Julius A. Bland a/k/a Julius Arlando Bland v. State of Mississippi
This text of Julius A. Bland a/k/a Julius Arlando Bland v. State of Mississippi (Julius A. Bland a/k/a Julius Arlando Bland v. State of Mississippi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2020-CP-00057-COA
JULIUS A. BLAND A/K/A JULIUS ARLANDO APPELLANT BLAND
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/22/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES McCLURE III COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JULIUS A. BLAND (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ZAKIA HELEN ANNYCE BUTLER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/02/2021 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A defendant was arrested after he kidnapped and sexually assaulted a woman. He was
indicted for kidnapping and plead guilty as a habitual offender. The rape charge was dropped
prior to his sentencing hearing.
¶2. After a trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in prison with five years
of non-reporting post-release supervision to follow, the man petitioned for post-conviction
relief (PCR). The court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner addresses several
issues not mentioned in his PCR petition. Because he is procedurally barred from presenting
his new arguments, we affirm. FACTS
¶3. Marquitta Henderson was traveling on a road in Panola County when a stranger, later
identified as Julius Bland, flagged her down on the side of the street. When Henderson
pulled over, Bland dragged her out of her seat, stuffed her in the trunk of a car he was
driving, drove about sixty miles to a neighboring county, and sexually assaulted her in the
woods. He later drove to an abandoned house and repeated the assault. Some time after
Henderson escaped, Bland was apprehended by police and indicted on a kidnapping charge
as a non-violent habitual offender because he had previously been convicted of two
burglaries in separate counties.1
¶4. Bland decided to plead guilty to the kidnapping charge and signed a detailed petition
to that effect. During his sentencing hearing, the trial court asked him a set of standard
questions to ensure Bland was fully informed as to the basis of his guilty plea. For example,
the court asked him whether his attorney “read everything” to him pertaining to his plea and
whether his counsel answered any questions he may have had. The court further asked Bland
to confirm whether his attorney went over the facts of the case, elements of the charges, and
possible defenses with him. Bland answered each of these questions affirmatively. His
attorney also confirmed that he explained Bland’s status as a habitual offender to him.
¶5. When the State offered certified copies of his previous burglary convictions, Bland
expressed his approval of the documents’ introductions, admitting that “certified copies were
provided to [me] in discovery, no surprise, no prejudice.”
1 As previously mentioned, Bland’s rape charge was dropped.
2 ¶6. After the State recited the facts surrounding the kidnapping charge, the trial court
asked Bland whether he agreed with the State’s allegations and version of the facts. Bland
replied that “[t]he only thing I did, I offered her money to have sex with me.” When the
court asked if “everything else is true and accurate as to what he said?” Bland replied,
“[Y]es, sir.” Bland ultimately admitted to kidnapping his victim and reaffirmed that he was
pleading guilty to the charge for that reason. Finally, he confirmed that he was previously
convicted of two burglary charges.
¶7. The trial court sentenced Bland to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections with five years of non-reporting post-release supervision to
follow. In response, Bland petitioned for PCR. Bland prefaced the arguments in his petition
by stating that he was not challenging his sentence or conviction. Instead, he took issue with
the fact that his indictment was amended to charge him as a habitual offender under section
99-19-83 (Rev. 2015) instead of section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015), because the change was
allegedly “substantive” and furthermore an illegal enhancement of his prison sentence.2
¶8. Bland also argued in his PCR petition that the amendment was illegal because it was
not changed by the grand jury. Finally, he claimed his status as a habitual offender was
illegal because he served one concurrent prison sentence for the two separate burglary
convictions. He later amended his petition to add that he believed the State breached its plea
2 According to the order denying Bland’s PCR petition, the reduction in his sentence from section 99-19-83 (which sentences a violent habitual offender to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment) to section 99-19-81 (which sentences him to the maximum term of imprisonment for the “prescribed felony”) was based on an agreement between Bland and the State. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-19-81 & 83. Contrary to his argument, his sentence was actually reduced, not enhanced, by the change in statute.
3 agreement with him.
¶9. The trial court denied his petition. After refuting his arguments with applicable
authority, the court ultimately dismissed Bland’s claims as unmerited and found that “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that [he] [could] prove no set of facts in support of his claims which
would entitle him to relief.”
¶10. Aggrieved, Bland appeals. However, he now abandons the claims he asserted in his
PCR petition. Instead, he presents several new issues for the first time on appeal, which can
be summarized into the following: (1) his conviction is illegal because he did not verbally
plead guilty; (2) his conviction as a habitual offender was not established for the record; and
(3) his counsel was ineffective because he allegedly failed to object to “non-authenticated
documents that were used to prove his habitual status,” failed to protect his right to confront
witnesses, and failed to object to inadmissible hearsay during his sentencing hearing.
ANALYSIS
¶11. Bland ignores the issues originally raised in the trial court and replaces them with new
arguments he failed to bring before that court. “Issues not raised in [a] motion for
post-conviction relief are procedurally barred on appeal.” Smith v. State, 973 So. 2d 1003,
1006 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, “[i]ssues raised for the first time on appeal
are procedurally barred from review as they have not first been addressed by the trial court.”
Griffin v. State, 824 So. 2d 632, 635 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). “A trial judge will not be
found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision.” Hampton v. State, 148 So. 3d
1038, 1041 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
4 ¶12. As a result, our review is strictly limited to those arguments contained in the
appellant’s petition unless the argument affects his fundamental rights. Evans v. State, 115
So. 3d 879, 881 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). However, even if an appellant does claim his
fundamental rights were affected, this Court must still assess whether his claim is worthy of
examination. “[T]he mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the
exception.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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