Julio E. Gil De Lamadrid v. Popular Auto and Veronica Duran Castillo

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 3 IN RE: : : CASE NO. 12-02042 (MCF) 4 JULIO E. GIL DE LAMADRID : : CHAPTER 13 5 : Debtor : 6 _ ____________________________: : 7 JULIO E. GIL DE LAMADRID : ADVERSARY NO. 13-199 (MCF) : 8 Plaintiff : : 9 vs. : : 10 POPULAR AUTO AND VERONICA DURAN : CASTILLO : 11 : Defendants : 12 __ ___________________________:

13 OPINION AND ORDER 14 The Plaintiff Julio E. Gil de la Madrid (“Debtor”) filed an 15 action against the Defendants Popular Auto, Inc. (“Popular 16 Auto”) and Veronica Durán Castillo (hereinafter collectively, 17 “the Defendants”), for unlawfully repossessing a vehicle in 18 willful violation of the automatic stay provision, pursuant to 19 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).1 Pending before the Court is the Debtor’s 20 motion for summary judgment and the Defendants’ opposition and 21 cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, 22 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “Bankruptcy Code,” “section” and 23 “§” refer to Title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq., as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 37 (“BAPCPA”). 24 - 1 - 1 the Debtor’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the 2 Defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment is granted. 3 I. UNCONTESTED FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 The Debtors, Julio E. Gil de la Madrid and Matilde de Jesus 5 Rivera, filed a joint bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13 of

6 the Bankruptcy Code on March 20, 2012.2 The Debtors listed their 7 interest as lessees on a motor vehicle in schedule G.3 On April 8 11, 2010, Popular Auto filed a secured proof of claim for 9 $35,358.56.4 The claim described the make, model, year and 10 vehicle identification number (“VIN”) of the motor vehicle that 11 served as collateral for Popular Auto’s secured claim. The claim 12 contained: (1) a lease contract for the purchase of the vehicle 13 and (2) a copy of the certificate of title for the vehicle 14 issued by the Puerto Rico Department of Motor Vehicles 15 (“PRDMV”). 16 On July 5, 2013, Popular Auto, the lessor, filed a motion 17 for relief from the automatic stay, pursuant to § 362(d)(1)- 18 (2)(the “362 Motion”).5 Popular Auto used a Form 16D caption for 19 adversary proceedings (hereafter, “double caption”) in its 362 20 2 Docket No. 1, Lead Case No. 12-02042. Subsequently, on June 13, 2012, the Chapter 13 Trustee's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 9) was granted and the 21 case was dismissed (Docket No. 26). The Debtors filed a reconsideration of dismissal (Docket No. 28) on June 28, 2012, which was granted by the Court 22 and the case was re-opened on August 1, 2012 (Docket No. 33). 3 Docket No. 32, Lead Case No. 12-02042. 23 4 Claim No. 4, Lead Case No. 12-02042. 5 Docket No. 126, “MOTION REQUESTING RELIEF FROM STAY,” Lead Case No. 12-02042. 24 - 2 - 1 Motion. The top portion of the caption contained the names of 2 the Debtors. The bottom caption contained the name of Matilde de 3 Jesus Rivera, the titleholder of the vehicle, as respondent in 4 the motion for relief.6 However, the bottom caption did not have 5 the name of Debtor Julio E. Gil de la Madrid. Nevertheless, the

6 Notice of the 362 Motion contained the names of joint Debtors in 7 the top and bottom portions of the caption. In addition, the 8 contents of the Notice named the joint Debtors and the Chapter 9 13 Trustee.7 According to the Certificate of Service, Popular 10 Auto notified each joint Debtor by certified mail with return 11 receipts requested, as evinced with the green and white return 12 receipts.8 Popular Auto also notified joint Debtors’ counsel of 13 record.9 14 The 362 Motion contained as exhibits (1) the contract for 15 the lease of the vehicle and (2) a copy of the certificate of 16 title for the vehicle issued by the PRDMV. Both documents 17 describe the make of the vehicle as a Mercedes Benz, 2010 year,

18 and VIN #4JGBF2FE1AA563295. However, the vehicle’s description 19 as to model did not match in both documents. The copy of the 20 certificate of title of the vehicle identified the Mercedes Benz

21 6 Id. 7 Docket No. 126, “NOTICE OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY UNDER 11 U.S.C. 22 §362,” Lead Case No. 12-02042. 8 Docket No. 33, “AMENDED STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS AND MEMORANDUM 23 OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” at Exhibits H & I, Adversary Case No. 13-00199. 9 Id. at Exhibit G. 24 - 3 - 1 as a Q3 model while the lease contract identified it as a 2 GL350BTC model. Furthermore, the 362 Motion pleadings described 3 the Mercedes Benz as a GL320 model and 2009 year. All the 4 documents in the 362 Motion reported the same VIN 5 #4JGBF2FE1AA563295.

6 The 362 Motion stood unopposed by the Debtors. On July 26, 7 2013, this Court granted Popular Auto’s 362 Motion by default 8 and issued the order to lift the automatic stay.10 On August 15, 9 2013, Popular Auto repossessed a Mercedes Benz make, GL350 BTC 10 model, and year 2010 vehicle. 11 The VIN #4JGBF2FE1AA563295 of 11 the repossessed vehicle corresponded with the VIN in the 362 12 Motion.12 On August 30, 2013, this Court granted Matilde de 13 Jesus Rivera’s request for voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy 14 case but the bankruptcy case continued as to the Debtor, Julio 15 E. Gil de la Madrid.13 16 On September 24, 2013, the Debtor filed an adversary 17 complaint against Popular Auto and Veronica Durán Castillo, the 18 attorney representing Popular Auto in the bankruptcy case. The 19 Debtor alleged in his complaint that Defendants violated the 20

10 Docket No. 134 “ORDER LIFTING THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN FAVOR OF MOVANT,” 21 Lead Case No. 12-02042. 11 Docket No. 28, Adversary Case No. 13-00199, “MOTION FOR SUMMARY 22 JUDGMENT” at 3, ¶ 13; Docket No. 33, “AMENDED STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 23 COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT” at 4, ¶ 13. 12 Id. 13 Docket No. 157, Lead Case No. 12-02042. 24 - 4 - 1 automatic stay when Popular Auto repossessed a vehicle not 2 described accurately as the collateral subject to the order for 3 relief of the automatic stay issued by this Court.14 On July 1, 4 2013, the Debtor filed a motion for summary judgment for 5 Defendants’ alleged violation of the automatic stay.15 An

6 opposition brief ensued, along with Defendants’ cross-motion for 7 summary judgment on July 7, 2014.16 After parties presented 8 their oral arguments before the Court on December 3, 2014, the 9 Court took the matter under advisement. 10 II. JURISDICTION 11 This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the 12 parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 157(a) and the "Standing 13 Order of Resolution for Bankruptcy Cases" dated July 19, 1984 14 (Torruella, C.J.), which refers title 11 proceedings to the 15 Bankruptcy Court. This is a core proceeding in accordance with 16 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 17 III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

18 This case presents two issues. Issue number one is whether 19 Popular Auto willfully violated the stay when it failed to 20 provide notice to the Debtor of its motion relief of stay by

21 14 Docket No. 1, Adversary Case No. 13-00199, “COMPLAINT” at 2 ¶ 2; Id. at 4 ¶¶ 12, 13. 22 15 Docket No. 28, Adversary Case No. 13-00199, “MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” 23 16 Docket No. 33, Adversary Case No. 13-00199, “AMENDED STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” 24 - 5 - 1 omitting the Debtor’s name in the caption of the motion. Issue 2 number two is whether Popular Auto willfully violated the 3 automatic stay when it repossessed a vehicle described 4 imprecisely in the pleadings of the 362 Motion granted by this 5 Court.

6 A. DEBTOR’S POSITION 7 First, the Debtor alleges that the repossessed collateral 8 was not the vehicle described as the collateral in the 362 9 Motion this Court granted. Second, the Debtor alleges that the 10 omission of his name in the heading in the 362 Motion 11 constitutes a lack of adequate notice. The Debtor submits in the 12 alternative, outside the willful violation arguments, that 13 Popular Auto was not entitled to the stay relief granted on the 14 vehicle. 15 B. POPULAR AUTO’s POSITION 16 Popular Auto alleges that the joint Debtors and their 17 attorneys of record received adequate notice of the 362 Motion. 18 Popular Auto purports that the documentary evidence accompanying 19 the 362 Motion properly described and identified the motor 20 vehicle later repossessed. Finally, Popular Auto contends that 21 the Debtor is precluded from re-litigating the issue of Popular 22 Auto’s entitlement to relief from the automatic stay. 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 - 6 - 1 A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2 Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made 3 applicable in adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4 7056. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 5 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

6 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 56(a). The proponent of a motion for summary judgment 8 may effectively end the case without going to trial unless the 9 party that opposes it can identify a genuine issue as to a 10 material fact. A genuine issue is one where “the evidence on 11 the point is such that a reasonable jury, drawing favorable 12 inferences, could resolve the fact in the manner urged by the 13 nonmoving party.” Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 14 428 (1st Cir. 1996). “Material” means that a contested fact has 15 the potential to alter the outcome of the suit under the 16 governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to 17 the nonmovant.” Id. (Quotations omitted). A genuine issue cannot

18 be established by the nonmoving party through “conclusory 19 allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 20 speculation.” Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 21 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Altogether, summary judgment is 22 proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 23 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 24 - 7 - 1 affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 2 any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 3 judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 4 317, 322 (1986). The record must be viewed in the light most 5 favorable to the nonmoving party. Nicolo v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

6 201 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2000). All reasonable inferences to be 7 drawn from the facts must be held in the manner most favorable 8 to the nonmovant. In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 9 1994). Summary judgment is precluded if a reasonable trier of 10 fact can draw other inferences from the totality of the 11 circumstances, as revealed by undisputed evidence. Id. (citing 12 Blanchard v. Peerless Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 13 1992)). 14 B. WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 15 Section 362(k) provides that “an individual injured by any 16 willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall 17 recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, 18 and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive 19 damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). “A debtor seeking damages under 20 this section bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 21 the evidence these three elements: (1) that a violation of the 22 automatic stay occurred; (2) that the violation was willfully 23 committed; and (3) that the debtor suffered damages as a result 24 - 8 - 1 of the violation.” Slabicki v. Gleason (In re Slabicki), 466 2 B.R. 572, 577–578 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012). 3 “A violation is ‘willful’ if a ‘creditor's conduct was 4 intentional (as distinguished from inadvertent), and committed 5 with knowledge of the pendency of the bankruptcy case. Laboy v. 6 Doral Mortg. Corp. (In re Laboy), 647 F.3d 367, 374 (1st Cir. 7 2011). See also Fleet Mortg. Group v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A willful violation does not require a 9 specific intent to violate the automatic stay. The standard for 10 a willful violation of the automatic stay [. . .] is met if 11 there is knowledge of the stay and the defendant intended the 12 actions which constituted the violation”). Thus, “without a 13 willful violation, the damages provision of § 362 by its terms, 14 is irrelevant.” Laboy, 647 F.3d at 373–374. 15 16 C. LACK OF ADEQUATE NOTICE IN THE CAPTION 17 The Debtor alleges that the omission of his name in the 18 heading of the 362 Motion constitutes a lack of adequate notice 19 that resulted in the willful violation of the automatic stay. 20 Basic motions practice requires that “[e]very pleading 21 should contain a caption with the court’s name, a title, a file 22 number and a Rule 7(a) designation. The title of the complaint 23 must name all the parties . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Popular 24 - 9 - 1 Auto used a double caption for its 362 Motion. Debtor submits 2 that Popular Auto’s omission of his name in the 362 Motion as 3 “defendant,” failed to provide him adequate notice of the 4 impending execution on his vehicle. Popular Auto named the joint 5 Debtors in the top caption of the 362 Motion. However, the

6 bottom caption in the motion contained the name of Matilde de 7 Jesus Rivera, named as respondent in the relief of stay action.17 8 As the record will demonstrate, the Debtor was not prejudiced as 9 a result of Popular Auto’s omission of the Debtor’s name as a 10 respondent in the caption of the 362 Motion. 11 The argument before the Court is of the type that gives 12 litigation a bad name. It is apodictic that the form of a writ 13 should not prevail against its substance so as to render it 14 fatally defective. Where the caption in a complaint is 15 defective, a court can identify the proper party to a suit 16 through analysis and examination of the allegations set forth in 17 the body of the complaint. Callahan v. Wells Fargo & Co., 747

18 F.Supp.2d 247, 251 (D. Mass. 2010). Although “an improper 19 defendant is indicated in the caption, we may consider a 20 complaint to have named the proper defendant if the allegations 21 made in the body of the complaint make it plain that the party 22 is intended as a defendant.” Id. at 25 (citing Barsten v.

23 17 Docket No. 126, “MOTION REQUESTING RELIEF FROM STAY,” Lead Case No. 12-02042. 24 - 10 - 1 Department of the Interior, 896 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1990). Once 2 the proper party is identified, the court may turn to the 3 substantive legal issues in the case. Id. 4 A plain examination of the caption in question shows that 5 Popular Auto used a double caption, appropriate in such

6 contested matters. In the top portion of the caption, Popular 7 Auto clearly mentions both Debtors at the time: Julio E. Gil de 8 la Madrid and the titleholder of the collateral, Matilde de 9 Jesus Rivera. The body of the complaint mentions “debtors” 10 throughout as the respondents and as the parties subject to the 11 362 Motion.18 Their names, including Debtor in the present 12 action, figure in the top portion of the 362 Motion. 13 Furthermore, the Notice of the 362 Motion contained the names of 14 joint Debtors in both the top and bottom portions of the double 15 caption. The contents of the Notice also named the joint 16 Debtors.19 According to the Certificate of Service, Popular Auto 17 notified each joint Debtor by certified mail with return

18 receipts requested, as evinced with the green and white return 19 receipts.20 Popular Auto also notified joint Debtors’ counsel of 20

18 Id. at 1, ¶¶4, 5. 21 19 Docket No. 126, “NOTICE OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY UNDER 11 U.S.C. §362,” Lead Case No. 12-02042; The Chapter 13 Trustee’s name also 22 appears in the bottom portion of the double caption of the 362 Motion, in the Notice of the 362 Motion and in the contents of the Notice. 23 20 Docket No. 33, “AMENDED STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” at Exhibit H, I., Adversary Case No. 13-00199. 24 - 11 - 1 record.21 The Order granting the 362 Motion contained the names 2 of both Debtors in the double caption.22 For this reason, this 3 Court deems Popular Auto’s notice of the 362 Motion was adequate 4 and in compliance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001, 7004, 9014, and 5 with Local Bankruptcy Rule 4001-1 regarding service and summons

6 of motions for relief from the automatic stay. 7 D. LACK OF ADEQUATE NOTICE FOR FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE 8 COLLATERAL 9 The Court is largely confronted with the issue of whether 10 the VIN is sufficient to identify a vehicle that is the object 11 of a creditor’s motion for relief of stay. If the identification 12 of a vehicle in a creditor’s 362 motion granted by default is 13 insufficient, the Court must then consider whether a willful 14 violation of the stay occurred when a creditor later executed 15 upon the vehicle without providing the debtor sufficient notice 16 of the identity of the collateral it intended to repossess. 17 We turn our analysis to Puerto Rico law. The vehicle 18 subject of the instant dispute is a consumer good purchased for 19 personal property. Commercial Transactions Act of 2012, P.R. 20 Laws, § 9-102(a)(23) (to be codified at P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19) 21 (“‘Consumer goods’ means goods that are used or bought for use 22 primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”). The

23 21 Id. at Exhibit G. 22 Docket No. 134, “ORDER LIFTING THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN FAVOR OF MOVANT,” Lead Case No. 12-02042. 24 - 12 - 1 Puerto Rico Commercial Transactions Act governs the creation of 2 a security interest in personal property. Commercial 3 Transactions Act of 2012, P.R. Laws. A security interest 4 attaches and is enforceable against the debtor and third parties 5 with respect to personal property, in relevant part, only if—

6 among other things—the debtor has authenticated a security 7 agreement that provides a description of the personal property. 8 Id. § 9-203(c)(A). The description of personal property “is 9 sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably 10 identifies what is described.” Id. § 9-108(a). Personal property 11 is reasonably identified if the description is a “(1) specific 12 listing . . . (5) computational or allocational formula or 13 procedure,” such as the VIN. Id. § 9-108(b). 14 A security interest in motor vehicles is perfected when the 15 title to the vehicle is recorded in a certificate of title 16 issued by the appropriate authority. Id. § 9-303(b). Under 17 Puerto Rico law, the PRDMV is the authority vested to issue 18 certificates of title for vehicles and record security 19 interests. Id. § 9-501(a)(1). The Puerto Rico Department of 20 Motor Vehicles Regulation #7357 regarding the Imposition and 21 Cancelation of Security Interests under Law No. 22 of Vehicles 22 and Transit of Puerto Rico expressly states, for administrative 23 purposes, that a VIN is the exclusive identification for a motor 24 - 13 - 1 vehicle.23 A “VIN” is “[t]he identification number assigned by 2 the manufacturer and used by the [PRDMV] as the exclusive 3 identification for the vehicle in question.” 7357 P.R.R. 4 Article VI, § VI-19 (Translation supplied). 5 There appears to be no case law from Puerto Rico regarding 6 the issue of inconsistent description of a motor vehicle with 7 respect to model and year. However, we found an analogous case 8 dealing with the issue. The District Court of the Southern 9 District of West Virginia held on appeal that—among other 10 things—the VIN reasonably described the collateral for the 11 purpose of determining the enforceability of a security interest 12 in bankruptcy court. Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC v. Hicks, 2012 13 WL 1906419 (Bankr.S.D.W.Va. May 25, 2012). There, the appellee 14 questioned the validity of the creditor’s security interest over 15 its vehicle due to contradicting descriptions of the collateral 16 in the security agreement and in the certificate of title. 17 However, the creditor had perfected its interest in the 18 collateral when it applied for and obtained a certificate of 19 title to cover the vehicle using consistent VIN descriptions. 20 “Irrespective of the discrepancy of the model year of the 21 vehicle purchased, [. . .] the description of the property on 22

23 23 “Reglamento para la Imposición y Cancelación de Gravámenes bajo la Ley Número 22 de Vehículos y Tránsito de Puerto Rico. Articulo VI, §VI-19.” 24 - 14 - 1 the Retail Installment Contract [. . .] and the Certificate of 2 Title provides notice of the [debtor’s] name, the creditor which 3 may have a security interest in the collateral claimed, and a 4 reasonable description of the property.” Id. at 11. The 5 certificate of title reflected the creditor’s lien over the

6 collateral described with a VIN. For that reason, there was no 7 dispute as to the identity of the vehicle. Id. 8 In the present case, the Debtor points out that the 362 9 Motion stated Popular Auto’s intent to execute on a Mercedes 10 Benz make, GL320 model, and 2009 year vehicle. However, Popular 11 Auto repossessed a Mercedes Benz make, GL350 BTC model, and year 12 2010 vehicle. The Debtor alleges that the repossessed 13 collateral was not the vehicle identified and described as the 14 collateral in the 362 Motion that was granted by the Court. As 15 such, the Debtor claims he was not adequately notified that the 16 Mercedes Benz make, GL350 BTC model, and year 2010 vehicle was 17 object to the lift of stay, resulting in a willful violation of 18 the automatic stay when Popular Auto later levied upon it. 19 Although Popular Auto admits a clerical mistake as to the 20 descriptions of model and year of the collateral, Popular Auto 21 specified the same VIN for the Mercedes Benz vehicle in the 362 22 Motion and its accompanying exhibits. 23 24 - 15 - 1 Upon this Court’s inquiry during oral arguments to consider 2 the motions for summary judgment, Debtor agreed that, according 3 to the PRDMV, the VIN is the one of the markers for identifying 4 a vehicle. If the Debtor perused the motion in its entirety, the 5 exhibits would have indicated to him that the vehicle Popular

6 Auto intended to repossess was consistently identified with the 7 same VIN #4JGBF2FE1AA563295 in the 362 Motion and in Exhibit A 8 (Sales Contract and Certificate of Title to Vehicle). Popular 9 Auto reasonably identified the collateral it intended to 10 repossess with the correct VIN. As such, it provided the Debtor 11 sufficient notice of Popular Auto’s intent to move this Court to 12 grant the lift of stay over the vehicle.24 Although there is a 13 discrepancy in the description of the model and year of the 14 vehicle in the 362 Motion and its exhibits, Popular Auto 15 consistently used the same VIN number throughout the pleadings 16 to identify the collateral, as reflected in both the Certificate 17 of Title and the purchase contract attached as exhibits to the

18 362 Motion. “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit 19 to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 10(c). Therefore, the Court finds that Popular Auto 21 24 Furthermore, the Sales Contract and the Certificate of Title to 22 Vehicle in Exhibit A describe a vehicle with license plate #HSB-606. The Debtor’s statement of uncontested facts admits that the same license plate 23 number for the vehicle repossessed that was described in the 362 Motion. See Docket No. 28, Adversary Case No. 13-00199, “MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT” at 3, ¶ 13. 24 - 16 - 1 gave adequate notice of its intent to levy upon the vehicle 2 properly identified with VIN #4JGBF2FE1AA563295. 3 The Debtor was notified of the 362 Motion and of Popular 4 Auto’s intent to execute upon the collateral identified with VIN 5 #4JGBF2FE1AA563295. Popular Auto’s notice was adequate and in 6 compliance with service and summons of motions for relief from 7 the automatic stay. If Debtor had any doubt as to which Mercedes 8 Benz was the object of the 362 Motion, he should have promptly 9 opposed the 362 Motion that was notified to him personally by 10 certified mail with return receipt and to his counsel through 11 electronic notice, as indicated in the Certificate of Service 12 filed by Popular Auto. The Debtor should have objected to the 13 relief of stay for the issue to be clarified. It behooves the 14 Debtor not to sleep on his rights. “Parties having knowledge of 15 the pendency of litigation which may affect their interests sit 16 idle at their peril.” Candelario del Moral v. UBS Fin. Servs. 17 (In re Efron), 746 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2014)(citation 18 omitted). 19 20 As discussed above, under Puerto Rico law, the VIN is the 21 key marker for identifying a vehicle. We agree with the Ford 22 Motor case that regardless of the discrepancies of other markers 23 such as model and year, like in our case, the VIN was reported 24 - 17 - 1 accurately in the contract and the certificate of title. For 2 this reason, this Court finds that the VIN is the marker for 3 identification of a vehicle when methods of identification such 4 as year, model and make are imprecise and contradictory. 5 Therefore, this Court concludes that a violation of the

6 automatic stay did not occur in the case at hand. 7 E. FINALITY OF THE ORDER FOR RELIEF OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 8 9 Turning to the Debtor’s alternative argument, the Debtor 10 questions the merits of the order for relief from stay granted 11 to Popular Auto on July 26, 2013. 12 The “law of the case” doctrine “makes binding upon a court 13 a ruling made [in] the same ... level [of court] during prior 14 stages of the same litigation.” Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 15 984 (1st Cir. 1986). “The law of the case doctrine is a 16 prudential principle that ‘precludes relitigation of the legal 17 issues presented in successive stages of a single case once 18 those issues have been decided.’” Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 40 19 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 167 20 (1st Cir. 1996)). Once an order is final, and the same has not 21 been appealed, it becomes the law of the case. First Am. Title 22 Ins. Co. v. Pifalo (In re Pifalo), 379 B.R. 1, 4 (BAP 1st Cir. 23 2007). The doctrine applies to issues that were litigated and 24 - 18 - 1 ||decided by the court. In re Philip Servs. (Delaware), Inc., 267 2 ||B.R. 62, 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 3 In the case at bar, the 362 Motion stood unopposed by both 4 Debtors, despite receiving actual notice. The motion was granted 5 by default on July 26, 2013. This Order became ae final 6 determination. The Debtor could have filed a timely notice of 7 appeal yet failed to do so. Because of his failure to act the 8 Debtor is barred from objecting to the 362 Motion in this 9 adversary proceeding. The law of the case binds the Debtor from 10 revisiting the merits of the prior Order. The Court rejects 11 Debtor’s belated argument challenging the validity of the order 12 granting relief from stay. 13 14 Vv. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Plaintiff's 16 |/Motion for Summary Judgment with prejudice. The Defendants’ 17 ||Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the merits. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 4° day of December 2014 20 . a“ 21 _ Coban MIDLDRED CABAN FLORES 22 U. S. Bankruptcy Judge 23 24 ~ 19 -