Julie Bickford v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 13, 2015
• Docket: 62A01-1409-CR-389
• Status: Published

Opinion

Feb 13 2015, 8:02 am

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Weineke Gregory F. Zoeller Weineke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Plainfield, Indiana Brian Reitz Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Julie Bickford, February 13, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No. 62A01-1409-CR-389 v. Appeal from the Perry County Circuit Court The Honorable Lucy Goffinet State of Indiana, Cause No. 62C01-1210-CM-660 Appellee-Plaintiff

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 1 of 9 [1] Julie Bickford (“Bickford”) pled guilty to three counts of Cruelty to an Animal,

as Class A misdemeanors.1 As part of its sentencing order, the trial court

required Bickford to pay restitution for costs associated with a rescue

organization’s care for the three horses Bickford had mistreated. She now

appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Issue [3] Bickford presents a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the

trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay restitution associated

with the care of three horses she formerly owned.

Facts and Procedural History [4] Bickford lived in an unincorporated area of Perry County with her husband,

children, and mother. The family owned a number of animals, including three

horses acquired over the course of 2011 and 2012.

[5] On September 4, 2012, Perry County Sheriff’s Deputy Daymion Marsh

(“Deputy Marsh”) observed the three horses while on patrol near Bickford’s

home. Based upon the condition of the horses, on September 5, 2012, Deputy

1 Ind. Code § 35-46-3-7 (West 2013). Our Legislature has amended significant portions of Indiana’s criminal statutes, effective July 1, 2014. We refer to the statutory provisions in effect at the time of Bickford’s offense.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 2 of 9 Marsh, together with Jodi Lovejoy (“Dr. Lovejoy”), a veterinarian from the

State Board of Animal Health, and members of a local rescue organization,

Horse Rescue South (“HRS”), went back to Bickford’s home. Deputy Marsh

informed Bickford that he had probable cause to believe that the horses were

being neglected, and requested that Bickford permit Dr. Lovejoy and HRS to

examine the horses.

[6] Bickford allowed the examination of the horses. Dr. Lovejoy concluded that

the horses were severely malnourished, none of the horses had received proper

care for their hooves, and one horse was ill. After Dr. Lovejoy’s examination,

she provided Bickford with information on proper care of the numerous

animals on the property. At the conclusion of the visit, Bickford voluntarily

transferred the three animals to HRS.

[7] The ill horse died in HRS’s care within ten days of the transfer. A second,

elderly horse died several months later, and the third horse was eventually

adopted from HRS’s care in December 2012. HRS incurred $691.82 in costs for

its care of the animals.

[8] On October 8, 2012, Bickford was charged with four counts of Cruelty to an

Animal. On February 20, 2014, the fourth count, which related to the care of

several kittens, was dismissed.

[9] On April 1, 2014, Bickford pleaded guilty to the three remaining counts of

Cruelty to an Animal—one count for each of the three horses. After a hearing

on April 1, 2014, which was continued to April 29, 2014, the trial court entered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 3 of 9 judgments of conviction and sentenced Bickford to three consecutive one-year

terms of imprisonment, with all three sentences suspended to probation. The

court imposed several conditions to Bickford’s probation, and further ordered

that Bickford pay restitution to HRS totaling $691.82 over eighteen months as

reimbursement for HRS’s costs in caring for the three horses.

[10] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [11] Bickford’s appeal challenges the trial court’s order of restitution to HRS for the

costs it incurred while caring for the three horses that were removed from

Bickford’s property.

[12] Bickford frames her question as a purely legal one: were the requirements of

Indiana Code section 35-46-3-6 met, such that the trial court was authorized to

order her to pay restitution to HRS? To the extent Bickford’s appeal centers

upon construction of the applicable statutes, we review such issues de novo. See

Vanderburgh Cnty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 833

N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

Animal Cruelty Statute [13] Bickford contends that the trial court’s restitution order was beyond its statutory

authority under Section 35-46-3-6. The statute provides, “[a]ny law

enforcement officer or any other person having authority to impound animals

who has probable cause to believe there has been a violation [of certain animal

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 4 of 9 cruelty laws] may take custody of the animal involved.” I.C. § 35-46-3-6(b).

The owner of an animal thus impounded may seek a separate hearing to

determine whether probable cause exists. I.C. § 35-46-3-6(d). The owner of an

animal impounded under the statute’s authority “may prevent disposition of the

animal by an animal shelter” by timely posting bond to provide for the animal’s

care, and may renew that bond under certain conditions. I.C. § 35-46-3-6(c).

However, “[i]f the owner of an animal impounded under this section is

convicted of an offense under this chapter or I.C. 15-20-1-4, the owner shall

reimburse the animal shelter for the expense of the animal’s care and keeping.”

Id.

[14] Upon sentencing Bickford, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution to HRS.

That is, Bickford argues that the trial court ordered reimbursement of HRS as

though HRS was in the position of an animal shelter. Bickford does not

challenge HRS’s status as a shelter. Rather, Bickford contends that her horses

were not impounded within the meaning of Subsection 35-46-3-6(b) & (c), and

thus, as a matter of law, the trial court could not properly order her to pay

restitution to HRS. Specifically, Bickford notes that she voluntarily surrendered

the horses to HRS, and that she did not seek to reclaim ownership of the

animals at any point during the proceeding.

[15] In support of this position, Bickford directs us to her testimony and that of Jo

Sodel (“Sodel”), the President of HRS who was present at Deputy Marsh’s

request on September 5, 2012. Sodel helped arrange care for the horses and

presented paperwork to Bickford that Bickford signed at the conclusion of Dr.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 5 of 9 Lovejoy’s examination of the horses. Bickford never sought to challenge

Deputy Marsh’s contention that probable cause existed, and never posted bond

to recover the horses, as allowed under the statute. Because she surrendered the

animals and took no action indicative of any intent to retrieve them at the close

of the proceedings in this case, then, Bickford argues that the animals were not

impounded as contemplated by the Section 35-46-3-6.

[16] Under this specific set of facts, we agree with Bickford that the horses were not

impounded within the contemplation of Section 35-46-3-6. Looking at the

entirety of the statute in light of the plain and ordinary meanings given to the

term “impound,” we cannot conclude that the course of events here amounted

to impoundment, because Bickford voluntarily relinquished possession and

ownership of the horses. The horses were not seized with any possibility of

return, a condition the impoundment statute contemplates.

Restitution Statute [17] Our analysis does not stop there, however. For while we conclude that the

horses were not impounded under Section 35-46-3-6, we must also look to

whether restitution to HRS was proper under the general restitution statute.

The statute provides, in relevant part,

in addition to any sentence imposed under this article for a felony or misdemeanor, the court may, as a condition of probation or without placing the person on probation, order the person to make restitution to the victim of the crime, the victim's estate, or the family of a victim who is deceased. The court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 6 of 9 (1) property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate); (2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime; (3) the cost of medical laboratory tests to determine if the crime has caused the victim to contract a disease or other medical condition; (4) earnings lost by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime including earnings lost while the victim was hospitalized or participating in the investigation or trial of the crime; and (5) funeral, burial, or cremation costs incurred by the family or estate of a homicide victim as a result of the crime. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-5-3(a). We review restitution orders for an abuse of

discretion. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[18] An order of restitution may be ordered as part of a defendant’s sentence

“wholly apart from probation.” Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200, 208 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013). “Restitution is a means of impressing upon a criminal defendant

the magnitude of the loss he has caused.” Ault v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1078, 1082

(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Restitution also serves to “vindicate the rights of society.”

Esdall, 983 N.E.2d at 207.

[19] Arguing against the applicability of the general restitution statute, Bickford

argues that HRS was not a victim as contemplated by the statute. A victim is

someone “shown to have suffered injury, harm or loss as a direct and

immediate result of the criminal acts of a defendant.” Reinbold v. State, 555

N.E.2d 463, 471 (Ind. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658

N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). Our courts have held that third parties—notably the

State—may be entitled to restitution for criminal offenses that resulted in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 7 of 9 monetary expenses for treatment of injuries. Thus, in Ault, this Court affirmed

an order of restitution favoring the State, where the State incurred expenses

associated with medical treatment for an infant who suffered severe injuries due

to Ault’s conduct, despite Ault’s contention that the State was merely serving a

role similar to that of “an insurance agency.” 705 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (citations

and quotations omitted).

[20] Here, HRS was contacted by Deputy Marsh to provide care for the horses, and

HRS provided such care. There is no indication in the record that HRS would

have refused to take care of the horses if Deputy Marsh had impounded them in

lieu of Bickford’s voluntary surrender of the animals. HRS would have not

been in a position to assume care of the horses had Bickford provided that care

herself—and Bickford cannot now claim, after a guilty plea, that she was not

neglectful in her care for the horses.2 Further, despite Bickford’s argument to

the contrary, just as the general restitution statute does not specify that only the

parent of a minor child may receive compensation associated with the child’s

injuries, neither does the statute limit compensation to the owner of damaged

property. See id.

[21] We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to order

Bickford to pay restitution to HRS.

2 Bickford argues there was some form of “as-is” transaction between her and HRS, but does not develop the argument. That argument is, accordingly, waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(a)(8)(A).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 8 of 9 [22] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 62A01-1409-CR-389 | February 13, 2015 Page 9 of 9