NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-184
JULIE C. LOCKLEAR
vs.
ARGENX US, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Julie C. Locklear, filed a complaint against
the defendant, her former employer argenx US, Inc., asserting
employment discrimination on the basis of disability or being
regarded as a person with a disability. A judge of the Superior
Court granted argenx summary judgment, concluding Locklear
failed to "demonstrate or introduce questions of fact by way of
direct or circumstantial evidence" that argenx's
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Locklear were
pretextual (emphasis omitted). We affirm.
Background. We summarize the material facts in the light
most favorable to Locklear with additional facts reserved for
later discussion. In September 2019, argenx, a pharmaceutical company based in Belgium and with an office in Boston, hired
Locklear as head of health economics and outcomes research.
While Locklear was based in argenx's Boston office, her
supervisor, Trevor Leighton, was based in Belgium. Leighton and
Locklear's working relationship began on a positive note. For
instance, argenx's chief operating officer (COO), Robert Keith
Woods, reported that Leighton was Locklear's "biggest fan in the
company" on her hire. Leighton was complimentary and
"impressed" by Locklear's work product during the first few
months after her hire.
In early January of 2020, Locklear informed Leighton that
she suffered from hypersomnia.1 Locklear did not state either
that she had a disability or that the condition would impact her
work performance. In response, Leighton told Locklear that she
"cannot use [her] disability as an excuse not to deliver" and
"[she has] to come up with strategies to overcome it." In mid-
January, Leighton met with argenx's head of human resources,
Sara Mannle, to discuss how to improve his working relationship
with Locklear. At this meeting, Leighton expressed concerns
about Locklear's understanding of his expectations and the
quality of her work. On January 20, Leighton communicated this
displeasure to Locklear by telling her that slides she had
1 Hypersomnia is a condition characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness.
2 created were "far from what [they] discussed and [he]
envisaged."
On February 6, Locklear described her hypersomnia to
Leighton as a "disability." Leighton notified Mannle. On the
same day, Locklear spoke to Mannle and "made some claims about
mistreatment" by Leighton and "expressed concerns about
Leighton's management style." On February 10, Mannle and Julia
Dumaux, argenx's human resources business partner, met with
Locklear to discuss her concerns. On February 11, Locklear
again met with Dumaux, where she stated that Leighton was "not
used to working with a strong woman" and did not understand
"some of the projects she [was] working on." On the same day,
Mannle sent an e-mail message to Leighton informing him of
Locklear's concerns and provided him feedback on improving his
relationship with Locklear. On February 13, Mannle met with
Locklear and Leighton, and following the meeting, provided
feedback to both of them on improving their communication.
On February 25, Locklear wrote an e-mail message to Mannle
and requested that she no longer be required to report directly
to Leighton. Locklear wrote, "[Leighton], therefore argenx, is
making me ill. I go home every day not believing in myself, my
work and whether or not I should even stay with argenx. This
has taken a toll on me professionally and personally. . . . I
am dealing with a personal illness." Later that day, Locklear
3 wrote an e-mail message to Leighton informing him she would not
be attending their scheduled one-on-one meeting the following
day, nor would she be attending any future one-on-one meetings
with him. In response, Mannle wrote to Locklear, stating "it is
not ok to just decline this meeting and more importantly future
meetings," and suggesting the three of them meet the following
day. Locklear then requested a meeting with Mannle and Woods,
indicating she was free to meet the following day. In response,
Mannle again suggested Locklear, Leighton, and herself meet.
Woods also responded, that he was willing to meet and "committed
to help."
On the following day, Locklear did not attend a scheduled
meeting with Mannle and Leighton. Locklear also failed to
attend the meeting she had requested with Mannle and Woods.
Mannle attempted to reach Locklear by calling and sending text
messages to her; Locklear did not respond. On or about February
26, Mannle and Woods discussed Locklear's actions and decided to
terminate her. On February 27, Mannle wrote Locklear an e-mail
message informing her that she was terminated and articulating
argenx's reasons for the decision. Locklear did not respond to
this message.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. On appeal, "[w]e
review a grant of summary judgment de novo." Miller v. Cotter,
448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). "We view the evidence in the light
4 most favorable to the nonmoving party." Federal Nat'l Mtge.
Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012). "Summary
judgment is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact
in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636
(2021). Summary judgment is "a disfavored remedy in the context
of discrimination cases based on disparate treatment . . .
because the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a factual
question" (citation omitted). Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473
Mass. 672, 689 (2016).
2. McDonnell Douglas framework. General Laws c. 151B,
§ 4 (16), bars employment discrimination on the basis of
disability or perceived disability:
"It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer, personally or through an agent, to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of . . . handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation."2
To survive summary judgment on a claim brought under this
provision, "an employee-plaintiff must produce evidence from
which a reasonable jury may infer 'four elements: membership in
a protected class, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation'"
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-184
JULIE C. LOCKLEAR
vs.
ARGENX US, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Julie C. Locklear, filed a complaint against
the defendant, her former employer argenx US, Inc., asserting
employment discrimination on the basis of disability or being
regarded as a person with a disability. A judge of the Superior
Court granted argenx summary judgment, concluding Locklear
failed to "demonstrate or introduce questions of fact by way of
direct or circumstantial evidence" that argenx's
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Locklear were
pretextual (emphasis omitted). We affirm.
Background. We summarize the material facts in the light
most favorable to Locklear with additional facts reserved for
later discussion. In September 2019, argenx, a pharmaceutical company based in Belgium and with an office in Boston, hired
Locklear as head of health economics and outcomes research.
While Locklear was based in argenx's Boston office, her
supervisor, Trevor Leighton, was based in Belgium. Leighton and
Locklear's working relationship began on a positive note. For
instance, argenx's chief operating officer (COO), Robert Keith
Woods, reported that Leighton was Locklear's "biggest fan in the
company" on her hire. Leighton was complimentary and
"impressed" by Locklear's work product during the first few
months after her hire.
In early January of 2020, Locklear informed Leighton that
she suffered from hypersomnia.1 Locklear did not state either
that she had a disability or that the condition would impact her
work performance. In response, Leighton told Locklear that she
"cannot use [her] disability as an excuse not to deliver" and
"[she has] to come up with strategies to overcome it." In mid-
January, Leighton met with argenx's head of human resources,
Sara Mannle, to discuss how to improve his working relationship
with Locklear. At this meeting, Leighton expressed concerns
about Locklear's understanding of his expectations and the
quality of her work. On January 20, Leighton communicated this
displeasure to Locklear by telling her that slides she had
1 Hypersomnia is a condition characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness.
2 created were "far from what [they] discussed and [he]
envisaged."
On February 6, Locklear described her hypersomnia to
Leighton as a "disability." Leighton notified Mannle. On the
same day, Locklear spoke to Mannle and "made some claims about
mistreatment" by Leighton and "expressed concerns about
Leighton's management style." On February 10, Mannle and Julia
Dumaux, argenx's human resources business partner, met with
Locklear to discuss her concerns. On February 11, Locklear
again met with Dumaux, where she stated that Leighton was "not
used to working with a strong woman" and did not understand
"some of the projects she [was] working on." On the same day,
Mannle sent an e-mail message to Leighton informing him of
Locklear's concerns and provided him feedback on improving his
relationship with Locklear. On February 13, Mannle met with
Locklear and Leighton, and following the meeting, provided
feedback to both of them on improving their communication.
On February 25, Locklear wrote an e-mail message to Mannle
and requested that she no longer be required to report directly
to Leighton. Locklear wrote, "[Leighton], therefore argenx, is
making me ill. I go home every day not believing in myself, my
work and whether or not I should even stay with argenx. This
has taken a toll on me professionally and personally. . . . I
am dealing with a personal illness." Later that day, Locklear
3 wrote an e-mail message to Leighton informing him she would not
be attending their scheduled one-on-one meeting the following
day, nor would she be attending any future one-on-one meetings
with him. In response, Mannle wrote to Locklear, stating "it is
not ok to just decline this meeting and more importantly future
meetings," and suggesting the three of them meet the following
day. Locklear then requested a meeting with Mannle and Woods,
indicating she was free to meet the following day. In response,
Mannle again suggested Locklear, Leighton, and herself meet.
Woods also responded, that he was willing to meet and "committed
to help."
On the following day, Locklear did not attend a scheduled
meeting with Mannle and Leighton. Locklear also failed to
attend the meeting she had requested with Mannle and Woods.
Mannle attempted to reach Locklear by calling and sending text
messages to her; Locklear did not respond. On or about February
26, Mannle and Woods discussed Locklear's actions and decided to
terminate her. On February 27, Mannle wrote Locklear an e-mail
message informing her that she was terminated and articulating
argenx's reasons for the decision. Locklear did not respond to
this message.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. On appeal, "[w]e
review a grant of summary judgment de novo." Miller v. Cotter,
448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). "We view the evidence in the light
4 most favorable to the nonmoving party." Federal Nat'l Mtge.
Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012). "Summary
judgment is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact
in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636
(2021). Summary judgment is "a disfavored remedy in the context
of discrimination cases based on disparate treatment . . .
because the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a factual
question" (citation omitted). Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473
Mass. 672, 689 (2016).
2. McDonnell Douglas framework. General Laws c. 151B,
§ 4 (16), bars employment discrimination on the basis of
disability or perceived disability:
"It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer, personally or through an agent, to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of . . . handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation."2
To survive summary judgment on a claim brought under this
provision, "an employee-plaintiff must produce evidence from
which a reasonable jury may infer 'four elements: membership in
a protected class, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation'"
2 "The statute uses the outdated terms 'handicap' and 'handicapped person.' . . . We employ the outdated language only when quoting from the statute." Geezil v. White Cliffs Condominium Four Ass'n, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 103 n.3 (2024).
5 (citation omitted). Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016). Employees may
produce "indirect or circumstantial evidence [of these elements]
using the familiar three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm first
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-
805 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas)." Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 444 Mass. 34, 38 (2005). First, the plaintiff must make
out a "prima facie case of discrimination"; second, "the
employer can rebut the presumption created by the prima facie
case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its [employment] decision"; and third, the employee must provide
evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason is a pretext (citation omitted). Bulwer, 473 Mass. at
681.
As did the motion judge, we assume without deciding that
Locklear's evidence supports a prima facie case of disability
discrimination. Turning to the second stage, Mannle articulated
argenx's reasons for Locklear's termination in her e-mail
message to Locklear informing her of the decision to terminate
her employ:
"Within the last twenty-four hours, you have declined to meet with your immediate supervisor and Human Resources, you have not attended a meeting you requested with the Chief Operating officer and you have not communicated with me, even though I have called and texted you. [A]rgenx has no choice but to take your refusal to speak with your manager, HR, the COO and your refusal to respond to written
6 communications to mean that you are leaving your role at argenx and therefore the company is terminating you, effective immediately."
Locklear's abandonment of her obligations constitutes a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for argenx's decision to
terminate Locklear. See Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 50 (employer has
burden of production, not persuasion, at stage two of McDonnell
Douglas framework and therefore "need not prove that the reasons
were nondiscriminatory" [citation omitted]). Thus, argenx met
their burden of rebutting Locklear's prima facie case of
discrimination. At the third stage, to survive summary
judgment, Locklear bears the burden to show that the evidence is
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer argenx's
justification is pretext; she does not have to prove that the
real reason was discrimination. See Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 397
("Massachusetts is a pretext only jurisdiction" [citation
omitted]); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 672 (employee need only present
evidence to allow for inference that "reasons given for
[employer's] action against him were not the real reasons for
that action" [citation omitted]). To meet this showing,
Locklear asserts that a combination of circumstances -- her
"hair-trigger" termination, inconsistencies in the statements
and actions of Mannle, and Leighton's hostility toward her
disability -- exists such that a reasonable juror could find "a
suspicion of mendacity." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
7 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). See Bulwer, supra at 684 (concluding
pretext supported by number of factors, including performance
evaluations inconsistent with supervisor's criticisms, similarly
situated individuals treated differently than plaintiff,
stereotype-based comments by supervisors, and failure to follow
written procedures).
First, Locklear asserts that argenx's quick decision to
terminate her, without giving her notice that she was facing
potential termination or asking if she wanted to stay at the
company, demonstrates pretext. Argenx's account is doubtful,
Locklear argues, because of its "quick trigger" termination and
lack of evidence that she abandoned her position as argenx
claims. She points to her own deposition testimony as evidence
that on the night before her termination, she had no intention
of leaving her role. Without more, Locklear fails to meet her
burden.
The decision by argenx to terminate Locklear was not made
in haste. Prior to deciding to terminate Locklear, argenx made
numerous efforts over the course of two days to avoid
termination and resolve Locklear's issues with Leighton. On
February 25, 2020, after Locklear informed Leighton she would be
declining all future meetings with him, Mannle attempted to
schedule time to meet with Locklear and Leighton the following
day to "see if we can sort through this." Woods, the COO of
8 argenx, also agreed to meet with Locklear at her request and
expressed his desire to resolve her issue, stating, "[w]e must
work through these differences together," "I am committed to
help," and "[l]et's find a way." The next day, on February 26,
after Locklear informed Mannle that she would not be attending
their scheduled meeting with Leighton, Mannle again tried to
come to a resolution by urging Locklear to reconsider her
decision. Later that day, Locklear again refused to meet with
Mannle and Leighton, failed to attend her requested meeting with
Mannle and Woods, and did not respond to calls and text messages
from Mannle.
Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that argenx
undertook extensive efforts to resolve Locklear's issue as
opposed to terminating her at its first opportunity. It was
only when it became clear that its efforts were unavailing, and
where Locklear repeatedly ignored meetings and communications,
that argenx decided to terminate Locklear. Therefore, pretext
cannot be reasonably inferred on this basis. See Tate v.
Department of Mental Health, 419 Mass. 356, 363 (1995)
(affirming summary judgment for employer where employee was
terminated after she ignored warnings and unilaterally addressed
her own concerns about employer's organizational structure, and
where her evidence "[did] not offer any support her contention
that the [employer]'s claim that she was insubordinate is a
9 pretext"). See also Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 323
(1st Cir. 2014) (plaintiff's termination was "reasonable
business practice" and not pretextual).
Second, Locklear asserts that pretext is further
demonstrated by an inconsistency between Mannle's affidavit and
Locklear's message to Mannle prior to her termination. See
Bonefont-Igaravidez v. International Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d
120, 124 (1st Cir. 2011) ("pretext can be established by showing
. . . 'weaknesses [or] implausibilities' . . . in the employer's
offered reasons" [citation omitted]). In her affidavit, Mannle
asserts that, "[i]f Locklear had requested vacation or time off
instead of ignoring my communications, I would have allowed her
to take time off." Locklear asserts that this statement is
false, and therefore shows pretext, because Locklear informed
Mannle that she "need[s] time to consider [her] options" and was
terminated shortly thereafter. These statements are not
inconsistent. Mannle conditioned her statement on Locklear
either requesting vacation or time off. Locklear did neither.
Instead, Locklear requested more time to consider her options
only after refusing to participate in multiple meetings and
ignoring Mannle's subsequent efforts to communicate with her.
Third, Locklear argues that argenx's pretext is
demonstrated from Leighton's stereotype-based comments and
hostility toward Locklear after she informed him of her
10 disability. On learning of Locklear's hypersomnia, Leighton
told her that "[she] cannot use [her] disability as an excuse
not to deliver." Further, he moved up the deadline of a major
project by one month, would not let her work with other people,
and rejected her request to travel to a work conference.
Critically, however, there is no evidence in the record showing
Leighton was involved in argenx's decision to terminate
Locklear. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The biases of one who neither makes
nor influences the challenged personnel decision are not
probative in an employment discrimination case").
Despite Leighton's lack of involvement, Locklear argues in
the alternative that pretext can still be inferred under a
"cat's paw" theory. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,
416 (2011) (employer can be held liable where "nondecisionmaker
exercised such 'singular influence' over the decisionmaker that
the decision to terminate was the product of 'blind reliance'"
[citation omitted]). We disagree. The contention that Leighton
influenced Mannle and Woods in their decision to terminate
Locklear is not inferable from this record such that a
reasonable juror could find pretext. See Bennett v. Saint-
Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[T]he plaintiff
speculates that [the decisionmaker] must have been influenced by
his subordinate. But conjecture cannot take the place of proof
11 in the summary judgment calculus"). Therefore, Locklear fails
to demonstrate argenx's stated reasons for her termination were
pretext.
Because Locklear failed to produce evidence that allows for
a reasonable inference of pretext, argenx has demonstrated the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and we conclude that
Locklear is ineligible for relief under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).
See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680, 683.3
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Walsh & Smyth, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: February 20, 2025.
3 Locklear's request for appellate costs and fees is denied.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.