Julien v. St. John the Baptist Parish School System

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: February 14, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01081
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CHARLES JULIEN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-1081

ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL DIVISION “5” SYSTEM, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (rec. doc. 52) filed by Defendant, Dr. Lynett Hookfin. Plaintiff, Charles Julien, opposes the motion, (rec. doc. 56), and Hookfin has filed a reply. (Rec. doc. 59). Having considered the pleadings and the caseI .l aw, thBeA CCoKuGrtR rOuUleNs Das follows.

On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed hies tc osemqp. laint alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e , and Louisiana state law. Plaintiff named as Defendants the St. John the Baptist Parish School System (“SJBPSS” or “School Board”), Christopher Mayes, Brandon Brown, Serena Duke, Cory Butler, and Heidi Trosclair. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 2). According to the pleadings, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with 1 thIde. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about FIedbruary 11, 2020. ( ). On April 6, 2021, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Plaintiff. ( .). Plaintiff was hired as an English teacher aIndd. Head Coach of the boys’ basketball team at East St. John High School in August of 2017. ( ). In October of 2018, he filed an internal grievance against Christopher Mayes, the school principal, for comments and gestures that

1 Id allegedly constituted sexual harassment. ( .). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Mayes showed him a nude photograph of himself andId then made a lewd gesture indicating that he wanted to perform sexual acts on Plaintiff. ( .). Two days after the filing of the internal

grievance, Plaintiff was informed by Serena Duke, aI Hduman Resources representative, that the SJBPSS did not find any wrongdoing by Mayes. ( . at p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that Mayes and Brandon Brown, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor and the high school Athletic Director, began to retaliate against him beginning in April of 2019. The acts of retaliation included locking Plaintiff and the basketball team out of the practice facility on at least four occasions and Brown refusing to allow the basketball team to partake in physical education class in August of 2019. Allegedly, the retaliation ultimately culminaItded with Brown and Mayes removing Plaintiff as the Head Coach of the basketball

team. ( .). Plaintiff maintains that theseId actions were taken in retaliation for his sexual harassment grievance filed with SJBPSS. ( .). Based on the aforementioned actions, Plaintiff brought claims for retaliation under Title VII and in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:967, as well as whistleblower violations under Louisiana Revised Statute § 42:1169. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 5 & Rec. doc. 28 at p. 2 2). On December 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File First Supplemental and Amended Complaint (rec. doc. 20), which this Court granted on January 10, 2022. (Rec. doc. 27). The supplemental and amended complaint named Dr. Lynett Hookfin, the

2 On October 29, 2021, Defendants Brown, Mayes, and SJBPSS filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(2), (Rec. doc. 12), which this Court granted. (Rec. doc. 49). On February 1, 2022, Superintendent of SJBPSS, as an additional defendant. (Rec. doc. 28). In that complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on October 29, 2021, Hookfin removed him from his positioInd at East St. John High School and transferred him to East St. John Preparatory School. ( . at p. 2).

Plaintiff alleges that this action was “punisIhdment” for filing a grievance against Mayes, as well as filing his complaint in this lawsuit. ( .). He further claims that no “legitimate basis” for his removal was provided, and that the transfer was “directly and indIdirectly an abusive method of control, punishment, avoidance, and/or disempowerment.” ( .). Thus, Plaintiff brings additional Louisiana state law claims against Hookfin pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 23:967 and 42:1169. On April 12, 2022, Hookfin answered the amended complaint and filed a counterclaim against Julien alleging that his cause of action under Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:967 was

brought in bad faith, entitling her to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in accordance with the statute. (Rec. doc. 42). Plaintiff replied on July 1, 2022, closing the pleadings. (Rec. doc. 48). On August 9, 2022, Hookfin filed this motion seeking judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims agaiInI.s t herT. H E PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Defendant brings this motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Louisiana state law § 42:1169 whistleblower and § 23:967 whistleblower retaliation claims. (Rec. doc. 52). Defendant

argues that no private cause of action exists under §p 4ri2m:1a1 f6a9c,i eand that the § 23:967 claims mIdust be dismissed as Plaintiff is unable to make a showing under the statute. ( .). Hookfin further asks the Court take judicial notice of a number of facts, as outlined in further detail below. Plaintiff pcrlaimimas f athciaet a private cause of action exists under § 42:1169 and that he is able to make a showing of retaliation under § 23:967. (Rec. doc. 56). Plaintiff further objects to the Court taking judicial notice of any public records and argIdues that this

motIiIoIn. is pArPemPLaItCuAreB aLnEd S sThAoNulDdA bRe DdSe cided at the summary judgment stage. ( .).

“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings unGdreeart R Lualek e1s2 I(ncs). ,i sS .sEu. bvj.e Gcrt atoy tGhreo suapm Inev s.t, aLn.Ld.Car.d as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc. , 550 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (E.D. La. 2021) (quoting , 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). Accordingly, to decide a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must determine whether thIde complaint, viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiIfnf, sreta Kteast rai nvaal iCda cnlaali mBr feoarc rheelise Lf.i tig.. The Court should accept “all well-pleaded facts as true.” , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). However, to decide whether dismisSseael Diso ew va.r Craalndtwedel, lthe Court will not accept conclusory allegations iKna tihseer c oAmlupmlaininutm a s& t rCuhee.m . Sales, Inc. v. Avon, 9d1a3le FS. hSiuppyapr. d2sd, 2In6c2., 271 (E.D. La. 2012) (citing , 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)). “Judgment on the pleadings is aGprperaotp Lraiaktees oInnsly., Sif. Em. aterial facts are not in dispute anVdo qeuste-sAtlipoinnse oTfr laadwin agr eU aSlAl tChoartp r. evm. Baainn.k” of China , 550 F. Supp. 3d at 370 (quoting , 142 F.3d 887, 891

(5th Cir. 1998)). When ruling on a Rule 12(c) Gmroetaito nL,a tkhees CInosu.,r St .mE.ust look only to the pleadings and exhibits attached to the pleadings. , 550 F. Supp. 3d at 370. “If, on a motion under 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, the Court may consider documents attached to a Rule 12(c) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgmenSte ei fA ltlhene

vd.o Hcauymsents are “referred to in the complaint and are ceSnutrllaivl aton tvh. eL epolari Enntieffr’gs yc,l La.iLm.C.”. , 812 F. App’x 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting , 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010)). The Court is alsow piethrmouitt ted to consider matters of public record and other matters subjecCt atold jwuedlilcial notice converting aU mnoitteido nS ttaot desis emx irsesl .i nWtoil loanrde vfo. rH suummamnaa rHye jauldthg mPleannt o. f Tex., Inc,. 913 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (citing IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS , 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003)).

a. Judicial Notice

Hookfin asks that judicial notice be taken of facts included within exhibits referenced in a•n d attached to the supporting memorandum, including: • • Exhibit A: Christopher Mayes Personnel Change Form • Exhibit C: East St. John Preparatory School Staff Roster (2021-22) Exhibit D: Charles Julien Paystub for Pay Period Ending September 30, 2021 Exhibit E: Charles Julien Paystubs for Pay Periods Ending October 31, 2021, November 30, 2021, and December 31, 2021 (Rec. doc. 52 at pp. 1-2). Defendant argues that the above documents consist of public records or information from government websites, which may beI dconsidered without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. . Plaintiff objects on the basis that the documents have not been verified or authenticated by anyone. (Rec. doc. 56 at p. 4). Defendant argues that it is well-settled that a Court may take judicial notice of facts that these records be certified, but even so, Exhibits C, D, and E all bear the official seal of the SIcdhool Board and are self-authenticating under Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. ( .). Further, Defendant attaches a “Declaration and Certification of Louisiana Public

Records” to Icdertify the authenticity of the public records, to the extent that is deemed necessary. ( .). When considering a motion to dismiss, courts are generally “limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attacVheadn Dtou ztehre v m. Uo.Sti. oBna ntok dNiastm. Aissss ’tnh.at are central to the claim and referenced by the compLloaninet S.”t a r Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays B,a 9n9k5 P FL.C Supp. 2d 673, 684 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting , 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)). Courts may also consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial

notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the recordW ohfi ttfhieel dc avs. eC,i tayn odf eNxehwib Oitrsle aatntasched to the complaint whose authenticity is unqueMsteiyoenresd v..” T extron, Inc. , 431 F. Supp. 3d 818, 823 (E.D. La. 2019) (quoting , 540 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir. 2013)). The case law is clear that the Court may take judicial notice of matters Soef ep Cuobxli vc. rReiccohradrd wsithout converting a motion to dismiss into onHea lflo vr. Hsuomdgmkainrsy judgment. , 761 F. App’sxe 2e4 a4l,s 2o4C8a (ld5wthe Cllir. 2019) (citing , 3H0u5m aFn. aA pHpe’ax lt2h2 P4l, a2n2 o7f (T5etxh. , CInirc. .2008)); Hebert, 9A1b3st rFa. cSt uCpop.,. I2ndc . avt. T27ou1c (hcsittoinnge Props., Ltd. , 336 F.3d at 379);

, 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”). In addition to taking judicial notiWceh oitff ipeuldblic records, the Court is Dpuerrmr vit. tGeOdL t,o L .tLa.kCe. judicial notice of government websites. , 431 F. Supp. 3d at 823; , 393 F. Supp. 3d 476, 482 (E.D. La. 2019). Importantly, “[p]ublic records and government

documents are generally considered not to be subject to reasonable dispute,” and “[t]his includes puUb.Sli. cE r.Ee.cOo.Crd. vs. aEn.Id. D guoPvoenrnt mdee Nnte mdoocuurms &e nCtos. available from reliable sources on the Internet.” In re Dingle , No. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (quoting , 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (W.D. Mich. 2003)). Federal Rule of Evidence 902(5) indicates that “publications purporting to be issued by public authorityE,”.I . iDnuclPuodnitn dge wNeebmpoaugress & m Coa.intained on a government website, are self- authenticating. , 2004 WL 2347559, at *2. Here, the attached exhibits that Defendant asks this Court to take judicial notice of are

not only “integral to the claim” asserted by Plaintiff but include public records and/or information from government websites. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled, and the Court tbak. eLs aju. dRiecvia. lS ntaotti. c§e 4o2f :E1x1h6ib9i ts A, C, D, and E.

Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s § 42:1169 claim must be dismissed as courts in this circuit and Louisiana state courts have consistently held that a private right of action does not exist under that statute. (Rec. doc. 52-1 at p. 4). Defendant notes that this Court has already dismissed this claim as applied to other Defendants and further pIdoints out that

Plaintiff has previously conceded that such a cause of action does not exist. ( .). Citing case law, Plaintiff claims that Louisiana law provides protection to employees like Plaintiff in the 3 form of a right of action against his employer. (Rec. doc. 56 at pp. 4-5).

Cunningham v. City of New Orleans Louisiana Revised Statute § 42:1169 – or the Code of Governmental Ethics – provides: Any public employee who reports to a person or entity of competent authority or jurisdiction information which he reasonably believes indicates a violation of any law or of any order, rule, or regulation issued in accordance with law or any other alleged acts of impropriety related to the scope or duties of public employment or public office within any branch of state government or any political subdivision shall be free from discipline, reprisal, or threats of discipline or reprisal by the public employer for reporting such acts of alleged impropriety.

La. Rev. Stat. § 42:1169(A). “An eCmolplinlosy ve.e S’sta rteem eexd rye lu. nDdeepr’t tohfe N Caotd. eR eosf. Governmental Ethics is through the Boasrede of Ethics.” , 118 So. 3d 43, 47 (La. Ct. App. 2013); La. Rev. Stat. § 42:1169(B)(1)(a). § 42:1169 “does not provide an inCdoellpinensdent right of action, rather, it relies upon other statutes to provide a right of action.” , So. 3d at 48. Here, Plaintiff attempts to invoke § 42:1169 as the basis for a cause of action against Defendant. HoweveSre,e t,h ei.sg .c, lBaiomw ime uvs. Ht boed gdeismissed as there is no independent cause of action under the statute. , No. 20-2441, 2021 WL 53312, at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2021) (“The court finds that [Plaintiff’s] claims against the defendants under Louisiana Revised Statute § 42:1169 must be dismissed because there is no independent cause of action under that statute.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 42:1169 claim against Hookfin is dismissed wc. ithL ap.r Rejeuvd. iSceta. t. § 23:967 Defendant argues that multiple reasons independently compel the conclusion that Plaintiff’s § 23:967 claim must be dismissed with prejudice: (1) Plaintiff suffered no adverse

whether a private cause of action exists under § 42:1169, although it refereSneec,e es. gt.h, eC osltliantsu tve. Satsa tperoviding whistleblower protections. 336 So. 3d 977, 990-91 (La. Ct. App. 2022). However, Louisiana courts that have addressed the issue have all held that a private cause of action does not exist. , 118 So. employment action; (2) there is no causal connection between any protected activity nor any act of reprisal; and (3) Plaintiff has not alleged any violation of state law. (Rec. doc. 52-1 at pp. 5-8).

Plaintiff argues that his claim should not be dismissed because: (1) he has “clearly alleged” that he suffered an adverse employment action when he was transferred; (2) a causal connection exists between the alleged protected activity and the alleged act of reprisal; and (3) he has alleged that the School Board violated state law. (Rec. doc. 56 at pp. 5-9). At the outset, the Court notes that the Fifth Circuit anRda yLboourins iva.n Bao ssstiaetre Pcaoru. rStcsh h. Bavde. consistently cited to Title VII standards toS ternofnogrc ve. U§ n2i3v:.9 H6e7a. l thcare Sys., L.L.C. , 881 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing , 482 F.3d 802,

805 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (“the standaSrmdsit gho vv.e ArnTi&nTg Sbooltsh. claims [under Title VII and § 23:967] are materially indistinguishable”); , 90 F. App’x 718, 723 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[w]hile the Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken directly on whether [Title VII’s] framework applies to § 23:967 cases, Louisiana courts have often looked to federal anti- Idnisbcorrinmoinnea tvi.o Tnr ejausruisrper Cuhdeesnt cCea siinn ointerpreting Louisiana’s anti-discrimination statutes”); Tatum v. United Parcel Ser,v N., oI.n 0c.4-2150, 2006 WL 1235979, at *3 (E.D. La. May 3, 2006); , 79 So. 3d 1094, 1103-04 (La. Ct. App. 2011)). Accordingly, this Court applies the standards and requirements of Title VII when analyzing

retaliation claims under § 23:967. In order to allege a whistleblower claim under § 23:967, an employee “establishes a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation by proving (1) that [he] engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal Rayborn link existed between the Lporontge vc.t eEda satcfiteivldit Cyo alln.d the adverse employment action. ” , 881 F.3d at 415 (quoting , 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged – indeed is unable to allege – that he

suffered any adverse employment action. (Rec. doc. 52-1 at p. 5). Defendant claims that “the § 23:967 claim should be dismissed by the Court because the amended complaint does not include a single factual allegation suggesIdting that an adverse employment action occurred because Mr. Julien was transferred.” ( .). Defendant points to a failure to allege facts indicating that Plaintiff’s salary was reduced, that he was prevented from being promoted, that he was reassigned to a position with sigIndificantly different responsibilities, and that he suffered a significant change in benefits. ( .). Defendant points to the attached payroll records, which show that Plaintiff’s gross monthly salary remained the same after he was

transferred, and that his jobI dtitle of English teacher and job responsibilities of teaching English remained the same. ( . at p. 6). Plaintiff alleges that this motion is premature and should not be subject to a summary 4 judgment standard. Plaintiff argues that a “mere perusal” of the amended complaint indicates that Plaintiff included factual allegations to suggest an adverse employment action occurred when he was transferred. (Rec. doc. 56 at p. 6). Plaintiff points to allegations in the complaint that indicate that he was “informed that he was being removed from his position at East St. John High School and beingId transferred to East St. John Preparatory School with no legitimate basis for his removal.” ( .). Plaintiff further alleges that he was transferred as

4 without As noted, this Court does not apply the summary judgment sCtaanlddwaredll in this case, as the Court is perm Wittileladr tdo consider matters of public record and other matters subject to judicial notice converting a motion for judgment on the pleadings into one for summary judgment. , 913 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (citing , Id a result of filing an internal grievance and filing the complaint in this Court. ( .). Specifically, he maintains that “an adverse employment action has occurred herein because he was transferred and/or reassigned from a high school where his curriculum involved teaching

high school studentsI dto a middle school where his curriculum involved teaching middle school students.” ( . at 7). Plaintiff claims this constitutes a “Isdignificant change in employment status” that constitutes an adverse employment action. . For the purposes of § 23:967, an adverse employment action “is defined as ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failure to promote, reassigning with signRifaicyabnotrlny different responsibilities, Toart ua mdecision causing a significant cBhuarnligneg tionn b Ienndeufist.,s .I’n” c . v. Eller,t h881 F.3d at 415 (quoting , 79 So. 3d at 1104) (quoting , 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Transfers may be considered

aHdavrepresre v e. mCiptylo oyfm Jeanckt saocnti oMnusn o. nSlcyh w. Dhiesnt. they are punitive or may be considered demotions. , 149 F. App’x 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has held that “a transfer or reassignment can be the equivalent of a demotion [which is a signiRfiacyabnotr cnhange in employment statTush]o manpds otnh uvs. Cciotyn sotfi Wtuatec oan adverse employment action.” , 881 F.3d at 416 (quoting , 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014)) (alteration in original). “To be the equivalent to a demotion, a transfer need not result in a decrease in pay, title, or grade; it can be a demotion if the new position proves objectively worse – Isduch as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room

for advancemencto.”u l d . As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “a lateral reassignment to a poAsriytiaoinn wv. iWtha el-qMuaarl tp Satyo res Te xa.m LPount to a materially adverse action in some circumstances.” Rayborn , 534 F.3d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). In , the Court found that the plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action when she was transferred to another school. The Court stated, “[s]he did not lose any pay or benefits. There is no evidence that she suffered a loss of responsibilities. Although her office facilities at the new school were subjectively less desirable, and she no longer

worked at the school her children attended, these differences do not amount to a demotion.” 881 F.3d at 416. Accordingly, tIhde Court determined that she did nRota ysbuoffrenr any significant change in employment status. . While the Court recognizes that was decided at the summary judgment stage, this Court too has exhibits before it to support whether Plaintiff’s transfer constituted an adverse employment action. Having reviewed the pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim under § 23:967 fails for one major reason: He cannot allege an adverse employment action. Plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that his salary was reduced, that he was prevented from being

promoted, that he was reassigned to a position with significantly different responsibilities, or that he suffered a significant change in benefits. Additionally, Plaintiff has provided very little to indicate that the new position is objectively worse, Sseuec ahl saos H baeripnegr lve.s Csi tpyr oefs Jtaigcikosuosn, lMesusn i.n Stcehr.e Dstiisnt.g, or failing to provide room for advancement. , 149 F. App’s 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action when she failed to provide evidence that her transfer from a high school to a middle school was an “ultimate employment action”). The attached exhibits of which this Court has taken judicial notice indicaRtea ythboart nPlaintHifaf’rsp esralary remained the

same. (Rec. doc. 52-2 at pp. 5-8). Like the plaintiffs in and , Plaintiff’s transfer did not rise to the level of a demotion. In opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that an adverse employment action occurred because he was transferred and/or reassigned from a high school where his curriculum involved teaching high school students to a middle school where his curriculum involved teaching middle school students. (Rec. doc. 56 at p. 7). There is no allegation of the kind in Plaintiff’s complaint or amended complaint. “An opposition to a motion to diPsmetiesrs- Tisa nkoant gth ve. pDlaecpe’t f oorf

Ca hpiladrrteyn t&o Fraamiseil yn Seewrv sfa.ctual allegations or assert new claims.” Goodwin v. Hous. Auth. of New Or,l Neaon. s14-1078, 2016 WL 69633, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2016); , No. 11-1397, 2013 WL 3874907, at *9 n.37 (E.D. La. July 25, 2013) (noting that it is “inappropriateC ator Craairsreie rnse, wIn cf.a vc.t sF oarndd M aostsoerr Ct on.ew claims in an opposition to a motion to dismiss”). In , the court stated that it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would mean that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even without filing an amendment, and simply by raising a point in a brief.

745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). This Court has reviewed the original complaint (rec. doc. 1) and the amended complaint (rec. doc. 28) and finds no allegation that Plaintiff’s adverse employment action consisted of his transfer and/or reassignment from a high school where his curriculum involved teaching high school students to a middle school 5 where his curriculum involved teaching middle school students. Plaintiff’s allegations are unavailing here.

prima facie 5 prima facie Given that Plaintiff has not alleged an adverse employment action, he cannot establish a case under V. CONCLUSION

AccoITrd IiSn OglRy,D ERED

GRANTED that the Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the PDleIaSdMinISgSs E(RDe Wc. dIToHc. 5P2R)E iJsU DICE , and Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Lynett Hookfin are . 14th February New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of __________________________, 2023.

_____________________________________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE