FILED IN THE 3 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON May 21, 2026 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 JULIE D.,1 No. 2:25-cv-492-EFS
8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff Julie D. asks the Court to reverse the Administrative 14 Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 2 benefits. Plaintiff claims she is 15 unable to work due to several impairments, including a headache 16 17
18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 disorder, as established by medical records and her testimony.
2 Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision because the 3 ALJ did not adequately consider Plaintiff’s headaches. This matter is 4 remanded for further proceedings.
5 I. Background 6 Plaintiff filed her Title 2 application for benefits in February 7 2023, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2021, due to a left shoulder
8 injury, bone spurs, arthritis, a rotator cuff tear, depression, asthma, 9 chronic pain, and high blood pressure.2 10 Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before ALJ Marie Palachuk in
11 February 2025, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified.3 12 Plaintiff testified that she had not worked since 2021 because she had 13 shoulder surgery, back problems, and breast problems.4 She had
14 difficulties standing, walking, reaching, and lifting because of back 15 pain; neck pain radiating down her arms; carpal tunnel; and 16
17 2 Administrative Record (AR) 184–88, 226. 18 3 AR 37–60. 19 4 AR 44. 20 1 “headaches every day.”5 She wore braces on both hands when she slept
2 due to pain.6 She received injections and was seeing a chiropractor to 3 treat neck pain, with very little benefit.7 She saw a counselor and took 4 medication for anxiety.8
5 The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical individual of 6 the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff limited to 7 light work with some movement and postural restrictions, but no social
8 restrictions, could work as a cashier, cafeteria attendant, or cleaner.9 9 The vocational expert testified that the same hypothetical individual 10 could not work those jobs if she was limited to two hours total of
11 standing or walking during the workday or could lift only five pounds 12 frequently.10 13
14 5 AR 45–47. 15 6 AR 48. 16 7 AR 49–50. 17 8 AR 51–52. 18 9 AR 57–58. 19 10 AR 59–60. 20 1 The ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.11 The
2 ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were “not entirely consistent” 3 with the medical evidence and other evidence.12 The ALJ considered 4 the lay statements from Plaintiff’s husband and found them not
5 persuasive.13 As to the medical opinions, the ALJ found: 6 • the reviewing opinions of Stanley S., MD, and Rudolf Titanji, 7 MD, generally persuasive.
8 • the reviewing opinions of Gerald G., PhD, and Renee E., PhD, 9 persuasive, with Dr. E.’s opinion more persuasive than Dr. G.’s 10 opinion.
11 • the evaluating opinion of Tom Crisp, DO, somewhat 12 persuasive. 13
14 11 AR 17–31. Per 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation 15 determines whether a claimant is disabled. 16 12 AR 23. As recommended by the Ninth Circuit in Smartt v. Kijakazi, 17 the ALJ should consider replacing the phrase “not entirely consistent” 18 with “inconsistent.” 53 F.4th 489, 499, n.2 (9th Cir. 2022). 19 13 AR 29. 20 1 • the evaluating opinion of Diane Kovac, PMHNP, not
2 persuasive.14 3 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 4 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through June
5 30, 2025. 6 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 7 activity since June 1, 2021, the alleged onset date.
8 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 9 severe impairments: degenerative disc disease in the cervical 10 and lumbar spine; degenerative joint disease in the left
11 shoulder; status post left rotator cuff tear repair; carpal tunnel 12 syndrome; asthma; chronic pain; obesity; depression; and 13 anxiety.
14 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 15 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 16 severity of one of the listed impairments.
17 • RFC: Plaintiff had the following RFC: 18
19 14 AR 27–29. 20 1 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the following exceptions. The claimant can 2 perform postural activities occasionally but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can 3 frequently with the left hand, which is the non- dominant hand, handle and finger (the claimant is 4 right hand dominant). The claimant can occasionally perform overhead reaching. The claimant should avoid 5 concentrated exposure to extreme cold, respiratory irritants, and hazards. The claimant is able to 6 maintain concentration, persistence or pace on simple, routine tasks for the two-hour intervals between 7 regularly scheduled breaks.
8 • Step four: Plaintiff had no past relevant work. 9 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work 10 history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant 11 numbers in the national economy, such as a cashier, cafeteria 12 attendant, and cleaner.15 13 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the 14 Appeals Council, which denied review.16 Plaintiff now appeals to 15 district court.17 16
17 15 AR 19–30. 18 16 AR 1–3. 19 17 ECF No. 1. 20 1 II. Standard of Review
2 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 3 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”18 and such error 4 impacted the nondisability determination.19 Substantial evidence is
5 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 7 support a conclusion.”20
9 18 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. 10 § 405(g). 11 19 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 12 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 13 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 14 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 15 20 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 16 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 17 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 18 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 19 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 20 1 III. Analysis
2 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. G.’s prior 3 administrative medical finding, her headache disorder, and her 4 subjective symptom testimony. The Commissioner argues the ALJ
5 reasonably considered the persuasiveness of Dr. G.’s findings, 6 reasonably considered Plaintiff’s headaches, and reasonably discounted 7 Plaintiff’s subjective statements.
8 A. Headache Disorder: Plaintiff establishes consequential 9 error. 10 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate her
11 headache disorder in three ways. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ 12 failed to determine whether her headache disorder was a medically 13 determinable severe impairment at step two. Second, acknowledging
14 that the ALJ nevertheless proceeded past step two, Plaintiff argues 15 that the ALJ failed at step three to evaluate whether her headache 16
17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 disorder medically equaled Listing 11.02(b) per Social Security Ruling
2 (SSR) 19-4p. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately 3 evaluate how her headache disorder affected her ability to function 4 when crafting the RFC. As explained below, the Court disagrees as to
5 steps two and three, but agrees as to the RFC. 6 1. Step Two 7 When an ALJ resolves step two in a claimant’s favor by finding a
8 medically determinable severe impairment, any error in failing to find 9 other severe impairments is harmless at step two; however, step-two 10 error can be prejudicial at a later step in the sequential disability
11 analysis.21 12 13
14 21 See Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th 15 Cir. 2006); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005) 16 (“Assuming without deciding that this omission constituted legal error 17 [at step two], it could only have prejudiced Burch in step three (listing 18 impairment determination) or step five (RFC) because the other steps, 19 including this one, were resolved in her favor.”). 20 1 Here, the ALJ resolved step two in Plaintiff’s favor despite not
2 finding her headache disorder to be a medically determinable severe 3 impairment, so any error is harmless at step two.22 Whether any error 4 affected the ALJ’s step-three and RFC findings will be addressed
5 below, as Plaintiff raises both arguments. 6 2. Step Three 7 At step three, if a claimant meets all of the listing criteria or if
8 her impairments medically equal a listed impairment, she is 9 considered disabled.23 Medical equivalence will be found if the medical 10 findings are at least of equal medical significance to the required
11 criteria.24 The ALJ is obligated to consider the relevant evidence to 12 determine whether a claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the 13
14 22 AR 19. 15 23 See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (requiring a claimant 16 to show that the impairment meets (or medically equals) all of the 17 specified medical criteria, not just some of the criteria). 18 24 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(d)(3); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 175 19 (9th Cir. 1990). 20 1 specified impairments set forth in the listings.25 The ALJ need not
2 recite the reasons for her step-three determination under the listings 3 portion of the decision so long as the relevant evidence and underlying 4 findings are discussed in the ALJ’s decision.26 The “ALJ is not required
5 to discuss the combined effects of a claimant’s impairments or compare 6 them to any listing in an equivalency determination, unless the 7 claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.”27
8 SSR 19-4p, “Evaluating Cases Involving Primary Headache 9 Disorders,” provides that primary headache disorder is not a listed 10 impairment, but an ALJ may still find that a primary headache
11 disorder, alone or in combination with other impairments, medically 12 equals a listing.28 “Epilepsy (listing 11.02) is the most closely analogous 13
15 25 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir.2001); 20 C.F.R. 16 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 17 26 Lewis, 236 F.3d at 513. 18 27 Burch, 400 F.3d at 683. 19 28 SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *7. 20 1 listed impairment for a[] [medically determinable impairment] of a
2 primary headache disorder.”29 3 Listing 11.02 Epilepsy requires documentation of a “detailed 4 description of a typical seizure and characterized by” either frequent
5 “[g]eneralized tonic-clonic seizures” or “[d]yscognitive seizures,” or less 6 frequent seizures with a marked limitation in physical or mental 7 functioning.30
8 Here, the ALJ did not evaluate whether Plaintiff’s headaches 9 medically equaled listing 11.02 or otherwise discuss Plaintiff’s 10 headaches at step three.31 Assuming for the sake of argument that this
11 was error, any such error was harmless. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s 12 reported headaches elsewhere in her decision and there is no evidence 13 of seizures in the record.32 Moreover, Plaintiff never tried to establish
15 29 Id. 16 30 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. 17 31 AR 20–21. 18 32 See AR 22–23; 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 11.02; 19 Lewis, 236 F.3d at 513. 20 1 equivalency to the criteria in the epilepsy listing.33 Therefore, the ALJ
2 committed no consequential error at step three. 3 3. RFC 4 SSR 19-4p also provides, “If a person’s primary headache
5 disorder, alone or in combination with another impairment(s), does not 6 medically equal a listing at step three of the sequential evaluation 7 process, we assess the person’s residual functional capacity (RFC).”34
8 The RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her] 9 limitations.”35 The ALJ must base the RFC “on all the relevant 10 evidence in [the] case record.”36 The ALJ must consider all medically
11 determinable impairments, even those that are not “severe” at step 12 two.37 The ALJ must consider “all of the relevant medical and other 13 evidence,” “any statements about what [the claimant] can still do that
15 33 See Burch, 400 F.3d at 683. 16 34 SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *7. 17 35 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 18 36 Id. 19 37 Id. § 404.1545(a)(2). 20 1 have been provided by medical sources, whether or not they are based
2 on formal medical examinations,” and “descriptions and observations of 3 [the claimant’s] limitations from [her] impairment(s), including 4 limitations that result from [her] symptoms, such as pain, provided by
5 [the claimant] . . . or other persons.”38 6 When assessing the RFC based on the claimant’s testimony, if the 7 ALJ finds inconsistency between the claimant’s reported symptoms and
8 the evidence, the ALJ must identify what symptom claims are being 9 discounted and clearly and convincingly explain the rationale for 10 discounting the symptoms with supporting citation to evidence.39 This
11 requires the ALJ to “show his work” and provide a “rationale . . . clear 12 enough that it has the power to convince” the reviewing court.40 13
15 38 Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). 16 39 Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. 17 § 404.1529(c); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014); 18 SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7. 19 40 Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (alteration added). 20 1 Here, when explaining the RFC finding, the ALJ considered
2 Plaintiff’s June 2023 function report where she reported having 3 “headaches daily from [her] neck hurting,” Plaintiff’s June 2024 4 function report where she reported having “constant headaches,” and
5 her hearing testimony that she had “headaches every day.”41 After 6 reporting all of Plaintiff’s other symptom reports, the ALJ made a 7 boilerplate finding that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
8 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 9 symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the 10 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
11 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 12 record for the reasons explained in this decision.”42 The ALJ then 13 discussed the medical records of lumbar pain, shoulder pain, neck pain,
14 shoulder surgery, hand paresthesia, carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, 15 asthma, anxiety, and depression.43 The ALJ next discussed the prior 16
17 41 AR 22–23, 45, 244, 271. 18 42 AR 23. 19 43 AR 23–26. 20 1 administrative medical findings and medical opinions, none of which
2 touched on headaches.44 The ALJ did not make any specific findings 3 regarding headaches and did not incorporate any limitations based on 4 headaches into the RFC.45
5 The ALJ’s brief report of Plaintiff’s relevant testimony, general 6 discounting of all of Plaintiff’s testimony, and omission of any 7 discussion of headache evidence contradicts the significant evidence of
8 headaches in the record. Plaintiff presented with headaches before and 9 after her shoulder surgery in December 2022.46 Plaintiff presented with 10 headaches at the two consultative examinations in December 2023.47
11 She continually reported having headaches at regular physical therapy 12 appointments throughout 2024.48 She reported having significant daily 13 headaches to a spinal treatment center in August and September 2024
15 44 AR 26–29. 16 45 See AR 22–29. 17 46 AR 518, 537. 18 47 AR 1361, 1371. 19 48 AR 1190, 1192–93, 1503–04, 1506–08, 1517, 1610, 1612, 1618. 20 1 and to a physiatrist in October 2024.49 On several occasions from
2 November 2024 to January 2025, she presented with headaches to a 3 chiropractor, who diagnosed her with “chronic tension-type headache, 4 intractable,” noted her medical history of migraines, and assessed her
5 with migraines.50 She was also assessed with headaches during a 6 January 2025 sleep study.51 7 This evidence demonstrates numerous, consistent complaints and
8 medical assessments of headaches that were never relieved by various 9 treatments for Plaintiff’s neck, shoulders, and back. On this record, the 10 ALJ’s failure to consider the headache evidence when crafting the RFC
11 or inquire further as to Plaintiff’s headaches falls short of the duty to 12 fully and fairly develop the record.52 Although an ALJ is not required 13 to discuss every bit of evidence in the record, “it is incumbent upon the
14 ALJ to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and 15
16 49 AR 2423, 2459, 2546. 17 50 AR 2486, 2489, 2497, 2502, 2511, 2516, 2521, 2530, 2535. 18 51 AR 2563–65. 19 52 See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 1 explore for all the relevant facts.”53 Additionally, the ALJ’s general
2 discounting of all of Plaintiff’s symptom reports without acknowledging 3 any potential limitations from headaches fails to provide a clear and 4 convincing reason to discount her headache reports.54
5 The ALJ came closest to considering the headache evidence when 6 the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s neck pain was not more limiting than 7 provided in the RFC,55 because Plaintiff reported at the psychiatric
8 evaluation and on one function report that her headaches were 9 connected to her neck pain.56 The ALJ considered that physiatrist 10 Steven Hansen, DO, examined Plaintiff twice in October 2024 and
11 found that Plaintiff had “extremely tight musculature across the 12 cervical paraspinals, upper trapezius, and rhomboids bilaterally with 13
14 53 Garcia v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2014) 15 (cleaned up); Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 16 1984). 17 54 See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. 18 55 See AR 24–25. 19 56 AR 244, 1371. 20 1 marked tenderness palpation and identifiable trigger points,” and
2 “[p]ersistent tenderness palpation along the paraspinal musculature of 3 the cervical spine near the lower parts of the cervical spine and upper 4 trapezius region,” but had “[f]ull active range of motion of the cervical
5 spine and bilateral upper extremities,” “5/5 strength bilateral[ly],” and 6 “[m]ove[d] all extremities spontaneously” with “no focal deficits.”57 7 Dr. Hansen also noted that Plaintiff received two injections in late
8 2024 that temporarily provided “100% improvement” in her neck 9 pain.58 10 Assuming the ALJ considered Dr. Hansen’s notes as a reason to
11 discount Plaintiff’s headaches, they do not constitute clear and 12 convincing reasons. No evidence shows that Plaintiff’s headaches were 13 caused only by her neck pain, such that improvement in the latter
14 would necessarily improve the former. The notes themselves say 15 nothing about headaches. And the few irrelevant, cherry-picked normal 16 findings considered by the ALJ say nothing about headaches, and
18 57 AR 2540, 2549. 19 58 AR 2491. 20 1 would not even be substantial evidence supporting a finding that
2 Plaintiff’s neck pain improved for purposes of long-term functioning.59 3 The Ninth Circuit case Ferguson v. O’Malley also requires finding 4 the ALJ erred.60 In Ferguson, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
5 because “substantial evidence d[id] not support the ALJ’s RFC 6 assessment because the ALJ did not articulate any specific, clear, and 7 convincing reasons for discounting Ferguson’s headache symptom
8 testimony.”61 There, the claimant testified to having headaches and the 9 ALJ “broadly stated that Ferguson’s statements ‘concerning the 10 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
12 59 See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) 13 (disallowing the ALJ from cherry picking evidence to support a 14 conclusion that contradicts the overall diagnostic record); Ghanim, 763 15 F.3d at 1164 (requiring the ALJ to consider the context of treatment 16 records and discouraging the discounting of a claimant’s reported 17 symptoms based on nonrelevant normal findings). 18 60 Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024). 19 61 Id. at 1204. 20 1 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
2 record for the reasons explained in this decision,’” but the ALJ “failed 3 to specify which of Ferguson’s many symptoms were, in the ALJ’s view, 4 inconsistent with the record evidence.”62 “[T]he ALJ never expressly
5 and specifically stated that Ferguson’s headache symptom testimony 6 was inconsistent with any particular record evidence, as it was 7 required to do.”63 The ALJ seemed to discount the claimant’s headaches
8 because the claimant (1) presented at an examination with no 9 neurological defects and a normal mood and affect, which the Ninth 10 Circuit found irrelevant; and (2) underwent spinal decompression
11 surgery, which the Ninth Circuit found not inconsistent with continued 12 headaches.64 Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s 13 argument that it should affirm under Britton v. Colvin65 because the
15 62 Id. at 1200 (emphasis in original). 16 63 Id. (emphasis in original). 17 64 Id. at 1200–01. 18 65 Britton v. Colvin, 787 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 19 that substantial evidence did not support limitations based on 20 1 Commissioner overstated the holding of that case: “We did not hold, as
2 the Commissioner asserts, that a claimant always must provide 3 independent medical evidence to establish the severity of their 4 headaches and can never rely on their own symptom testimony.”66
5 This case is materially similar to Ferguson. Like the ALJ in 6 Ferguson, the ALJ here made a boilerplate finding as to the 7 inconsistency of Plaintiffs statements concerning the intensity,
8 persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms without specifying 9 headaches. The few normal findings in the neck-pain records— 10 assuming the ALJ here relied on them in discounting Plaintiff’s
11 headaches—are irrelevant to headaches, just like the few normal 12 findings in Ferguson. To the extent the ALJ here considered neck 13 treatments as a reason to discount headaches, the record and the ALJ’s
14 decision lacks a connection between the two, just like the 15
16 migraines where there was “no independent medical evidence” of 17 migraines and a medical expert’s testimony about migraines relied 18 exclusively on the claimant’s non-credible testimony). 19 66 Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1202 (emphasis in original). 20 1 decompression surgery in Ferguson. And the Commissioner here makes
2 the same argument based on an overstated reading of Britton as the 3 Commissioner did in Ferguson, so the Court rejects the argument.67 4 Ferguson is distinguishable because the claimant there described
5 how his headaches specifically limited him.68 Here, in contrast, 6 Plaintiff did not specify which limitations were caused by headaches 7 rather than any of her many other conditions. This does not make the
8 ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting Plaintiff’s headaches any less unclear or 9 unconvincing based on this record. Moreover, as explained, the ALJ’s 10 apparent failure to consider the headache medical evidence whatsoever
11 or inquire further into headaches are errors additional to those 12 committed in Ferguson. 13 In sum, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC
14 finding because, on this record, the ALJ did not adequately consider 15 the evidence of Plaintiff’s headaches and did not provide clear and 16 convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s headache testimony.
18 67 ECF No. 13 at 6. 19 68 See 95 F.4th at 1198. 20 1 B. Other Symptom Reports and Medical Opinions: The ALJ
2 must reevaluate on remand. 3 The inadequate consideration of Plaintiff’s headaches impacted 4 the RFC finding and the ALJ did not consider the rest of Plaintiff’s
5 symptom reports or the medical opinions in light of the medical 6 evidence of headaches. Therefore, remand is required for a new 7 disability determination, and the Court will not analyze Plaintiff’s
8 remaining challenges regarding her overall symptom testimony and 9 Dr. G.’s prior administrative medical finding, which are likely to be 10 affected when the ALJ takes into account the headache evidence.
11 IV. Conclusion 12 Plaintiff establishes the ALJ consequentially erred. On remand, 13 the ALJ is to develop the record and reevaluate—with meaningful
14 articulation and evidentiary support—the sequential process. The ALJ 15 is to consider the medical evidence of Plaintiff’s headaches, provide 16 Plaintiff the opportunity for a new hearing at which the ALJ is to
17 inquire further into Plaintiff’s headaches, and, if the ALJ discounts 18 Plaintiff’s reports of headaches, the ALJ is to articulate clear and 19 convincing reasons for doing so.
20 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
9 1. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this
3 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social
4 Security for further proceedings pursuant to
5 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 6 2. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF
7 Nos. 10 and 13, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, 8 and CLOSE the case.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to file this
10 ||order and provide copies to all counsel.
11 DATED this 21** day of May 2026.
13 EDWARD F.SHEA Senior United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 25