to pay the SBA Loan as required by
6 the Final Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant failed to make monthly payments
on the [SBA Loan], on a consistent basis,” and directs the Court’s attention to Exhibit 4. P1’s
Decl. pp. 3 - 4 and Ex. 4 (March 16, 2022). Defendant argues that there is no notice of default 8 on the SBA loan, and asserts that “[he] is current on the SBA mortgage and never defaulted.” 9 See Mm. Entry 10:58:00AM (May 19, 2022); see also Defs Dccl. p. 2(April 18, 2022). 10 Here, Plaintiff misrepresents the language of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment.
11 Plaintiff asserts that “in violation of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment, Defendant failed to
12 make monthly payments on the [SBA Loan]....” However, the Stipulated Interlocutory
Judgment specifically states, “[Defendant] further agrees that should he get two or more 13 months behind in ... the SBA ... loan j, or otherwise default.. .on ... [the SBA Loan].. ..“ See 14 Stip. Interloc. J. pp. 3 - 4 (Oct. 25, 2021). This language reflects that Defendant could have 1) paid the SBA Loan one month late without being in violation of the provision. Further,
16 Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 reflects that Defendant never went beyond one month without making a
17 payment. As such, Defendant was still within that limits set forth in the Stipulated
Interlocutory Judgment provision that is “two or more months” late. finally, Defendant asserts 18 that he never defaulted on the SBA loan and is current on payments. Court observes no 19 evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the 20
Page4of9 SBA Loan, and has been doing so. The Court finds that there is no violation of the Stipulated
Interlocutory Judgment as it relates to the SBA Loan, and Defendant is not in contempt. 2 ii. Refinancing the SBA Loan 3 The next issue is whether Defendant had the ability to refinance the SBA Loan within
five years of the final Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant failed to refinance
5 the [SBA Loan] within five years from the divorce.” P1’s Decl. p. 4 (March 16, 2022).
6 Defendant argues that “shortly after divorce, [he] attempted to refinance the SBA loan. [He]
applied at Bank Pacific and Bank of Hawaii. [He] was denied [his] applications because [his]
income was too low, around $11/hr. Also, the banks said that because the house was built on 8 Chamorro Land Trust land, the banks could not mortgage the leased land.” Defs Deci. p. 2 9 (April 18, 2022). 10 The Court’s finds that Defendant’s inability to refinance the SBA Loan in accordance
11 with the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment is not due to Defendant’s lack of effort or neglect.
12 The Court acknowledges Defendant’s effort to refinance the SBA Loan through his application
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1 2[,U F’ :
3 / IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4
5 DOMESTIC CASE NO.: DM0269-lO DAISY MARIE B. JUMAN Jka DAISY MARIE BENAVENTE 6 SALAS,
7 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt $ .
9 VINCENT J. QUIDACHAY SALAS,
10 Defendant.
12 INTRODUCTION
13 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on May 19, 2022, for a
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt. Present at the hearing 14 were: Plaintiff Daisy Juman (“Plaintiff’) with Counsel Catherine Camacho, and Defendant 15 Vincent Salas (“Defendant”) with Counsel Nicole Cruz. Having considered the arguments, 16 briefs, and the applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show
17 Cause Re: Contempt.
Page 1 of 9 1 BACKGROUND
The instant case arises from a Complaint for Divorce filed on April 22, 2010. The 2 parties entered into a Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce on September 29, 2011, 3 and the same was filed on October 25, 201 1, with a final Decree of Divorce that incorporated
the provisions of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgernent.
5 On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt
6 wherein she argued that: (I) Defendant failed to remit monthly payments to the Personal
Finance Center for the 200$ Dodge Nitro; (2) Defendant failed to make monthly payments on
the Small Business Administration Loan (“SBA Loan”), which encumbered the Agat Property; 8 and (3) Defendant failed to refinance the SBA Loan within five years of the final Decree. See 9 Pl.’s Mot. OSC (March 16, 2022). Defendant filed his Opposition on April 1$, 2022, wherein 10 he argues that the Chamorro Land Trust Lease is not assignable and is not transferable, and the
11 contemplated “transfer” of the Lease under the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment is void. See
12 Defs Opp’n (April 18, 2022). Then on May 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Reply.
A hearing on the instant motion was held on May 19, 2022. At the hearing, the parties 13 established that the payment of the 2008 Dodge Nitro was no longer at issue. See Mm. Entry 14 10:54:50AM (May 19, 2022). As such, the parties focused their arguments on the Agat 15 Property, and the Court took the matter under advisement. Having established that the 2008
16 Dodge Nitro is a non-issue, the Court’s Decision and Order only addresses (1) the SBA Loan
17 on the Agat Property; (2) refinancing the SBA Loan within five years of the final Decree; and
(3) the transfer of the Chamorro Land Trust Lease. 18
Page 2 of 9 1 DISCUSSION
I. CONTEMPT 2
Trial courts may use its contempt powers under title 7 GCA section 34101 to hold a
party in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s orders. See Patti’s Guam Inc. v.
Superior Court of Guam, 2020 Guam 30 ¶ 1$; see 7 GCA § 34101. Title 7 GCA section
5 34101(b) establishes the penalty that may be imposed on a person found guilty of indirect
6 contempt of court, and it states in relevant part:
Any person found guilty of contempt of court pursuant to § 34102(b) [regarding indirect contempt of court] is subject to the same penalties as a person found guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 2 7 GCA § 34101(b). The elements of contempt are generally: “(1) a valid order, (2) knowledge 9 of the order, (3) ability to comply with the order, and (4) willful failure to comply with the 10 order.” Lamb v. Hoffman, 200$ Guam 2 ¶ 44; quoting Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 2003 Guam $ ¶
11 15.
12 a. Valid Order and Knowledge of the Order
The first issue is whether there is a valid order, and whether the parties had knowledge 13 of that order. “A divorce decree incorporating a settlement agreement is simply a consent 14 decree.” Bias v. Crtcz, 2009 Guam 12 ¶ 1$; citing Leon Guterrero v. Movian, 2000 Guam 2$ ¶ 15 8. “A consent decree is a font of a contract.” Leon Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8. “It is
16 approved on its face by a court presumably not privy to the details of the negotiation, or the
17 parties’ subjective intentions; it is then incorporated in a judicial order; and it is ultimately
backed up by the court’s power of contempt.” Id. 1$ Here, the Court approved the final Decree of Divorce, which incorporated the 19 provisions of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce, on its face and without being 20 privy to the details of negotiations or the subjective intentions of the parties. See Leon
Page 3 of9 Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8. As such, the valid ordei here is the Final Decree of Divorce, and
the parties’ knowledge of the same is not disputed. Therefore, a finding of contempt turns on 2 the third and fourth elements. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 3 b. Ability to Comply with the Order 4 1. SBA Loan
5 The first issue is whether Defendant had the ability to pay the SBA Loan as required by
6 the Final Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant failed to make monthly payments
on the [SBA Loan], on a consistent basis,” and directs the Court’s attention to Exhibit 4. P1’s
Decl. pp. 3 - 4 and Ex. 4 (March 16, 2022). Defendant argues that there is no notice of default 8 on the SBA loan, and asserts that “[he] is current on the SBA mortgage and never defaulted.” 9 See Mm. Entry 10:58:00AM (May 19, 2022); see also Defs Dccl. p. 2(April 18, 2022). 10 Here, Plaintiff misrepresents the language of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment.
11 Plaintiff asserts that “in violation of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment, Defendant failed to
12 make monthly payments on the [SBA Loan]....” However, the Stipulated Interlocutory
Judgment specifically states, “[Defendant] further agrees that should he get two or more 13 months behind in ... the SBA ... loan j, or otherwise default.. .on ... [the SBA Loan].. ..“ See 14 Stip. Interloc. J. pp. 3 - 4 (Oct. 25, 2021). This language reflects that Defendant could have 1) paid the SBA Loan one month late without being in violation of the provision. Further,
16 Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 reflects that Defendant never went beyond one month without making a
17 payment. As such, Defendant was still within that limits set forth in the Stipulated
Interlocutory Judgment provision that is “two or more months” late. finally, Defendant asserts 18 that he never defaulted on the SBA loan and is current on payments. Court observes no 19 evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the 20
Page4of9 SBA Loan, and has been doing so. The Court finds that there is no violation of the Stipulated
Interlocutory Judgment as it relates to the SBA Loan, and Defendant is not in contempt. 2 ii. Refinancing the SBA Loan 3 The next issue is whether Defendant had the ability to refinance the SBA Loan within
five years of the final Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant failed to refinance
5 the [SBA Loan] within five years from the divorce.” P1’s Decl. p. 4 (March 16, 2022).
6 Defendant argues that “shortly after divorce, [he] attempted to refinance the SBA loan. [He]
applied at Bank Pacific and Bank of Hawaii. [He] was denied [his] applications because [his]
income was too low, around $11/hr. Also, the banks said that because the house was built on 8 Chamorro Land Trust land, the banks could not mortgage the leased land.” Defs Deci. p. 2 9 (April 18, 2022). 10 The Court’s finds that Defendant’s inability to refinance the SBA Loan in accordance
11 with the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment is not due to Defendant’s lack of effort or neglect.
12 The Court acknowledges Defendant’s effort to refinance the SBA Loan through his application
at two different banks: Bank Pacific and Bank of Hawaii. See DePs Dccl. p. 2 (April 8, 2022). 13 Instead, Defendant’s inability to refinance the SBA Loan was caused by two things: (1) the 14 inability of the banks to mortgage or lease the Agat home that is built on Chamorro Land Trust 15 Land and encumbered by the SBA Loan; and (2) the denial of Defendant’s application due to
16 his low income. See Defs Decl. p. 2 (April 8, 2022). As such, Defendant’s inability to
17 refinance the SBA Loan in accordance with the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment does not
warrant a finding of contempt.
iii. (‘han, orro Land Trust Lease 19 Finally, the Court turns to whether Defendant had the ability to “immediately transfer” 20 the Chamorro Land Trust lease in which the residential home is situated, as required by the
Page 5 of 9 1 final Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff argues that “Defendant has failed to vacate the premises and
or transfer the Chamono Land Trust Lease to [her] name [; and that] not withstanding
Defendant’s violation of the terms and conditions of the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment, 3 Defendant has been enjoying exclusive control and use of the Agat property.” See P1’s Decl. p.
5 (March 16, 2022). Defendant argues that the Chamono Land Trust Lease is not assignable
5 and is not transferable. Defendant further argues that the contemplated “transfer” of such lease
6 in the Stipulated Interlocutory Judgment, is void. See Defs Deci. p. 3 (April 18, 2022).
The Guam Supreme Court has ruled that contract principles apply to the interpretation
of settlement agreements. Leon Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8; citing C’amacho v. Camacho, 8 1997 Guam 5 ¶ 32. In the interpretation of contracts, effect must be given to the mutual 9 intention of contracts; effect must be given to the mutual intention of the parties as it exists at 10 the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. Id; citing 18 GCA §
11 87102. When a contract is reduced in writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the writing alone, if possible. Id.; citing Camacho, 1997 Guam 5 ¶ 32; see 18 GCA §
87105; see also Boyett v. Boyett, 799 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.Ct.App. 1992) (ruling that marital 13 property agreements, even if incorporated into a final divorce decree, are treated as contracts 14 and the law of contracts then governs interpretation of the decree’s legal force and meaning). 15 However, it is within the inherent power of the court to set aside consent decrees for
16 fraud, mistake, or absence of real consent. Leon Guerrero, 2000 Guam 28 ¶ 8; citing Hafner v.
17 HaJher, 54 N.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Minn. 1952). On the other hand, “where a party to a divorce
action, represented by counsel, voluntarily executes a property settlement agreement which is 18 approved by the court and incorporated into a divorce decree, such decree may not be vacated 19 or modified as to such property provisions in the absence of fraud or gross inequity. Id.; citing 20 Hoshor v. Hoshor, 580 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Neb. 1998).
Page 6 of 9 1 Here, the Court interprets the relevant provision of the Stipulated Interlocutory
Judgment, which is: 2 [Defendant] further agrees that shotttd he get two or more months behind in either the 3 SBA or Personal finance Center loans, or otherwise default on either loan as defined in the loan documents, he will, upon written demand from Plaintiff immediately transfer the Chamorro Land Trust lease on which the residential home is sitttated to Plaintiff (subject to approval by the Chamorro Land Trust Commission,) and quitclaim all his interest in the residential home to Plaintiff at no cost to Plaintiff He further agrees to 5 immediately vacate the home and Plaintiff will then assume exclusive ownership and possession of the home. At such an occurrence, Plaintiff will then become solely liable 6 for the SBA loan and hold Defendant harmless on all future loan payments. However, Defendant shall remain solely liable for any deficiencies on the SBA loan incurred prior to Plaintiffs possession.
If Defendant remains in possession of the residential home, he agrees to refinance the $ home by the end of the five-year period, removing Plaintiffs name from the mortgage. Should he fail to do so, the home will immediately be marketed for sale by a real estate 9 broker chosen exclusively by Plaintiff.
Stip. Interloc. J. pp. 3 4 (Oct. 25, 2021) (emphasis added). -
10 First, the Court notes the conditional language used in the provision: 11 [S]hould [Defendant] get two or more months behind in either the SBA or Personal 12 finance Center loans or otherwise default on either loan, he will upon written ...
demand from Plaintiff, immediately transfer the Chamorro Land Trust lease on which the residential home is situated to Plaintiff 13 See Stip. Interloc. J. pp. 3 - 4 (Oct. 25, 2021) (emphasis added). Based on the parties’ 14 ascertainable intentions reflected in the written provision above, the triggering events for the 15 transfer of the Chamorro Land Trust lease are twofold. first, Defendant must have been two or
16 more months behind on either the SBA Loan or the Personal finance Loan, or have defaulted
17 in either of those loans. Second, Plaintiff must have made a written demand for Defendant to
transfer the Chamorro Land Trust Lease to her. 18 Here, the first prong of the triggering event—Defendant’s payment that is two or 19 months behind, or a default on the loan—has not occurred. Defendant was never more than one 20 month behind on the SBA Loan. See P1’s Decl. Ex. 4 (March 16, 2022). further, Defendant
Page 7 of 9 1 was never in default of that loan. See Defs DecI. p. 2 (April 18, 2022). It has also been
established that the Personal Finance Loan and its correlation to the 2008 Didge Nitro is a non- 2 issue in the instant matter. Notwithstanding the nonoccurrence of the first triggering event, 3 Plaintiff executed a written demand for the transfer of the Charnorro Land Trust lease. See P1’s
Deci. Ex. 5 (March 16, 2022). Without the initial triggering event—Defendant’s payment that
5 is two or more months behind, or default on the loan—Plaintiffs written demand is premature
6 and ineffective. As such, the transfer of the Charnorro Land Trust lease was never effectively
triggered, and a finding of Defendant in contempt therein is not warranted. The Court also
notes that there is no motion before the Court to detennine the validity of such provision or to 8 set the same aside. Therefore, the Court will not delve into such analysis here. finally, in the 9 interest if a complete analysis, the Court turns to the last element of contempt. 10 c. Willful failure to Comply with the Order
11 i. SBA Loan
12 The issue is whether Defendant willfully failed to pay the SBA Loan as required by the
Final Decree of Divorce. Here, Plaintiff uses the term “failure” throughout her moving papers 13 and in her Declaration. However, what is noticeably absent from Plaintiffs assertions is an 14 argument or explanation to Defendant’s “willful failure” to comply, which is the legal standard 15 for contempt. Instead, the record reflects Defendant’s compliance. As established above,
16 Defendant was never more than one month behind on the SBA loan payment, and he was never
17 in default thereof. Therefore, nothing in the record reflects Defendant’s willful failure to
comply with his obligation to pay the SBA Loan as required by the Final Decree of Divorce.
As such, the Court does not find Defendant in contempt. 19
Page $ of 9 1 II. Refinancing the SBA Loan
The next issue is whether Defendant willfully failed to refinance the $BA Loan within 2 five years of the final Decree of Divorce. Again, Plaintiff fails to advance an argument or
proof of Defendant’s willful failure to refinance the SBA Loan. Instead, the record reflects
Defendant’s efforts to refinance the SBA Loan at two different Banks: first Hawaiian Bank
5 and Bank Pacific. See Defs Deci. p. 2 (April 18, 2022). While Defendant’s applications were
6 denied, the Court does not find that Defendant’s failure to refinance the SBA Loan was willful.
As such, the Court does not find Defendant in contempt.
iii. (‘ham orro Land Trust Lease $ Finally, the Court turns to whether Defendant willfully failed to “immediately transfer” 9 the Chamorro Land Trust lease in which the residential home is situated, as required by the 10 Final Decree of Divorce. As established above, the trigger for Defendant’s transfer of the
11 Chamorro Land Trust lease did not occur. In other words, it cannot be said that Defendant
12 “willfully failed” to execute the transfer the lease to Plaintiff, because such transfer was never
triggered. Therefore, the Court does not find Defendant in contempt.
CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Order 15 to Show Cause Re: Contempt.
17 IT IS SO ORDERED AUB 2% 202L
18 SERVCE VA E.MAL acknowledge C et an electronr 19 copy of the ongna was emaded to -
20 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS DateTne Judge, Superior Court of Guam Joseph Samba Depety Clerk, Sce or to t c Jr Page 9 of 9