Julian E. Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

Opinion

FILED JULY 23, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

JULIAN E. WEISSNER, ) ) No. 41349-7-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )

STAAB, C.J. — Julian Weissner filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice

against Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in

favor of the hospital, determining that Weissner failed to supply the requisite expert

testimony to establish the relevant standard of care and proximate cause. Weissner

appeals, arguing the expert declaration was sufficient because it established the doctor’s

qualifications, set forth specific facts as a basis for his opinion, and stated that Weissner’s

injury was caused by negligence on a more probable than not basis. We disagree with

Weissner’s arguments and affirm. No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

BACKGROUND

Because this case was decided on summary judgment, the following facts are

presented in the light most favorable to Weissner. See Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358,

370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015).

Julian Weissner underwent total knee replacement surgery at Our Lady of Lourdes

Hospital in March 2021. While still at the facility post-surgery, Weissner became unable

to urinate. Over the next several hours, a nurse inserted a “straight” catheter five times.

Eventually a “permanent” catheter was inserted. Weissner indicates that the

nurses did not wash the genital area or provide a numbing agent before performing the

insertion. Weissner experienced excruciating pain during the process. Following the

procedure, he was released from the Hospital with instructions to go to an emergency

room if any complications arose.

After returning home, Weissner experienced problems with the catheter. Later

that night, he went to the emergency room at Kadlec1 where a nurse determined that the

catheter had slipped out of place. The nurse removed the catheter and administered

fluids. After about one hour, Weissner was able to urinate, and he was released to go

home.

1 Kadlec Freestanding Emergency Room and Kadlec Urology are referenced throughout the record. There is no indication that Kadlec is the same entity as, or otherwise associated with, Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital.

2 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

Once home, Weissner began to feel ill with body aches and shaking. He was

taken back to the emergency room at Kadlec by ambulance. When recalling the

experience in his sworn declaration, Weissner stated: “they transported me to Kadlec

Emergency and that is where my nightmare started.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 31. The

nurses at Kadlec treated Weissner by inserting a “Foley” catheter. Weissner continued to

experience persistent pain and difficulty urinating.

In November 2024, Weissner filed a complaint against the Hospital, alleging he

received negligent health care at its facility in 2021. Kadlec was not named as a

defendant in the lawsuit.

The scheduling order designated March 10, 2025, as the due date for Weissner to

disclose lay and expert witnesses. When Weissner did not disclose an expert witness by

the due date, the Hospital moved for summary judgment.

Weissner opposed summary judgment, supporting his response with the

declaration of a board-certified urologist. After reviewing Weissner’s declaration and

“records from Kadlec Urology, defendant Lourdes and Kadlec Hospital,” the doctor

declared:

5. Mr. Weissner’s records reflect a consistent history of urological complaints including pain with urination, weak stream, “split stream” when urinating and “spraying.” These latter complaints are not the traditional/typical complaints associated with aging or enlarged prostate.

6. “Split stream” and “spraying” are suggestive of urethral injury in general and damage from traumatic catheterization in particular.

3 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

7. Mr. Weissner’s records reflect a consistent history of pain with urination, “split stream” and “spraying” since a traumatic catheterization on March 5, 2021.

8. Mr. Weissner’s Declaration reports very significant pain during the catheterization.

9. Based upon his history, and the records, in my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, his symptoms of pain, “spraying” and “split stream” are likely secondary to urethral injury during the catheterization.

10. I am familiar with the standard of care for catheterization of the type he underwent. It is a national standard.

11. Though patients can sometimes suffer traumatic catheterizations, in my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty (more probably than not) Mr. Weissman’s [sic] urethral damage was due to a break in technique, representing a breach of the standard of care for catheterization.

CP at 32-33.

The declaration incorporated the doctor’s resume, which reflected his education

and experience specific to urology. In addition to working as an attending urologist, the

doctor regularly published research, provided lectures, and taught various courses. The

doctor’s teaching experience included teaching one-day courses on “Foley Catheter

Placement” and “GU System and Catheter Placement” in 2023. CP at 35-36.

The Hospital replied, arguing the doctor’s declaration was insufficient to defeat

summary judgment for two reasons. First, it argued that nothing in the declaration

demonstrated the doctor’s competency to testify to the standard of care for nurses in

4 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

Washington, nor did the declaration tie the alleged national standard of care to the

standard of care in Washington. Second, the Hospital asserted the declaration failed to

identify specific facts to support its conclusions, such as what the relevant technique

involved and what act or omission constituted a “break” in such technique.

Following a hearing on the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment,2 Weissner

filed a supplemental brief. He argued that an expert is not required to demonstrate

specific knowledge of Washington’s standard of care. Additionally, he argued the

declaration showed a factual basis for the doctor’s opinion because the doctor reviewed

Weissner’s declaration and treatment records and stated that Weissner’s symptoms

suggested damage from traumatic catheterization.

The court granted the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed

Weissner’s complaint.

Weissner appeals.

ANALYSIS

Weissner contends the court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the

Hospital. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, he argues that his expert’s declaration

sufficiently established the doctor’s qualifications, set forth specific facts as a basis for

his opinion, and stated that Weissner’s injury was caused by negligence “on a more

2 The record does not contain the verbatim report of proceedings from this hearing.

5 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

probable than not basis.” CP at 70. To the extent the declaration was insufficient to

establish negligence, Weissner suggests application of res ipsa loquitur.

The Hospital maintains that the proffered expert declaration was insufficient to

defeat summary judgment because it merely summarizes Weissner’s allegations and

asserts conclusory statements. Additionally, the Hospital argues the declaration lacked

adequate foundation, the doctor opined outside his scope of expertise, and the doctor

failed to establish the relevant standard of care in Washington. Finally, the Hospital asks

this court to reject Weissner’s theory regarding res ipsa loquitur because it was not raised

below.

We agree with the Hospital.

We review orders on summary judgment de novo. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370.

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; CR 56(c). The moving

party bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no disputed issues of material

fact. Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). “A

material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in

part.” Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass’n Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115

Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is considered in a light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370. If the moving party

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satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish there is a

genuine issue for the trier of fact. Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225. While questions of fact are

typically left to the trial process, they may be treated as a matter of law if “reasonable

minds could reach but one conclusion.” Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 775, 698 P.2d

77 (1985). A nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or having its own affidavits

accepted at face value. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Ent. Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721

P.2d 1 (1986). Instead, a “nonmoving party must set forth specific facts that sufficiently

rebut the moving party’s contentions and disclose that a genuine issue as to a material

fact exists.” Id.

Under RCW 7.70.040(1), the plaintiff in a medical negligence claim bears the

burden of showing:

(a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances; (b) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.

Generally, a plaintiff must “support each element of their medical malpractice

claim with qualified expert testimony.” Campanelli v. PeaceHealth Sw. Med. Ctr., 34

Wn. App. 2d 24, 36, 565 P.3d 933 (2025). A medical expert “must state specific facts

showing what the applicable standard of care was and how the defendant violated it.”

Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79, 89, 419 P.3d 819 (2018). “[W]e do not

require affiants to aver talismanic magic words, but allegations must amount to more than

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conclusions . . . with a basis in admissible evidence that can support a claim.” Id.

Negligence cannot be inferred from a bad result. Id. “If a plaintiff lacks competent

expert testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact . . . a defendant is entitled to

summary judgment.” Id. at 86.

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Weissner, we conclude

the doctor’s declaration failed to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to

support Weissner’s medical negligence claim.

First, the declaration does not articulate the applicable standard of care with the

required specificity. It offers only a generalized assertion of familiarity with a “national

standard,” without describing what that standard required under the circumstances

presented here. CP at 31-33. The declaration does not identify the steps, precautions, or

clinical judgments that a reasonably prudent nurse in Washington would have

undertaken, nor does it connect any purported national standard to Washington practice.

See RCW 7.70.040(1)(a).

Second, the declaration fails to identify specific acts or omissions constituting a

breach. The opinion that the injury resulted from a “break in technique” is conclusory.

CP at 33. It does not explain what “technique” entails in this context, how it was

deviated from, or which of the multiple catheterizations allegedly caused the injury. The

underlying facts in the record describe multiple straight catheter insertions, followed by

placement of a permanent catheter without washing the area or providing a numbing

8 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

agent, after which Weissner experienced significant pain and later complications. Yet the

doctor does not tie any particular conduct—failure to cleanse, absence of anesthetic,

number of attempts, insertion method, or securing of the catheter—to a defined standard

or explain how that conduct fell below the standard of care. Without such connection,

the expert’s opinion amounts to an inference of negligence from a bad outcome, which is

insufficient as a matter of law. Reyes, 191 Wn.2d at 89.

The declaration is also insufficient to establish that the Hospital proximately

caused Weissner’s injury. Most glaringly, it is unclear whether the allegedly traumatic

catheterization was performed by the Hospital or Kadlec. Although Weissner recounts

his painful experiences while at the Hospital, he also states that his “nightmare started”

after he was transported to Kadlec emergency. And the doctor’s declaration does not

opine as to which procedure performed at which facility was the origin of Weissner’s

injury.

Additionally, although the doctor concludes that Weissner’s symptoms are “likely

secondary” to urethral injury from catheterization, his opinion is not specific to an

established breach of care. The declaration posits injury from “traumatic catheterization”

but does not identify what made the catheterization traumatic in terms of departure from

the standard of care. CP at 33.

Weissner’s additional arguments do not cure these deficiencies. The expert’s

credentials, while notable, do not substitute for the required articulation of standard and

9 No. 41349-7-III Weissner v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

breach. Nor does the expert’s review of records and Weissner’s declaration suffice; those

materials may support an opinion, but the opinion must still disclose the governing

standard and the manner of its violation. Reyes, 191 Wn.2d at 89. And while we

acknowledge Weissner’s account of severe pain during insertion, pain alone does not

establish negligence without expert testimony explaining why the manner of insertion fell

below the standard of care.

Finally, we decline to consider Weissner’s argument regarding application of res

ipsa loquitur because he did not raise it below. See RAP 2.5(a). Weissner states that

RAP 9.12 authorizes this court to entertain his contention because the issue of negligence

was before the trial court and res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence pertaining to

negligence. We find this argument unpersuasive.

“Res ipsa loquitur is a method of proof.” Tinder v. Nordstrom, Inc., 84 Wn. App.

787, 789, 929 P.2d 1209 (1997). “A plaintiff may rely on res ipsa loquitur’s permissive

inference of negligence if: (1) the accident or occurrence that caused the plaintiff’s injury

would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence, (2) the agency or

instrumentality that caused the plaintiff’s injury was in the exclusive control of the

defendant, and (3) the plaintiff did not contribute to the accident or occurrence.” Nguyen

v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 172, 317 P.3d 518 (2014). Under RAP 9.12, “the

appellate court will consider only evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial

court.” Here, Weissner failed to call to the attention of the trial court, res ipsa loquitur as

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a method of establishing his prima facie case. As such, application of the doctrine is not

properly before this court on appeal. See RAP 2.5(a) (“The appellate court may refuse to

review any claim of error not raised in the trial court.”).

In sum, Weissner did not present competent expert testimony establishing the

standard of care, a specific breach, and proximate cause. Because Weissner failed to

raise a genuine issue of material fact on essential elements of his claim, the Hospital was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore conclude the trial court properly

granted summary judgment.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

_________________________________ Staab, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ Hill, J.

_________________________________ Cooney, J.